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Abstract 
This thesis examines representations of Romania in British public and political 
discourse from 1907, when an extensive and violent Peasants’ Revolt erupted in 
Romania, to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where the country doubled in size. 
Britain’s detachment from southeastern Europe was briefly reversed in this period of 
conflict and diplomacy. Romania was eventually acquired as an Entente ally in 1916 
and Britain subsequently played a considerable role in the adjudication of Greater 
Romania’s borders and minorities.  
Located between two large multi-national empires, Austria-Hungary and Russia, 
which were both home to extensive Romanian populations, and bordering the Balkan 
Peninsula, much of it governed by the Ottoman Empire until 1912-13, Romania is a 
complex case study in the creation of national identities. The Balkan wars in 1912-13 
forced Britain to come to terms with a strategically more significant Romania, an 
exploration of which will demonstrate both the motivations behind and limitations of 
British ‘expertise’ and highlight the power dynamics and volatility involved in external 
imaging during periods of extreme dislocation.  
Efforts to discover a politically useful identity for Romania were impacted by 
various competing national constructs, with Romania’s Jewish Question and the priority 
accorded to the Romanians in Hungary’s Transylvania reinforcing opposing ideas about 
the country and its status in Europe. It was the wartime propaganda generated by 
British-born Queen Marie of Romania that played an important part in the broader 
process of national legitimisation, and an examination of her work and imaging will 
argue for the central role of monarchy in national representations.  
A decade of conflict saw European regional groupings overlap and realign, with 
the demands of war and Romania’s contradictory features exacerbating the country’s 
fluid place in British discourse. This malleability saw Romania’s identity pivot from 
Eastern, through Balkan to Latin and Central European spatial groupings in a ten year 
period, with Britan’s determination to embrace a post-war New Europe facilitated 
through representations of Greater Romania in which Transylvanian identity was 
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Note on Spelling and Dating 
Spelling 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Romania was either spelt ‘Roumania’ or 
‘Rumania’ in English. I have kept the original spellings of Romania in citations. 
Elsewhere, I have retained the original spellings of place names and individuals. On the 
rare occasion where clarification is needed I’ve added a footnote.  
Dating  
The Gregorian calendar, used in this study, was the dating system that the majority of 
Europe followed at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was 13 days ahead of the 
Julian calendar that much of Eastern Europe still used, including Romania, which 
adopted the Gregorian system in April 1919. Queen Marie invariably dual dated her 
correspondence, but where Romanian politicians and newspapers only cite the Julian 




For two years Britain coveted Romania as an ally in World War I, but when it finally 
joined the conflict on the side of the Entente, the results were disappointing. In 
December 1916, within four months of entering the war, two-thirds of the country had 
been occupied by the Central Powers, and although Romania held off the Germans in 
the north, capitulation followed in March 1918. Yet despite this challenging record, by 
the end of the war Romania had made territorial acquisitions that saw it double in size, 
to become the fifth biggest country in Europe.
1
 These geographical gains were ratified 
at the Peace Conference in Paris where Britain played a leading role and Romania’s 
Prime Minister, Ion Brătianu, stood out for his intransigence. The first seminal year of 
that Conference, 1919, was the culmination of a period of unprecedented engagement 
between the two countries. The range of representations that this evolving relationship 
generated in British discourse saw Romania inhabit numerous, often conflicting 
identities, including Balkan, East European, Latin, oppressive, oppressed, military, 
feminine and as part of a post-war New Europe – all of which will be examined here.  
British–Romanian collaboration in World War I and the decade that preceded it 
have tended to be overlooked by historiography, an absence partially explained by the 
prerogatives of Britain’s imperial reach in the nineteenth century, which excluded 
Romania. This thesis will address that oversight and establish the significance of early 
twentieth-century British– Romanian relations through an investigation of Romanian 
identity in British public and political discourse. If, pre-1914, a growing mass media 
saw journalists exercise a ‘great influence on decision-making in Whitehall’,
2
 it was 
during World War I that a perfect storm of propaganda, publicity and expertise raised 
the stakes in the game of national identity and imaging. Romania’s exceptional 
characteristics were refractured through partial analysis impacted by fast-moving 
events. It is an examination of the resulting constructs in British discourse that will shed 
                                                          
1
 With a population of 14.5 million and 295,049 square km of territory Greater Romania 
was also the second most populous county after Poland in East Central Europe. Irina 
Liverzeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania; Regionalism, nation-building and 
ethnic struggle, 1918–1930, Ithaca, NY; London, Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 8. 
2
 Andreas Rose, Between Empire and Continent: British Foreign Policy before the First 
World War, New York, Berghahn Books, 2017, p. 13. 
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new light on a little-known relationship and simultaneously provide original 
assessments of Western representations of the East and interpretations of nationalism. 
Never directly occupied by the Ottomans, and sandwiched between the 
Habsburg and Russian Empires, at the turn of the twentieth century Romania evaded a 
straightforward Balkan identity in British discourse. Unlike other countries in 
southeastern Europe which were supported by the Balkan Committee, Romania lacked a 
specific British champion and exhibited national characteristics that complicate its 
inclusion in recent studies of Balkan identity. It was Edward Said’s Orientalism, which 
emphasised the West’s dominance and authority in constructions of the East, that 
inspired extensive debate over the representation of Balkan and Eastern rubrics within 
Europe.
3
 Maria Todorova and Larry Wolff have demanded that the genesis and 
motivations for these ‘lesser’ European appellations are understood as affirmations of 
Western superiority and civility.
4
 However, Romania is poorly served in this expanding, 
predominantly Balkan-focused field; an issue this study will address though an 
examination of Romanian identity in British thinking. It will identify the country’s 
shifting locus westwards during the early twentieth century: in 1907 Romania was 
predominantly associated with a savage Eastern Europe, it had become a Balkan leader 
by 1913, and was part of a feted new East Central European construct by 1919. 
Romania was an uncomfortable bedfellow within these unstable spatial groupings, and it 
is the unexplored compromises and contradictions involved in this imaging which 




Widely recognised as a ‘little known land’,
6
 emerging Romanian ‘experts’ in the 
pre-war period had the freedom to craft Romania’s identity in ways that accorded with 
their own British-centric worldviews. This thesis will demonstrate that the likes of 
conservative journalist Dr Emile J. Dillon and Habsburg nationalities expert R. W. 
Seton-Watson challenged Britain’s ability to understand what kind of country Romania 
                                                          
3
 Edward Said, Orientalism, London, Penguin, 2003.  
4
 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, New York; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1997; Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The map of civilisation on the mind of 
the Enlightenment, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1994. 
5
 For an overview of Europe’s regional frameworks see Mishkova and Trencsényi, 
‘Introduction’ in Mishkova, Diana & Trencsényi, Balázs, (eds), European Regions & 
Boundaries, A Conceptual History, New York; Oxford, Berghahn, 2017, pp.1-11. 
6
 The Times, 2 Nov 1916. 
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was before the war, and respectively undermined and facilitated later wartime 
representations that sought to align it with a Latin West. It is the identification of this 
shifting Romanian identity, subject to the vagaries of external British opinion, which 
will demand a reassessment of the importance of royalty in nation-building. This thesis 
will argue that through its British-born queen, Marie of Romania, the country acquired a 
degree of agency over its own image-making in Britain, with results that challenge 
Romania’s place in a Balkan rubric that has been perceived as masculine and savage.
7
 
More broadly the dilemmas and limitations associated with expertise and its political 
and public roles will be highlighted through the fluctuating emphasis accorded to two 
very different Romanian minorities – the internal Jewish ‘other’ and the external 
Romanian Transylvanians in Austria-Hungary.  
The long-term presence of a disenfranchised Jewish minority complicated 
Romanian identity and provides a fresh opportunity to examine complex British ideas of 
the Jewish ‘other’ in the context of an East European country and ally. Jewish 
representations were pronounced in pre-war Romanian identity, with British coverage 
of the 1907 Peasants’ Revolt serving as a reminder that the country’s Jewish Question 
remained unresolved. However, it will be argued that during the war Britain deliberately 
sought to minimise the significance of Romania’s Jewish Question, fostering a 
disconnection with the issue that imperilled the cause of the country’s minorities, which 
included the Jews and in total accounted for nearly 30% of the population by 1919.
8
 In 
British wartime discourse the Romanian narrative was instead reshaped through one of 
the country’s external populations, the Transylvanian Romanians, who united with 
Romania after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in December 1918. This thesis’s 
identification of an overwhelming emphasis on Transylvanian Romania at the expense 
of other Romanian constructs is a significant discovery. It is the presence of these 
complicated interconnected national representations in British thinking that demands the 
assessment of several, sometimes conflicting, theories of nationalism. 
Rogers Brubaker’s analysis of post-1918 Europe, Nationalism Reframed, and his 
three competing nationalities model will be thoroughly examined in relation to 
                                                          
7
 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, pp. 13–15; Andrew Hammond, The Debated Lands: 
British and American representations of the Balkans, Cardiff, University of Wales 
Press, p. 4. 
8
 Liverzeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, p. 9. 
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Romanian representations for the first time. This assessment will apply his post-war 
modelling to the nationalisms of pre-war Romania in order to highlight the complexities 
in the country’s evolving identity and to explain the conflicting tensions that were 
subsequently associated with Romania at the 1919 Peace Conference.
9
 Modernist 
theories of nationalism from the likes of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, with 
their stress on industrial and educational factors respectively, are a poor fit for 
Romania’s feudal society.
10
 In contrast, numerous historians of East European 
nationalism place an emphasis on cultural identity developing independently of socio-
economic conditions; this too has certain limitations in a country where, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, much of the ruling elite communicated in French 
and the peasant population was rebellious and predominantly illiterate.
11
 Analysing 
British responses to Romanian identity, this study will focus on the Czech historian 
Miroslav Hroch’s middle-way which recognises a cultural identity that eventually 
reaches the masses, but is not dependent on industrial or educational stimulus. Hroch’s 
modelling cannot always resolve the contradictions in Romanian identity but it does 
help to explain Britain’s respective wariness and embrace of different versions of the 
country and the impact of war on those constructions.
12
 More broadly, it is Britain’s and 
Romania’s common experience of war that makes a re-evaluation of Anthony Smith’s 
ethno-symbolic identifiers useful for the explication of the countries’ shared recognition 
                                                          
9
 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question 
reframed in the New Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
10
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983; Benedict R. O’G. 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, 
London, Verso, 2016. 
11
 Drace-Francis acknowledges the tension between the priority accorded to cultural and 
economic factors: Alex Drace-Francis, The Making of Modern Romanian Culture: 
Literacy and the development of national identity, London; New York, Tauris Academic 
Studies, 2006, pp. 1-2. Historians of East European nationalism who stress the cultural 
include Gale Stokes, Politics as Development: The emergence of political parties in 
nineteenth-century Serbia, Durham, NC; London, 1990; Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in 
Greater Romania; Fikret Adanir, ‘Balkan Historiography related to the Ottoman Empire 
since 1945’, in K. Karpat (ed.), Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, Leiden, Brill, 2000, 
pp. 236–52.  
12
 The best concise account of Hroch’s three-stage model is Miroslav Hroch, ‘From 




of notions of racial purity under dynastic rule, upon which the idea of a post-war 
Greater Romania in a New Europe was founded.
13
  
The empirical evidence against which Romania’s various identities in Britain 
will be analysed is drawn from numerous sources. The examination of publications and 
communications belonging to the commentators who controlled much of Romania’s 
imagining will be at the forefront of that research. Work from publicists and ‘experts’, 
including Dillon and Seton-Watson, will be reviewed, in some cases for the first time, in 
relation to Romania and the country’s identity in British discourse. The sources they 
relied on and individuals they communicated with, the evolving opinions they publicly 
expressed and positions of influence these ‘experts’ enjoyed within British public life, 
will be assessed, and their impact on British foreign policy-making in relation to 
Romania analysed. This commentator-led evaluation will be complemented with an 
examination of the central role of monarchy in Romanian constructs, in an assessment 
that focuses on the prolific propaganda and imaging generated by Queen Marie of 
Romania. Original research examining Marie’s private correspondence and 
publications, as well as newsreel footage, will highlight the pivotal role of this monarch 
in the imaging of her adopted country and will be preceded by an analysis of the 
romantic oeuvre and style established by her predecessor, German-born poet-queen 
Elizabeth.  
Individual contributions to Romanian imaging will be assessed in the context of 
a comprehensive review of British mainstream newspapers, as well as more niche 
journals and magazines and their different identifications of Romania. For cross-
reference purposes, occasionally American and Romanian newspapers, memoirs and 
diaries will also be consulted, while a review of British Foreign Office files will yield 
original material regarding Britain’s official perceptions of Romanian identity. The 
extensive combination of sources, shedding new light on both individual and national 
efforts to frame Romania, will provide the largest body of empirical research ever 
accessed in relation to this subject. This material will be examined in five chapters 
which adhere to the chronology of events and are divided into several sections that will 
analyse regionalising concepts, competing national constructs and respective 
commentators’ impact. This comprehensive multi-angled approach will shed new light 
                                                          
13
 Anthony Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical debates about ethnicity and 
nationalism, Hanover, NH, University Press of New England, 2000. 
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on Britain’s often conflicting interpretations of Romanian identity and their correlation 
with external events.  
The following introductory explanation will outline how this thesis provides an 
original contribution to current knowledge regarding the reception to and imagining of a 
country which defied conventional nationality rubrics, while simultaneously providing a 
timely historical assessment of British–Romanian relations. It offers a brief overview of 
the historiography available on those bilateral relations during the last 170 years in 
order to contextualise both the time frame and subjects addressed in this thesis, which 
begins with Britain’s sensational coverage of Romania’s Peasants’ Revolt in 1907, and 
ends with an analysis of Romanian identity during the country’s controversial 
appearance at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. It will identify Romania’s inclusion 
in various academic works that focus on the Balkans in Western representations, and 
suggest that the country’s exceptional features have been inadequately served by 
generalisations about the region.  
This will be followed by an assessment of the historiography available on the 
various commentators, experts and royals examined here, which will serve to 
demonstrate that an exposition of their work in the Romanian sphere is a necessary 
addition to the field. It will argue that the role these individuals played in the 
construction of Romania draws attention to different aspects of the country’s conflicted 
national identity and in some cases demands a re-evaluation of Saidian ideas about 
Western concepts of the East. Finally, an explanation of how different Romanian 
constructs serve to raise important issues concerning nations and nationalism will be 
highlighted through an analysis of several leading theories of nationalism. This 
assessement will seek to demonstrate that within the period under study certain theories 
acquire a heightened relevance in relation to British interpretations of Romania, with 
dislocating external events and Romania’s anomalous identity serving to emphasise 
potential areas that may require reassessment. The introduction will conclude with a 
brief chapter guide that outlines the chronological and thematic structure in which the 





Historiography and British–Romanian Relations 
It is through the identification of conflicting Romanian imaging, in a period of 
heightened engagement with one of Europe’s Great Powers, that this thesis seeks to 
better understand the influences behind and impact of Romania’s perceived location 
within various overlapping European rubrics, such as Balkan, East European and a post-
war New Europe. To ascertain how that locus was affected by domestic and 
international events, and to contextualise the subsequent interpretations of Romania in 
British discourse, it is important to establish British-Romanian history in the context of 
available historiography, which will reflect the broader issue of relations between the 
two countries making ‘slow progress down the centuries’.
14
 This introductory 
explanation will begin with an assessment of these histories. Through a brief outline of 
Britain’s relationship with Romania since the latter’s unification in the 1850s, it will 
demonstrate that the period under study witnessed unprecedented bilateral engagement 
between the two countries and therefore merits closer examination.  
The Old Kingdom of Romania emerged from the union of the Principalities of 
Wallachia and Moldova in 1859 and gained full independence after the Russo–Turkish 
war of 1878–78. British nineteenth-century relations with this emerging Romanian 
nation-state were hampered by imperial preoccupations with the Eastern Question and 
the preservation of Ottoman power in south-east Europe.
15
 Anglo–Romanian Relations 
after 1821 addresses this period but, impacted by the nationalist policies of the 
Communists under whom it was compiled, overinflates the relevance of Romania in 
British political discourse.
16
 Diana Dumitru’s revisionist history of Britain’s 
involvement in the country’s unification process is more useful.
17
 She claims 
                                                          
14
 Alexandru Duţu, ‘Glimpses of Reciprocal Perceptions’, in Dennis Deletant (ed.), 
Studies in Romanian History, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 1991, p. 8. 
15
 For Britain’s foreign policy in the period preceding Romania’s unification see David 
Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846–55, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2002. 
16
 Reliability issues are compounded by substandard citations in some chapters. Gh. 
Buzatu and Al. Pascu, Anglo–Romanian Relations after 1821, Romanian-English 
Colloquy of Historians, Iaşi, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1983. 
For an overview of relations from the early nineteenth century see Duţu, ‘Glimpses of 
Reciprocal Perceptions’, pp. 7–23. 
17
 Diana Dumitru, Marea Britanie şi Unirea principatelor Române (1856–59), Pontos, 
Chişinău, 2010, pp. 97–105. For a rough sketch of nineteenth-century relations between 
Britain and Romania see Carmen Andraş et al., An Imagological Dictionary of the 
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historiography views Britain’s role too negatively, but concedes the country lacked 
‘direct interests in the Romanian Principalities’.
18
 Existing literature acknowledges that 
Balkan issues did crop up in late nineteenth-century British politics, and that when the 
British government refused to support independent Balkan uprisings, Liberal opponents 
quickly adopted their cause against the Ottoman infidel.
19
 But unlike its southern 
neighbours, Romania was never directly occupied by the Ottomans and did not enjoy 
the benefits of a defining war of independence.
20
 The resulting lack of interest in 




The pattern of ambivalence was briefly ruptured in the early twentieth century 
when geopolitical pressures saw Romanian and British interests converge, culminating 
in Romania’s entry into World War I in August 1916 on the side of the Entente. This 
study is focused on that period of mutual interest which has been curiously overlooked 
by wartime historiography. Glenn Torrey’s Romania in World War I, which includes an 
analysis of the Entente’s military negotiations that both sought to draw Romania into 
the war and then prevent the country from capitulating, is a rare exception.
22
 Britain’s 
leading role in the ratification of Romania’s considerable territorial gains in Paris has 
seen the Peace Conference better represented. However, the majority of attention 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Cities in Romania Represented in British Travel Literature (1800–1940), Târgu Mareş, 
Editură Mentor, 2012, pp. 16–22. 
18
 Dumitru, ibid., p.167. 
19
 Richard Thomas Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876, Hassocks, 
Harvester Press; Hamen Conn, Archon Books, 1975; J. Perkins, ‘British Liberalism and 
the Balkans, c 1875–1925’, PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London, 2014. 
20
 Referred to as a War of Independence in Romanian historiography, it was in an 
alliance with the Russians during the Russo–Turkish war 1877–78 that Romania 
declared full independence and ceased to pay a tithe to the Ottoman Empire. For an 
overview of Romania’s engagement in that war see K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866–1947, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 41–49. 
21
 France was an early backer of the Romanian project. Post-1848 exiled Romanian 
leaders found an ‘outstanding ally’ in French Emperor Napoleon III: Lucian Boia, 
Romania, Borderland of Europe, translation James Christian Brown, London, Reaktion 
Books, 2001, ebook, loc. 1230–65; Vesa examines French led efforts to woo Romania 
prior to August 1916, Vasile Vesa, Romȃnia şi Franţa la începutul secolului al XX-lea, 
1900-1916, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Ştiinţifică, 1975. 
22
 Glenn Torrey, Romania and World War I: A collection of studies, Iaşi; Oxford; 
Portland, Center for Romanian Studies, 1998, pp. 95–120, 291–300; See also his 
biography of the head of the French military mission in Romania, Glenn Torrey, Henri 
Mathias Berthelot: Soldier of France, Defender of Romania, Iaşi, Center for Romanian 
Studies, 2001.  
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accorded to Romania at the Conference is focused on the behaviour and treatment of its 
assertive prime minister, Ion I. C. Brătianu,
23
 and the reception Queen Marie received.
24
 
With the exception of Erik Goldstein’s general analysis in Winning the Peace, the 
historiography fails to assess where Greater Romania fitted into thinking regarding a 
post-war New Europe.
25
 By the 1920s Tom Gallagher notes that Britain’s imperial 
agenda again diverted attentions away from Eastern Europe,
26
 and in the 1930s 
Romania was increasingly drawn into Germany’s economic orbit, culminating in a 
fascist alliance with the Nazis in July 1940. It is ironic that Anglo-Romanian 
historiography deals more comprehensively with the distant, ultimately enemy relations 
between Romania and Britain in the 1930s and 1940s, than the countries’ closer 
engagement in the 1910s.
27
  
Dennis Deletant’s In and Out of Focus, Romania and Britain, provides some 
insightful essays on British–Romanian relations, but the chronology, which begins in 
the 1930s, runs counter to the converging interests of the two countries in the earlier 
                                                          
23
 In Macmillan’s assessment of the Conference, Romania’s excessive demands and 
behaviour stand out: Margaret MacMillan, Peacemaker, the Paris conference of 1919 
and its attempt to end war, London, John Murray, 2001, pp. 134-45. Spector provides 
an analysis of Romania’s Premier Brătianu at the Conference: Sherman Spector, 
Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference. A study of the diplomacy of Ioan I. C. 
Brătianu, New York, Bookman Associates, 1962; Keith Hitchins, Ion I C Brătianu, 
Romania, Makers of the Modern World, London, Haus Publishing Ltd, 2011, pp. 107-
132.  
24
 For a review of Queen Marie’s place in historiography see pp. 27-28.  
25
 Erik Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British diplomatic strategy, peace planning and 
the Paris Peace Conference, 1916–1920, Oxford, Clarendon, 1991, pp. 252-57.  
26
 Lloyd George’s philhellenism and concerns over a resurgent Turkey meant Greece 
was an exception. Gallagher argues that the Greek Crisis highlighted the danger of risky 
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1989, London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 73–126. 
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World War II relations are detailed in two dated Romanian accounts. Gheorghe 
Paşcalău, România şi Marea Britanie, Relaţii Politico-Diplomatice 1933–1939, 
Albatros, Bucureşti, 2001; Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu and Ion Pătroiu, Anglia şi 
România între anii 1939–1947, Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, R.A., Bucureşti, 1992. 
10 
 
part of the century.
28
 Mutual Understanding: 125 years of Anglo–Romanian Diplomatic 
Relations looks at contact between Britain and the Romanian court in the late nineteenth 
century and (the historic lack of) Romanian studies in the UK.
29
 But a failure to analyse 
the impact of Britain’s World War I alliance with Romania is surprising given the 
political agenda of the book, which was compiled from a conference hosted by the 
Romanian embassy in 2005 and includes a foreword from the Romanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu, who stressed the ‘special relationship’ 
between the two countries.
30
 Two years later Romania joined the European Union, and 
contact between Britain and Romania has subsequently intensified, with Romanians 
becoming the second largest foreign nationality in Britain in 2017.
31
  
With regards to national imaging, Alex Drace-Francis begins his study of 
modern Romanian culture by examining what ‘Europe’ knew of the Romanian 
Principalities to 1829 and identifies ‘a number of themes and ideas which became 
staples of the theories of Romanian identity’, including ‘backwardness, obscurantism 
and alienation from Europe’. Although his study focuses on the impact this imaging had 
on Romania’s national development, he acknowledges that these external 
representations ‘formed the principal public idea of the Principalities’ in European 
thinking.
32
 His analysis is a useful start point for this study’s more specific examination 
of British perceptions of Romania a century later, with many of the negative tropes and 
generalisations that Drace-Francis identifies still prevalent in pre-World War I British 
thinking. His later study, The Traditions of Invention, Romanian ethnic and social 
stereotypes in historical context, also makes some stimulating observations about 
Romania’s reaction to and assimilation of existing Western preconceptions, particularly 
in relation to the Romanian peasant. However, he takes a deliberately ‘long-term 
approach’, with case studies ranging from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth 
century, and the focus is again on representations of Romanian culture, rather than 
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British or Western interpretations of that culture.
33
 Other histories look at projections 
and imaging of Romania in Britain or the West, but tend to do so within a broader 
Balkan or Eastern rubric, and in most cases fail to take proper account of Romania’s 
distinct national differences when compared with its Balkan neighbours.
34
  
It was Said’s seminal 1978 study, Orientalism, that identified a conceptual 
model which stressed the dominance and power of the West in ‘invented’ ideas of the 
Orient, as one of the ‘deepest and most reoccurring images of the Other’.
35
 Said’s 
thinking has had a profound impact on subsequent theories of national imaging, 
including efforts to identify the othering process in a European context through the 
identification of different European appellations.
36
 Although Todorova’s Imagining the 
Balkans credits the influence of Orientalism and its identification of a ‘general crisis of 
representation’, in an analysis of a Balkan construct against which West Europe 
measured ideas of their own civility and advancement, she is clear that Balkanism is not 
merely a subspecies of Orientalism. Todorova argues that while the two constructs are 
similar phenomena, one of the key differentials between them is ‘the geographical 
concreteness of the Balkans’ in comparison with the ‘intangible nature of the Orient’.
37
  
It is within this distinct geographical Balkan construct that Todorova includes 
Romania. Although she acknowledges ‘the peculiarities in Romania’s social and 
economic structures’ courtesy of the ‘special status of the antecedent Danubian 
Principalities as vassal territories’, Romania is not excluded from generalisations about 
the image of an appellation she identifies as crystallising ‘in a specific discourse around 
the Balkans wars and World War I’. Todorova assumes that Romania conformed to her 
identification of a geographical cluster which affirmed Western ideas of superiority with 
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its distinctively male identity, defined through ‘uncivilised, primitive, crude, cruel’ 
characteristics.
38
 This thesis concurs with Romanian historian Carmen Andraş’s 
argument that these generalisations, particularly the idea of ‘Balkan’ as a masculine 
construct, cannot be consistently applied to the case of Romania. While Andraş looks at 
British travel-writing in an earlier period and acknowledges the exotic vestiges of Greek 
culture, this study will examine the role of Romania’s first two queens and their 
gendered impact on Romania’s identity in early twentieth-century Britain.
39
  
Romania features in Andrew Hammond’s analysis of British and American 
travel-writing in the Balkans, which identifies a dominant paradigm that includes 
‘preternatural barbarism, congenital perfidy, inveterate cruelty and unfathomable 
complexity’, and Eugene Michail in The British and the Balkans argues that in the first 
decade of the twentieth century the common Balkan theme was ‘one of revulsion’, 
albeit ‘matched by unspoken fascination’.
40
 Given Romania’s inclusion in this construct 
and the prominence accorded to Western perceptions of that Balkan appellation as 
violent and unappealing, it is significant that no reference is made to Romania’s 
Peasants’ Revolt of 1907, which unleashed a series of dramatic representations in 
Britain and is the pre-war start point for this thesis. Chapter 1 will argue that although 
the revolt saw Romania fulfil the primary identifiers associated with Balkanism in 
recent historiography, Britain did not interpret the incident in a Balkan context, which 
perhaps explains its omission in the aforementioned literature.
41
 It will suggest that the 
conflicted identity of Romania before World War I, which exhibited a pronounced anti-
Semitic strain, saw it fit more readily into Larry Wolff’s identification of a larger, but 
no less savage, East European rubric that included Russia.
42
 However, Wolff’s 
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Inventing Eastern Europe focuses on the Enlightenment period and therefore only 
provides a vague starting point for Romania’s place in Europe,
43
 the perception of 
which would shift dramatically during World War I when several ‘experts’ sought to 
identify Romania as part of Latin Europe and an anticipated New Europe. It is this 
examination of Romania’s fluctuating place within different conceptual clusters in 
British discourse that will contribute to a better understanding of what Diana Mishkova 




Commentators, Royal Figureheads and Representations of Romania 
The below outline identifies the leading publicists, influencers and royals included in 
this thesis who emerged as significant voices in a British discourse on Romania in the 
period under study, and assesses the current historiography concerning both their work 
and ideas around ‘experts’ and expertise in a wartime context. It was Said’s Orientalism 
which acknowledged Western representations as a means for ‘dominating, restructuring 
and having authority’ in an analysis that stresses the premise of exteriority in this 
imaging.
45
 The current study predominantly focuses on British-based commentators and 
much of the resulting imagery conforms to that Saidian model, which highlights the 
power imbalance between West and East. However, Queen Marie, as a British-born 
monarch who prioritised Romanian interests, is a complicating factor in representations 
of Romania. A presumed binary paradigm that prioritised the West is also confused by 
Mary Louise Pratt’s insistence that as well as a recognition of the ‘Imperial Metropole 
... determining the periphery’, the reverse dynamic also existed. An examination of what 
Pratt identifies as transcultural ‘contact zones’ and information exchanges, particularly 
in the development of wartime expertise on Romania, will highlight the complexities in 
representational models that have too often focused on pairings of dominance and 
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 It will argue that briefly the common interests and pooled ‘expertise’ of 
both British and Romanian politicians and commentators during war witnessed 
Romania’s partial elevation away from more pejorative Eastern constructs, into a feted 
post-1918 New Europe.  
The failure to adequately represent Romania in pre-war Balkan historiography is 
partially explained by the early absence of a distinct British commentator seeking to 
burnish the country’s image. However, if in Chapter 1 the lack of commentators in 1907 
suggests that Romania was not deemed sufficiently relevant to merit detailed scrutiny in 
British discourse, that situation changed with the 1912–13 Balkan wars and the outbreak 
of World War I when the country’s strategic importance led to increased interest. 
Chapter 2 will identify the work and significance of conservative journalist Dr Emile J. 
Dillon and Habsburg nationalities’ expert and publicist R. W. Seton-Watson in this 
period. An examination of the impact and the influence that these men had on the 
imaging of Romania in Britain will demand that key aspects of ‘expertise’ – access to 
power and the ability to influence official thinking – are assessed in relation to 
Romania.
47
 More broadly this analysis will argue that the failure to fully recognise the 
role of the press in opinion-making undermined the significance of Romania’s pre-war 
place in British representations of southeastern Europe. 
As the Daily Telegraph’s special correspondent based in Russia, Dillon’s 
decision to visit Romania twice during the Balkan wars and support the country’s entry 
into the second 1913 conflict, followed by his virulent criticism of Romania during its 
two-year neutrality between August 1914 and August 1916, have been overlooked in 
historiography.
48
 It is the tendency to underplay the role of journalism when analysing 
wartime ‘expert’ networks that partially explains Dillon’s absence from British-
Romanian historiography, an oversight that will be rectified through original archival 
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research and a comprehensive examination of Dillon’s articles and publications.
49
 
Chapter 2 will argue that the pre-1914 association of the Balkans with liberalism also 
explains why Dillon’s work on feudal Romania has been sidelined.
50
 Symptomatic of 
this liberal bias is Michail’s study, which focuses on the Balkan Committee as the 
leading purveyor of Balkan imaging between 1900 and 1910, and does not acknowledge 
Dillon.
51
 However, by 1913 the internecine warfare of the second Balkan war ensured 
that the Peninsula was no longer identifiable as one sympathetic group, a change that 
was advantageous for previously sidelined Romania. Its anomalous position, sitting 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia and to the north of the Balkans, attracted Dillon’s 
attention as a country well placed to capitalise on the fluid geopolitical situation. 
Publicist and Habsburg nationalities’ expert, R. W. Seton-Watson, was the other 
significant commentator who supported Romania during the Balkan wars. A member of 
the Balkan Committee who became a leading expert in the region during World War I, 
Seton-Watson has been better served by historiography.
52
 However, Chapter 2 will 
argue that his later prominence in the campaign for a post-war New Europe should not 
inflate his impact in the field of Romanian imaging pre-1914, and this thesis will serve 
to contextualise Seton-Watson’s contribution to Romanian identity in an area where 
historiography is prone to eulogy and overstatement.
53
 Conforming to the Saidian 
identification of ‘exteriority’ in Western image-making,
54
 like Dillon, Seton-Watson 
was British and his representations of Romania were motivated by his idea of British 
interests. Seton-Watson initially thought these were best served through a peaceable 
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solution to the Habsburg nationalities question.
55
 Chapter 2 will analyse the impact of 
this approach which prioritised the Transylvanian Romanians in Hungary over the 
identity of the Romanian kingdom, and it will compare Seton-Watson’s early work with 
Dillon’s more conservative approach. The two-volume R. W. Seton-Watson şi românii 
provides a comprehensive catalogue of Seton-Watson’s correspondence and articles 
concerning Romania and this thesis will use it as a guide for further archival research, in 
order to assess Seton-Watson’s increasing influence over Romanian image construction 
in the context of ‘expert’ influence and Britain’s shifting strategic aims.
56
  
Section 2.2 will examine the development of Dillon’s and Seton-Watson’s 
versioning of Romania during World War I. Between 1914 and 1916 Britain wanted 
neutral Romania to join the Entente and the two men’s very different responses to this 
priority are striking. It will argue that Dillon reverted to standard Balkan 
disparagements when Romania refused to commit to war, exposing the vulnerability of 
national imaging when crafted through the prism of an external agenda. In contrast 
Seton-Watson, whose nationalities expertise had moved him closer to the centre of 
British political power, skewed Romania’s national image to fit his vision for a New 
Europe and identified the country primarily through the Romanians living in enemy 
Hungary’s Transylvania. Underlining the Foreign Office’s pre-war lack of knowledge 
regarding Romania, Chapter 2 will identify an additional voice that was recruited to 
frame Romania in wartime discourse. David Mitrany, a Romanian Jew and political 
scientist based in London, is famous for his later role as the founding father of the 
functional approach to world government.
57
 There has also been research into his study 
of war governments and peasant revolutions in South East Europe, which informed the 
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foundations of his international theory.
58
 However, Mitrany’s earlier World War I work, 
when he acted as both a publicist for and a British government advisor on Romania, has 
been almost entirely overlooked.
59
 Chapter 2 will rectify this through an examination of 
his wartime papers and publications and identify a man who was primarily concerned 
with assisting his host nation and framed his homeland in the press accordingly. 
With the outbreak of war, a consensus gradually emerged about the idea of a 
conflict fought for small nations that demanded a fresh identity for Central and Eastern 
Europe. If the main architect for this New European construct was Seton-Watson, the 
vision for a future Greater Romania within it was taken up by his acolyte, British 
academic and later government adviser, Allen Leeper. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the 
impact of Seton-Watson’s wartime thinking on Romania and focus on Leeper’s work as 
the country’s leading expert in Britain. These chapters will argue that Leeper spent the 
latter half of the war identifying and promoting an idea of a Greater Romania, in which 
he prioritised both the prospective and the eventual inclusion of Habsburg land, 
Transylvania. Part of the highly influential Political Intelligence Department in 1918, 
Leeper also sat on the British Territorial Commission that oversaw Romania’s case in 
Paris the following year. However, with the exception of Goldstein’s study of peace 
planning, which acknowledges Leeper’s role within the British delegation and influence 
in the ratification of Romania’s borders,
60
 there has been no specific examination of his 
Romanian work.  
Accessing Leeper’s archive and relevant publications and British Foreign 
Offices files, Chapters 4 and 5 will address that absence, and reveal a man whose close 
cooperation with Romanian and Transylvanian émigrés in wartime London and Paris 
highlights Britain’s dependency on partial information about Romania. It was this close 
collaboration between Leeper and a small wartime contingent of Romanians that helped 
to briefly pivot the country away from Old Kingdom Balkan associations. This thesis 
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will suggest that by 1919 representations of Romania had been overlaid by a new 
Greater Romanian identity that sat precariously within a Central East European rubric 
and temporarily suited both countries’ strategic goals. More broadly, an examination of 
Leeper’s work will suggest that the transnational process of knowledge exchange in 
building expertise, particularly during war, requires acknowledgement in Saidian ideas 
that emphasise Western dominance in national representations.  
The increased political significance of Romania during the period under study is 
highlighted by the number of British commentators prepared to champion and discuss 
the country. But, as mentioned, before the Balkan wars Romania lacked a prominent 
British advocate. Chapter 1 will argue that this vacuum was partially filled by Jewish 
and royal narratives, and that these had disproportionate significance in early 
constructions of the country. In the context of royalty and its impact on British 
discourse, this thesis will reassess Western concepts of the East and discover a Romania 
which fails to conform to the primarily male and violent Balkan indicators identified by 
Todorova and Hammond.
61
 Featured in every chapter of this thesis (with the exception 
of Chapter 2) the evolving promotional work of Romania’s two foreign queens, 
German-born Elizabeth and British-born Marie, will be examined in order to better 
understand the roles of monarchy and gender in external representations of the country.  
The literary reputation and career of Queen Elizabeth, who published under the 
pen name Carmen Sylva in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain, has 
recently benefited from the valuable research of Laura Nixon. However, by seeking to 
establish her literary credentials as distinct from her royal image, Nixon does not fully 
articulate the impact Elizabeth had on her country’s image.
62
 Doina Pasca Harsanyi’s 
broad-ranging article, ‘Blue Blood and Ink: Romanian aristocratic women before and 
after World War One’, does acknowledge the impressive international reach of both 
Queen Elizabeth and her successor Marie, but nothing is said about the impact their 
oeuvre had on British impressions of Romania or how these queens inform current 
historiographical debate about representations of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
63
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Chapter 1 will establish Queen Elizabeth’s feminine influence over Romanian 
imagining in British discourse. This preceded heightened geopolitical interest in the 
country, and is an early challenge to Romania’s presumed place in Todorova’s prosaic, 
masculine rubric. Carmen Sylva’s prolific oeuvre that promoted romantic, folkloric 
ideas about Romania also demands a slight revision of the colonial paradigm in Vesna 
Goldsworthy’s book, Inventing Ruritania. This work emphasises ‘the world’s most 
powerful nations’’ exploitation of ‘the resources of the Balkans to supply its literary and 
entertainment industries’, but it fails to adequately acknowledge the East’s role in the 
facilitation of that colonisation, exemplified in the literature of Romania’s poet-queen.
64
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will demonstrate how Queen Marie built on Elizabeth’s 
work and reputation through the promotion of Romania in wartime Britain and at the 
Paris Peace Conference. Romania’s total war saw Marie, a talented propagandist, 
occupy the role of a war hero, a space invariably inhabited by men, while her nursing 
persona ensured she did not destabilise established norms of acceptability.
65
 Efforts 
have been made to address her wartime impact by American-Romanian historians 
Harsanyi and Maria Bucur, with Bucur focusing on Marie’s dominant domestic 
reputation, its negative repercussions for gender stereotyping and the Queen’s 
celebrated association with the achievements of post-war Greater Romania.
66
 However, 
insufficient attention has been paid to Marie’s wartime capacity to generate British 
interest in her adopted country, confirming Rodney Mclean’s argument that 
historiography invariably overlooks the diplomatic significance of monarchy.
67
 Her 
appearance at the Paris Peace Conference has been better served in this context, but 
most analysis fails to move beyond recognition that Marie made an impact, with little 
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agreement over the extent of that impact.
68
 My MA dissertation examined the Queen’s 
diplomacy both during World War I and the Peace Conference but Romanian imaging 
in Britain is not the study’s primary focus.
69
 This thesis will build on my previous 
research, accessing Marie’s archive in Bucharest, the Royal Archives in Windsor, 
archived newsreels and print media, to demonstrate how the Queen helped form 
sympathetic impressions of her country in Britain, which crystallised into a specific and 
effective propaganda campaign after Romania entered the war in August 1916.  
 Section 4.2 will argue that Queen Marie helped establish a wartime precedent 
for Romania that other British female writers capitalised on. The published works of 
socialite and traveller, Mrs Will Gordon, and British wartime nurses, Lady Kennard and 
Yvonne Fitzroy, among others, will be examined for the first time in the context of 
Romanian imagining and compared with equivalent wartime literature written by 
British women based in Serbia. In her book British women of the Eastern Front, which 
focuses on wartime Serbia and Russia,
70
 Angela Smith examines the role of the ‘female 
other’ and acknowledges that many women working in Serbia engaged with the war in 
ways that challenged accepted gendered norms.
71
 Their experiences and literature are a 
useful counterpoint against which to examine the imaging generated by British women 
in Romania whose work and identity occupied a more conventional feminine space. 
This section will suggest that the wartime oeuvre Romania and its queens inspired, and 
in which Marie was a leading voice, continued to confound presumptions of Balkan 
masculinity and violence.  
If in Chapter 4 a presumed British superiority (despite disappointment over 
Britain’s failure to assist Romania) was integral to the works of Romania’s female 
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wartime visitors, Marie’s use of the same trope to promote Romania in London and 
Paris in March–April 1919, examined in Chapter 5, will serve to highlight the 
complexities of West–East identity-formation. The significance of the Romanian 
representations that Marie promoted will be analysed in the context of British non-
settlement imperialism and Todorova’s argument that Said overlooks the East’s 
essentialising of the West as the ‘hegemonic pair in the dichotomy’.
72
 It will argue that 
Marie used the idea of British superiority to maximum effect during the war, 
highlighting her own British birth to underscore ideas of Western responsibility. The 
resulting imagery, which was promoted with Romania’s interests in mind but 
conformed to British ideas of the underdeveloped East, will affirm Todorova’s ‘Trap of 
Backwardness’ thesis, while simultaneously insisting on a modest reassessment of the 
Said-style binary representational model that focuses on the West’s domination of 
Eastern representations, in relation to the complex case of Romania.
73
 
Alongside an early identification of royal representations, Chapter 1 will seek to 
contextualise the anti-Semitic overtones of the 1907 Peasants’ Rebellion and British 
responses to them. It will argue that Jewish historiography does not acknowledge the 
revolt in the context of Romania’s Jewish Question in a field which otherwise examines 
British responses to Russian, Romanian and Polish anti-Semitism in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.
74
 Included in this research is Mark Levene’s examination 
of the role of the influential Conjoint Foreign Committee of British Jews and their 
persistent representations on behalf of East European Jews, including Romanian Jews.
75
 
This thesis will complement that analysis with a focus on the best-known Romanian 
national in Britain during this period, Jewish Rabbi Dr Moses Gaster. A prolific writer 
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and theologian, Gaster’s vast archive has been précised.
76
 However, his prominence as a 
Zionist and as the Haham of the Spanish and Portuguese congregation in Britain 
obfuscated Gaster’s identity as a Romanian Jew and his conflicted role in constructions 
of his homeland has been poorly served. Although referenced elsewhere in this thesis, it 
is §1.2 that primarily benefits from the revisiting of Gaster’s archive. His work will 
serve to demonstrate the complexity of Romania’s Jewish Question in a British context 
where it was subjected to the competing forces of migration, Zionism, rising 
nationalism and war.  
In an example of the wartime compromises demanded of external ‘experts’, in 
§2.2, the aforementioned David Mitrany’s public writing and work for the British 
government will be highlighted for its failure to fully acknowledge the issues facing his 
co-religionists in Romania. A comprehensive examination of British Foreign Office 
files, the Board of Deputies of British Jews’ archive and relevant press coverage that 
begins in §1.2 will argue that, in line with Levene’s analysis, it was the efforts of the 
Conjoint Committee, in particular the work of their leading spokesperson, Lucien Wolf, 
which kept the country’s Jewish Question alive in official British thinking.
77
 However, 
the latter’s efforts were compromised by the war; Chapters 2 and 4 will examine the 
impact the conflict had on ‘expertise’ and representations of Romania’s Jewish 
Question, and identify muted external imaging of this oppressed minority. The 
repercussions of a diminished Jewish identity in constructions of wartime Romania will 
be outlined in §5.2, which focuses on the events that led to the country’s eventual 
signing of the Minorities Treaty in December 1919. This section will probe Levene’s 
identification of Wolf ‘in his own historical context’ as ‘not a loser’ in the complex case 
of Romania,
78
 in an assessment that will serve to rebalance current historiography that is 
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Theories of Nationalism and British Perceptions of Romania between 
1907 and 1919  
Britain’s fluid classifications of Romania, which saw it ostensibly move from 
ambiguous, quasi-Balkan ‘other’ to sympathetic Latin ally in less than a decade, 
demand that within the broader, expert-led analysis of Romania’s place in European 
appellations, a thorough assessment of definitions of a nation and nationalism is 
undertaken. Fast-moving events radically overhauled Britain’s perceptions of Romania, 
and saw profound differences in the way the country was framed at the beginning and 
the end of the period under study. These tensions make Romania’s external national 
identity an instructive one against which to compare and assess the validity of different 
nationality theories. Romanian historian Lucian Boia is bullish about post-war 
Romania, claiming ‘the natural configuration of a Romanian national state’ was ‘more 
coherent and has proved more viable than Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland’.
80
 
Yet despite Romania’s considerable territorial gains in 1919, the majority of studies that 
examine broader wartime nationality themes in the region skirt over the country. Naomi 
Chazan’s emphasis on the role of conflict in the examination of Irredentism rarely 
mentions Romania. The primary case studies in Brubaker’s useful focus on the nature of 
nationalism in post-war Central and Eastern Europe are Poland and Weimar Germany, 
and in a collection of Hroch’s articles, his stress on the ‘smaller’ European nations, i.e. 
‘those without statehood’, by definition excludes the Romanian Kingdom.
81
 
An agrarian-based economy within a feudal structure, pre-war Romania is a 
difficult match for modernist thinking which prioritises industrial and social 
development in the rise of nationalism. In The Making of Modern Romanian Culture 
Drace-Francis acknowledges that the creation of Romania’s national identity as 
predominantly the work of cultural activists in the nineteenth century is one that has 
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been ‘deeply enshrined’ in many accounts of Romania’s cultural historiography.
82
 
Katherine Verdery argues that by 1900 virtually all political and intellectual discourse 
had ‘something to say about Romanians’ essential character’, and Paul Michelson 
asserts that the establishment of Romanian culture was the most important achievement 
of the preceding hundred years.
83
 It was a culture that from the 1860s featured several 
persistent dichotomous tensions – ‘West or East, Europe or the Balkans, urban 
civilisation or the rural spirit’,
84
 with Drace-Francis noting that the issues which 
concerned Romanian writers were already established by 1900, including the peasant, 
modernity versus tradition and the Jewish Question.
85
 
An interpretation of those national issues in British discourse at the beginning of 
the twentieth century was complicated by Britain’s historic failure to prioritise 
Romanian imagining, a tendency which compounded confusion over what kind of 
country it was. While the contradictions that Romanian identity presented in 1907 
British discourse were not fully resolved by 1919, the country’s rising geopolitical 
significance in the intervening period ensured that they had been the subject of 
considerable attention and were highlighted and manipulated accordingly. In this thesis 
that process of national image creation will be explicated through extensive, although 
not exclusive, engagement with the works of historian of East European nationalisms, 
Hroch, post-1918 nationalities analyst Brubaker, and cultural-ethnies champion Smith, 
in an assessment that highlights the fluidity of national identity in war, the expedience 
of external representation and the significance of royal figureheads. 
Chapter 1’s examination of Britain’s dramatic coverage of the rebellion is a 
good example of the immediate problem Romanian identity poses for modernist 
historians of nationalism and serves to contextualise the limitations of the cultural idea 
of Romania in nineteenth-century thinking. Gellner insists on an industrialised society 
as a prerequisite for nationalism to flourish and Anderson stresses the rise of the reading 
public in the emergence of the ‘imagined community’ that was the lifeblood of 
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 Romania’s predominantly serf-based economic model, exposed by the 
revolt, is a challenging fit for both these theories. Eric Hobsbawm’s recognition of the 
unifying role of a national language is more easily applied to Romania, but the 
country’s low literacy levels undermine his argument that primary education was a key 
facilitator of a unitary language. While Drace-Francis’s study of Romanian culture and 
his recognition that ‘Literacy is now seen not as an abstractable absolute but a process 
that needs to be understood in relation to its various cultural functions’ is helpful for an 
explication of Romanian development, nonetheless undeniable contradictions in 




In the British press, the revolt unleashed dramatic reports of anarchy and civil 
unrest which served to complicate ideas of Romania’s national legitimacy. Very 
different from the propertied peasant model in other Balkan countries, the mass serfdom 
of Romania’s peasantry was pitched against a few absentee feudal landowners in a 
structure more representative of Tsarist Russia.
88
 Gellner concurs with Max Weber’s 
argument that ‘the “state” is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned 
with the enforcement of order’. During Romania’s Peasants’ Revolt that order appeared 
to have broken down, serving to undermine the validity of the country itself.
89
 Chapter 1 
will argue that in industrialised countries like Britain, where modernist thinking 
regarding nationalism finds more fertile terrain, the rebellion enforced an idea of 
Romania as an anomalous, underdeveloped state.  
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Hroch, who refutes Gellner’s thinking with his argument that national identity 
often appeared before the arrival of modern industrialisation,
90
 provides a useful three-
stage model for the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe. However, Chapter 1 will 
argue that this model flounders when applied to external interpretations of 1907 
Romania. Among East European nationalities, Hroch identifies an ‘exogenous’ ruling 
class that dominates ethnic groups which occupied compact territory but lacked their 
own nobility and political units. He outlines three structural stages in the emergence of a 
national movement with the capacity to become a self-governing nation. The first 
involved scholarly inquiries into linguistic and cultural ties that bound the group, the 
second saw a new range of activists looking to win over compatriots, and the third stage 




A mass rebellion against Romanian landowners that had to be crushed with 
extreme force and was extensively covered in the British press, suggested that ‘new 
mass participation in a national project’ was yet to materialise in Romania. 
Furthermore, Hroch’s identification of the need ‘for absolutist oppression from a 
foreign other’ in the formation of national identity is difficult to substantiate in the case 
of 1907 Romania.
92
 The country’s relationship with the Ottomans was defined by 
suzerainty pre-1881, not occupation, while the severity of the Peasants’ Revolt 
underlined the exploitative rule of Romanian boyars (nobles) within the Kingdom itself. 
Moreover, self-definition in Romania was partly driven by reactions against an internal 
minority. The country’s refusal to enfranchise their Jewish minority despite the 
stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 ensured that ‘oppression’ within the 
Kingdom was Romanian and often used against ‘a foreign other’, an issue that 
international Jewish networks successfully drew attention to.  
This thesis will demonstrate that it was the idea of Romania as an oppressive 
state which helps to explain the ambiguities in the country’s pre-war image in Britain 
and it will argue that Hroch’s model was not applicable to the version of the Romanian 
Kingdom identified in Chapter 1. It is in Chapter 2’s examination of emerging British 
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expertise on Romania that Hroch’s model is partially vindicated. Pre-World War I, the 
restive nationalities in the Habsburg Empire, including the Romanians in Transylvania, 
had begun attracting British attention. Subject to increasing oppression, the Hungarians 
provided the ‘foreign other’ against which the Romanian population reacted and 
organised themselves. The emerging national movement, championed by Seton-Watson, 
helps to explain why Britain accorded the Transylvanians disproportionate attention in 
subsequent constructions of Romania. Chapter 3 which focuses on the Romanian 
Kingdom as a coveted neutral, will argue that the country’s identity in this period was 
significantly impacted by ideas centred on self-determination and a just war of 
reunification with the Transylvanian Romanians.  
Considering both the Jewish minority inside Romania and the Transylvanian 
Romanians beyond the country’s western border, this thesis will identify competing 
Romanian identities circulating in British discourse. In order to explicate responses to 
those nationalisms it will invoke an assessment of Brubaker’s study, Nationalism 
Reframed, which focuses on the state creation that occurred when the Ottoman, 
Habsburg and Russian Empires imploded during and immediately after World War I. 
Brubaker argues that the new states were the ‘nationalisms that have emerged in the 
wake of the nationalisation of the political space’
93
 and identifies a ‘triadic nexus that 
involves three distinct and mutually antagonistic nationalisms’ which provide a model 




This thesis will argue that an understanding of Romania’s competing identities 
requires an earlier assessment of Brubaker’s nationalisms that begins not in the post-war 
period, but in the pre-war period, when the country’s narrative in British discourse was 
complicated by its dual role as both an oppressive host nation of a disenfranchised 
Jewish minority, and as a nation whose own minority in Austria-Hungary was being 
oppressed. In his model, Brubaker identifies a nationalising nationalism which involves 
claims made in the name of the core nation and is defined in ethno-cultural terms. His 
description of this nationalising nation as inherently weak ‘despite its rightful 
‘ownership’ of the state’ helps explain the insecurity and chauvinism of Greater 
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Romania in the post-war period. However this thesis will argue it is also applicable to 
the Old Kingdom’s earlier exclusive response to its internal Jewish minority.
95
  
Brubaker’s second nationalism involves the ‘transborder nationalisms’ of what 
he calls ‘external national homelands’, which emphasises a state’s right to monitor, 
assert the rights and protect the interests of ‘their’ ethno-national kin in other states. He 
identifies external national homelands in a post-war setting when, for example, Hungary 
was focused on its minority existing within Greater Romania’s nationalising nation.
96
 
However, this thesis will examine the reverse situation in a pre-1918 context and 
analyse representations of Romania’s evolving national homeland narrative in relation 
to the country’s feted population in Transylvania and its responses to Hungarian 
chauvinism.  
The third nationalism in Brubaker’s model belongs to national minorities. Pre-
war, again Romanian identity manifests itself in a dual context. With sizeable minorities 
in neighbouring countries, there were several sympathetic Romanian national minority 
narratives, including a pronounced one in Hungary’s Transylvania. This thesis will 
examine the Transylvanian Romanians’ role in relation to Seton-Watson’s framing of 
Hungary as an oppressor state and through the development of Romania’s sympathetic 
national homeland claims in British discourse. Conversely, it is the identity of 
Romania’s internal Jewish minority nationalism that serves to explicate Britain’s wary 
responses to the country pre-war. It is the simultaneous existence of all three of 
Brubaker’s nationalisms within constructions of Romania which explains the fluid, 
often conflicting interpretations of the country’s identity in Britain. 
Brubaker identifies minority nationalism as ‘caught in the middle’ between the 
nationalising nation and the homeland nationalism.
97
 But Romania’s Jews did not have 
a bordering country championing their cause. This minority depended on international 
support to highlight its plight. Here, Brubaker’s identification of the national minority 
as having a double field of struggle which involves the need to ‘impose and sustain a 
certain vision of the host state, namely as a nationalising or nationally oppressive state’ 
is critical. This definition helps to explain the presentation of Romania’s Jewish 
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minority nationalism in British discourse, and the impact of its ‘struggle’ on competing 
intrepretations of Romanian identity.
98
  
In the context of the 1907 Peasants’ Revolt, §1.2 will establish the imperilled 
national minority agenda of Romania’s Jews, supported by an international network of 
co-religionists which included the campaigning work of the Anglo-Jewish Conjoint 
Committee. Later analysis in Chapters 2 and 4 will highlight the compromises that 
impacted on their representations of Romania’s Jewish Question during the war and the 
autochthonous atmosphere that facilitated a less tolerant British interpretation of the 
Jewish ‘other’. Romania’s Jewish nationalism was muted and its ability to portray the 
Romanian Kingdom as an oppressive nation reduced. Instead, the country was 
increasingly defined through the Romanian population in Transylvania - Brubaker’s 
external homeland nationalism - the assertion of which accorded with British war aims. 
This focus on Transylvanian Romanians elevated the country’s status as a worthy 
European ally, in a powerful exposition of Milica Bakić-Hayden’s ‘Nesting 
Orientalisms’ theory. 
In her study of post-war Yugoslavia, Bakić-Hayden refers to implicit 
assumptions about the ‘primordial qualities’ of different peoples, which are 
subsequently used to explicate the ‘fate of nations’. In the case of wartime Romania, the 
Old Kingdom with its ‘Balkan burden’ and challenging Jewish ‘national minority’ was 
demoted and representations of the country’s vaunted Transylvanian population were 
prioritised.
99
 Section 4.3, which examines New Europe thinking in London during the 
last two years of World War I, will argue that this deliberate framing of Romania 
through its national homeland nationalism and the elevated status of the Transylvanian 
Romanians, highlights the unease which persisted in Britain about the type of nation 
Romania was, and explains Allen Leeper’s focus on the Romanian population in 
Hungary. 
Representations of Romania’s Jewish Question will culminate in Chapter 5 with 
an examination of Romanian identity in relation to the signing of the Minorities Treaty 
at the Peace Conference, in an analysis that acknowledges the diminution of Romania’s 
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Jewish Question in British discourse and the problems associated with Greater 
Romania’s chauvinism. The examination of Romania’s complex identity through the 
evolving nationalisms identified by Brubaker will highlight the role Britain played in 
emphasising a particular nationalism at any given time, and it will contextualise the 
country’s often inadequate political responses to competing Romanian representations. 
Chapter 5 will conclude that in 1919, Britain’s eagerness to embrace a New European 
solution at the Peace Conference saw them fail to anticipate or understand Romania’s 
assertive nationalising nationalism. 
Complementing the work of Brubaker, in Chapters 4 and 5, Irredentism and 
International Politics edited by Naomi Chazan will help to explain responses to 
Romania’s role in the Entente’s war, through the identification of conflict and 
international assistance as factors which draw Irredentist claims out of their gestation 
period.
100
 The year 2018 witnessed extensive and international celebrations funded by 
the Romanian government for the centenary of ‘România Mare’, in a tone that presumed 
the creation of Greater Romania had been inevitable.
101
 In contrast, and in line with 
Chazan’s thinking, this thesis will argue that World War I delivered a brief period of 
mutual interest when Romania’s acquisition of Austria-Hungary’s Transylvania suited 
both Allied and Romanian political agendas. In Chazan’s book, Donald Horowitz’s 
observation that successful Irredentist action on the part of a retrieving state is rare 
provides a reminder of the potency of Romania’s nationality theme, particularly in 
relation to the Transylvanian minority.
102
 Chapters 4 and 5 will argue that the 
identification of Transylvania as the ‘cradle of the Romanian nation’ partially 
confounds Horowtiz’s argument regarding ‘the common reluctance of people at the 
centre to see nominally kindred people on the periphery as truly members of the same 
ethnic group’.
103
 This Transylvanian exceptionalism explains why Britain was able to 
suspend its long-term uneasiness about Romania and imagine an improved nation-state 
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under the influence of a Romanian population that enjoyed a more Western heritage and 
location.  
The relocation of Romania in British discourse from a sub-Balkan or savage 
Eastern country to a West-facing New European construct will emerge as a prominent 
theme in this thesis, serving to highlight what Hobsbawm identifies as the malleability 
of key indicators in national constructs.
104
 That malleability was particularly important 
when external representations were subject to the demands of war. In a conflict where 
the search for a moral raison d’être began early, it was important that any equivalence 
over Romania as a potential ally was resolved. Alongside pre-war Semitic and Balkan 
traits, §1.3 will identify early and deliberate efforts by Romania to stress its European 
heritage that would prove useful in Britain’s subsequent reframing of the country.  
Affirming the presence of a distinct Romanian culture in the nineteenth century 
which prioritised its Latin heritage, Hobsbawm notes the state’s decision to dump 
Cyrillic in preference for Roman letters in the printing of the language.
105
 This move 
was indicative of the Romanian elite’s preoccupation with Western acculturation. 
Anderson’s focus on the technology of ‘print capitalism’ in the emergence of the 
‘imagined community’ is confused in Romania’s case, where, by the late nineteenth 
century, the language of power was French.
106
 However, what retarded a popular 
national consciousness at home was its strength in European diplomatic circles.
107
 
Examinations of Balkan and neutral Romania in Chapter 2 will identify Take Ionescu, a 
politician educated in France and married to a British woman, as one of a handful of 
Romanians whose politics and elegance were disproportionately endorsed in Britain as 
indicators of Romania’s potential for civic government. Likewise §4.3 will highlight the 
sophisticated diplomats and émigrés from the Old Kingdom and Transylvania working 
with British experts in wartime London. 
This thesis will argue that Romania’s European politicking in British discourse 
was complemented by ideas of an ancient nation which rested on images that were more 
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traditional. In particular the efforts of Romania’s two queens, who keenly asserted the 
romantic and Latin credentials of their adopted country’s peasant society, struck a chord 
in Britain’s reductive wartime atmosphere. It is ironic that it was first a German-born 
queen and then a British one who were the most effective purveyors of ideas about the 
Romanian peasant and his Roman heritage. In order to understand the power of this 
complex, potentially contradictory imaging, the thesis will employ Anthony Smith’s 
ethno-symbolic arguments and examine how Elizabeth and Marie operated as conduits 




Chapter 1will establish Elizabeth as the royal figurehead who was formative in 
the external articulation of a Romania symbolised by peasants and folklore, themes that 
will be further explored in later chapters through Marie’s dual appeal in Romania and 
Britain. A Clausewitzean emphasis on military capacity as a benchmark for national 
maturity, an idea examined in Chapter 3, was confounded by the country’s defeat in 
December 1916.
109
 However Chapter 4 will argue that instead Marie, deliberately 
framed as the symbolic Mother of her people, mobilised the idea of an ancient peasant 
stock which straddled both the Old Kingdom and Transylvania and was willing to die 
for Romania’s ‘Empress’ and Empire. Here Smith’s rebuke of Gellner for only telling 
‘half the story’ in terms of nationalism’s appeal is instructive. Smith argues that 
Gellner’s claim that the nation is a fairly recent phenomenon fails to account for the full 
concept of a nation as a territorial community with ‘a shared history and culture’.
110
 
Chapters 3 and 4 will concur with Smith and suggest that modernist thinking is ill-
equipped to understand the appeal of Romania’s ‘shared history and culture’ in a period 
which saw the rising appeal of folklore and fantasy genres across Europe.
111
 Based on 
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traditional images of Latin peasants, martial spirit, remote monasteries and monarchy it 
was this idea of Romania that Marie so effectively articulated in British discourse. 
Smith also challenges Hobsbawm for failing to see the other half of the story.
112
 
But through the recognition of Marie as a modern ‘invention’ in Romania’s history, 
albeit one who demanded a belief in the sacred role of monarchy, Chapters 3 and 4 will 
provide a partial vindication of Hobsbawm’s identification of ‘invented’ traditions 
comprised of national symbols, mythology and suitably tailored history that nurtured 
nationalism.
113
 However, just as Smith challenges the modernists’ attempts to debunk 
the notion of the primordial or perennial through his emphasis on ethno-symbolic 
significance and proto-national communities, this thesis will argue that Britain’s 
readiness to embrace the idea of a racially pure Romanian peasant stock demonstrates 
that in war, old definitions of a Western civic nationalism versus an Eastern ethnic 
nationalism were further diminished. Britain was receptive to Marie’s other ‘half of the 
story’, which depended on Romanian ‘memories, values, myths and symbols’,
114
 and 
this commonality in approach allowed the country to be re-evaluated in a more 
European context.  
The impact of World War I on European monarchies is rarely disputed. Miranda 
Carter provides a comprehensive list of royalty for whom the conflict had been 
disastrous, concluding that on Armistice Day George V ‘was the only emperor still 
standing on his balcony’,
115
 and yet Chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate that wartime 
Romania was defined in Britain through an emboldened, Queen Marie. Rodney Barker 
in Legitimating Identities stresses that it is individual rulers who are legitimated, not the 
regimes in which they serve. However, this study will suggest his argument that most 
rulers who practise legitimation, ‘do so in relation to their own referential hinterland, 
rather than the wider community’, demands revision in the case of Romania’s Queen.
116
 
An examination of Marie’s imaging and work in Britain’s wartime and Peace 
Conference press coverage will reveal that she was accorded unprecedented levels of 
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legitimacy in her British homeland, partially because of her reputed popularity in 
Romania, which by 1917 lay in stark contrast to the abdication and later murder of the 
Tsar and Tsarina in neighbouring Russia. 
In the context of this royal success story, Chapters 4 and 5 will revisit Hroch’s 
three-stage model, which could not be successfully applied to constructs of the pre-1916 
Romanian Kingdom in British discourse. However, by the end of the war heroic Marie, 
as the symbol around which the peasant soldiers gathered, had become the bridging link 
between Hroch’s second stage – ‘activist looking to win over as many compatriots as 
possible’ – and third stage – ‘mass participation’ – with German occupation providing 
the crucial ingredient of external oppression.
117
 Similarly Michael Jeismann identifies 
the concept of the nation developing out of an ‘oscillation between two poles: self 
definition on the one hand and the image and idea of the enemy on the other’.
118
 While 
both the theories of Hroch and Jeismann focus on the domestic rise and identification of 
nationalism in relation to oppression or enemy action, Chapters 4 and 5 will look at the 
definitions in British discourse of an allied Romania that was framed against a common 
German adversary and led by a British-born queen. 
This thesis will argue that during the latter half of the war, Romania’s national 
story more readily adhered to recognised patterns of nationhood and would prove 
compelling to a British audience despite the country’s defeat in December 1916 and 
capitulation in March 1918. By assessing the chronology of events through the 
nationalism debates outlined above, it will argue that Britain’s strategic demands 
insisted Romania’s complex and shifting nationalities were reframed through a Latin 
peasant narrative that included the Old Kingdom but prioritised the West-facing lands 
of Habsburg Transylvania. This facilitated a representational shift in Romania’s 
identity, which saw previous constructions associated with an Eastern or Balkan 
Romania dissembled and temporarily overlaid with ideas about a New European 
country capable of democracy and civic government. Britain’s wartime efforts to mask 
a persistent wariness regarding old Romania are exemplified through the alacrity with 
which British-born Marie was embraced as the country’s exceptional figurehead and 
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saviour. In keeping with the idea of Romania’s realignment into a post-war New 
Europe, at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Queen Marie was the undisputed star of the 
show. However, as would quickly become apparent in the interwar period, these 
superficial ideas concerning Greater Romania and its popular queen required the 
commonality of allied conflict to challenge Britain’s long-term lack of interest and 
presumed superiority. 
 
Chapter Outlines and Structure 
The speed and dislocating impact of international conflict in the period studied here had 
a profound effect on regional definitions, with complex implications for Romanian 
identity. To facilitate an understanding of the relationship between events and national 
imaging in British discourse, the five chapters in this thesis adhere to a rough 
chronology and are split into sections focused on different themes within the relevant 
time periods. All five begin with an introduction that extensively outlines the aims of 
the chapter. 
Chapter 1, ‘Locating Romania and the 1907 Peasants’ Revolt’, focuses on 
pre-war constructions of Romania, in particular the impact the Peasants’ Revolt had on 
Britain’s Balkan, Jewish, European and royal interpretations of Romania. 
§1.1, ‘The Balkans, Romania and the Peasants’ Revolt’, looks at the work of 
Britain’s Balkan Committee and analyses Romania’s conflicted place within a Balkan 
rubric in light of the 1907 rebellion.  
§1.2, ‘Romania’s Jewish Question and the Peasants’ Revolt’, recognises that 
Romania’s refusal to enfranchise its Jewish minority had been a defining issue in 
nineteenth-century British discourse and examines changing attitudes towards that 
Jewish Question at the beginning of the twentieth.  
§1.3, ‘Latin Romania and its German Monarchy’, examines Romania’s 
European and royal efforts under King Carol
119
 and assesses the extent to which they 
were impacted by the events of 1907 and Britain’s increasing Germanophobia. 
Chapter 2, ‘British Expertise and Romanian Imaging, 1906–1916’, examines 
the role of British-based experts in relation to Romania, with a particular focus on the 
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country’s identity in the second Balkan War and two-year neutrality during World War 
I. 
§2.1, ‘British Expertise and the Second Balkan War’, is divided into four parts 
that alternate between assessments of conservative journalist Dillon and Habsburg 
nationalities expert Seton-Watson. Dillon’s focus on the Romanian kingdom is 
contrasted with the priority Seton-Watson accorded the Romanians in Austria-
Hungary’s Transylvania. 
§2.2, ‘World War, Romanian Neutrality and the Changing Face of Expertise’, 
consists of two parts that compare Dillon’s public criticism of Romanian neutrality and 
the limitations of his ‘expertise’, with the rising stock of Seton-Watson who continued 
to champion Romania, and the more cautious promotional efforts of Romanian 
academic, David Mitrany.  
Chapter 3, ‘Military and Royal Representations of Neutral Romania’, 
highlights the contradictions in wartime Britain’s perception of neutral Romania 
through an examination of aspirational military constructs and the feminine imaging led 
by Queen Marie.  
§3.1, ‘Military Representations of Neutral Romania’, looks at the motivations 
behind idealised depictions of Romania’s army in a British discourse desperate to boost 
national morale.  
§3.2, ‘A King and Two Queens; Feminine Romania and Neutrality’, identifies 
the emergence of a distinct, albeit secondary, feminine narrative in Britain that was 
predominantly fostered by Romania’s two queens.  
Chapter 4, ‘Romania at War, August 1916–December 1918’, identifies 
Queen Marie as the main vehicle through which Romania’s image was rehabilitated in 
British discourse and argues that her work complemented ideas about Greater Romania 
promoted by powerful New Europe experts in wartime London. 
§4.1, ‘Iconic Marie and Romania’s War’, examines Queen Marie’s wartime 
imaging and propaganda and discusses the impact these gendered royal constructs had 
on Romanian identity in Britain after August 1916.  
§4.2, ‘My Country, Female Literature and Wartime Romania’, identifies 
literature written by Queen Marie and several British women during the last two years 




§4.3, ‘Peace-planning, Greater Romania and a New Europe’, acknowledges 
Seton-Watson’s influential New Europe thinking in relation to the work of Romanian 
expert Allen Leeper, and his wartime collaboration with émigré Romanians. 
Chapter 5, ‘Romania at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919’, examines how 
public and political interpretations of Romania at the Conference were impacted by 
Romanian Premier Brătianu’s intransigence and the flamboyant appearance of Queen 
Marie.  
§5.1, ‘Brătianu, Transylvanian Romania and a New Europe’, analyses British 
responses to Brătianu’s chauvinism in Paris and London. Public support for Romanian 
belligerence in Hungary will contrast with the exasperation of British officialdom and 
the faith placed in a Transylvanian-led idea of Romania. 
§5.2, ‘Britain, the Peace Conference and Romania’s Jewish Question’, will 
assess the significance of Brătianu’s obstructive attitude towards the Minorities Treaty 
for the imaging of Romania and interpretations of its Jewish Question. 
§5.3, ‘Queen Marie in Paris, London and Greater Romania, 1919’, examines 
Marie’s capacity to capitalise on her celebrated war work and its implications for 
constructions of the country she claimed to have given a ‘face’ 
 




Locating Romania and the 1907 Peasants’ Revolt 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 will argue that at the beginning of the twentieth century Romanian identity in 
British discourse was conflicted and ambiguous, occupying a vague shifting locus 
within broader Balkan and East European constructs. Despite Romania’s pivotal 
position between the Habsburg and Russian Empires, this chapter will identify a country 
that lay outside Britain’s sphere of interest and, unlike other states in South East 
Europe, lacked the specific conditions necessary to attract British commentators to its 
national cause. Todorova argues convincingly for an emerging Balkan identity in the 
West prior to World War I,
1
 as do Hammond and Michail, who both focus on British 
perceptions of this Eastern rubric.
2
 Tethered to the footprint of the Ottoman Empire, 
they insist the Balkans was increasingly seen as a barometer against which to measure 
European civility and progress. However, this chapter will challenge their general 
failure to confront Romanian exceptionalism within that appellation. Through an 
examination of Hroch’s three-stage model of nationalism and the identification of two 
of Brubaker’s nationalisms, it will explicate British responses to issues thrown up by 
Romania’s 1907 Peasant’s Revolt and identify a complex national identity not without 
European appeal, that partially resisted Balkan associations at the same time as it 
reinforced ideas of a savage Eastern Europe. 
Section 1.1 will seek to clarify British definitions of the Balkans at the turn of 
the twentieth century, with particular reference to the work of the Balkan Committee, a 
political pressure group formed in response to the 1903 Macedonian Uprising. It will 
argue that Romania, never occupied by the Ottomans and with its own oppressed serf 
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majority population, has been poorly served by subsequent efforts to define Balkan 
from a British perspective. Neither the arguments of Hobsbawm or Hroch, which help 
identify the rise of nationalism on the Peninsula, fully explain Romanian national 
identity in the early twentieth century,
3
 the complexities of which often contradicted the 
‘Balkan’ tag in British discourse. Interpretations of the Peasants’ Revolt in 1907, a 
violent national uprising that attracted international opprobrium, will highlight the 
confusion associated with Romanian identity and suggest that coverage of the rebellion 
undermined the country’s efforts at European statehood. Instead, Romania was held up 
as a commentary on Britain’s rapprochement with Russia leaving Wolff’s identification 




Section 1.2 will examine Romania’s Jewish Question as the first of two 
conflicting national indicators that dominated Romanian identity in the pre-war period. 
Hobsbawm argues that migration and non-traditional classes in urbanised societies 
helped develop a heightened sense of national identity.
5
 Romania was a case in point. 
The arrival of a large Jewish minority in the previous century, coupled with anti-
Semitism as a consistent leitmotif of Romanian government, had seen Victorian Britain 
predominantly identify the country through its Jewish Question. Article 44 in the 1878 
Treaty of Berlin, which insisted that Romania enfranchise its Jews, was the result of 
Great Power pressure led by Britain. However, the vast majority of Romania’s Jews 
remained disenfranchised at the beginning of the twentieth century and anti-Jewish 
attacks were a hallmark of the 1907 revolt.  
As will be discussed, a significant shift from the more inclusive high Victorian 
period to a more exclusive nation-state narrative by the turn of the twentieth century 
coarsened debate in Edwardian Britain and complicates efforts to evaluate the impact of 
the Jewish Question in pre-war Romanian representations.
6
 This transnational picture 
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was further challenged by the arrival of a sizeable East European Jewish minority in 
London. Focusing on Brubaker’s instructive identification of national minority 
nationalism, which required the minority to define its host state as an oppressor, this 
section will examine the Semitic representations featured in the coverage of the 
Peasants’ Revolt and seek to explicate British responses to Romania’s Jewish Question. 
It will argue that while Romania’s Jews were increasingly dependent on the work of the 
Conjoint Committee of British Jews for support, the latter’s persistent reminders at 
official level that Romania was a ‘persecuting power’ pinned the country’s identity to a 
larger savage Eastern rubric. It will conclude that in 1907 Romania’s Jewish Question 
provided a timely commentary on Britain’s commitment to the Anglo–Russian 
Convention signed the same year.
7
  
Section 1.3 will argue that Romania countered these negative associations – 
Balkan, Slavic, anti-Semitic – through the self-conscious promotion of a European 
identity located in traditional imagery. The monarchy played an important part in this 
process, and has typically been ignored or trivialised, with Todorova in Imagining the 
Balkans querying the value of European royalty in the contested nation-states of South 
East Europe.
8
 Section 1.3 will challenge that trivialisation in the case of Romania, 
where the imported German monarchy became an early and important vehicle for 
articulating ideas about Romania’s ancient heritage and capacity for modernisation. 
Arriving in a country with a French-speaking aristocracy and a distinct feudal structure, 
Romania lent easily to the reign of Hohenzollern Prince Carol in 1866. Although 
latterly the King’s German nationality compromised his appeal in British discourse, the 
international qualities of Carol’s German poet-queen, Elizabeth of Wied, proved more 
resistant to Britain’s Germanophobia. This section will suggest that while Todorova has 
observed the value of foundation myths and stories in Western discourse, she fails to 
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credit Elizabeth (whose greatest success was among literary audiences in the West) for 
creating a unique Romanian construct.
9
  
Section 1.3 will highlight the value of modernist theories of nationalism which 
expound the importance of the printing press and literacy, for the creation of a Romania 
in the British imagination.
10
 Elizabeth gave the illiterate peasant her voice, and in doing 
so planted the idea of a folkloric romantic land in British discourse. This imaging of the 
core Romanian nation was the competing other to Romania’s national minority image, 
with the Queen responding directly to challenges of Romanian anti-Semitism. The 
important precedent she set challenges Saidian ideas that prioritise the premise of 
exteriority in representations, with Elizabeth’s international fame adding to a 
commentary on royal ceremonial as a part of the weaponry of ‘international rivalry’.
11
 
The section will conclude that her celebrated femininity emphasised Romania’s 
difference in a corner of Europe commonly associated with masculinity and barbarity.
12
  
Following these separate threads of Romanian national identity – informed, but 
not exclusively defined by, Balkan and East European generalisations – Chapter 1 will 
highlight the country’s ability to confound standard nation-building tropes at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and help to explain the confusion over what Romania 
stood for both in public discourse and within the Foreign Office. While Andreas Rose 
has argued that historiography has overlooked or ‘even deliberately ignored’ Britain’s 
policy in the Balkans in this pre-war period,
13
 Romania, with an identity in Britain that 
did not conform to Hroch’s three-stage modelling for the rise of nationalism and which 
uncomfortably straddled Balkan and Russian orbits, provides a good example of how 
some nations resist clear definition and thus compound historiography’s oversight. It is 
Brubaker’s useful framing, which helps elucidate a distinct minority identity for 
Romania against which the core Romania nation was also partially defined, that serves 
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to differentiate between nationalisms. This evolving presentation of more than one 
Romania would assist in the country’s national repositioning within British discourse by 
1913, when tensions in the region and the emergence of a third Romanian nationalism 
in Austria-Hungary helped facilitate direct British interest and saw the creation of more 
sympathetic national constructs. 
 
1.1 The Balkans, Romania and the Peasants’ Revolt 
‘We speak another language: the Danube separates us from the Balkans and we have 
nothing in common with their races.’ Although ‘greatly taken with the idea of an 
exhibition in London’, in 1906 when Romania’s King Carol I was approached by 
Harold Hartley, the managing director of the London’s Exhibitions, he was ‘absolutely 
opposed to Romania being associated with any other Balkan country’.
14
 Hartley 
considered Romania sufficiently Balkan, Carol did not. The King sacrificed the benefits 
of a London exhibition to avoid the ‘Balkan’ tag (although there were ‘hopes of 
arranging an all-Roumanian event’
15
). His decision was indicative of Romania’s 
elevated self-regard in relation to its southern neighbours. This section will look at 
Romania’s equivocal position within the Balkan appellation at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and suggest that the King’s efforts to avoid Balkan associations in 
British discourse were misjudged.  
It will agree with Michail and J. A. Perkins that the Balkans, although not 
embraced by the Foreign Office, nonetheless attracted sympathetic imaging in Britain as 
the staging of an exhibition suggested.
16
 However, these historians do not acknowledge 
Romania’s conflicted identity in relation to Europe’s southeastern Peninsula, an 
oversight this section will suggest is partially explained by the country’s exceptional 
political features. It will argue that Romania’s serf-style feudalism confounded 
traditional ideas of Balkan nationhood and exhibited a structural imbalance in 
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Romanian society that was dramatically highlighted when the Peasants’ Revolt erupted 
in 1907. It was British coverage of this rebellion that pitched Romania’s image further 




The word ‘Balkan’ was inspired by the eponymous Turkish word that referred to 
the mountain chain running between the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire, a 
geographical demarcation which separated the southeastern Peninsula from the rest of 
the continent.
18
 Romania’s location north of that mountain range, a physical barrier 
exacerbated by the course of the Danube River, highlights the geographical 
contradistinction between Romania and its ‘Balkan’ neighbours. Misha Glenny argues 
that many scholars regard the Danube as the northern border of the Peninsula, before 
conceding that Romania is not only ‘in most Western studies of the Balkans but even in 
Romanian histories of the Balkans’. The country is one of the ‘core regions’ in his 
Balkan study.
19
 This geographical inconsistency is explained by Vesna Goldsworthy, 
who claims that ‘precise details of Balkan history and geography are less important than 
the imaginary or near imaginary landscapes of the British concepts of the Balkans’.
20
 
Philanthropist Edith Sellers exemplified this in 1907 when she wrote, ‘Roumania has 
little in common with the Balkan states’, but included it in her Balkan poor-relief review 
as it ‘is too near a neighbour of theirs not to claim mention here’.
21
 
A political definition that includes Romania is also troublesome. The word 
‘Balkan’ was increasingly used in Britain from the 1870s in reference to the countries 
that had once been part of Turkey in Europe.
22
 Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century the Ottoman Empire’s retreat was formalised in a series of independence wars 
and movements, the diplomatic consequences of which were overseen by the Great 
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Powers. The emerging nation states were increasingly referred to as the Balkans. 
However, unlike their southern neighbours, the Romanian Principalities had never been 
governed by the Ottomans. Their looser vassel status within a broader imperial structure 
reduced Romania’s capacity for a defining independence movement which became a 
hallmark of the Balkan states. Mark Mazower includes the country in his study, The 
Balkans, with the qualifier that the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
‘fought over by Russia and Turkey for most of the 18
th
 century ... were the most 
important example of those autonomous provinces that inhabited an intermediate space 
between total incorporation within an empire and independence’.
23
 King Carol’s dispute 
over Romania’s Balkan identity in 1906 underlines this ambiguity, and the country’s 
exclusion from the British Encyclopaedia’s ‘Balkan peninsula’ definition in 1910 
suggests his distinction was in line with some British thinking.
24
 
Diana Mishkova observes that ‘the scholar who contributed the most to the 
cultural-historical definition of the region before World War I was Nicolae Iorga, the 
founder of the Institute for the Study of Southeastern Europe in Bucharest in 1914’. In 
outspoken opposition to ‘the Balkans’ and the ‘Balkan Peninsula’, Romania’s national 
historian and politician traced southeastern Europe (as distinct from Eastern Europe 
which he considered part of the ‘Eurasian World’) from the Carpatheans to the Aegean, 
in a neat exposition of Romanian nationalism which incorporated Romanians from 
Transylvania in the north-west to those in Greece and Macedonia in the south.
25
 This 
thinking informs the paradox that contemporary Romanian historian and politican, 
Adrian Cioroianu, identifies at the heart of Romania’s national identity, whereby the 
country’s independence under Carol in 1881 was part of a process where ‘every step 
towards modernisation was perceived as a step away from the Balkans’, in which the 
culminating event was the 1906 Bucharest Jubilee Exhibition.
26
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While Romania’s ‘insider’ cultural ideas of its own place in European 
constellations were pitted against a Balkan concept always ‘framed more from the 
outside than the inside’,
27
 their resistance to Balkan associations resonates with a 
powerful thesis in the West that Balkan was a byword for ‘chaos, backwardness, 
savagery and obfuscation, superstition, sloth and moral dissolution’.
28
 Hammond 
convincingly argues that these were the Peninsula’s defining features in British 
Victorian discourse. In line with Said’s recognition of the construction of a lesser 
‘other’ for self-referential purposes, Hammond agrees with Todorova that negative 
characteristics were demanded of a Balkan discourse which served to emphasise 
Western Europe’s symbolic cleanliness, order and justice.
29
 Both Todorova and 
Mishkova identify a ‘growing criticism of the Balkans’ which hardened during the 
Balkan wars and World War I.
30
 In this context Romania’s ‘radical overhaul to become 
European’ in the late nineteenth century, dumping first its Greek and then its Ottoman 
heritage, is understandable both in terms of the country’s desire to distance itself from 
the Turk, and from the Balkan Peninsula.
31
 If the small stock of British opinions on 
Romania in the late 1800s failed to pick up on the country’s reimagining,
32
 Shona 
Kallestrup’s contention that the international forms in the 1906 Bucharest Jubilee 
Exhibition were overt manifestations of Romania’s superiority over its non-Latin 
neighbours, suggests Romanians took the project seriously.
33
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However, while the identification of Balkanism as a negative term is broadly 
accurate, the tone of British political discourse in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries questions Romania’s presumption that in relation to its national identity 
Balkan associations were best avoided. During this period, a liberal sympathy for the 
‘national question’ demanded a fresh understanding of the Peninsula.
34
 The precedent 
was established early in the nineteenth century, when Greek independence framed 
against Ottoman aggression witnessed a subsequent rise in philhellenism encapsulated 
through the work of Lord Bryon.
35
 Mixing morality with politics, Liberal opposition 
leader William Gladstone’s championing of Bulgaria in 1876 was Britain’s most 
famous response to a series of national struggles against the Turkish infidel which were 
frequently used to pillory Tory Foreign policy in public discourse.
36
 It is historian of 
East European nationalism, Hroch, who argues that ‘a clearly defined external enemy’ 
increased pressure on the ‘national acceleration’ phase of nation building, when the idea 
of national identity spreads beyond the elite few.
37
 Applying this observation to the 
Balkan rubric, it is striking that the Turkish enemy also helped define countries like 
Greece, Bulgaria and Macedonia in British thinking.
38
 Romania, unlike its Balkan 
neighbours, lacked an equivalent ‘Crescent versus the Cross’ narrative and therefore 
missed out on the sympathetic imaging which accompanied it. 
In the early twentieth century the task of representing the Balkans in Britain was 
assumed by the Balkan Committee, an organisation founded in direct response to the 
1903 Macedonian Uprising, with the intention of ‘awakening and focusing public 
interest and for supplying accurate information and just views to a too ignorant 
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 Over 300 public meetings and conferences were held in the autumn of 1903 
alone, and as one disapproving publication put it, the Committee enjoyed ‘adventitious 
advertisement ... extorted from the press’
40
 and tapped into what Stefan Collini has 
identified as an intelligentsia driven by concerns for a liberal, humitarian world order 
that was loosely aligned with the Liberal party and progressivist opinion.
41
  
The Committee consisted of well-connected, liberal men who occupied an array 
of powerful positions within parliament, the established church and the liberal/radical 
press
42
 and had the capacity to challenge British foreign policy decision-making at the 
highest levels.
43
 Invariably steering clear of the trickier nationalist conflicts that saw 
Christian pitched against Christian, the Balkan Committee’s key argument was about 
freedom versus oppression, in what founding member Charles Buxton referred to as 
‘Europe unredeemed’.
44
 Romania was not included in that unredeemed Europe, nor was 
it included in the oeuvre of work produced by various Balkan Committee members with 
specific interests in certain ‘pet’ Balkan states.
45
  
In contrast to the more straightforward claims of most Balkan countries, 
Romania’s efforts to contest the welfare of a 200,000 strong Aromanian population
46
 (a 
Romance-speaking people of Romanian descent spread through the southern Balkans) 
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had an adverse impact on relations with the Christian Greeks, not the Turks.
47
 Raising 
the issue was regarded by the British Ambassador in Bucharest, Sir Conyingham 
Greene, as a piece of unwise political game-playing; he thought Romania was trying to 
‘establish a claim in some future settlement of the Balkan Question’.
48
 The country’s 
championing of this minority failed to resonate in a broader Balkan dialogue and drew 




Further complicating the idea of Romania as Balkan was the publication of the 
Near East, a British journal established in 1908 to enlighten the public to ‘matters 
relating to the Ottoman Empire’, in direct opposition to the Balkan Committee’s 
‘ridiculous’ proposals and ‘hysterical sentiment’. The publication covered a broad 
sweep of countries including ‘the Balkan states, Egypt, Persia and India’ and gave 
‘Latin’ Romania preferential treatment over its Balkan rivals.
50
 This recognised gulf in 
British discourse between the Balkans and their northern neighbour is reflected in recent 
historiography. Examining the British Liberals’ relationship with the Balkans between 
1875 and 1925, Perkins does not include Romania in his thesis.
51
 A country which by 
the 1900s had good relations with the Ottoman Empire, and was better known as a 
‘persecuting power’ of its Jewish minority,
52
 did not appeal to Britain’s liberal 
conscience. Romania is featured in Michail’s The British and the Balkans but the 
country’s position is ambiguous. Michail argues that without the Balkan Committee, 
1900 to 1910 would have been ‘a forgotten decade for the Balkans’ and claims that the 
only other newsworthy event coming from the region was the Serbian regicide of 
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 Although elsewhere in his book, the scope of which extends to 1950, Romania 
is referenced, it is significant that Michail overlooks Romania’s Peasants’ Revolt in 
1907 and does not articulate where the country fitted into his definition of ‘Balkan’ 
during the first decade of the twentieth century.  
Confusion concerning an identifiable Balkan Romania is compounded through 
Britain’s embrace of South East Europe’s most celebrated motif, the peasant. 
Hobsbawm identifies a ‘romantic passion for the pure, simple and uncorrupted 
peasantry’ in European nationalism,
54
 and in an era when Darwinian evolutionism 
provided racism with a powerful set of tools against the foreigner, in Britain the peasant 
as the repository for racial purity had broad appeal. Military anxieties concerning the 
degeneration and decline of the British male fuelled this trend and the national past was 
celebrated in a revival of folk culture and village imagery that was used by 
commentators on both the left and right.
55
  
Martin Wiener argues that by the turn of the twentieth century the southern 
metaphor of Englishness as ‘romantic, illogical, muddled, divinely lucky, Anglican, 
aristocratic, traditional, frivolous’ was triumphing over the industrial idea of England. 
In 1902 Prime Minister Arthur Balfour’s cousin, Rudyard Kipling, looked to England’s 
rural past to assuage his imperial anxieties, writing of a happily ‘primitive peasantry’ in 
an England ‘made up of trees and green fields and mud and gentry’.
56
 Complementing 
this conservative imagery, Perkins argues that the peasant was ‘at the heart of British 
liberal interactions with the Balkans’; it was through idealised constructions of Balkan 
life, they ‘found something that was missing’ at home.
57
 This discovery of a positive 
Balkan construct sees Perkins attack the Saidian assumption that societies ‘derive a 
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sense of their identities negatively’ through contradistinction with ‘others’. He insists 
that representations of the Balkans were more nuanced and sympathetic than 
Todorova’s and Hammond’s generally inferior Balkan constructs allow for.
58
 Although 
Perkins confines his study to Balkan Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece,
59
 
imagery of both Romanian and Balkan peasantry was frequently conflated in a public 
discourse which readily admitted its own ignorance. ‘Does anyone who has not 
travelled in this part of Europe realise, for instance, the difference between a country 
like Rumania and a country like Servia? Do they understand what Greece is?’
60
 
Alex Drace-Francis notes that the idea of Romanians as peasants in European 
thinking had ancient roots, and concedes that in the mid-nineteenth century ‘perhaps it 
was inevitably more natural for a Western author to focus on the figure of the peasant as 
a symbol of purity and simplicity’ than it was for a Romanian writer.
61
 The favourable 
impression the peasant made in Western Europe emboldened Romania’s commitment to 
the image of the peasant as a nation symbol.
62
 At the 1867 Universal Exhibition in 
Paris, Romania almost chose a peasant smallholding for their Pavilion, sending both the 
architect’s plan and a selection of peasant costumes to be exhibited, and by 1876 the 
Romanian royal family had begun appropriating peasant clothes as a ‘national 
costume’.
63 In British discourse, when Romanian aristocrat, Tereza Stratilesco, 
discovered the British ‘knew but little’ about Romania, she wrote a book in 1906 that 
‘simply aims at showing and describing what the Roumanian nation is, or at least the 
genuine and most interesting part of it, the peasants’.
64
 The Times Literary Supplement 
appreciated this ‘full and closely-detailed study with much historical matter, of the 
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Rumanian peasant in relation to the soil, the state, religion, foreigners and society’.
65
 In 
Vanity Fair, writer George Raffalovich described his Romanian host as ‘an enthusiast 
for his country’s art and folk-lore’ in a house with furniture ‘embroidered by the 
peasants’.
66
 If the much heralded tension with the Turk was specific to certain ‘Balkan’ 
states, the idea of a timeless peasant society was also applicable to Romania. Harold 
Hartley tried to solicit Romania for a Balkan Exhibition in Earls Court, memorable for 
the ‘exoticism of village life’
67




But peasant Romania had a fault line that did not exist in other Balkan states. In 
1915 Balkan Committee member Noel Buxton wrote War and the Balkans, in which 
Romania sat alongside other Balkan people as ‘races of peasants’ which ‘have the “bon 
sang” of those who have lived and whose ancestors have lived for many generations on 
the soil’. However, Buxton, an avid Bulgariophile, distinguished between the Balkan 
‘peasants with holdings of their own, with a consciousness of having something to fall 
back upon and a clear sense of the stake they hold in their country’ and Romania, where 
‘the distribution of wealth is extremely unequal’ and there is ‘a degree of abject poverty 
not known in Sofia, Belgrade or Athens’.
69
 Unlike their Balkan neighbours, Romania’s 
dependence on vast feudal estates more closely resembled the social structure of 
neighbouring Russia.
70
 Mazower observes, ‘1 per cent of the landowners held nearly 50 
per cent of the arable and grazing lands, while perhaps eighty-five per cent of peasant 
cultivators were operating at or below subsistence level.’
71
 
Unlike other Balkan countries, Romania’s governance, without popular support 
and prone to intermittent upheavals, including a large rebellion in 1888, failed to 
conform to the nation-building models on which Hobsbawm and Hroch premise many 
                                                          
65
 Times Literary Supplement, 16 Nov 1906. 
66
 Raffalovich, ‘Turkey and the Balkans’, p. 38. 
67
 Steward, ‘The Balkans in London’, Balkan Studies, p. 82. 
68
 Daily Graphic, 6 May 1907, cited in ibid. 
69
 Noel Edward Buxton, Baron, The War and the Balkans, [S.I.], Allen and Unwin, 
1915, pp. 18–19, 53. 
70
 Mazower, The Balkans, p. 40. 
71
 Ibid., p. 40; For more on the condition of the Romanian peasant see D. Hurezeanu 
and M. Iosa, ‘Social, Economic and Political Condition of the Peasants in the Early 20
th
 
Century’ in Ion Illincioiu, The Great Romanian Peasant Revolt of 1907, Bucureşti, 
Editura Academiei Romȃne, 1991, pp. 9-41. 





 In 1906 Alfred Stead, one of the few British men who supported 
Romania in public discourse (and was employed to do so by the Romanian government 
the following year),
73
 worked hard to counter ideas that the country’s hierarchical 
structure was a national weakness. In an article called ‘The Japan of Europe’, in his 
father’s publication, Review of Reviews, Stead modelled Romania on Asia’s most 
advanced nation and its Meiji imperial restoration. ‘Today the country is one of the 
principal grain exporting countries of the world, and the lot of the peasants, formerly so 
low, has been improved.’
74
 The same year Stratilesco’s book also played down rural 
divides and focused on the ‘spirit’ of the Romanian peasant, his vernacular verse, 
traditional dress and religious practises.
75
  
Arguably, the uncomfortable contradiction at the heart of Romania’s peasant 
society might have gone more or less unnoticed were it not for the 1907 Peasants’ 
Revolt, which began in the northern region of Moldova and soon engulfed the whole 
country. The worst uprising in modern Balkan history, claiming an estimated 11,000 
lives,
76
 the extreme nature of the rebellion appealed to Britain’s rapidly expanding 
press. Extensive coverage in the leading pictorial weekly, Illustrated London News, 
epitomised the conflict at the heart of Romania’s national identity. The front-page 
headline was ‘The Bloodshed and Pillage in Roumania’ and there were dramatic 
pictures of cavalry patrols sabring rioters and rebels burning farmhouses. Inside the 
same publication, rural images represented the ‘Types of Agrarian Agitators’, including 
‘a picturesque Roumanian bride and bridegroom’ in embroidered wedding costumes, ‘A 
bullock-cartful of bridesmaids’, gypsy women smoking a ‘peaceful pipe’, and a ‘quaint 
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Roumanian bullock-wagon’ with peasant girls carrying baskets of grapes.
77
 Coverage of 
the prolonged revolt lasted for nearly a month and saw these bi-focal images give way 
to lurid reporting that hardened perceptions of Romania as violent and backward:
78
  
Already the men, women and children slaughtered number thousands. Heaven 
alone knows when these scenes of barbarous ferocity, of fire and pillage, of 
things worse than the vilest murder will cease ... Officers captured by the 
peasants have been treated with awful cruelty. Petroleum was poured over 
engineer Captain Botez and he was roasted alive. A captured Lieutenant’s hands 
were cut off and he was otherwise tortured.
79
  
Edwardian Britain was presented with a horror story from the other side of Europe that 
questioned the very nature of Romanian statehood.  
Within a week the Illustrated London News focused exclusively on efforts to 
crush the rebellion.
80
 In the context of Gellner’s reminder that ‘the state is the 
specialization and concentration of order maintenance’, Romania’s image as a modern 
nation had been thoroughly undermined.
81
 The Manchester Guardian was pessimistic 
about its capacity to handle the crisis; Romanian troops had resorted to ‘savagery’ and 
‘wholesale executions’ to deal with rioters. Seventeen peasants set fire to granaries and 
the officer, ‘not being satisfied that all were dead, fired a bullet into the head of every 
single one’.
82
 Analysis of a ‘corrupt and very far from sincere’ political elite and a 
‘miserable’ peasantry, ‘treated like slaves’ and living in conditions ‘little better than 
pre-1864 serfdom’, offered little hope in a country where ‘the landowners and farmers 
hold the government of Roumania in their hands’.
83
 The Times agreed in an analysis 
which contradicts A. Deac’s conclusion that ‘the prevailing British view on the revolt 
was reactionary.’
84
 Retrospectively in 1915, even Britain’s best-known Romanian 
‘expert’ and sympathiser, R. W. Seton-Watson, could not exonerate the country, 
admitting that the ‘agrarian problem is the weakest spot in Roumania’s armour’, citing 
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Indicative of the seriousness with which Romania took this dent to its 
international image was the appointment of Alfred Stead as Romanian Consul-General 
in London that same year. A rare voice who had previously championed the country, 
Stead’s appointment was a judicious one.
86
 But the corrosive impact of the rebellion 
compounded doubts in the Foreign Office over a country they struggled to take 
seriously. Ambassador Greene wrote of ‘the exciting times we’ve been having here’, 
before conceding the Peasants’ Revolt ‘has I fear thrown back the country a long way 
and damaged its prestige abroad’.
87
 If newspaper coverage lasted for the duration of the 
month-long riots, the impression of an unstable country lingered on in government 
circles. In May 1908 Greene insisted that ‘the agrarian insurrection of last year takes us 
back to the Middle Ages’. Peace only reigns ‘for a while’ and it is hard to say ‘how long 
this state of trance’ will last, as ‘the peasantry will wake up some day’.
88
  
These persistent and unforgiving representations in both public and political 
discourse conform to Todorova’s identification of a more general Balkan rubric 
associated with ‘uncivilised, primitive, crude, cruel’ men.
89
 Specifically in the pre-war 
period, Michail identifies negative imagining in the extensive coverage of the Serbian 
Regicide, which also featured common themes of ‘revulsion’ and ‘unspoken 
fascination’ that were used to extrapolate generalisations about Serbia and the 
Balkans.
90
 In this context Michail’s failure to acknowledge the Peasants’ Revolt is 
significant, suggesting that while violence was regarded as a parameter for Balkanism, 
violence by, for and against the peasant – repository for all that was good in the Balkans 
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– was a harder phenomenon to account for.
91
 Contemporary reports from 1907 confirm 
that despite Romania’s ‘savage’ behaviour, any rare Balkan comparisons compounded 
the country’s outsider status. Against Romania, Serbia was heralded as a ‘Balkan’ 
exception that had settled the agrarian question in favour of the peasantry, and Seton-
Watson later noted of Romania, ‘the situation of the peasantry is still very unfavourable 
compared to that of Serbia or Bulgaria’.
92
 The conservative Spectator cited Romania’s 
landowning aristocratic structure as the reason why previously the country had ‘been 
considered in Western Europe the best governed of the Balkan states’ in a commentary 
that highlights the discrepancies between conservative and liberal/progressive thinking 
and underlines Romania’s anomalous status in both.
93
 
In 1907 rebel Romania was not convincingly identified in a Balkan rubric, 
pejorative or otherwise. However, the behaviour of their peasantry with its ‘element of 
Eastern cruelty’
94
 did confirm the country’s location in ‘the shadowed lands of 
backwardness, even barbarism’ that Wolff identifies as features of a broader Eastern 
Europe construct which included Russia.
95
 By early 1907 Foreign Secretary Sir Edward 
Grey was leading a controversial rapprochement with Russia that culminated in the 
signing of the Anglo–Russian convention on 7 September 1907.
96
 Valentine Chirol, the 
foreign editor of The Times (a paper associated with government policy and one which 
supplied most of the regional papers with their foreign stories), was persuaded to adopt 
a pro-Russian stance. But the 1903 Kishinev Pogrom and 1905 Revolution were 
untimely reminders of the country’s instability and anti-Semitism in a British discourse 
which remained cautious about the political wisdom of embracing Russian Tsardom.
97
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The opportunity to publicly examine similar problems in neighbouring Romania 
(including the widely reported anti-Semitic nature of the rebellion, discussed in §1.2) 
provided Britain with a politically neutral context in which to air broader concerns.  
The Spectator opined, ‘the poorer class of the peasantry in Russia are hardly 
better off than in Romania and we have seen with the past fortnight how swiftly 
agrarian despair may break through the veneer of civilisation’.
98
 According to The 
Times, ‘the situation is exceedingly grave – graver than seems realised by the outer 
world’. The revolt exhibited ‘indications that a widespread organisation is at work’ and 
with the involvement of ‘anarchist societies over the Russian frontier ... the influence of 
Russian revolutionary movements is everywhere apparent’.
99
 The Review of Reviews 
concurred: ‘Anarchist societies over the Russian frontier are said to have been stirring 
up the peasantry.’
100
 Efforts to implicate Russia in coverage of the rebellion were 
politically motivated but, echoing the rational of Gellner that a state must facilitate 
order, they also helped to explain a revolt which was otherwise hard to understand. 
Inverting the rules of Hroch’s ‘agitation phase’ of nation-building, the peasants were 
agitating against their own Romanian leaders.
101
 It wasn’t until the beginning of April 
that the Manchester Guardian dismissed the Romanian government’s attempts to blame 
the ‘sailors of Potemkin, trade unionists and socialists’ as a ruse to distract from the real 




In 1905 Whitehall had spoken of the ‘re-establishment of Russia in “the 
Councils of Europe”’. London’s press and politicians were aware that ‘the real concern 
was to lay the foundations for a new political system for Europe’ and the Daily 
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Telegraph concluded, ‘The Grouping of the Powers has begun.’
103
 This geopolitical 
shift had direct implications for the balance of power and, more specifically, expansive 
Russian ambitions in the Balkans. Unsurprisingly given the timing of the Peasants’ 
Revolt and Romania’s geographical location between two opposing empires, the 
country’s volatility served as a warning shot against further instability. In a prophetic 
article, the Review of Reviews was pessimistic about the wider repercussions of the 
rebellion:  
Neither Austria nor Russia can afford to see an agrarian jacquerie blaze up, 
heaven high, just across their frontiers. No one can say how far such a 
conflagration might spread, and when, once the international fire brigades are 
called into action to extinguish the conflagration in their neighbours’ territories, 
no one knows how soon they may come into collision with each other.
104
 
Although internationally discrediting Romania, the rebellion also served as a 
reminder of the country’s potential geopolitical significance. Reports of Bulgaria and 
Austria dispatching steamers to evacuate their nationals and Austrian, Russian, Serbian 
and Bulgarian troops gathering on Romania’s frontiers to prevent contagion emphasised 
the danger.
105
 Hroch’s and Hobsbawm’s respective identification of the significant role 
of an ‘external factor’ in the emergence of the nation state or ‘actual or threatened 
violence’ in relation to ‘post-imperial migratory unmixings’ help contextualise British 
expectations of further regional instability.
106
 Despite Romania’s close allegiance with 
neighbouring Austria-Hungary, the Review of Reviews acknowledged the role of ‘bands 
of peasants from across the Austrian frontier’ and connected the Kingdom with its 
three-million strong minority in the Dual monarchy.
107
 Just months earlier, the British 
ambassador had observed Romania’s loyalty to the Hapsburgs was conditional upon the 
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Romania’s dislocation in 1907 was a reminder of its strategic location between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia at a time when Britain’s foreign policy was pivoting 
towards the latter.
109
 Located on the crossroads between two empires and with an 
ambiguous political allegiance to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Romania’s status in 
South East Europe would rise over the next decade. However, the more immediate 
impact of the revolt was the confirmation of long-held Western prejudices about the 
eastern half of Europe. Complicating ideas that Balkanism was the natural repository for 
negative generalisations, the coverage of the 1907 rebellion did not frame it as Balkan, 
but rather underlined the profoundly disturbing nature of statehood in a more general 
eastern ‘savage Europe’. This commentary on Romanian violence and upheaval served 
Britain a salutary reminder of the company it was seeking through rapprochement with 
Russia – ‘the land of mystery, gloom and death’.
110
 
1.2 Romania’s Jewish Question and the Peasants’ Revolt 
Reviewing the image of the pre-war Balkans in 1915, renowned historian and Balkan 
Committee member George Trevelyan argued that ‘all that the average Englishman 
knew about Roumania was that the Jews were denied civil rights there’.
111
 In Romania’s 
case, a persistent failure to resolve its Jewish Question predated the country’s 
incremental journey to independent Kingdom, and defined it in a period when 
alternative external representations of Romania were limited. Guided by Brubaker’s 
model for reframing nationalities, this section will suggest that two of the competing 
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nationalisms he identifies in post-World War I Central and Eastern Europe found their 
equivalents in the very different context of pre-World War I Romania. In particular, it 
will examine Romania’s significant Jewish population as a national minority with a 




Brubaker recognises that ‘external perceptions’ of different nationalisms and the 
political stance they help justify and sustain are important.
113
 This section will look 
specifically at British perspectives of Romania’s Jewish Question, including an 
assessment of Jewish imagery during the Peasants’ Revolt, to analyse that theory. It will 
acknowledge that Trevelyan’s comment was a product of the historian’s liberal politics 
and argue that any examination of Romania’s Jewish Question in British discourse must 
take into account the increasingly conflicted image of the Jew in this period.
114
 This 
section will identify persistent Anglo-Jewish lobbying at government level that 
undermined the reputation of Romania’s political class. It will consider the impact of 
these representations against rising anti-Semitism in Britain and concerns regarding 
Jewish immigration that saw the volatile Romanian construct partially engulfed within a 
broader East European identity.  
Conforming to Brubaker’s identification of competing nationalisms embedded in 
the post-war period, in 1919 Romania the insecure nationalising nation clashed with the 
demands of its expanded minority population, including the Jews.
115
 If the issue was 
temporarily contained with the signing of the Minority Treaty in December 1919
116
, the 
interplay between Romania’s different national fields began much earlier. Fulfilling 
Brubaker’s national minority criteria, Romania’s Jewish community was at its most 
effective in the late nineteenth century when its demands for enfranchisement 
dovetailed with a sympathetic international reception to Jewish representations of 
Romania as an oppressive state.  
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Romania’s contested minority were predominantly Ashkenazi Jews who arrived 
in the country’s northern region, Moldova, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
having fled war and persecution in Russia and Galicia. Although they never represented 
more than 5% of the population, their rapid growth (10,000 Jews in Moldavia in 1803 
compared with 269,000 in 1899) and increased visibility in towns due to discriminatory 
measures, coincided with the thrusting nationalism of an embryonic state keen to define 
itself in the face of overpowering neighbours.
117
 By 1866, despite its liberal pretensions, 
Romania’s constitution failed to emancipate the Jews in a country where anti-Semitism 
had become a ‘genuine state institution’
118
 and ‘an integral part of the intellectual life’ 
to the extent ‘that being Romanian became synonymous with being an anti-Semite’.
119
 
If, as will be discussed in §1.3, externally Romania sought to assert the Latin credentials 
of its core nation, internally a radical interpretation of that Romanian nationalism 
excluded the Jews.  
In a straightforward example of what Hans Kohn identifies as ethnic nationalism 
in the East contrasting with civic nationalism in the West, the crystallisation of 
Romania’s Jewish Question coincided with a period of enlightened liberalism in 
Western Europe which reached its apogee in the 1860s and 1870s.
120
 Britain, France 
and Prussia had already achieved political and partial social emancipation that included 
their Jewish populations, and expectations ran high for the emerging nation states in 
South East Europe. However, Romania, with proportionally the region’s largest Jewish 
minority, was destined to disappoint. Historian Sam Johnson argues that ‘had British 
commentators been asked in the 1860s where in Europe the Jewish lot was at its worst, 
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The issue’s prominence in British dialogue was maintained through the work of 
the well-established Anglo-Jewish community at a time when little else was known 
about the country. From 1866, reports of persistent Jewish exclusion and persecution 
saw the Jewish Board of Deputies utilise their relationship with a sympathetic Foreign 
Office under Lord Stanley. Sanctioned by the British government, in 1867 the Board’s 
octogenarian president Charles Montefiore travelled to Bucharest, enjoying official 
support and meetings in Paris and Austria en route.
122
 Significantly Montefiore met 
Romania’s new German prince, Carol Hohenzollern, and the latter’s reassurance 
regarding Romania’s treatment of its Jews was published in The Times.
123
 Receiving 
considerable press, the trip served to affirm Romania’s nascent reputation as a backward 
other for which assurances were granted in the name of a foreign prince.
124
 It was a 
reputation subsequently compounded through continual exposure of Romania’s failure 
to resolve its Jewish Question by a well-organised trans-European network of Jewish 
organisations. 
In time for the Congress of Berlin 1878, the Anglo-Jewish Association had 
created a shared platform with the Board of Jewish Deputies called the Conjoint Jewish 
Committee with the purpose of conducting Anglo-Jewish Foreign Policy.
125
 
Confirmation of the ‘Jewish Question’s’ significance in political discourse was British 
Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s appearance at the Congress where he insisted that 
formal recognition of Romanian independence must depend on the promise of social 
and political equality for the Jews written into the treaty. The Great Powers stood in 
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agreement and Romania was compelled to sign Article 44.
126
 The year 1878 represented 
the high-water mark of international cooperation and a clear statement of Anglo-Jewry’s 
ability to help frame Romania’s independence in the context of its Jewish Question.
127
  
However, despite its legal obligations, Romania continued to prevaricate over 
Jewish emancipation and increased the legal restrictions on its Jews. Britain, which 
established a legation in Romania in 1880, began diplomatic relations with a country 
that was defined by its evasion of Article 44, an issue highlighted through ongoing 
communications from the Conjoint.
128
 This context explains the genesis of George 
Trevelyan’s comment. As one of Edwardian England’s foremost liberal historians who 
blended a firm belief in the English traditions of liberty and religious freedom with a 
dislike of continental despotisms, he was particularly sensitive to Romania’s refusal to 
emancipate their Jews.
129
 However, Trevelyan’s assumption that in the early twentieth 
century the public shared both his specific knowledge about Romania and his 
disapproval of Romanian anti-Semitism reflected the presumptions of a political figure, 
and should not be mistaken for British attitudes more generally.
130
 By the turn of the 
century the existing model of Romania as a persecutor of the Jews in British discourse 
was clouded by several interconnected realities in the late Victorian period which 
implicated neighbouring Russia and that country’s domination of the Jewish issue 
before World War I.  
As discussed in §1.1, historiography has given considerable attention to the 
emergence of a Balkan rubric which included Romania, while much less space has been 
accorded to the country’s shared border and history with Slavic Russia. An example of 
this Balkan preoccupation is historian Constantin Iordachi’s framing of emerging 
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Romanian nationalism in the context of its Ottoman heritage. He argues the ‘thick’ 
definition of Romanian citizenship during the mid-nineteenth century had its roots in 
the laws of religious exclusion inherited from the early days of fifteenth-century 
Ottoman suzerainty when the Romanian principalities enjoyed relative autonomy in 
their internal affairs.
131
 He identifies a country that drew on previous administrative and 
legal practices to establish a national citizenry in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
that excluded the Jews. He compares Romania’s state evolution with Bulgaria’s, 
arguing the latter’s occupation by the Ottoman Empire resulted in a system which 
generally conferred rights on all permanent citizens and led to constitutional differences 
with Romania that would play in Bulgaria’s favour internationally as the Balkan nations 
rose to prominence in the early twentieth century.
132
 By focusing on the Balkans, 
Iordachi fails to account for Russian influence in Romania, which culminated in the 
invasion and occupation of the Principalities between 1828 and 1834. It was the 
subsequent rule of Russian Prince Kisselev that saw the implementation of a new 
constitution, Réglements Organiques, the legacy of which lived on post-1856 through 
the restrictive legislation that was applied to Jews.
133
  
If Romania was best known for its anti-Semitism in the 1860s, within 30 years 
shocking anti-Jewish violence in Imperial Russia (home to half the world’s Jewish 
population), culminating in the 1905 Kishinev pogrom, shifted international attention 
onto its much larger Slavic neighbour.
134
 In her study of Russian, Polish and Romanian 
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anti-Semitism, Johnson identifies how ‘crises entwined’ for Jews in these countries in 
the first decade of the twentieth century, but fails to acknowledge the increasing 
tendency in British discourse to consider the northern part of Eastern Europe as one 
amorphous anti-Semitic block. Russia’s annexation of the eastern parts of Bessarabia 
from the Principality of Moldavia in 1812 and the country’s acquisition of the whole 
region in the wake of the 1877–78 Turkish–Russo war helped compound the idea of 
Romania as part of a larger eastern identity, the hallmark of which quickly became anti-
Semitism.
135
 The existence of this broader, predominantly Russian construct is evident 
in Britain’s response to the arrival of growing numbers of Ostjuden – East European 
Jewish immigrants – in London’s East End, which led to the introduction of the 
country’s first immigration legislation, the 1905 Aliens Act.
136
  
A prelude to the 1905 Act, the 1903 Royal Commission on Alien Immigration 
identified Britain’s Jewish immigrants as being ‘practically all Russians or Poles.’ (In 
the ‘great year’ of migration from Romania, they still only made up 2,776 of Jewish 
immigrants, who numbered 30,000 a year on average.
137
) The Russian Empire’s 
medieval treatment of their Jews was discussed at length by the Commission, with only 
a brief acknowledgement that Romania’s Jews were treated in the same way.
138
 Major 
Evans-Gordon, MP for Stepney and member of the Commission, visited Romania 
during his investigative tour of the East, and his subsequent report (also published as a 
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book in 1903) was comprehensive in its condemnation of Romania.
139
 However, in 
terms of weighting and perception, his analysis predominantly concerned Russia. The 
Times Literary Supplement recommended his book as a means of forming an opinion 




The Russian catch-all for East European Jewish migration was regularly used in 
the public sphere. De Maurier’s Svengali, the best-known fictional Jew of the period, 
came from ‘some remote province in Eastern Russia – out of the mysterious east!’
141
 
Leo Amery, a British politician and journalist with Jewish heritage, was disdainful of 
‘the Jews in Poland and Russia or those who have just come from there’.
142
 Russia’s 
size and political relevance guaranteed the attention of several well-established British 
correspondents.
143
 Dr Emile Dillon, a journalist based in Russia and writing for the 
Daily Telegraph and Contemporary Review, was perhaps the best known. He kept 
Russia and its Jewish issue in the public eye when Romania received no equivalent 
attention.
144
 In Inventing Eastern Europe, Wolff acknowledges an issue of adjacency in 
the eighteenth century, whereby neighbouring lands were often considered together and 
seen as representing a sort of geographical destiny.
145
 He writes of Hungary, Bulgaria 
and Wallachia (the southern province of united Romania) occasionally being coloured 
together on a map of Europe due to Oriental associations under Ottoman rule and 
ancestral connections to Asia,
146
 while Romania’s northern province, Moldavia, which 
bordered Russia and had a large Jewish population originally from Russia, shared 
identity issues with its northern neighbour. In the late nineteenth century associations 
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between Romania and its Jewish Question were increasingly subsumed into a larger 
Russian-dominated narrative which exhibited the standard tropes of ‘backwardness, 




By 1907 the impact of this anti-Semitic imaging in British discourse was 
complicated by increasingly contested interpretations of Eastern Europe’s Jewish 
Question. Sam Johnson, Alyson Pendlebury and Bryan Cheyette are three among 
several historians who have identified Britain’s hardening Semitic representations at the 
turn of the century.
148
 East European Jewish immigrants predominantly clustered in 
cities and were framed as impoverished, visually striking ‘followers of that unbending 
orthodoxy enjoined by Rabbinical Law’.
149
 By 1905 the unprecedented Aliens Act 
restricted the numbers entering Britain. The atmosphere was not conducive to 
sympathetic representations of Ostjuden Jews. Here it is instructive to return to 
Brubaker’s ‘national minority’ construct in the context of Romania’s Jews. Brubaker 
argues that a national minority’s successful articulation partially depends on the ability 
to portray its host country as oppressive. Self-evidently, if by the turn of the century 
Britain was focused on a more closed domestic agenda set on limiting the arrival of East 
European Jews, the incentive to portray the host countries as oppressive was minimised 
(although as the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration demonstrated, not 
eradicated). In 1902, the rash of additional restrictive legislation that Romania 
introduced against their Jews exorcised Britain’s Jewish press and attracted some 
attention in The Times.
150
 However, the combination of domestic antipathy and a 
dominant Russian narrative saw Zionist Joseph Cowen at the annual meeting of the 
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Anglo-Jewish Association in 1902 argue that a Romanian bulletin published by the 
Jewish press to highlight the country’s discrimination would be futile.
151
  
Given the entwined issues that complicated perceptions of Romania’s Jewish 
issue, coverage of the 1907 Peasants’ Revolt, which involved attacks and violence 
against Romania’s Jews, acquires heightened significance. Moses Gaster, a prominent 
Jewish rabbi who settled in London after he was expelled from Romania in 1885, was a 
primary point of contact for Romania’s Jews. In 1907 he received appeals that were 
uncompromising in their analysis of the horror. ‘An indescribable calamity has erupted 
... [T]he peasants are breaking, devastating and stealing everything from the Jews ... 
houses ruined, doors, windows.’ Fellow Jews in the West urged action: ‘something must 
be done and done quickly’.
152
 But Gaster waited a month before he spoke about the 
issue publicly. Then he explained that Romanian Jews, even those in England, loved 
their native land ‘as a child loved its mother’. Their complaint was not against the 
peasantry for whom they had ‘a deep seated affection’, but rather against the 
government, which used the ‘time honoured political titles of Conservative and Liberal 
as a cover for oriental despotism and persecution’.
153
 Gaster ominously concluded, ‘the 
story would be put about that the Jews had instigated all the outrages’.
154
  
Indicative of the negative stereotyping of the Jew in radical British culture, 
coverage in the liberal press pitched Jew against peasant.
155
 The first edition of The 
Nation dismissed the idea of an anti-Semitic motive behind the peasants’ attacks and the 
following week exonerated the rioters. ‘The peasants are ground between the absentee 
landlord and the Jewish middleman who farms out their estates ... [R]evolt was a 
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terribly natural method of protest.’
156
 The Manchester Guardian initially acknowledged 
an anti-Semitic element in the uprising, but later changed its mind and referred to the 
Jews ‘as the true landowners of the country’, a misleading statement given Jews could 
not own land under Romanian law.
157
 The inherent bias of the coverage explicates 
Gaster’s statement regarding the Romanian Jew’s deep-seated affection for the peasant; 
his analysis anticipated interpretations of the riots which pitted the sympathetic peasant 
against the destabilising Jew.
158
  
It was acknowledged that the fragmentary information reaching Britain was 
deliberate.
159
 This absence of facts gave publications carte blanche to say what they 
liked. The Spectator wrote that bailiffs, invariably ‘clever Jews’, obtained from the 
peasantry ‘the utmost they can squeeze’. These men ‘conciliate’ officials, ‘demand 
double, and in some cases triple the accustomed rents, which were already heavy’ and 
probably used their ‘position without mercy’. The Jews were as guilty as the ‘most 
dissolute’ Romanian landowners.
160
 Glover argues that by the turn of the century the 
caricature of the Jew as an untrustworthy, avaricious moneylender or peddler was 
‘becoming appreciably more threatening to the imagined community of the nation-
state’.
161
 He was referring to Britain’s community, but by implication, in 1907 
Romania’s Jews were undermining the Romanian nation state and its valuable 
peasantry. In terms of assessing the impact of these representations on British 
constructions of Romania, Brubaker is again informative. The Jewish minority, no 
longer able to depict the host state as oppressive, had been branded disloyal.
162
  
As discussed, the Peasants’ Revolt reaffirmed the country’s place in a more 
general Eastern rubric, where anti-Semitism and violence were presumed elements of 
‘Eastern cruelty’. However, the dialogue in the press did not sympathise with the 
persecuted Jew, rather one nationality’s treatment of another impacted negatively on the 
identity of both, and in some cases exonerated the Romanian peasant. Cheyette argues 
that by the beginning of the twentieth century the British Jew’s own cultural identity 
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was constructed in deliberately equivocal terms both as the embodiment of a 
transformable Hebraism and simultaneously an unchanging radical ‘other’.
163
 This 
analysis contextualises press claims that the Peasants’ Revolt exhibited ‘indications that 
a widespread organisation is at work’ with the involvement of ‘anarchist societies over 
the Russian frontier’, and that those ‘anarchist societies are said to have been stirring up 
the peasantry’.
164
 The role of the Jew was deliberately ambiguous. This was an uprising 
which, according to some reports, targeted the Jew, but references to the instigators as 
Russian anarchists, at a time when Britain frequently denigrated their East European 
immigrants as international political radicals and anarchists, implied a Russian Jewish 
provenance at the heart of the rebellion.
165
 The ‘international’ Jew in relation to an 
emerging Romanian identity was increasingly problematic in an era which demanded 
clear-cut definitions of the nation state. 
In this more autochthonous atmosphere, rising Jewish nationalism and Zionist 
thinking around the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine fractured the Jewish community’s 
voice. Moses Gaster personified the complications that beset the broader Jewish 
Question. Well connected in both Britain and Romania, he was potentially the 
Romanian Jews’ greatest champion. Enjoying a friendship with Romania’s German 
royal family, he had an audience with King Carol in 1902, when Queen Elizabeth, 
Romania’s most famous personality, told him, ‘we often grieve that you are no longer 
among us’.
166
 He also regularly corresponded with high-prolife Romanian politicians, 
including Anglophile Take Ionescu and Nicolae Iorga.
167
 In Britain, as a scholar and 
rabbi, he secured several prestigious positions, including such non-Jewish affiliations as 
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a membership of the Royal Asiatic Society and President of the Folklore Society, and 
was regularly featured in the American and British press.
168
  
But despite Gaster’s potential as an influential bridge between the two countries, 
Romanian Jewish identity gained less than it might have done from a man best known 
for his roles as Chief Rabbi of the Spanish and Portuguese Sephardic congregation and 
president of the English Zionist Federation.
169
 While neither position was inimical to the 
promotion of Romania or the plight of its Jews, both compromised his effectiveness in 
these fields. As the British Empire’s leader of the Sephardic community, his association 
with the much poorer Ostjuden Jews was weakened and his passionate championing of 
the Zionist cause was controversial within the Jewish community.
170
 Zionism promoted 
an idea of Jewish difference which ran counter to the message of assimilation that the 
acculturated Anglo-Jews, particularly the Conjoint Jewish Committee, had long being 
trying to encourage in Eastern Europe.
171
 The conflict for Romania’s Jewish minority 
was best summed up by the Jewish American press in relation to Gaster’s 1902 meeting 
with Romania’s King Carol: 
I am bound to confess that he made a mistake in speaking of Zionism to the 
King of Roumania ... It must be apparent it seems to me, that when you desire to 
have equal rights extended to the Jews in Roumania you are bound to obliterate 
the semblance of the fact that the Jew is a foreigner in the land where he was 
born ... [T]he knowledge that the Jew may have a ‘home’ in Palestine urges 
more strongly than ever the anti-Jewish agitators.
172
 
The ramifications of this Zionist agenda, in which Gaster was a leading player, would 
split the Jewish voice into rival camps during World War I and helped deliver the 
                                                          
168
 Jewish Chronicle, 18 Jan 1907. 
169
 American and British publications invariably cited these titles when referring to 
Gaster: The Jewish Messenger, 22 Jan 1897, New York Press, 1 July 1900, Chicago 
Israelite, 20 Sep 1902, The Times, 1 Apr 1912. 
170
 ‘He is the only Jewish minister of note who at any time associated himself 
prominently with the Zionists ... but feeling has run so high on this question that the 
Haham ... has to declare himself a Zionist in his own private person and not 
representing the Sephardic community.’ The name of publication is not clear, 23 Aug 
1902, Bound vol. A. Newspaper Cuttings, MGA, UCL/SC. 
171
 Gaster chaired a Zionist Federation meeting in 1908 where the guest speaker 
criticised the policies of the Anglo-Jews who sought to improve ‘the condition of the 
Jews in such countries as Russia and Roumania’. The Zionist, May 1908. 
172
 Chicago Israelite, 20 Sep 1902. 
   
71 
 
Balfour Declaration of 1917.
173
 Gaster’s Zionism saw Romania’s best-known Jew in 
Britain predominantly focused on the creation of an Israeli state, not the overhaul of 
Romania’s flawed nation state.
174
 
Nonetheless, when Romania introduced more punitive laws against the Jews, 
Gaster did speak out on the ‘pitiful condition of our countrymen’.
175
 But although based 
in Britain, the majority of his campaigning work was featured in the American press.
176
 
The country had a greater vested interest in Romania’s Jewish Question. An unofficial 
American Jewish consular representative visiting Bucharest in 1870 had encouraged 
Romanian Jews to emigrate there; within 45 years a quarter of the country’s Jewish 
population had resettled in the States.
177
 (The Royal Commission on Alien Immigration 
acknowledged the majority of Romanian Jewish migrants headed for America.
178
) 
Sitting outside European power politics, the administration pushed hard for solutions 
from a position of relative independence.
179
 Although the USA was not a signatory of 
the Treaty of Berlin, American Secretary of State Colonel John Hay sent a formal, 
strongly worded note to the Romanian government in 1902 proposing a naturalisation 
convention between the two countries and criticising the plight of the Romanian Jew.
180
 
                                                          
173
 For an examination of the tense relations between the Zionists and the Conjoint 
Committee see Levene, War, Jews and the New Europe, pp. 77–127. 
174
 Hroch does not consider that Zionist agitation achieved its goal of mass movement 
within Jewish communities before World War II. Gaster, whose position enabled him to 
effect perceptions both within and outside the Jewish community, fits Hroch’s 
description of a voice ‘from above’. Hroch, Nation, nationalism, social change, pp. 73–
81. 
175
 New York Press, 1 July 1900; Britain’s Sunday Special, 15 July 1900. 
176
 New York Press, 1 July 1902; Chicago Israelite, 27 Dec 1902; The American 
Review, Dec 1902. 
177
 On departure to Bucharest the American consular Benjamin Peixottto was told any 
actions on behalf of Romania’s Jews would be unofficial; cited in P. Adams, Politics, 
Faith and the Making of American Judaism, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 
2014, pp. 121–27. 
178
 Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, p. 530; Evans-Gordon, The Alien Migrant, 
pp. 186–88. 
179
 Feeling powerless in the wake of more anti-Jewish violence in Russia, President 
Theodore Roosevelt made Oscar Straus Secretary of Commerce and Labour, saying that 
the appointment of a Jew to the President’s Cabinet would show ‘Russia and some other 
countries what we think of Jews in this country.’ In Adams, Politics, Faith and the 
Making of American Judaism, p. 143. 
180
 J. Hay, Department of State, Washington, to C. Wilson, Legation of the United 
States, Athens, 17 July 1902, pp. 910–14, 
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1902 accessed 5 July 2016. 
   
72 
 
The Note was rejected outright by the Romanian government and The Times observed 
that it could only hope to induce a ‘moral effect’.
181
 However, a sign of America’s 
growing significance, it put added pressure on the British government to act, with Major 
Evans-Gordon observing that the Note bought the subject of Romania’s Jews 
‘prominently before the [British] public’.
182
  
Courtesy of the Conjoint’s prolific communications with the Foreign Office, 
including a letter from millionaire banker Lord Rothschild in 1901, the British 
government was already aware of the situation in Romania.
183
 In 1902 Britain 
recommended to fellow signatories that ‘some common action should be taken’, but was 
‘met with no response from the other Great Powers’.
184
 If, in Britain’s public domain, 
representations of Romania’s Jews were conflicted and hard to distinguish from Russian 
equivalents, in political discourse American pressure and the Conjoint Committee 
ensured the Jewish Question continued to undermine perceptions of Romania’s 
government. The 1907 Anglo–Russian convention, signed the same year as the 
Peasants’ Revolt, demanded that Britain measured its response to Russian anti-
Semitism. The Conjoint Committee’s reduced leverage in Russia was compensated for 
in politically less significant Romania.
185
 Lucien Wolf, an Anglo-Jewish polyglot and 
journalist with extensive international connections, formalised his position as the 
effective head of the Committee in 1908.
186
 That year Romania responded to its 
Peasants’ Revolt with the attempted expulsion of Moldavian Jews in a new Rural 
Communes Law. The Conjoint sent numerous uncompromising memorandums to the 
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British government, even reminding them of ‘destitute Jewish emigration which directs 
itself towards the United Kingdom’.
187
  
British legation reports arriving from Bucharest denied that religious persecution 
existed in Romania and Ambassador Greene positioned the Jewish minority as an 
economically destabilising presence.
188
 But despite anti-Semitism in official 
correspondence, the Conjoint, peopled with influential members, had a degree of 
success in keeping Romania’s Jewish Question alive in the Foreign Office. Their 
missives always received polite, if somewhat opaque, replies.
189
 Britain’s increasingly 
close relations with Tsarist Russia angered the liberal elite and had helped the 
Conjoint’s cause in Romania.
190
 Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey raised the matter of 
increased restrictions against Romania’s Jews in the House of Commons, demanded a 
further report from the British legation in Romania and reminded the Conjoint of the 
Foreign Office’s long-term commitment reviewing the situation.
191
 At the governmental 
level, Romania continued to be defined as a country which had consistently reneged on 
its Treaty obligations.  
Although resistant to reform, Romania was highly sensitive to accusations of 
anti-Semitism. In 1903 King Carol tried to distance himself from his government’s 
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record and the American chargé d’affaires noted that the publication of Britain’s 
‘Report of the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration’ caused a domestic furore, with 
Romania concerned ‘that this report will have great weight abroad and that the country 
has been misrepresented’.
192
 During the Peasants’ Revolt the Romanian government 
played down the anti-Jewish element and their most potent national symbol, Queen 
Elizabeth, set out her pro-Jewish credentials in France’s La Revue, later abbreviated in 
Britain’s Review of Reviews.
193
 The Queen’s argument that the Jews had benefited at the 
hands of persecution (‘it will be the unhappiest day for the Jews when persecution 
ceases’) was dubbed ‘curious’ by the journal. Nonetheless, that the poet-queen stated 
her philo-Semitic stance in an article entitled ‘In Praise of the Jews’ was indicative of 
the international pressure her country felt in the wake of the insurrection.
194
  
Romanian efforts to burnish their reputation were indicative of an enduring 
distrust that surrounded the issue. Trevelyan’s identification of the overriding 
prominence of the Jewish Question in a pre-World War I construct, and the Foreign 
Office’s regular acknowledgement of the subject, suggest that while the Conjoint’s 
persistence may not have resulted in increased sympathy for the Romanian Jew, it 
served to undermine trust in the Romanian government. More generally, the negative 
tropes that the issue reinforced pegged the nation’s image back to the stereotypes Wolff 
identifies with a broader Eastern rubric. However, returning to Brubaker’s model of 
competing nationalisms, by 1907 there were already signs that the thorny nature of 
Britain’s pre-war Semitic discourse facilitated sympathy for the beleaguered Romania 
peasant – as the soul of ethnic Romania – at the expense of the maligned Jew. It was 
over the next ten years that the increased validity of ethnic nationalism as an attribute of 
statehood would see constructions of the Romanian nation and the Romanian population 
in Transylvania gain ascendancy over representations of their Jewish minority in a 
British narrative comprised by the exigencies of war.
195
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1.3 Latin Romania and its German Monarchy 
The 1907 Peasants’ Revolt focused minds on the Romanian state as an example of 
Eastern cruelty. Ideas of Balkan backwardness compounded an association between 
Romania, anti-Semitism and ideas of the savage East that included Russia. However, 
these negative tropes were not the only definitions of Romania in the pre-war period. 
This section will examine the link between Romania’s self-conscious efforts at fostering 
a European national identity and the reception of that identity in British discourse.  
Todorova identifies a relationship between the development of nationalism in 
Eastern Europe which was focused on myth and history and Western Europe’s 
obsession with the rights ‘of “historic” or “non historic” peoples’.
196
 This 
representational paradigm will provide the starting point for this section’s examination 
of Romania’s European nation-building efforts in Britain. However, despite Todorova’s 
recognition of the West’s commitment to foundation myths, in Imagining the Balkans 
she overlooks the external impact of Romania’s deliberate focus on a Latinist 
primordial agenda and dismisses the country’s most successful example of Western 
appropriation – the imported Hohenzollern monarchy.
197
 This section will contextualise 
British representations of Romania’s Latin ‘myth’ at the beginning of the twentieth 
century and argue that it was King Carol and Queen Elizabeth who were the country’s 
leading European symbols and national exponents. In particular, Elizabeth’s imaging 
and her popular published oeuvre with its emphasis on the ancient, feminine and 
spiritual will be assessed in order to evaluate royalty’s role in the dissemination of a 
sympathetic, European version of Romania in British discourse pre-1914. 
In comparison with emerging ‘culture-communities’ and ‘neo-national’ styles in 
the Balkan countries directly under Turkish rule, in Romania ‘vernacular revivalism’ 
had played a subsidiary role to the expression of Latin identity.
198
 During the eighteenth 
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century the Ottoman-sanctioned installation of the Phanariots had incited an adverse 
reaction among Romanian nobility and encouraged the idea of a national “myth” of 
European belonging in the form of an imagined community of Daco-Roman origin.
199
 
The conquest of Dacia (Romania’s acclaimed indigenous start-point), and its inclusion 
in the Roman Empire, was established as the founding narrative in a Latinist primordial 
agenda which identified Trajan’s column in Rome as the birth certificate of European 
Romania.
200
 Romanians presented themselves as Roman descendants and their 
homeland a Latin outpost that had survived numerous onslaughts, most recently from 
the Hungarians, Turks and Slavs. It was an ancient narrative that resonates with Smith’s 
identification of ethnies as largely defined by their ‘ancestry myths and historical 
memories’, which both impacted on domestic ideas about Romania and had a bearing 
on external versions of the country.
201
  
Romania’s leading historian, who laboured to establish this national ‘revival’, 
was Alexandru Xenopol, and his multi-volume work, Istoria românilor din Dacia 
Traiană, was published in both Romania and France.
202
 The rapid embrace of Western 
forms and foundation myths saw Europe ‘become a permanent state of mind for 
Romanian intellectuals.’ The elite shed their Eastern connections and the thin top layer 
of aristocracy blended into the large European beau-monde.
203
 With a colony of elite 
Romanian writers and artists established in Paris, including Anna de Noilles and Hélène 
Vacarescu, and a Romanian presence in the city’s universal exhibitions of 1867, 1889 
and 1900, by the late nineteenth century Romania successfully managed to achieve a 
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However, this idea of Romania as a ‘Latin island in a Slavic sea’, observed by 
Ambassador Greene in Bucharest, had less traction in Britain.
205
 There was no 
equivalent Romanian colony in London, and the famously ‘mongrel’ race had 
harboured a long-held ambivalence towards its Latin neighbours across the Channel. 
John Breuilly argues that a language of broad racial distinction (and a narrower ethnic 
distinction) was too casual, impressionistic and detached from political conflict to be 
significant before 1914 (with the exception of anti-Semitism).
206
 But, given the 
increased focus on Britain’s European relations in this period, his tendency to underplay 
the importance of the race card is difficult to substantiate. Inspired by a reinvigorated 
Victorian Empire and the growing prominence of eugenics in science, racial thinking 
was increasingly used to make sense of national rivalries by the beginning of the 
twentieth century.
207
 In 1903 Anglo–French relations were overhauled and a revived 
affection for all things Latin, spearheaded by King Edward VII, the darling of Parisian 
society, saw Britain sign the 1904 Entente Cordiale.
208
 It is in the context of this sea 
change in British thinking that any subsequent acknowledgement of Romania’s Latin 
heritage needs to be understood.  
In 1907 the Westminster Gazette’s special correspondent, Harry De Windt, 
published Through Savage Europe, which was an odyssey throughout the Balkan States 
and European Russia.
209
 The author justified the title on the basis that ‘the term 
accurately describes the wild and lawless countries between the Adriatic and the Black 
Seas’. Todorova dismisses the travel book as an example of the ‘facile generalisations’ 
in which English journalism indulged, and fails to take into account De Windt’s 
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acknowledgement of Romanian difference within the Eastern sphere.
210
 In his chapter 
‘The City of Pleasure’, Bucharest stood out as an exception within the Balkans. It was a 
capital that could genuinely claim similarities with Paris. There were six French 
references in his descriptions of local culture, and Romanians were hailed as members 




Romania’s mirroring of the dominant West with its self-conscious Latin pitch 
was a long-term strategy, against which the 1907 Peasants’ Revolt could be posited if 
not as an aberration, at least as an incentive to continue pushing for a more sympathetic 
narrative. (It occurred the same year de Windt’s book was published and therefore was 
not mentioned.) In 1908 Ambassador Greene conceded Romania was still ‘a Latin 
island in a Slav sea’, a ‘land of the rain and sun’.
212
 Entwined European and elemental 
signposts hinted at a blend of progressive and primordial strands in Romania’s exported 
identity. As Consul General for Romania in London, Alfred Stead was duly tasked with 
encouraging British investment. In a lecture at the Royal Society of Arts and in a series 
of Near East articles, he established Romania as a country that reaped the benefits from 
‘centuries ago’ when ‘the Roumanian nation stood among the foremost of civilised 
states and played a great role in the shaping of Europe’. It ‘was the scene of exploits of 
the Emperor Trajan’ and the country’s early history stood ‘chiselled in undying figures 
on Trajan’s Column at Rome’.
213
 Stead’s efforts were received with caution by the 
Foreign Office, but the tactics he used are significant.
214
 A year after the Peasants’ 
Revolt the deliberate emphasis on a Romanian heritage rooted in the heartland of Latin 
Europe asserted the idea of a core nation that had more in common with the civilised 
West than the savage Slavic East. 
Fleeting positive references in British public discourse admired Romania for 
both its exceptional civility – a mannered people with French pretensions – and its 
‘ancient Roman’ heritage in a part of Europe more commonly associated with prosaic 
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 Given the priority accorded to the Latin aspects of Romania’s national 
story, it is ironic that the couple who did the most to mobilise this combination of high 
culture and ancient myth were German.
216
 In 1866 Romania welcomed a Prussian 
Officer, Prince Carol Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, as the dynastic ruler of the United 
Principalities. He and his German wife, Elizabeth of Wied, became king and queen of a 
newly independent Romanian kingdom in 1881, after the Russo–Turkish war. By the 
late nineteenth century, with the exception of Serbia, all the so-called Balkan states had 
imported German monarchs (Albania followed suit in 1914). They borrowed from 
Western Europe’s most symbolically potent institution in the hope that external royal 
dynasties would reinforce their standing internationally and that the new rulers would 
rise above domestic factionalism.
217
  
In 1993, former US ambassador George Kennan reflected on the Balkans as 
monarchies whose leaders were ‘as a rule somewhat more moderate and thoughtful than 
their subjects’.
218
 Todorova objects to the presumption of Western superiority in this 
analysis, wondering, ‘which was the rule and who were the exceptions?’ She dismisses 
Bulgaria’s King Ferdinand as ‘clearly not a moderate, thoughtful monarch’, likewise 
Serbia’s Milan Obrenović, before facetiously claiming Romania’s dynasty was 
‘moderation incarnate, especially the soap opera Carol II.’
219
 That Todorova fails to 
acknowledge the Western recognition accorded to Romania’s founding royal couple, 
Hohenzollern Carol and his wife Elizabeth, is perhaps because Romania’s first 
monarchs best fitted the description attributed to Balkan royalty in Kennan’s analysis.
220
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In a strategic union which gave Britain a dynastic foothold in the ‘volatile 
Balkans’, Marie, the 17-year-old daughter of Albert, Duke of Edinburgh and one of 
Victoria’s English-born granddaughters, married Carol’s Hohenzollern’s nephew, 
Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Romania, in 1893. The wedding was held in Germany and 
Marie later admitted that when they first met she asked Ferdinand no questions about 
his ‘far off country’ and was ‘rather vague’ about its ‘place on the map’.
221
 However, 
the marriage symbolised Britain’s recognition of Romania’s founding royal couple and 
received comprehensive coverage in the British press.
222
 Michail recognises the 
important ‘role in intercultural contacts’ that monarchy played, referencing both the 
volume of representations they attained in British popular culture and their capacity as 
the key ‘carriers’ of images from their respective countries.
223
 He cites a ‘colourful’ 
report featuring Romania’s Queen Elizabeth in the Illustrated London News as an 
example of a royal story that provided a parallel reality during the Balkan wars in 1913 
and argues that the poet-queen’s romantic pose fed the ‘popular perception of Balkan 
Kingdoms as fairy-tale Ruritanian neverlands’ in the face of war.
224
 Michail is struck by 
the contrast between the two contemporaneous images but he does not probe further the 
impact of the country’s German monarchy on British perceptions of Romania.  
In fact, Britain identified Romania’s new monarchy as more than mere ‘carriers’ 
of key national images, and invariably credited them with any progress their nation 
made. Ambassador Greene concluded that the King had ‘succeeded in building up a 
state which stands today as a monument of one man’s work’. All his subjects ‘recognise 
that King Charles is the founder, not just of the dynasty, but of the country itself’.
225
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Windt identified Carol as responsible for Romania’s conversion into a ‘constitutional 
state’ and ‘prominent’ military power.
226
 In 1906 Romania’s Jubilee exhibition 
celebrated the King’s forty years as Romania’s dynastic ruler; Cioroianu credits the 
event with powerful historical imagery where ‘the Roman Emperor Trajan (the “father 
of the Romanian people”) and the Romanian King shake hands across the centuries’.
227
 
Taking place during the high noon of royal pageantry on a crowded European stage, 
Romania’s Jubilee celebrations attracted minimal attention.
228
 (In Britain coverage 
focused on the erroneous arrest of two British subjects working at the Exhibition.
229
) 
But a year later, in the aftermath of the Peasants’ Revolt, The Times recalled the Jubilee, 
when a ‘demonstration of popular enthusiasm’ celebrated ‘one of the best and wisest 
monarchs in Europe’ under whom the country ‘had advanced by leaps and bounds’.
230
 
The paper observed, ‘the large landowners in Rumania do not have a good reputation as 
landlords’, but exonerated the King, Romania’s biggest landowner. The Times saw the 
monarch as a solution to the peasant problem. ‘We hardly need say that King Charles 
who has so long ruled his kingdom with judgment and with courage may be trusted to 
face the crisis as becomes a Hohenzollern.’
231
  
This tendency to attribute credit for Romania’s progress to a Western monarch, 
and simultaneously excuse the same monarch for the country’s failures – most 
significantly the Peasants’ Revolt – is symptomatic of what Said identifies as ‘the 
exteriority’ of Western representations. In Orientalism, this is when ‘the orientalist, 
poet, scholar makes the Orient speak’ as it is unable to speak for itself, in a paradigm 
which prioritises the agenda of the West.
232
 Romania was ruled over and represented by 
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a foreign king who was exempt from association with the most ‘backward’ aspects of 
his adopted nation’s identity. In Britain, a country accustomed to the language of 
monarchy, Carol helped make the unfamiliar both familiar and acceptable. However, 
although Anderson argues that there was a ‘discernible tendency among the Euro-
Mediterranean monarchies to sidle towards beckoning national identification’, despite 
more than forty years in Romania and the odd appearance in popular costume, Carol 
remained relentlessly German.
233
 It was Britain’s increasing equivalence towards 
Germany in the pre-war period that complicates interpretations of Romania’s monarch. 
The King was rumoured to have ‘never recovered from homesickness for the 
Fatherland’, and Greene told the Foreign Office that independent Romania began life 
under the auspices of Germany with ‘a German prince, born in Germany, reared in the 
school of German military discipline and called fresh from the German mould and so it 
has come about, that the policy of Roumania has under King Charles steadily 
progressed along German lines’.
234
 Recognition that Carol committed Romania to an 
alliance system led by Germany significantly compromised his appeal.
235
 The King 
correctly identified British indifference towards Romania, urging closer relations, a 
bigger British legation and English companions for Crown Prince Ferdinand’s first-
born, Prince Carol,
236
 all of which were unlikely as long as he was on the throne.
237
 By 
1906 Stead was promoting the King’s Romanian credentials in Britain – he was ‘the 
best Roumanian of all the Roumanians’ – and no reference to his German homeland 
was made.
238
 When, in a deliberate diplomatic move, the Russian Tsar visited the 
Romanian royal family in June 1914 at the Black Sea port Constanţa, the British press 
did not refer to the King’s nationality.
239
 Despite these efforts, the distinctly German 
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Carol ensured independent Romania’s first monarch was an increasingly marginal, 
albeit admired figure, in pre-World War I Britain.
240
  
Harsanyi describes Carol as a man ‘deeply aware of the task ... to modernise’ 
Romania and that he ‘undoubtedly chose his wife Elisabeth Von Wied because of her 
ability to participate in this project’.
241
 Elizabeth did not disappoint. The Queen’s 
appearance in the aforementioned 1913 Illustrated London News was testimony to a 
woman who was renowned internationally as a celebrity royal, a poet-queen under the 
pen name Carmen Sylva, and a philanthropic figure.
242
 Conforming to standard tropes 
of a backward Balkans in need of external domination and improvement, Elizabeth, 
building on a familiar association between female royalty and charity, was widely 
recognised as a queen who led a life dedicated ‘to raising national and moral standards 
in her adopted country’.
243
 In a 1907 review of the Balkans, Edith Sellers credited 
Elizabeth with the only poor-relief system she had come across that was both devised 
and worked by women. By the ‘fire’ of the Queen’s ‘example the great ladies of 
Roumania soon rallied’, ensuring that ‘of all the capitals in Europe, Bucharest is 
certainly the one in which charity most abounds’.
244
 In 1909 Elizabeth’s biographer 
Chappell explained, 
Along with much that was picturesque and charming, the young Princess of 
Roumania found in her realm many black spots of ignorance and superstition. 
Her first task was to learn to read and write the language of her people. Then she 
set herself to found schools, hospitals soup kitchens and other beneficent 
institutions of Western civilisation.
245
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The precedent Elizabeth established as a German princess known for her work 
as a Romanian queen is significant; borrowing from standard imperial tropes, she took 
Western institutions and norms and applied them to her ‘ignorant’ Eastern realm. The 
Queen’s publication of her philo-Semitic stance after the 1907 Peasants’ Revolt needs 
to be understood in this context.
246
 However, renowned in her own right as a celebrity 
and writer, Elizabeth’s broader impact on Romanian imaging demands a re-evaluation 
of Said’s exteriority argument in Orientalism.
247
 As Todorova acknowledges, the 
Balkans were not merely a subspecies of the Orient.
248
 A contested part of a lesser 
version of Europeanism, Romania acquired a queen whose capacity to inhabit her 
adopted country though her written work as Carmen Sylva partially subsumed her 
German nationality.  
Rodney Barker argues that in terms of ruling, ‘identification is the key to 
understanding legitimation and legitimation is one of the principal functions of 
identification’.
249
 Unlike her husband, whose first love was always the ‘fatherland’, 
through her literature and self-imaging Elizabeth acquired an international identity as 
the legitimate Queen of Romania.
250
 Although born a German Princess of Wied, her 
published work was often promoted under the title ‘the Queen of Roumania, Carmen 
Sylva’. In her thesis, ‘The ‘British’ Carmen Sylva’, Laura Nixon argues that the Queen, 
writing more frequently and in more detail about aspects of Romanian life than any 
other writer over a three-decade period, provided British readers with a sympathetic 
version of Romania at a time when a growing periodical press vastly increased the 
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availability of her short stories and articles
251
 (between 1882 and 1913 Elizabeth was 
published in 34 journals and wrote 50 books).
252
 However, Nixon attempts to 
distinguish between Elizabeth’s impact and value as a writer and her impact as a queen 
who happened to write, when it was the sum of both those parts – the poet and the 
Queen of Romania – that ensured Elizabeth and her oeuvre reached a wide audience. 
Elizabeth visited Britain several times and had enjoyed good relations with 
Queen Victoria that helped facilitate the marriage between British Marie and Romania’s 
Crown Prince Ferdinand.
253
 At a more intimate level than standard royal pomp and 
splendour allowed, connection with Romania’s queen was possible through her 
luxurious books, which enjoyed a unique place in the literary market.
254
 In 1915 
Dorothy Kirke remembered ‘a pretty picture’ of the ‘famous Carmen Sylva’ that had 
hung in her English schoolroom.
255
 Ambassador Greene concluded that the Queen ‘has 
secured a niche in the gallery of celebrities, not only of Roumania but the outer world’. 
‘Carmen Sylva is known to us even in England and Queen Elizabeth’s writings in our 
language are the best proof of her claim upon our appreciation.’
256
 The Sunday Times 
marvelled, ‘Surely no woman and certainly no Queen enjoys such popularity as Carmen 
Sylva, the poetess Queen of Roumania.’ Courtesy of Elizabeth’s ‘clever advertising of 
the resources of her country and her own popularity as an author ... little Roumania, 
formerly one of the most insignificant spots on the map of Europe, has become one of 
the best known and most prosperous’.
257
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Anderson and Hobsbawm are key voices among nationalism’s modernists who 
argue for education and literacy as prerequisites of the nation state.
258
 Meanwhile Smith 
demands that the other ancient ‘half of the story’ is also told.
259
 On the international 
stage, Elizabeth’s work cleverly utilised opposing sides of this nationalism debate. Her 
depictions of Romania’s illiterate peasant, bonded only through ancient song and Latin 
blood, found its binary other among literate Western audiences. The Bard of the 
Dimbovitza and Legends from River and Mountain bore the name of Romania’s Queen 
and celebrated the country’s most powerful motif, the peasant and his surroundings. The 
Bard of the Dimbovitza was republished four times and contained Romanian folksongs 
translated by Elizabeth, and Legends from River and Mountain featured ten folkloric 
tales written by the Queen, ‘many of them associated with the mountains which 
surround her home’.
260
 In the latter, illustrations featured dancing maidens and 
handsome shepherds in fantasy worlds of forests, ravines, ancient Romans (Ovid), 
goblins, snakes and dwarfs.
261
 All bore the Queen’s hallmark sentimental style. 
Returning to Todorova’s identification of the national myth and its home in the West, 
Elizabeth’s writing had broad appeal in an industrial, predominantly urban Britain, 
where folk-culture was enjoying a revival.
262
 
With a ‘propensity for the theatrical’ Elizabeth was also astutely aware of her 
own personal image in an era when the royal brand was increasingly commoditised.
263
 
Portrait shots often accompanied the Queen’s articles, in which she invariably wore 
distinct, loose-fitting white robes and a long white veil as a ‘mark of royal dignity’.
264
 
Numerous articles and biographies focusing on a royal existence were sprinkled with 
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romance (marriage to her prince), heart break (the death of her only child Maria) and 
even scandal (she encouraged and was subsequently exiled for her role in Prince 
Ferdinand’s affair with Hélène Vacarescu).
265
 For readers of women’s literature with 
little reason to otherwise consider Romania, Elizabeth became the personification of her 
new home, a ‘quaint semi-oriental town in the midst of the Carpathians’, where the 
‘Queen’s romantic nature and artistic sense’ could indulge in the ‘picturesque beauty of 
her new surroundings’ amidst a people ‘almost untouched by modern civilisation but 
showing traces everywhere of their Roman origin’.
266
 Hobsbawm argues that a crucial 
part of nation building – ‘inventing traditions’ – is ‘essentially a process of 
formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past if only by 
imposing repetition’.
267
 Elizabeth’s quaint literary oeuvre and her own exotic royal 
brand endured for decades; arguably there was no better carrier of Romania’s imagined 
self on the external stage. 
Elizabeth’s writing and life conjured up ideas of a national idyll in a vague 
romantic Eastern setting. It was very different from the savage East identified through 
representations of the violent Peasants’ Revolt.
268
 The femininity and exoticism 
associated with the Queen find no home among the cruel, complex and perfidious 
motifs Hammond claims the Balkans were primarily identified with.
269
 Todorova argues 
that, unlike the imaginary Orient, the Balkans induced a ‘straightforward attitude, 
usually negative’, ‘totally devoid of the mystery of exoticism’ and with a ‘distinctly 
male appeal’.
270
 In this analysis Carmen Sylva’s feminine Romania is Oriental before it 
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is Balkan. Perhaps Elizabeth’s capacity as an exceptional national identifier has been 
overlooked because superficially she appears to conform to Said’s identification of 
exteriority in dominant Western representations of ‘the other’. Nixon concedes that in 
the build-up to World War I, Carmen Sylva’s popularity in Britain was impacted by her 
German nationality, and witnessed a ‘sharp decline’ from 1910.
271
 However, an 
overview of both Elizabeth’s celebrity and her literary oeuvre demand that she is 
recognised for her legitimacy as the Queen of Romania in her own right, who 
successfully reframed her nation’s image on numerous levels. That Britain proved 
receptive to Elizabeth and her romantic peasant kingdom left Romania’s subsequent 
queen, English-born Marie, considerable scope for building on this image during World 
War I. 
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British Expertise and Romanian Imaging, 1906–1916 
Introduction 
Covering the 1912–13 Balkan wars and Romania’s neutrality during World War I, this 
chapter will predominantly focus on the roles of two British commentators, journalist 
Dr Emile Dillon and publicist and scholar R. W. Seton-Watson, who adopted the cause 
of Romania at a time when the country’s geopolitical significance was rising. It will 
suggest that pre-war ‘expert’ analysis has historically overlooked Romania and its 
conflicted identity in relation to the Balkans, and it will cite Dillon as an example of a 
commentator whose status as a conservative journalist has seen his impact on 
perceptions of Romania ignored. Dillon’s work as a Russian-based correspondent with 
an imperialist outlook will be assessed in relation to the role of Seton-Watson. As the 
leading champion for the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire, Seton-Watson has been 
better served by history, but his framing of Romania through its Transylvanian 
population which this section will explore, is less well known. It will argue that pre-war, 
both men recognised the increased importance of Romania, identifying it as the most 
significant country in South East Europe. This positive construct of a Balkan Romania 
complicates the country’s place in an appellation Torodova identifies as hardening into 
a pejorative entity during the same period.
1
  
Section 2.1, which is divided into four parts, will look alternatively at the roles 
of Dillon and Seton-Watson in relation to Romania’s identity both before and during the 
second Balkan war in 1913 and argue that the work of these two commentators was 
hugely important for a country that had previously lacked an external champion in 
British discourse. Dillon’s general significance as a leading conservative voice in a 
growing British press has recently been recognised by Andreas Rose in his study of pre-
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war British Foreign Policy.
2
 However, Eugene Michail’s specific examination of 
experts in The British and the Balkans, which is heavily influenced by the profiles of 
the Balkan Committee’s liberal members, does not mention Dillon.
3
 More broadly the 
recent attention accorded to the role of ‘experts’ during World War I, with Volker Prott 
arguing that ‘expertise requires both a reliable access to decision makers and a certain 
freedom to develop alternative options’ and Tomás Irish’s emphasis on the role of 
scholarly networks that mobilised information, tends to overlook the influential role of 
journalism.
4
 This section will serve to address that imbalance through an examination of 
Dillon’s exclusive focus on the Romanian Kingdom during the second Balkan war and 
the unrivalled conservative perspective of a little-known country that this provided. It 
will argue that his work helped to locate Romania firmly within the Balkan sphere, 
while his championing of its European statesmen and credentials complicate the 
country’s place in what has been identified as a maligned Balkan rubric.
5
  
Historiography has feted Scotsman Seton-Watson as the main expert 
championing Romania’s cause in this period.
6
 However, §2.1 will argue that the 
perception of Seton-Watson as Romania’s leading champion in British discourse prior 
to 1914 is misleading. Both a liberal and a member of the Balkan Committee with an 
overriding interest in the nationalities of the Dual Monarchy, in 1912 and 1913 Seton-
Watson’s primary focus was the impact of the Balkan conflict on the durability of 
Austria-Hungary. It was his concern regarding the Romanian majority population in 
Hungary’s Transylvania that informed his initial relations with the Romanian Kingdom. 
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This interest in the Romanians beyond the country’s Western border, and the 
prominence Seton-Watson accorded them in subsequent dialogue, demands a further 
assessement of Brubaker’s nationalisms’ model. Operating in a period when the 
Hapsburg nationalities question remained largely unrecognised in Britain, Seton-
Watson identified an oppressed Romanian nation in Hungary and identified the 
Romanian Kingdom predominantly through its corresponding homeland nationalism.
7
 
The assessment of Hroch’s three-stage model in relation to this unredeemed population 
will serve to explicate the subsequent appeal of Romania’s Transylvanian narrative in 
British discourse.
8
 Crucially it was the pre-war groundwork that Seton-Watson laid 
through his contacts with and expertise of Romanians in Transylvania that facilitated his 
emergence as Romania’s leading British expert post-August 1914.  
Section 2.2, divided into two parts, will examine the roles of Dillon and Seton-
Watson, respectively, as well as the work of London-based Jewish Romanian David 
Mitrany, during Romania’s two-year neutrality in World War I. It will identify a period 
when British military pressures often compromised ‘expertise’ and led to increasingly 
volatile constructions of Romania. A Saidian emphasis on representations premised 
upon exteriority and used as a means for ‘dominating, restructuring and having 
authority’, explicates the motivations behind neutral Romania’s imaging in British 
wartime discourse.
9
 It will argue that journalist Dillon’s pivot away from sympathetic 
Romanian representations to extreme criticism of the country for failing to commit to 
war, illustrates the relative powerlessness of the Eastern other in external Western 
commentary. Dillon considered himself among a ‘few individuals unconnected with the 
diplomatic corps’ that the wartime British government relied on, claiming he had 
‘firsthand knowledge of the secret compacts entered into by the rulers of Roumania and 
Bulgaria with the Habsburg monarchy’.
10
 However, his broad geographical range as a 
wartime journalist and the demands of a British conservative readership saw him 
abandon close and informed representations of Romania in favour of the neutral 
country’s denigration. This opportunistic approach undermined his ‘expert’ reputation.  
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Section 2.2 will argue that Seton-Watson became Romania’s leading British 
expert between 1914 and 1916. The country’s territorial ambition to acquire 
Transylvania conveniently dovetailed with his adjusted geopolitical view that 
necessitated the demise of the Habsburg Monarchy. This section will argue that the 
inclusion of Romania in his recognition of the rights of ‘small nations’ in what later 
became a formal mission statement for the Allied war effort, provided the country with 
a flattering exposition during its compromising neutrality. This nationalities agenda was 
supported by the additional voice of Romanian Mitrany. Both men stressed the 
imperative of Romania’s unification with the ‘heart’ of its nation, Transylvania.  
This focus on a West-facing version of Romanian nationalism came at the 
expense of other nationalisms, including representations of the country’s Jewish 
minority and more Easterly constructs of the old Romanian Kingdom. Their work 
provides a reassessment of Brubaker’s competing nationalities in the earlier context of 
wartime Romania; in this instance the prominence of the Transylvanian narrative not 
only served to denigrate enemy Hungary’s nationalising nationalism but it also pivoted 
Romanian identity away from previous, less sympathetic associations.
11
 It is through a 
comparison of these three men – Dillon, Mitrany and Seton-Watson – and their political 
and professional perspectives that new light will be shed on external commentators’ 
priorities and leverage in relation to national image construction during World War I. 
Although they all highlighted Romania’s geopolitical significance, this chapter will 
conclude that the growing wartime authority of Seton-Watson, who enjoyed a ‘certain 
freedom to develop alternative options’ was particularly important for the establishment 
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2.1 British Expertise and the Second Balkan War 
2.1.1 Dr Emile Dillon between the Balkan wars 
By 1877 Dr Emile Dillon, an accomplished polyglot and former professor of philology, 
had moved to Russia and soon became an authority on Russian affairs as the 
correspondent for one of Britain’s leading conservative papers, the Daily Telegraph.
13
 It 
was in 1910 that his focus temporarily shifted to South East Europe, where he 
accurately predicted the next European disturbance would occur between the Balkan 
nationalities and Turkey.
14
 Dillon wrote to the managing editor of the Daily Telegraph, 
‘Authorise me to watch the course of events in the Balkan Peninsula with a view to my 
going there whenever the situation begins to grow acute.’ Permission was granted.
15
 In 
his recent study of pre-war British foreign policy, Rose quotes Dillon in a line that 
summarises the premise of his book: ‘Edwardian decision makers saw imperial 
challenges and continental challenges as two sides of the same medal.’
16
 Rose argues 
historiography’s subsequent failure to address Britain’s foreign policy in the Balkans is 
curious given that the Anglo–Russian Convention put this European periphery back on 
the political agenda.
17
 No one understood that better than Dillon. This first part of §2.1 
will examine his role in relation to Romanian imaging between the Balkan wars and 
establish a powerful voice that has been overlooked in Balkan historiography. It will 
identify a man who was capable of influencing public and political discourse in a 
commentary that highlighted Romania’s leading status in the Balkan region. Dillon’s 
contextualisation of Romania’s role prior to the second Balkan war helped to counter 
previous ambiguities that had been exacerbated by the country’s neutrality in the 1912 
conflict and queries Romania’s unequivocal place in Todorova’s denigrated Balkan 
rubric.  
The first Balkan war in 1912 was the crescendo event in nearly a decade of 
sympathetic representations of the European nations previously under Ottoman rule, 
                                                          
13
 J. Baylen, ‘Dillon, Emile Joseph [pseudo. E. B. Lanin] (1854–1933), journalist and 
philologist’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 24 May 2008, 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
9780198614128-e-32828, accessed 26 June 2019. 
14
 Dillon to Le Sage, Daily Telegraph, 10 Feb 1910, no. 19, Dillon, NLS. 
15
 Dillon to Mr Le Sage, 31 Jan, 10 Feb 1910, ibid. 
16
 Dillon in Rose, Between Empire and Continent, p. 4. 
17
 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 
   
94 
 
provided by the Balkan Committee. Focused on this organisation and the events it 
covered, in The British and the Balkans Michail argues that in order to occupy the role 
of an ‘expert’ there had to be an ‘information gap’ about the country, with experts 
considering it their ‘self-assumed role’ to ‘right the gap’.
18
 Romania was not a 
belligerent in the first Balkan war and Dillon, who visited Bucharest for the first time in 
October 1912, is not considered an expert in Michail’s book. It seems likely the 
omission of the latter was partly informed by the anomalous position of the former. 
However, Romania’s neutrality in 1912 indicated a complexity in the region’s political 
relations which the Balkan Committee failed to grasp, in a dialogue that was invariably 
framed in an anti-Ottoman context. By late 1912 even the status quo cheered the 
Christian belligerents who had broken ‘the Turk in the name of freedom and Europe’.
19
 
Britain was poorly equipped to understand the ‘undiminished tension’ between 
individual states that led to a second war within a year.
20
 Michail argues that experts 
were ‘idealist and liberal’ and had a ‘sense of commitment to the region’,
21
 but it was 
precisely because Dillon enjoyed a broad overview of the conflict from an imperial 
perspective (both British and Russian) that he identified Romania’s emerging 
significance.  
Keen to capitalise on its tactical neutrality, the Romanian delegation arrived at 
the London Peace Conference in January 1913 to make territorial claims against their 
southern neighbour, an enlarged Bulgaria. With its cause célèbre heritage and recent 
valiant efforts against the Ottomans, Bulgaria proved a challenging adversary in British 
discourse. Influenced by the pro-Bulgarian sentiments of their correspondent James 
Bourchier, The Times was hostile to Romania. The Daily Mail considered its behaviour 
ominous and Punch drew the ‘Bayard of Bukharest’ making off with ‘Bulgaria’s coat’ 
as compensation for not ‘stabbing you from behind in the previous bout’.
22
 Keen to 
provide a ‘forecast which corresponds as fully as possible to the realities of the 
situation’, Dillon took a very different approach.
23
 Supplementing his Daily Telegraph 
correspondence with monthly ‘Foreign Affairs’ articles in the Contemporary Review (a 
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publication among the ‘most influential papers precisely because their readership 
included leading decision makers’),
24
 Dillon challenged the idea that Romania’s 
presence in London was unjustified. Historic mistreatment by Russia left Romania with 
an indefensible part of Bulgarian Dobrogea as its sole access to the sea. Their territorial 
claims were an understandable reward for neutrality in the first Balkan war.
25
 This 
perspective prefigured the more complex implications of the second Balkan conflict and 
paved the way for an alternative, conservative campaign that sought to highlight 
Romania’s significance. 
In her analysis of expertise, Prott argues that experts’ effectiveness required 
‘reliable access to decision makers’.
26
 At a time when access to and knowledge of the 
other side of Europe was limited, Dillon regularly flaunted his contacts with leading 
statesmen and diplomats in South East Europe. ‘Every man of note in the Balkans is an 
acquaintance of mine, when he is not a friend. I enjoy the confidence of most influential 
men of the day.’
27
 Mirroring ‘his close friendship’ with the Russian Minster of Finance 
Sergei Witte (they worked together to win over the American press during the 
Portsmouth Peace Conference, 1905), in January 1913 Dillon collaborated closely with 
Romania’s Anglophile Foreign Minister Take Ionescu.
28
 Ionescu, a distinguished 
product of Romania’s French educated elite, was married to a British woman and 
enjoyed long-term connections with the British press.
29
 Dillon publicly championed this 
accomplished politician as proof that within the Balkan rubric, Romania was the 
European exception. Exemplifying Rodney Barker’s argument that ‘it is in the first 
place persons not systems, rulers not regimes who are legitimated’,
30
 Ionescu was 
identified as a ‘statesman of special mark’, ‘endowed in a high degree with many of the 
qualities of the Latin race ... he is also gifted with Anglo-Saxon balance, perseverance 
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 Just as Dillon had praised Witte at the expense of the Japanese 
Ambassador Count Komara during the 1905 Russo–Japanese Peace Conference,
32
 he 
increasingly blamed Romania’s alienation from Bulgaria on the ‘diplomatic methods’ of 
the latter’s Foreign Minister. 
Dr Daneff’s scrupulous patriotism shrank from surrendering a rood of his native 
soil to Roumania, while his diplomacy clothed the refusal in a form that 
estranged the sympathies of the nation with which his own was to have fused its 
forces and recomposed the Balkan world.
33
 
Enjoying the ear of British ‘decision makers’, prior to the 1905 Peace 
Conference Dillon had made considerable diplomatic efforts to galvanise political 
opinion in favour of Russia, including a visit to Prime Minster Arthur Balfour.
34
 Once 
in America, Dillon planned the Russian minister’s publicity campaign, telling Witte 
how to handle himself amidst the political elite.
35
 Unlike Witte, Romanian Ionescu 
spoke English and was a more sophisticated operator;
36
 nonetheless it is likely that 
Dillon liaised with him over approaches to the British government. Foreign Secretary 
Edward Grey and Under Secretary Arthur Nicolson met with Romania’s able British 
ambassador Nicolae Mişu (transferred from Constantinople at the beginning of the year) 
and Take Ionescu.
37
 The Romanians and Dillon shared the same opinion, arguing that 
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Bulgaria’s Daneff was ‘“stiff”, taciturn and disinclined to make any concessions’.
38
 
Although favouring no side over the Bulgarian–Romanian dispute in the interests of 
Great Power impartiality, the Foreign Office appeared to agree with them over 
Bulgaria’s obdurate tactics. The argument that Romania was within its rights to claim 
compensation from Bulgaria was implicit in official communications.
39
  
The access that Romania was granted in these meetings was recognition of the 
country’s rising significance. Romania had felt snubbed by a skeletal staff at the British 
legation, a problem compounded when Ambassador Greene left in 1912 and was not 
immediately replaced. The Foreign Office conceded the staff might be increased ‘in 
view of the growing importance’ of Romania and Grey acknowledged he had ‘no desire 
to slight the country’.
40
 Although Sir George Barclay was in twilight of his career, the 
transfer of this experienced diplomat from Persia to Bucharest in September 1912 was 
significant. He was quick to observe that the country was no longer content to sit at the 
tail of the two empires, but would rather assert itself in the Balkans.
41
 This analysis 
tapped into a fear that the Bulgarian–Romanian dispute would tip into war and lead to a 
wider conflagration, with the Foreign Office backing mediation handled by the Great 
Powers. Negotiations were assigned to St Petersburg in the spring of 1913 but worries 
persisted.
42
 With Take Ionescu unable to guarantee that Romania would not fight 
alongside its ally Austria-Hungary in a possible war, there was little hope of the Foreign 
Office making sense of Romania’s ambiguous foreign relations.
43
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It was in this opaque, politically uncertain context Dillon asserted himself as a 
leading voice on Romanian affairs. He was one of the first commentators to articulate 
the significance of Romania’s shifting position, predicting that an attack on Bulgaria in 
direct opposition to the Habsburg Empire’s Balkan strategy would result in ‘Romania’s 
emancipation from the guardianship of the Dual Monarchy’, which could be ‘swiftly 
disastrous’ for Austria-Hungary’s ‘mechanical scheme of Balkan reconstruction ... 
indeed one might liken it to the loss of a linchpin on a remote country road.’
44
 (Tellingly 
his analysis prefigured the assessment of Romania in The Sleepwalkers, Christopher 
Clarke’s influential book on the causes of World War I.
45
) He argued a retreating 
Turkey would see the spread of the Austrian–Russian rivalry over the whole of the 
Balkan Peninsula. In that context, a moderate Romania must be allowed to stand up for 
herself against Bulgaria: ‘an obstinate race who owe more to dogged perseverance than 
to dash or enterprise’ which was accused of poor statecraft and over playing its hand.
46
 
Dillon’s ability to explicate Romania’s significance through the geopolitical lens of the 
entire region is an illuminating example of why he was considered ‘Britain’s premier 
foreign correspondent’.
47
 Challenging long-term British affections for Bulgaria, Dillon 
pioneered a new perception of Romania as a country whose commitment to Austria-
Hungary could no longer be taken for granted. His most candid articles asserted the 
country’s significance for British aspirations of stability in the region and their titles – 
‘British Policy in the Near East’ and ‘Eastern Problems and British Interests’ – made it 
clear where Dillon’s interests ultimately lay.
48
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Dillon’s case for Romania was echoed elsewhere in the press. Michail identifies 
Herbert Vivian as a conservative writer interested in Balkan affairs, arguing that his 
affection for the region was profoundly impacted by Serbia’s 1903 regicide. However, 
Michail fails to acknowledge that by 1913 Vivian was championing an enlarged 
Romania, envisaging it ‘joined to the Triple Entente’ which would ‘secure 
Transylvania, the kernel of the Roumanian race to the present Kingdom of Roumania’.
49
 
This support for Romanian enlargement challenges Michail’s claim that conservative 
writers ‘invariably became fervent opponents of the dominant Balkan nationalism’.
50
 In 
January The Review of Reviews conceded ‘the situation of Roumania’ was ‘one of great 
interest’ and that the country was ‘a factor of great importance in the future 
development of the Near East’.
51
 G. Abbott in the Quarterly Review recognised that 
Romania was seeking ‘some gain’ from Vienna, noting ‘there are many Rumanian 
districts under Austria-Hungarian rule’.
52
 In the Edinburgh Review ‘the Roumanian 
population of Hungary is next door to the flourishing Kingdom ruled by King Charles at 
Bucharest’ and Nineteenth Century was more blatant: ‘From Russia and Austria-
Hungary she [Romania] can obtain vast territories inhabited by Roumanians.’
53
 
These references to the Romanians in Transylvania were at least partially 
informed by the writings of academic and publicist R. W. Seton-Watson. The 
Fortnightly Review argued that the Balkan wars had set a precedent for the ‘spirit of 
nationalism’ which gave hope to Austria-Hungary’s nationalities who wanted to govern 
themselves and referred specifically to the ‘excellent books’ of Seton-Watson that they 
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described as ‘far too little known’.
54
 Dillon was well aware that ‘three million 
Roumanians’ who ‘feel drawn as if by some potent spell towards the state ruled by King 
Charles’, potentially had dire implications for the Dual Monarchy and therefore the 
stability of Europe.
55
 But unlike Seton-Watson, Dillon did not approach the issue of 
Romania from the perspective of its population in Austria-Hungary. Instead he focused 
on the rising significance of the Romanian Kingdom as a power broker in the region.  
The difference between the two men’s approaches (discussed in §2.1.2 in relation 
to Seton-Watson) is significant and Brubaker’s identification of distinct, evolving 
nationalisms provides a useful means of assessing that difference.
56
 Dillon primarily 
identified Romania through the ambitions of its core nation – the nationalising 
nationalism of the Kingdom of Romania. In contrast, Seton-Watson identified Romania 
through its external homeland nationalism focused on Transylvania and pitted against 
Hungary’s oppressive nationalising nationalism. It was Dillon’s identification of the 
Romanian Kingdom’s growing strategic importance that saw him relocate to Bucharest 
in the summer of 1913. He went to report for the Daily Telegraph when it looked likely 
that Romania would enter the second Balkan war. In §2.1.3 it will be argued that while 
the war brought international condemnation on the entire southeastern Peninsula, 
Dillon’s considerable public voice in the coverage of the conflict provided the 
Romanian Kingdom with a valuable counterpoint narrative. 
 
2.1.2 R. W. Seton-Watson and two Romanian nations 
Historian and publicist Robert W. Seton-Watson was a member of Britain’s pre-war 
Balkan Committee. However, unlike the majority of Committee members whose 
primary concern was the welfare of the Balkan Christians in relation to the Ottomans, 
Seton-Watson’s focus was the national minorities in Austria-Hungary and the durability 
of the Empire. Irish has argued that the pre-war period was a boom time for an 
increasingly networked, international academic scene, the pooled intellect of which 
would be mobilised during the war and Prott identifies ‘professional academics’ who 
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were ‘employed’ as wartime ‘experts’.
57
 Seton-Watson, an Oxford educated historian, 
who had studied at Berlin University and the Sorbonne, was one such academic who 
became a wartime ‘expert’. However, this section will seek to distinguish between his 
later status as a ‘great authority on Balkan politics’ straddling the worlds of politics, 
press and academia,
58
 and his earlier work inspired by a research trip to Austria-
Hungary in 1905–6. Pre-World War I, Seton-Watson’s overriding priority was the 
oppressed nationalities within the Habsburg Empire, including the Romanians in 
Transylvania and their peripheral reaction to the Magyar government.
59
 Understanding 
his approach is necessary for the later explication of a British framing of wartime 
Romania that prioritised a European construct, predominantly evaluated through the 
potential of the Transylvanian Romanians. In order to explain the appeal of the 
Transylvanian narrative that Seton-Watson helped establish in British discourse, this 




Seton-Watson had a comprehensive academic grounding in the history of the 
Dual Monarchy and first arrived in Vienna in 1905 intending to write a history of the 
Habsburg Empire. However, a constitutional crisis in Austria-Hungary between the 
Emperor-King and the Hungarian parliament saw him divert his attention to Hungary in 
1906, where his sympathies initially lay with the Hungarian Parliament, in a country 
that Britain considered ‘stable, progressive, liberal and anticlerical’ and the best means 
of maintaining Austria-Hungary as the ‘pivot of European politics’.
61
 Seton-Watson met 
both the Hungarian ruling elite who were committed to the creation of a Maygar 
national state and leading members of the country’s numerous and predominantly 
disenfranchised national minorities and he quickly revised his opinions. It was the 
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beginning of a journey of political discovery that within two years saw him publicly 
denounce ‘untrammelled Magyarisation’ as a process which, unless reversed, would 




Seton-Watson began championing the democratic rights of the Romanians 
alongside the claims of Serbian, Croatian and Slovakian minorities within Hungary. 
Sometimes writing under his pseudonym Scotus Viator, Seton-Watson began promoting 
his opinions in a polemical pamphlet and occasional Spectator articles where he 
identified universal suffrage as a means of ultimately strengthening the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, which, if allowed to collapse, ‘would be a source of endless dangers 
and confusion and would mean something far worse than burnt fingers for everyone 
concerned’.
63
 His first significant publication was the 1908 monograph, Racial 
Problems in Hungary, in which the idea of a Hungarian nation created on the basis of a 
Dualist system between the Magyar and non-Magyar ‘races’ was promoted. This book 
focused on the Slovaks who had no potential Irredentist claims and therefore were less 
likely to instigate external interference.
64
 In comparison, the Romanians of Transylvania 
were a secondary feature in a publication that was heralded by the British press for 
illuminating the misconduct of a ‘people which produced Kossuth and which is 
identified with one of the most notable movements for national freedom in Europe’. The 
Pall Mall Gazette opined it was ‘the strongest, most reasoned and most impressive 




Seton-Watson’s arguments for urgent reform in Austria-Hungary were out of 
step with the residual sympathy that still existed in Britain for the Dual Monarchy
66
 and 
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attracted controversy on an international scale.
67
 However, it is important to 
contextualise his relevance and impact before 1914. Seton-Watson’s writing style, 
bound with statistical research and political argument was not ‘the ordinary reading of 
the man in the street’.
68
 Despite the critical acclaim his publications received, his books 
were described as ‘far too little known’ and in 1911 Seton-Watson criticised British 
apathy towards the cause of Austria-Hungary’s minorities.
69
 This analysis contrasts with 
the opinion of Hungarian historian László Marácz who blames Seton-Watson and 
Racial Problems in Hungary for delivering ‘the mortal blow on the traditional British 
image of liberal constitutional Hungary’ when ‘positive Western images of Hungary 
turned negative in the years preceding World War I’.
70
 An explanation for this 
discrepancy lies in the subsequent success Seton-Watson had as a publicist and expert 
who predicted the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the beginning of World 
War I and became a highly influential figure on future European realignment during the 
conflict.  
However, if the impact of Seton-Watson’s work was not fully felt until the war, 
crucially he had already done the groundwork. Prott argues that expert status requires 
both ‘reliable access to decision makers and a certain freedom to develop alternative 
options’.
71
 Self-funded, Seton-Watson had the freedom to pursue passions before they 
enjoyed popular appeal and his early focus on the Empire’s nationalities gave him 
unprecedented access to seminal political players. He first met the leadership of 
Hungary’s majority Romanian population in Transylvania in 1906 and established 
communication and friendship with men whose political ambitions dovetailed with his 
own ideas about political reform within the Empire.  
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Since the Enlightenment, Romanians in Transylvania had led the way in the 
‘development of Romanian national consciousness by publishing studies which 
emphasised the Roman origins of the Romanian people’.
72
 If, in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, they still ‘clearly distinguished between ‘motherland’ and ‘nation’’, 
the 1848 Revolution saw Hungarians and Romanians ultimately fight on opposing sides, 
encouraging the development of the latter’s national ideology.
73
 By 1867 and the advent 
of the Dualist period, Romanian Transylvanians were well placed to respond to 
Hungary’s increased efforts to assert control over its national minorities and emerged as 
a distinctly middle-class, ambitious movement whose main goal was national 
autonomy. Keith Hitchins observes that these nationalists were not revolutionaries and 
that in all their endeavours the party had ‘as its model the great bourgeoisie of Western 
Europe, whose accomplishments and sense of purpose it was determined to emulate’.
74
  
Practical men with national claims couched in a Western democratic bias, 
Transylvanian politicians and journalists like Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, Iuliu Maniu 
and Vasile Goldiş impressed Seton-Watson in 1906 and maintained contact with him.
75
 
He also met and became lifelong friends with Henry Wickham Stead, The Times 
correspondent in Vienna from 1903, who Seton-Watson introduced to Vaida-Voevod, a 
man whose political reasoning regarding the status of Romanian Transylvanians 
mirrored his own. By 1910 the influential Transylvanian poet and Romanian National 
Party member Octavian Goga and his wife had holidayed with Seton-Watson in 
Scotland.
76
 The unrivalled knowledge that Seton-Watson accrued from these 
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relationships help explain his emerging ‘expert’ status and provide an interesting 
commentary on the process of information exchange in representations, with 
Transylvanians playing an influential role in Seton-Watson’s external imaging of their 
plight and Romanian constructs more generally.
77
  
However, it is important to emphasise that before 1914 Seton-Watson’s 
preoccupation was the maintenance of the Habsburg Monarchy and in that context he 
was more worried about the ‘Slavs outside the bounds of Hungary proper’ than any 
Romanian Irredentist ambitions.
78
 This fear informed his 1911 publication which 
concentrated on the South Slav question and possible cooperation between the Serbs 
and the Croats within an enlarged Monarchy.
79
 Although the Romanian Transylvania 
question was a ‘serious obstacle to friendship between Austria-Hungary and Roumania’, 
Seton-Watson considered it less pertinent. In 1907 he noted that Vaida-Voevod thought 
Romania’s national historian and politician, Nicolae Iorga’s Irredentist dreams fanciful, 
and in 1908 Seton-Watson cited Romania’s earlier Prime Minister, Dimitrie Sturdza, 
who in 1893 had argued Irredentist claims in Transylvania ‘cannot gain ground, and 
have no political significance whatsoever’.
80
  
Like the majority of the Romanian Transylvanians, initially Seton-Watson did 
not champion unification between Romania and its minority population in Hungary. 
Assessed in relation to Brubaker’s triadic nexus of nationalisms, the Kingdom of 
Romania’s homeland nationalism was muted by complex geopolitical realities. But, as 
their keen pre-war liaisons suggest, the capacity of the Romanians in Transylvania to 
highlight the oppressive nature of Magyar rule in Hungary was assisted through the 
campaigning work of Seton-Watson. In terms of the Romanian nation’s development in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
A Nation Affirmed, p. 353. For more on the political life of Goga see G. I. Bodea, 
Octavian Goga: o viaţia, un destin, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Limes, 2004. 
77
 Seton-Watson also introduced Romania diplomat and Transylvanian Moroianu to H. 
W. Steed: Moroianu to Seton-Watson, 9 Aug 1908, SEW/17/18/5, UCL/SSEES. 
78
 Scotus Viator, The Future of Austria-Hungary, p. 46; Spectator, 29 Sep 1906. 
79
 Seton-Watson argued for a South Slav state in partnership with Austria-Hungary, 
believing it would improve the Monarchy’s standing and weaken its dependence on 
Berlin. R. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy, 
London, Constable & Co., 1911, preface, pp. vii–viii. 
80
 Sturdza cited in Seton-Watson, The Future of Austria-Hungary, pp. 48–49, reiterated 
in Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary, p. 405; Seton-Watson in conversation 
with A. Vaida-Voevod, June 1907 in Bodea and Seton-Watson (eds), R. W. Seton-
Watson şi românii, vol. 1, p. 181. 
   
106 
 
Hungary, this Romanian minority’s movement enjoyed both scholarly inquiry and 
political activism, with the Magyars providing the ‘oppression from a foreign other’. 
That these Romanians appear to fulfil the first two stages of Hroch’s three-stage 
nationalism model helps explain their later appeal as a legitimate national entity in 
British discourse.
81
 By 1890 this sympathetic nation had developed closer relations with 
the Romania Kingdom through the establishment of the Bucharest-based Liga pentru 




Crucially it was Seton-Watson’s reputation as a champion of Hungary’s 
nationalities that led to his first contact with the Romanian Kingdom. Aware of his 
work, George Moroianu, a Transylvanian-born member of the Romanian legation in 
London, facilitated his visit to Romania in June 1909.
83
 It was through the lens of 
Transylvania that Seton-Watson was introduced to Romania and its leading statesmen. 
Seton-Watson noted that Premier Brătianu emphasised the ‘necessity of remaining on 
good terms with the Hungarian state’ and Ionescu regarded the ‘Transylvanian Question 
as infinitely the greatest problem for Roumanians’, but that ‘this dream can only be 
realised through the collapse of Austria-Hungary and this would create an infinitely 
more dangerous situation for Roumanians’.
84
 Fearful of Russian ambitions, Romania 
was reluctant to imperil its alliance with Austria-Hungary.
85
 Managing carefully 
balanced relations with the Romanians in Transylvania and the Dual Monarchy, the 
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Romanian Kingdom appeared reasonable in comparison with the Hungarians who 
refused to relinquish the idea of a Magyar national state.
86
  
At the beginning of 1912 the British Ambassador in Bucharest, Sir Walter 
Townley noticed ‘Austro–Romanian relations are less friendly than they were when I 
was here before.’
87
 The same year, changes in the balance of power after the first 
Balkan war further strained relations between the Dual Monarchy and Romania, and 
Seton-Watson’s attitude towards the status quo in the region began to shift in favour of 
Romania. Taking note of the country’s emboldened nationalism after the 1912 war, he 
publicly declared that the Great Powers had to both acknowledge the ‘interests of 
Austria-Hungary’, but also ‘Roumania as the most powerful of the five smaller states’. 
He claimed that during the war, Romania had behaved with restraint and deserved 
compensation.
88
 It is significant that Dillon, a conservative journalist invested in 
imperial structures, and Seton-Watson a publicist with an increasing reputation for his 
support of suppressed nationalities in Austria-Hungary, both struck the same supportive 
note in the face of the negative press that accompanied Romania’s territorial claims in 
January 1913. There were differences between the two men’s perspectives; Dillon was 
committed to the Old Kingdom and its growing role as a regional power-broker, while 
Seton-Watson was better connected to the Romanian minority in Transylvania and the 
corresponding national homeland narrative in Romania.
89
 However, it was the two 
mens’ unequivocal championing of Romania during the second Balkan war that would 
prove a crucial factor in the emergence of a distinct Romanian identity in British 
discourse. 
2.1.3 Dr Emile Dillon and the second Balkan war 
This section (2.1.3) will argue that Dillon’s role in Romania’s image-making during the 
second Balkan war has been unjustifiably overlooked and it will reassert his 
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considerable hand in Romania’s image recuperation in British discourse during 1913. 
With decades of experience as the Daily Telegraph’s special correspondent in Russia, it 
will argue that his championing of Romania’s role in the second Balkan war and neat 
avoidance of the Jewish Question are examples of a man who understood how to 
manipulate a nation’s image. Through both praise and omission, Dillon established 
himself as the primary voice covering Romania in an unpopular second Balkan conflict. 
It is the significance of this commentary which demands the re-evaluation of journalism 
in the role of expertise, while the impact of Dillon’s work, which emboldened ideas of 
the Romanian Kingdom as a leader in South East Europe, complicates the country’s 
place within a denigrated Balkan construct.  
Initially the British press were almost universal in their condemnation of 
Romania’s belated decision in June 1913 to enter a ‘Squalid War’ that pitched the 
previous Christian victors of the first Balkan war against one another.
90
 ‘King Carol is 
holding his sword to auction ... The temptation to fish in muddied waters bids fair to 
overcome all moral considerations’ in a conflict where the Pall Mall Gazette regarded 
‘all the combatants, including Roumania as much of a muchness’ and condemned the 
Foreign Office for ‘glossing over in paltering words Romania’s action’.
91
 For the 
Manchester Guardian ‘no one I suppose will go as far as to regard the Roumanian blow 
in the back with moral enthusiasm’.
92
 The Punch headline was ‘KLEPTOROUMANIA 
or the Pinch of Chivalry’ and Romania was a ‘hyena power’ in the Nation, who 
declared war on her ‘distressed neighbours’. The Times (the paper most likely to think 
‘everything is for the best in the Balkans’)
93
 described Romania’s intervention as ‘the 
cheapest declaration of war on record’, concluding ‘political morality is not being 
practised with ardour anywhere in the Balkans right now’.
94
  
This early press commentary implicated Romania in a war that Todorova rightly 
argues helped crystallise the negative designation Balkanism through descriptions 
which frequently identified a confusing distant conflict known for its savagery and 
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 The south-eastern Peninsula’s violence was posited as a problem 
that needed to be solved and historians have subsequently argued it provided the binary 
other that served to highlight the ‘European’ qualities of those countries in the West.
96
 
The Pall Mall Gazette complained, ‘Europe is fast losing patience with these continual 
bickerings’, and The Times argued, ‘Europe is weary both of strife in the Balkans and of 
the quarrels of the Balkan people.’
97
 The British government summed up the conflict as 
a ‘profound disappointment’.
98
 This internecine warfare between neighbouring 
Christian states was the death knell of the region’s main British champion, the Balkan 
Committee. The 1913 war ‘seriously shook’ its ‘basic liberal-universal belief that when 
liberated from the worst restraints of Ottoman rule the region would automatically be 
set on a path to progress and civilisation’.
99
 The body of experts splintered and 
individuals often turned against each other in favour of their ‘pet nation’.
100
 However, 
while the demise of this united front was a loss for the region’s image, the subsequent 
fragmentation in representations worked in Romania’s favour as a country which had 
never been promoted by the Committee.
101
  
While pro-Bulgarian sentiment prevailed in certain leftwing publications,
102
 
Dillon, with his dual platform in the conservative press, offered unprecedented and 
consistent support to Romania. He identified a covetous Bulgaria that had pushed 
Romania into a conflict for ‘the interests of the equilibrium of the Balkans’. Ionescu’s 
‘pacific and moderate ministry’ had been forced to ‘intervene and ask what Roumania 
has never yet demanded – compensation for the shifting of frontiers and growth of 
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 Dillon’s arrival in Romania by early July 1913 saw Romania 
appear almost daily in the Daily Telegraph, in a war that suffered from an ‘absence of 
trustworthy correspondents’.
104
 His subsequent eye-witness reports framed Romania’s 
war in a moral, invigorating context. The villages were ‘rejoicing, bands played national 
tunes, songs were chanted, flags were fluttering and the flower of the Roumanian youth 
was starting for the front’.
105
 Celebrating a peasant idyll widely acknowledged in British 
discourse, Dillon’s descriptions countered the notion of a ‘Squalid War’ and contrasted 
sharply with the predominantly Bulgarian atrocities reported in the Daily Telegraph and 
known to the Foreign Office.
106
  
With the largest army in the Balkans, Romania’s two formation entry into 
Bulgaria brought the war to a close, and the swift victory vindicated Dillon’s claim that 
Romania’s intervention was a justifiable act of self-preservation by a country which had 
undergone successful militarisation.
107
 Romania’s refusal to accept Bulgaria’s offer of 
territory in exchange for troop withdrawal proved the country was seeking peace for all 
belligerents: ‘Romania’s policy is national in its strivings and European in its wise 
restraint’, while its newly accrued high-ranking status in southeastern Europe left 
Romania well placed to capitalise on ‘Russia’s discreet advances’.
108
 In contrast, 
Bulgaria was identified as a slippery country prepared to forego her Slav identity for 
material advantage, and Austria-Hungary was trapped ‘in masses of net which holds 
together the integral elements of the Dual state’.
109
 Romania’s stewardship at the 
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Dillon’s unusual position as an ‘establishment’ journalist who was ‘on-the-spot’ 
in Romania during the second Balkan conflict gave him a disproportionate influence 
over contemporary interpretations of events. He exercised this influence both through 
praise for Romanian action as well as his astute handling of the country’s troublesome 
identifiers. The Balkan wars had seen a recognisable gulf emerge between Romania’s 
pro-Austrian monarch King Carol and the growing anti-Habsburg sentiment of the 
country’s leading politicians.
111
 Romania’s subsequent attack on Bulgaria, against 
Habsburg advice, exacerbated tensions. Well aware of the importance of royal 
symbolism, Dillon did not refer to the tension between the King and his Romanian 
government. Instead he emphasised Carol’s prowess after the Treaty of Bucharest had 
been signed in August 1913: ‘Ingenious and resourceful’, the King had courageously 
assumed responsibility and delivered a policy of ‘brilliant success.’
112
 Dillon signed off 
his last report from Romania with a resounding reminder of the country’s regal civility. 
The only foreign journalist invited to Castle Peleş, King Carol’s royal retreat, he 
enthused: ‘If Wagner had beheld this abode of delight nestling amid the pine clad hills 
he might have been moved to make it the scene of yet another immortal opera.’
113
  
Dillon employed similar tactics in his handling of Romania’s Jewish Question in 
1913. Romania’s anticipated acquisition of Bulgarian territory in Dobrogea and the 
implications for Jews living in that region had led to vociferous complaints from the 
international Jewish community. Mark Levene credits Lucien Wolf for the 
extraordinary coordinated efforts sent to the Foreign Office in 1913.
114
 In January the 
Committee had pushed for the settlement of the Romania–Bulgaria dispute to be 
conditional upon the question of Jewish rights. In May when the cessation of territory 
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from Bulgaria looked inevitable, the protests grew more persistent. A letter from Lord 
Rothschild and additional appeals from the International Peace Committee 
supplemented the Conjoint Committee’s reminders that Romanian assurances were not 
to be trusted.
115
 The British Foreign Office trod a cautious path, keen to avoid 
ostracising the new dominant power in the Balkans, but aware that the Conjoint 
Committee was an ‘influential group’.
116
  
For Dillon the matter was less ambiguous. Reporting in Russia had exposed him 
to the desperate conditions of East European Jews, but his coverage was rarely 
unbiased. (During the 1912 Beilis Case when a Ukrainian Jew was accused of killing a 
13-year-old in order to drain his blood for religious purposes, Dillon was one of the few 
British journalists who did not dismiss the ritual murder accusations outright.
117
) But he 
was also aware of the alienating nature of anti-Jewish discourse, and in 1905 had 
successfully urged Russian Minister Witte to appear sensitive towards American 
concerns over Russian anti-Semitism.
118
 This complex appreciation of Eastern Europe’s 
multifaceted Jewish Question saw Dillon studiously avoid one of the country’s most 
prominent issues throughout his 1913 coverage. His casual dismissal of the American 
Secretary of State’s Note at the Bucharest Peace Conference was symptomatic of this 
approach. 
The United States of America has made an official communication to the 
negotiating governments that the treaty shall obtain a clause bestowing civil and 
religious liberty upon the populations of all the newly annexed territory. The 
members of the Conference evince no enthusiasm for this intercession which, 
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However, if Dillon managed to keep Romania’s Jewish Question away from 
public discourse in 1913,
120
 his silence could not compete with the persistent noise 
generated by the Conjoint Committee inside the Foreign Office. Here it is instructive to 
return to Prott’s analysis of expertise, which omits the public role of journalism, 
identifying experts in the World War I context of politics and transnational policy-
making.
121
 Dillon, although well known, was not a lobbyist. His journalism broadly 
helped anchor public opinion around the need to maintain the European status quo, but 
press coverage was just one factor influencing Foreign Office policy. In contrast, the 
Conjoint Committee provided the British government with regular uncompromising 
reminders of Romania’s capacity for obstruction: in ‘Greece, Bulgaria, Servia and 
Montengro the constitutions provide for the equal rights of all religious denominations 
... Roumania is a flagrant exception.’
122
 By autumn 1913 the prospect of another Great 
Power conference to legitimise territorial changes saw the Jewish Committee on the 
verge of a breakthrough with an official confirmation that the British government would 
consult the signatories of the Berlin Treaty to reaffirm the liberties of religious 




This disparity between Dillon’s dismissal of the Jewish Question and the 
Conjoint’s assertion of its importance is indicative of Brubaker’s recognition that in 
order for a national minority to promote its nationalism, it needs the capacity to frame 
the host nation as oppressive. Both Dillon and the Conjoint were aware of the 
significance of that framing. Events in 1913 witnessed a power struggle between the 
‘competing nationalism’ of the Romanian Kingdom and the international leverage of its 
Jewish community, one that would be temporarily resolved in favour of the Romanian 
Kingdom with the outbreak of World War I.
124
  
In terms of Romania’s more general framing in 1913, because much of Dillon’s 
thinking was in line with government policy, it’s hard to discern the extent which his 
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articles swayed opinion in the Foreign Office.
125
 Despite a keenness to remain impartial 
in July 1913, the government recognised that ‘the Bulgarians are to blame for their own 
misfortune’
126
 and British Ambassador Barclay’s sympathy for Romania’s case echoed 
Dillon’s.
127
 The dovetailing of opinion between British officials and Dillon again 
explains Michail’s exclusion of the journalist in an analysis that framed ‘liberal’ experts 
operating pre-1914 as invariably contesting the government’s position.
128
 In contrast, 
Dillon’s long-standing argument that Romania was now the decisive player in the 
Balkans tallied with Grey’s thinking. While advising against Great Power action in the 




With the conclusion of peace in Bucharest, Dillon’s work became the touchstone 
for contemporary Romanian identity in public discourse. Performing a volte-face, the 
Pall Mall Gazette quoted him directly: ‘I am now convinced the Roumanian 
Government, which is straining every nerve to smooth away the difficulties and arrange 
a treaty ... is virtually certain to succeed.’ Dillon’s positioning of Romania as a power 
with the right to dictate Bulgaria’s territorial limits and his recognition that ‘Roumania 
is keen to raise its prestige above the smaller states of Europe’
130
 was echoed in The 
Times and the Pall Mall Gazette: ‘Roumania has increased her authority in the Balkans 
and has raised her prestige in Europe.’
131
 Barclay reminded the Foreign Office that 
Romania was ‘seconding the efforts of the Great Powers in the cause of peace’ and had 
asserted her independence in the face of Austrian influence, becoming ‘in great measure 
the arbiter of the Balkans’.
132
 Romania’s identified ‘prestige’ and ‘status’ helped single 
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Recognition of Romania’s increased significance, which Dillon had championed 
consistently from early 1913, demands an acknowledgement of the country’s 
achievements and a reassessment of Romania’s unequivocal place in Todorova’s 
negative Balkan rubric.
134
 By August 1913 Dillon’s Romania was a European country 
that ‘had tackled and performed a task which mighty Russia had attempted and failed to 
achieve’, becoming the ‘the elder sister prima inter pares of the Christian states’ in the 
Balkans.
135
 Romania’s role in the second Balkan war, embellished through Dillon’s 
relentless championing, had the conflicted impact of cementing the country’s place in 
an increasingly condemned Balkan rubric while simultaneously elevating Romania’s 
position within that cluster. Dillon’s 1913 representations of Romania reinforced the 
complexity at the heart of the Kingdom’s projected identity. Adrian Cioroianu 
recognises that it is strange the ‘country so persistent in its effort to escape the Balkans, 
improved its status and emerged as a power due to the same Balkans – more precisely 
the Balkan wars of 1912–13’.
136
 No one articulated the importance of this change in 
Romania’s status more clearly than Dr Emile Dillon. 
 
2.1.4 R. W. Seton-Watson and the second Balkan war 
When evaluating Seton-Watson’s role in interpretations of Romania in 1913, Prott’s 
identification of experts as possessing ‘reliable access to decision makers and a certain 
freedom to develop alternative options rather than being forced to provide a single 
solution to complex problems’ provides a useful benchmark against which to measure 
his emerging ‘expert’ status.
137
 Seton-Watson’s published research on the nationalities 
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within Austria-Hungary had acquired heightened relevance during the first Balkan war, 
leaving him well placed to warn of a pan-Slav, anti-Austrian agenda flanked by a 
justifiably restive Romania. As early as December 1912 Seton-Watson was 
championing the prospects of a Balkan world led by non-Slavic Romania ‘as the most 
powerful of the five Christian states in the Peninsula’.
138
 In February 1913 he began a 
Balkan tour which included a visit to Bucharest in June.
139
 Seton-Watson was still in 
Bucharest when the second Balkan war began and the conflict saw him review his 
previously held belief that the momentum for reform in the Dual Monarchy should 
come from within the Empire. This final part of §2.1 will argue that the increasing 
importance he placed on the smaller states that bordered the Habsburg Empire included 
Romania, and was inspired by his recognition of the external homeland nationalisms of 
those countries in relation to their nationalities in the Dual Monarchy. The reassessment 
of Brubaker’s nationalisms model in the context 1913 will help elucidate the difference 
between Dillon’s more straightforward recognition of an increasingly assertive 
Romanian Kingdom and Seton-Watson’s appreciation of that Kingdom through the lens 
of the Romanians in Transylvania.  
The year 1913 saw Seton-Watson further develop his relationships with 
statesmen in the Romanian Kingdom, although his entry point remained those with 
strong Transylvanian interests. In early 1913 Seton-Watson’s pivotal contact, 
Transylvanian-born Romanian diplomat Moroianu, objected to the ‘exceptional hatred 
towards Roumania’ expressed in the British press and, recognising the Scotsman’s 
potential leverage to challenge the situation, continued to supply Seton-Watson’s with 
the majority of his Romanian introductions.
140
 While Dillon countered Britain’s anti-
Romanian sentiment through forthright copy in conservative publications, with 
Moroianu’s help Seton-Watson played a multilayered, longer-term game. He introduced 
Macedo-Romanian delegates to influential members in the British press in the hope that 
Romania’s Aromanian Diaspora might inspire sympathy; they included Balkan 
Committee members Henry Brailsford and Noel Buxton at the Morning Post, John 
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Strachey at the Spectator and Henry Massingham and Christopher Nevinson at The 
Nation.
141
 During the second Balkan war he challenged Romanian perceptions that 
Britain’s coverage was biased, insisting that with the exception of the Nation, which is 
‘screamingly Bulgarophil’, the British press ‘is showing very considerable tact and 
moderation towards Roumania’.
142
 In a reminder of the two-way exchanges in the fields 
of representation and expertise, he also worked to establish his own credentials among 
Romanians as their champion in Britain, sending Moroianu his supportive letters in the 




In September 1913 it was reported that ‘omniscient’ Dillon in his ‘voluminous 
description of the negotiations which culminated in the Treaty of Bucharest, agrees 
substantially with Mr Seton Watson’s eulogy of Roumanian statesmanship’.
144
 There 
were clear parallels in the two men’s thinking. Seton-Watson also supported Romania’s 
intervention in July 1913, arguing Romania, ‘shut in by two great powers’, had little 
choice but to challenge the rise of a Greater Bulgaria, prevent the crushing of Serbia and 
claim any hegemony for itself ‘as the most powerful and developed of the Balkan 
nations’. The country offered the Great Powers the only possible solution: ‘a balance of 
power between the Christian states of the peninsula’.
145
 Like Dillon, Seton-Watson 
identified Romania not only as prima inter pares in the Balkans, but also as the country 
which held the balance of power between Russia and Austria-Hungary, with the 
capacity to defect from Vienna and in the event of war, help ‘confront the Dual 
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Monarchy with a solid phalanx of enemies stretching from Galicia to the Adriatic’.
146
 
But Seton-Watson differed from Dillon both in terms of how he believed Romania 
should utilise its newly acquired status and through his engagement in behind-the-
scenes political brokering to realise his emerging vision for the Balkans.  
At the end of the second Balkan war Seton-Watson wrote that he had identified a 
‘growing determination’ in Bucharest for change in Hungary.
147
 Three months earlier he 
met Romanians with a keen interest in their Transylvanian kinsmen. They included 
cabinet ministers Nicolae Xenopol and Take Ionescu, a founding member and the vice-
president of the Liga Culturală, Gheorghe Bogdan Duică and Virgil Arion, and 
opposition Liberal Party leader, Ion Brătianu. Seton-Watson observed intolerance 
towards Hungary’s conduct in Transylvania (noting Bogdan-Duică stressed the 
possibility of ‘joint action with the Serbs’) and he encouraged Brătianu to ‘assert’ that 




It is possible to identify the imprint of Seton-Watson’s discussions with Balkan 
leaders, including those in Bucharest, on the evolution of his opinions. By September 
1913 he was publicly arguing in Britain that the ‘Balkan War marks a turning point in 
Austro–Hungarian relations’ and ‘has taught both Roumania and Servia to look 
northwards to their kinsmen across the frontier whose emancipation from the Magyar 
yoke seems to have drawn insensibly nearer’. Previously wary of regicidal Serbia, in 
1913 he enthusiastically referred to the country’s army and its ‘brilliant achievements’ 
and argued that the ‘renaissance of Serbia’ and Romania’s emergence as the ‘most 
powerful and cultured of all the Christian states of the Peninsula’ were developments 
through which ‘drastic changes in Hungary and an abandonment of a Magyarising 
Policy’ might finally be realised.
149
 Mindful of the balance of power and still convinced 
of the need for a strong Dual Monarchy, he did not advocate the inclusion of the ‘four 
million Roumanians of Hungary’ into the Romanian Kingdom, but like Romanian 
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Bogdan Duica, he identified a unity of mission with Serbia, the war having ‘revealed to 




In contrast, Dillon championed the cause he had come to support in Bucharest 
while ultimately remaining loyal to his conservative instincts. He identified the 
maintenance of Austria-Hungary as essential for stability in the region and cautioned 
against publicists encouraging the idea of ‘these restless little states working together’. 
Romania, no longer ‘drawn in the wake of the Dual Monarchy’, had made the ‘eternal 
Servian problem ... more acute’. Dillon warned of what a living thing ‘nationality is 
become in southeastern Europe’, the strong undercurrents of which have ‘never yet been 
measured’. Romania’s wilful behaviour had given hope to their brethren in the 
Monarchy and thus created another ‘Ireland’ for the Empire.
151
 Here an assessment of 
Brubaker’s competing nationalisms is again informative. Shifts in the geopolitical 
situation had made the prospects of an external homeland nationalism focused on 
Transylvania more viable.
152
 The leverage which this accorded Romania in relation 
Hungary’s nationalising nationalism was keenly acknowledged by Seton-Watson. In 
contrast, Dillon, having spent years in Tsarist Russia, was a believer in traditional 
imperial centres of power. He recognised the merits of a strengthened core Romanian 
Kingdom, but did not share Seton-Watson’s optimism over the prospect of a Balkan 
alliance, nor independent Romanian action that might imperil the viability of the 
Habsburg Empire.  
In the wake of the Treaty of Bucharest, liberal idealist Seton-Watson believed a 
‘Serbo-Roumanian Entente’ had the potential to expand into a larger Balkan league with 
common commercial and strategic interests that would not be purely Slav thanks to the 
addition of Romania and would be ‘freed from the intrigues and domination of Russia 
and Austria alike’.
153
 If Todovora’s observes ‘almost total disappointment’ in the region 
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during the Balkan wars, in 1913 Seton-Watson sought to challenge that opinion.
154
 He 
cited the Treaty of Bucharest as ‘fresh proof’ that the ‘reviving Christian states’ of the 
Balkans ‘are well able to manage their own affairs without outside interference’ and 
argued ‘recent events have forced the Western world to revise its judgement of all the 
Balkan States’ which had been stereotyped by ‘false estimates’ (including his own).
155
 
Crucially, it was Romania that Seton-Watson singled out as the country ‘entitled’ to 
‘leadership in the Balkans’, concluding that ‘the moderation which she has displayed in 
the recent crisis proves that she desires to lead rather than to dominate’.
156
  
Not a professional journalist, in September 1913 Seton-Watson’s views were 
expounded in one Contemporary Review article. And the liberal press did not always 
agree with him. In the Manchester Guardian, Romania’s ‘robbery under arms’ in 
Bulgaria’s Dobrogea undermined Bucharest’s protestations over ‘the sufferings of 
sundry millions of Roumanians under the yoke of the Magyars in Hungary’.
157
 
Nonetheless, by the end of 1913 Seton-Watson had established his reputation beyond 
the Habsburg nationalities as both a Balkan and a Romanian expert. Like Dillon, he 
identified Romania’s growing power in the region. But unlike Dillon, who remained 
committed to the status quo, Seton-Watson offered a different view for the potential 
manifestation of that power and in doing so fulfilled one of Prott’s key identifiers in the 
definition of expertise. Asserting of the rights of Romanian Transylvanians, seeing the 
potential for a alliance with other Balkan states, and demonstrating his ability to work 
on both sides of the Romanian–Hungarian border to realise his political vision, Seton-
Watson demonstrated what Prott identifies as ‘a certain freedom to develop alternative 
options rather than being forced to provide a single solution to a complex problem’.
158
 
His dedication to the region paved the way for Seton-Watson’s elevated status during 
World War I when Britain sought additional allies on the Eastern Front. If 1913 was the 
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culmination of journalist Dillon’s exclusive engagement with the Romanian kingdom, 
for ‘expert’ Seton-Watson it was just the beginning.  
 
2.2 World War, Romanian Neutrality and the Changing Face of 
Expertise 
2.2.1 Dr Emile Dillon – ‘the semi-official ambassador’  
In November 1913 Vanity Fair published a caricature of Dr Emile Dillon above the 
caption, ‘the semi-official ambassador’.
159
 Doubtless the epithet pleased Dillon, the man 
who had reminded readers that his fountain pen was used to sign the Treaty of 
Bucharest.
160
 The peace negotiations in August 1913 marked the high point in his 
relations with Romania, and sealed a friendship with politician Take Ionescu that 
endured beyond the Conference.
161
 However, after the outbreak of World War I, 
Dillon’s support of Romania was increasingly dependent on the country’s willingness to 
join the conflict on the side of the Entente. This section will argue that his irate 
constructions of neutral Romania expose the fickleness of what Said’s Orientalism 
identifies as representations ‘premised upon exteriority’.
162
 Dillon believed Romanian 
inaction did not suit British military needs and roundly castigated the country, 
attempting to redefine Romania as another untrustworthy Balkan neutral. His 
opportunistic coverage between August 1914 and August 1916 will serve to underline 
the limitations that journalism imposed on ‘expertise’, with the commentator premising 
the needs of his own image and readership over accuracy and strategy. It will identify 
Romania’s two-year neutrality as a period of heightened uncertainty which highlighted 
the contrast between Dillon’s professional media voice and the more fluid position of 
men like Seton-Watson who occupied an increasingly powerful role that bridged 
academia, politics and the press.  
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Immediately after Dillon’s departure from Bucharest in August 1913, Romania 
was relegated to his general ‘Foreign Affairs’ contributions in the Contemporary 
Review. For the first time he reported on the country’s compromising internal issues, 
drawing attention to Romania’s profligate landowners dependent on the peasant ‘who 
barely receives enough to enable him to live and go on working for their behoof, and 
occasionally to drown his sorrows in alcohol’.
163
 These were not peasants ‘in the 
European sense’. The criticism is indicative of a superior external perspective; 
backward Romania still had a long way to go. However, although Dillon located the 
country in a second tier of Eastern nations, he remained optimistic about Romania as the 
‘warden of the Balkan states’ and a ‘veritable Power in Europe’.
164
 He was relieved that 
Romania’s new premier Brătianu appeared prudent and argued that under him ‘reform 
will be a more moderate affair than promised and imagined last summer’. Dillon wanted 
the peasant question addressed in order that the country had a free hand to attend the 
‘problems of foreign policy’. Romania, ‘in a position of predominating influence’, was 
still his bright hope for peace in a Peninsula which was a vital and unresolved 
component in a divided continent.
165
  
In line with British foreign policy, Dillon emphasised the need for political 
equilibrium in Europe. Two days before the Austrian Ultimatum was presented to 
Serbia in July 1914, Ionescu, the former Romanian Interior Minister, was surprised by a 
meeting with the British Foreign Secretary when Grey insisted he did not want Italy to 
leave the Triple Alliance and join France and Russia, because ‘the peace of Europe 
which rests on the balance of power would be endangered’.
166
 In a similar vein, Dillon 
denied ‘Roumania’s alleged fundamental change of policy’. Amidst speculation that 
France and Russia were wooing Romania in the spring of 1914, he urged caution.
167
 
Ignoring increased Irredentist manifestations towards Transylvania, Dillon argued that 
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‘Romania needs and covets no territory’.
168
 By June 1914, although he was reporting 
from war-torn Albania, Dillon held onto the idea of Romania as a centre of reason and 
continued to refer to the diplomatic finesse of Ionescu (who had left office in January 
1914).
169
 This happy co-existence between journalist and Romanian ideal endured as 
long as Dillon felt Romania’s outlook worked in the interests of Britain. But with the 
latter’s entry into World War I, those interests were turned upside down and Dillon’s 
championing of peaceful Romania abruptly ended. The next two years witnessed a 
volte-face in his coverage of the country whose place in British discourse he had so 
enhanced.  
In 1913 Dillon’s superior knowledge of Romania saw him challenge Michail’s 
definition of a Balkan ‘expert’ that demands a ‘sense of commitment to the region’.
170
 
But the war exposed the weakness of his role as a man who earned his living by 
covering the ‘great events’ in Europe.
171
 By February 1915 Dillon had moved to Italy, 
where he watched the former member of the Triple Alliance swap allegiance and join 
the Entente that May. Present at an earlier Franco-Romanian banquet in Paris, where 
Romania’s entry into the war was anticipated along with that of Italy’s, and following a 
particular line of diplomatic thinking, Dillon predicted ‘Roumania is bound by a 
specific engagement to cooperate with the Allies in the second phase of the war which 
is now impending’ and he anticipated imminent military engagement.
172
 That the 
country he thought he knew so well failed to act on the assurances given by ‘principal 
members of the present cabinet, as well as by the chiefs of the opposition’ was a bitter 
disappointment and a professional humiliation.
173
 Having championed a parallel case 
between Italy and Romania for months, he now cautioned Britain over assumptions that 
the countries were similar. No longer a Latin land, Romania was a ‘Danubian 
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Kingdom’, where ‘the masses are mostly uneducated, bereft of political rights, inert’.
174
 
Dillon ruthlessly unpicked the political legitimacy of a country he had helped construct, 
comparing the ‘soul’ of Italy’s people which was capable of dictating their country’s 
war course, with a Romanian people in the thrall of a virtual ‘dictatorship’ at the hands 
of Brătianu. The Prime Minister was a scrupulous man ‘unable to make a decision’. 
Romania’s strategic hesitancy that Dillon had praised in 1913 was damned as 
‘faintheartedness’ in the context of World War I.
175
 
In July 1915 Dillon was briefly consoled by the idea that when Bulgaria joined 
the Allies, Romanian interventionists would force the hand of their government.
176
 (The 
Foreign Office thought Romania was unlikely to enter the war with an equivocal 
Bulgarian neighbour.
177
) Bulgaria’s decision to join the Central Powers in September 
1915 quashed those hopes. Dillon’s response to Romania’s continued neutrality was 
uncompromising. Contradicting his previous argument that Romania sought no 
additional territory, he attacked their cowardly leaders for failing to save the four 
million Romanians who ‘vegetate and languish’ in Hungary, claiming that the 
‘Bucharest government might have annexed the territory long ago’. The Irredentist 
claims he had been reluctant to acknowledge in 1913 were now used as stick to beat the 
inactive Romanian Kingdom with. In the Illustrated London News Dillon wrote that the 
country was run by a ‘single average’ brain – Prime Minister Brătianu – who waited for 
Transylvania to ‘drop into her lap without an effort on her part, as a result of a certain 
magic formula uttered by himself’, while his friend, pro-Entente Ionescu was ‘relegated 
to the inactivity of unofficial life’.
178
 Dillon’s very personal attacks on Brătianu 
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compounded the untrustworthy reputation of Romania’s prevaricating leader.
179
 
Brătianu’s Sphinx-like image became a catch-all used to describe the whole country.
180
  
Dillon’s Romania fell further into the negative Balkan world identified by 
Todorova. It was an unscrupulous country in a despised Balkan rubric riddled with 
mutual loathing,
181
 where ‘the mental and moral mechanisms’ are ‘worked by a set of 
levers that differ widely from those of the more developed peoples of Europe’.
182
 J. O. 
Baylen argues that during the war Dillon’s opinions were seen as an increasing liability 
by Lord Burnham, the managing editor of the Daily Telegraph, and his work was 
frequently censored.
183
 However, Dillon continued to write for the Daily Telegraph; in 
1916 he was hailed as their ‘well known foreign correspondent’ and wrote a ‘series of 
important articles’ on the diplomatic history of the Balkans that capitalised on ‘his 
unrivalled knowledge of political Europe to trace the course of war diplomacy during 
last year’.
184
 The Illustrated London News flaunted his brand: ‘DR E. J. DILLION the 
best informed authority on foreign affairs and the inner side of international diplomacy 
will write on the DIPLOMATIC SIDE OF THE WAR each week.’
185
 In June 1916, the 




Dillon continued to count himself as one among a few experts outside the 
Diplomatic Corp who could help the British government understand Balkan policy.
187
 
Publicly he was prepared to criticise them, pointing out that the ‘pith of the matter’ 
regarding Romania’s neutrality was the Allies’ injudicious decision to promise Romania 
the territories belonging to Austria-Hungary in exchange for mere neutrality.
188
 In 
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London he also enjoyed access to several leading political players. One day in February 
1916 he had a meeting at the Foreign Office, supper in London with the Home 
Secretary, the President of the Board of Trade and Lord Burnham, and talked to the 
Department of Trade about ‘attitudes and German intrigues in Roumania’.
189
 In the 
wake of Romania’s entry into the war the censored contents of one of his articles was 
reported to Prime Minister Lloyd George, and Dillon also attempted to meet him 
regarding a separate matter.
190
 However, Dillon’s primary outlet and priority remained 
the unsubtle and waspish power of his pen, the success of which he depended upon for 
his income.
191
 In his articles he was unbending in his criticism of Romania. Returning to 
Prott’s identification of expertise which required the freedom to arrive at alternative 
solutions, Dillon, beholden to his own rigid interpretation of events and those of his 
conservative readers, falls short. He could countenance only one outcome – Romania’s 
immediate entry into the war.
192
  
Within the space of a year Dillon had publicly contradicted himself and pivoted 
Romania’s image away from European and prestigious to undemocratic and Balkan. 
This is indicative of the power of external Western opinion-makers and the relative 
powerlessness of their Eastern subjects in a vindication of the binary dynamic Said 
identifies at the heart of oriental representations.
193
 It was a paradigm that the 
propaganda-soaked atmosphere of World War I exacerbated. However, although Dillon 
undermined ideas of Romania as European and legitimate that elsewhere Seton-Watson 
continued to champion, he did not undermine the country’s relevance. Dillon’s 
disappointment at Romania’s failure to commit to the Entente cause and his exasperated 
conclusion that the country would play the game of ‘follow my leader’ and only embark 
on a war ‘when it can with certitude be predicated’ what the outcome will be,
194
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validated the idea, mooted in the Foreign Office and in the British press, that ‘to win 




2.2.1 Romanian neutrality, R. W. Seton-Watson and David Mitrany  
Until the outbreak of World War I R. W. Seton-Watson remained steadfast in his view 
that a reformed Dual Monarchy was essential for the European balance of power. Even 
when his friend, The Times foreign editor, Henry Wickham Steed, led the Unionist press 
in its interventionist stance after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, Seton-
Watson did not immediately relinquish the idea of ‘regeneration’ within the Empire.
196
 
However, once Britain declared war against Austria-Hungary in August 1914, like 
Dillon, Seton-Watson adapted his thinking in line with the geopolitical equilibrium he 
believed best suited British interests.
197
 Capitalising on his ability to straddle different 
worlds and mobilise transnational contacts and networks, he became an early champion 
of the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire and pushed for his vision of a reformed 
‘New Europe’ which included the creation of Greater Romania.
198
 This section will 
identify Seton-Watson’s framing of neutral Romania through its unredeemed westerly 
Transylvanian minority, which was mirrored by the work of academic Romanian Jew 
David Mitrany. Their ‘expert’ version of Romania will serve not only as a vindication 
of Brubaker’s recognition of an external ‘homeland nationalism’ ‘competing’ with 
opposing Hungarian ‘nationalising nationalism’, but it will also illustrate how this 
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When World War I began, Seton-Watson offered ‘his pen and such knowledge 
as I know of the situation in the Near East’ to The Times and was rebuffed by Wickham 
Steed: ‘now that the war is general, Servia recedes into the background’.
200
 But if by 
August 1914 public focus had moved away from the Balkans, Irish has identified 
autumn 1914 as a watershed moment when ‘scholars engaged as combatants in a 
cultural war’ mobilising networks, pooling knowledge and establishing committees.
201
 
Motivated by the idea of promoting the nationalities within the Habsburg Empire, 
including Transylvanian Romanians, Seton-Watson had already started preparatory 
work on a provisional periodical to address the ‘huge gaps in English on quite a number 
of important political and racial problems’ which was targeted at ‘those who ‘count’ in 
politics, diplomacy and literature’
202
 By December 1914 he had written two serious 
contributions aimed at defining the Entente’s political raison d’être: a Round Table 
pamphlet and two chapters in The War and Democracy published by the Council for the 
Study of International Relations. Committed to the liberation of small nations which 
must rise and deliver ‘the reconciliation of the ideal of national unity with that of full 
liberty for racial minorities’, he identified ‘over five million Roumanians, including the 
very cream of the race’ who ‘still live under foreign domination’ and focused on the 
need for Romania to fulfil the dream of ‘Roumanian Unity’ with the Romanians in 
Austria-Hungary and join the Allied cause.
203
 
In The War and Democracy even his academic co-authors found Seton-Watson’s 
style challenging. He was not writing for the general public, but rather seeking to 
explicate a complex situation that would both foster understanding at a top level and 
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ultimately encourage joint action.
204
 Despite his awareness that over a million 
Romanians lived in Russia’s Bessarabia, which had been annexed from Romania in the 
previous century, Seton-Watson did not follow Arthur Greenwood’s recommendation 
and insist ‘Russia must give up Bessarabia to Roumania.’ Instead he argued that the 
‘abstract theory of nationality’ must first be ‘reinforced by the more practical argument 
of sterling services to a common cause’.
205
 The Manchester Guardian highlighted this 
contradiction but conceded ‘that no difficulties of detail affect the central fact that 
nationality is the best salve for existing wounds’ and ‘its application will enormously 
reduce the infected areas’.
206
 Seton-Watson’s awareness of both Romania’s priorities 
and Allied constraints placed him in the ‘division of labour’ Irish identifies in 1915, 




The Oxford Pamphlets was another product of an early scramble to find answers 
to a war many did not understand. It was a Jewish Romanian scholar at the London 
School of Economics who wrote for them about Romania, highlighting both academias’ 
ability to identify and mobilise knowledge and the demand for specific information on 
Romania.
208
 David Mitrany enjoyed connections to the Balkan Committee and was keen 
to demonstrate loyalty to Britain, his adopted nation. He had tried to join the army but 
his ‘alien’ status led to rejection.
209
 Failing a Foreign Office interview, and encouraged 
to focus on Balkan intelligence,
210
 he applied his Romanian expertise in the public 
domain. His Oxford Pamphlet ‘Rumania, her history and her politics’, was published in 
1914, and he contributed a chapter to the prestigious 1915 wartime study, The 
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 Although a Romanian, in both publications Mitrany conformed to Said’s 
exteriority paradigm and closely observed the needs of Britain’s ‘national interest’. 
Later wartime correspondence with Anglo-Jew Lucien Wolf, confirms Mitrany’s 
concern for the welfare of his Romanian co-religionists.
212
 However, in line with 
Foreign Office recommendations, just as Wolf suppressed the Jewish Question during 
neutrality,
213
 likewise Mitrany either avoided the subject or wrote a disclaimer:  
The Jewish question in Rumania is undoubtedly a very serious one; but the 
matter is too controversial to be dealt with in a few lines without risking 
misrepresentation or doing an injustice to one or other of the parties. For which 
reason it has not been included in this essay.
214
 
The Jewish Question was tuned out and Mitrany focussed on Romania’s 
Irredenta in Transylvania. Again, interplay between the evolving nationalisms Brubaker 
recognises is identifiable here.
215
 In wartime Great Britain, potential ally Romania could 
not be portrayed as an oppressor and the nationalism of Romania’s Jewish minority lost 
out accordingly. In contrast, an external homeland nationalism championing the rights 
of the oppressed Romanian Transylvanians in enemy Austria-Hungary vindicated the 
idea of a war for small nations and was encouraged in British discourse. Mitrany’s 
contributions drew heavily on ideas in Xenopol’s Istoria românilor din Dacia Traiană 
and imbued Romanian nationalism with the type of ‘historical mobility’ Smith identifies 
as a legitmating force.
216
 Romania was an ancient land peopled by an amalgamation of 
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Dacians and their Roman conquerors.
217
 The location of the Romanians in the 
Carpathians, prior to the arrival of the Hungarians in the ninth century, framed the 
Romanian race as the righteous heirs to what had subsequently become Hungarian 
Transylvania.
218
 This compelling Transylvanian narrative provided the historical 
justification for the moral outrage sketched in Seton-Watson’s descriptions of 
Romanian oppression by the Magyars. 
In Seton-Watson’s 1915 book, Roumania and the Great War, which received 
overwhelmingly positive reviews,
219
 the Transylvanian Romanians were presented as a 
cohesive national unit whose situation had become a matter of ‘life and death’. If the 
country entered the war ‘it can only be with one objective – the conquest of 
Transylvania’. Pushing his self-determination agenda and with a keen eye on the post-
war settlement, additional appendices were a means ‘to provide exhaustive religious and 
ethnographical statistics of the population of Transylvania and of the Rumane counties 
of Hungary proper’.
220
 Seton-Watson even provided a possible future boundary for 
Greater Romania to reduce the racial ‘mix-up’.
221
  
However his concern for minorities did not stretch to the largest minority within 
the Kingdom of Romania. Seton-Watson’s embedded anti-Semitism saw him gloss over 
the country’s Jewish Question and assert the ‘very serious economic dangers’ Jewish 
immigration had presented in Romania. He argued that the restrictions placed on 
Romania’s Jews were an answer to the ‘agitation of international Jewish societies and 
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financial interests’ working against the ‘very existence’ of the Romanian state.
222
 Few 
publications picked up on these anti-Semitic tropes,
223
 choosing instead to focus on the 
creation of a Greater Romania; both The Times and the Spectator were convinced by 
Seton-Watson’s analysis. If Romanians ‘steer the right course they should come out of 
this war a great nation, with Transylvania and Bucovina incorporated in a Romanian 
kingdom’. In the Athenaeum Seton-Watson had drawn a ‘frontier line in such as way as 
to liberate a very large proportion of the Roumanians without burdening Roumania with 
an unmanageable number of Magyars or Saxons’.
224
  
Anderson defines nations as ‘imagined communities’, which are both ‘limited’ 
and ‘sovereign’. His widely recognised theory is problematic when applied to the large 
Romanian population which lay under Habsburg rule in Transylvania and was identified 
as inhabiting the ‘cradle’ or ‘heart’ of Romanian civilisation.
225
 It is this conundrum 
which explains the power of Mitrany’s and Seton-Watson’s wartime work. The small 
nations parameter increasingly used to reframe the Entente’s war aims, ensured that by 
1915 the feted Transylvanian Romanians presented Romanian identity in British 
discourse with a solution, not another problem. Encouraging Romania to go to war for 
its oppressed kinsmen over the mountains fitted the goal of emancipating subject races 
from alien rule, while giving Romania a chance to fulfil the so-called ‘principle of 
nationality’. Seton-Watson was quick to remind his audience of that nationality’s 
European value. Romania was ‘the sentinel of Latin culture in the east of Europe, a 
racial link with Italy and France amid a world of alien peoples’.
226
 The Times referred to 
Italy and Romania as ‘Latin and Liberal’, and an in-depth feature concluded that 
‘Rumania herself is a geographical anomaly and it is very curious to find a Latin 
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enclave in Eastern Europe surrounded on all sides by Slavs and Hungarians.’
227
 The 
Manchester Guardian, which had been unsure about entering a war on behalf of the 
Slavs, took consolation in Romania’s national characteristics. These people ‘originally 
of Italian origin’ managed to ‘keep back the Slav hordes’ and retained ‘many Italian 
characteristics in language, race, manners and traditions’.
228
  
Hobsbawm observed that many of the criteria used for defining nations are 
fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous, noting this ‘makes them unusually convenient for 
propagandist and programmatic’ purposes.
229
 The malleability of Romania’s wartime 
image serves to emphasise that point. In 1907 it was a wild Eastern outpost, not worthy 
of its Balkan neighbours and almost indistinguishable from giant Russia, but by 1915 
the Romanian nation, as defined by the apparently immutable ethnic indicators of 
language and race, was located as a Latin exception with particular emphasis placed on 
the Romanian population that sat in enemy Hungary. Seton-Watson held fast onto the 
public promotion of this Latin agenda in the summer of 1915.
230
 His timing was 
significant as Romania did not follow Italy and join the conflict in May 1915 and 
thereby confounded expectations which had been accentuated through Romania’s 
receipt of a £5 million British loan in January 1915.
231
 Dillon’s wrath concerning 
Romania’s protracted neutrality has already been noted; elsewhere sections of the left-




That the Foreign Office, perhaps influenced by Dillon, had overestimated the 
connection between Italy and Romania was indicative of a global conflict which 
exposed government diplomacy as unprepared.
233
 David Kaufman has argued that 
shortly after the outbreak of war the Foreign Office came under attack, criticised for 
‘aristocratic bias’ and its ‘small clique of professional advisors far removed from public 
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 Problems were compounded by a world war that impacted on the flow of 
diplomatic intelligence at a time when statesmen were confronted with the need for 
additional allies in regions they knew little about. Having previously dismissed the 
concerns of the Balkan Committee in favour of maintaining the status quo, the war 
demanded a different approach. Without a specific policy for Eastern Europe, they 
sought external individuals who could offer expertise and relationships with local 
leaders that their department lacked.
235
 It was in this context that Seton-Watson, and to 
a lesser extent, Mitrany, saw their influence expand beyond public and academic 
realms. 
It was recognition that winning Bulgaria to the Entente cause was key to 
Romania entering the war that saw the Buxton brothers Noel and Charles,
236
 go to Sofia 
in the autumn of 1914. The trip was a failure and the Foreign Office longed for the 
Buxtons to come home, but this did not deter their engagement with other Balkan 
experts.
237
 George Trevelyan recommended Seton-Watson to the Foreign Office as a 
man ‘who has much knowledge and experience of southern Austria’.
238
 Seton-Watson 
had already sent them a chapter on the South Slavs from The War and Democracy and 
discussions began regarding a Trevelyan/Seton-Watson trip to Serbia and Romania.
239
 
The Foreign Office decided that Seton-Watson ‘as an unofficial observer and a well 
known Serbo-Croat sympathiser might not be without effect’. He was considered less 
likely to inspire mistrust in the Russians than the pro-Bulgarian Buxtons.
240
 The trip 
included a visit to Romania, Grey admitting it was ‘impossible for His Majesty’s 
Government to obtain a definite statement of Roumania’s intentions and difficult to 
form a reliable estimate of them’.
241
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In January 1915, en route from Belgrade to Bucharest, Trevelyan and Seton-
Watson were convinced that Romania’s ‘action or inaction’ would prove decisive for 
saving Serbia.
242
 However, the two men couched their opinions very differently. 
Trevelyan drew on the image of an opportunistic Romania. ‘No one, Serbian or English, 
has any confidence that Roumania will march until after the battle has been fought and 
won.’ While Romania ‘ought to help’ the ‘only safe assumption’ was that Romania 
would ‘not march until she sees who is victor’.
243
 Seton-Watson was more circumspect. 
He conceded that Serbia was ‘disappointed and perhaps somewhat hurt by her 
[Romania’s] attention hitherto’ and referred to, but did not affirm, the image of a self-
serving Romania refusing to make any concessions.
244
 
Seton-Watson’s guarded analysis underlines the significance he placed on 
Romania, the country he considered to be the ‘centre of gravity’ in the Balkans,
245
 and 
the seriousness with which he took his ‘expert’ role. He considered himself both an 
advisor to and mediator between Britain and Romania. With the advantage of two prior 
visits to Bucharest, Seton-Watson, not Trevelyan, was the driving force there. At a 
banquet with the League of National Unity of the Romanians, he played two hands. He 
reassured his audience of the special interest taken by Britain in Romania. He claimed 
that both countries stood for the principles of nationality, and the liberty and unity of the 
small peoples in Europe and that both were confronted by similar obstacles; Britain’s 
foe was ‘Prussian militarism’ and Romania’s was ‘Magyar hegemony’. In this context 
he urged Romania, ‘to play the principal role’ in the defeat of Austria-Hungary. ‘I do 
not want to believe that his hand will tremble.’
246
 In an assertion of his power as 
Romania’s main broker on the British stage, the same message was written more 
forcefully in a letter to the Transylvanian poet Goga
247
 and printed in several Romanian 
newspapers: 
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If Roumania should stand by and allow the Serbs to be annihilated – which I 
cannot believe – then I should be ashamed of my relations with the Roumanians. 
For not merely is the community of interests between Roumanians and Serbs 
clear beyond dispute, but I notice among this heroic people, in spite of all its 
miseries, the moral greatness which is the pledge of a splendid future and the 
possession of which the Roumanians still have to prove by action.
248
 
Britain received a very different brief. In contrast with the earlier report sent 
from Serbia recommending ‘a strong line should be taken in Bucharest’, the Foreign 
Office was told there was a ‘strong hope’ Romania won’t see ‘Servia altogether 
crushed’, but that ‘strong pressure’ on Bucharest was ‘inadvisable’. Seton-Watson 
excused Romania’s hesitancy, warning that the country, overshadowed by and 
mistrustful of Russia, must be convinced of Britain’s commitment.
249
 Changes were 
made, although to what extent Seton-Watson influenced them is less easy to discern. 
With an additional request from Ambassador Barclay, by the spring of 1915 the Foreign 
Office had assigned a military attaché, Colonel C Thompson, exclusively to Romania 
and in March 1915 the legation had a new deputy, Frank Rattigan.
250
 Although 
motivated by concerns over Italian claims in Serbian Dalmatia, Seton-Watson’s meeting 
on 3 May 1915 with Foreign Secretary Grey encompassed the entire region and 
suggests his expertise was valued.
251
  
However, the limits of his influence were exposed when Seton-Watson’s 
ambition that the Great Powers should broker a pro-Entente Balkan alliance was never 
seriously considered.
252
 Its dismissal by the Foreign Office was indicative of the 
problems individual ‘experts’ encountered when trying to steer Entente policy in the 
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labyrinthine Balkans. Seton-Watson’s and Trevelyan’s earlier suggestion that ‘Britain 
should run considerable risks to save Serbia’ and encourage Romania and Greece to 
cooperate with Serbia was also disregarded, on the basis that ‘our new counsellors are 
giving advice without evidently a clear knowledge of the steps which can be taken at 
Athens and Bucharest or of the views held in these latter capitals’.
253
 Pessimistic about 
the chances of a Balkan alliance, and convinced that military victory was the most likely 
incentive to bring the neutral states into the war, the Foreign Office focused its strategic 
policy in the East on the Dardanelles.
254
  
The response to Seton-Watson’s Bucharest visit in the British press was also 
hard to control; reports of his positive reception in Bucharest were held up as evidence 
that Romania was on the brink of joining the Allies.
255
 Anticipating frustration, in a 
series of public lectures Seton-Watson worked to explain the country’s prevarication. 
‘Romania was not ready. Her position was isolated. Her trade was cut off ... the 
Rumanians had more excuse than anybody else for waiting until the snow had thawed 
before they entered.’ An arrangement was needed with Bulgaria.
256
 In Roumania and 
the Great War he placed the onus for Romania’s protracted neutrality on ‘the field of 
international policy’ and that included Britain.
257
 He was concerned by suggestions that 
our Government, so far from favouring Roumanian unity was dreaming of a 
great Hungary as an obstacle to Russian aggression. The Magyar intrigues which 
were so noticeable in the British press during last December and January 
deepened the alarm caused in Romania by such rumours.
258
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Seton-Watson was referring to the pro-Hungarian campaign featured in the 
conservative Morning Post.
259
 In a series of articles Hungarian national, Joseph 
Szebenyi, pushed a sympathetic image of Hungary as a reluctant member of the Central 
Powers. ‘Every Hungarian will be grateful to the English press if it champions the cause 
of the unfortunate Magyar people who were unwittingly dragged into this war by 
cunning warlords and enemies of humanity.’
260
 Penned in London, Szebenyi pretended 
his articles were smuggled in from Hungary,
261
 which he positioned as the victim nation 
keen for both independence from the Dual Monarchy and peace. Leading Romanian 
Transylvanians were identified as ‘agitators’ misleading ‘ignorant people’ and preparing 
spurious ‘reasons for Roumanian intervention on the ground that Roumanian peasants 
are executed wholesale’.
262
 Romania was singled out as intent upon destroying 
Hungary: the country ‘does not want concessions’ for Hungary’s Romanians ‘but 
Transylvania for herself and that is the one thing we cannot promise and will not 
give’.
263
 The paper’s editor, H.A. Gwynne, shared Szebenyi’s concerns over Romanian 
ambitions in Hungary and supported his case with editorials, urging Hungary, either as 
part of Austria-Hungary or ‘alone’, to make ‘overtures’ to the Entente.
264
  
Seton-Watson was incensed by this campaign
265
 and his concerns were picked 
up in the press. The Economist was surprised: ‘We are told many Roumanians distrusted 
England, believing curiously enough that we sympathised with their special foes the 
Magyars.’ The Evening News referred to ‘the humiliating news of how a long series of 
                                                          
259
 Morning Post, 11 Nov, 5, 12, 24 Dec 1914, 1, 6, 8 Jan 1915. Similar sentiments were 
referred to in other publications: The Spectator, 26 Dec 1914, Manchester Guardian, 6 
Jan 1915. 
260
 Morning Post, 1 Jan 1915. 
261
 Frederick D. R. Shipton, ‘British Diplomatic Relations with Austria-Hungary and 
British Attitudes to the Monarchy in the Years 1885–1918’, DPhil Thesis, University of 
Sussex, 2012, p. 87. 
262
 Morning Post, 11 Nov, 5, 12, 24 Dec 1914, 1, 6, 8 Jan 1915. 
263
 Ibid., Dec 1914. 
264
 Ibid., 16 Dec 1914, 13 Jan 1915. The idea that an independent Hungary might ‘join 
hands with Roumania and Italy’ was mooted, 6 Jan 1915. The Manchester Guardian 
also championed the idea of a separate Hungarian peace, but conceded a future state 
may have to modify its borders, ‘for Transylvania is in no sense Hungarian’. 
Manchester Guardian, 6 Jan 1915. 
265
 Seton-Watson, Roumania and the Great War, pp. 68–69. That as recently as 1906 
Seton-Watson had been a supporter of home rule in Hungary probably inflamed his 
anxiety over the campaign. László, ‘R.W. Seton-Waton’s Changing View on the 
National Question of the Habsburg Monarchy’, pp. 665–66. 
   
139 
 
articles from Budapest published by a London journal have been cited by an influential 
member of the Rumanian Cabinet as proof of our hostility to Rumanian aspirations’.
266
 
More broadly Seton-Watson’s book offered a stern rebuke of international policy and 
British diplomacy.
267
 The tendency to overlook Romania had persisted to the present 
day, and thus it was Britain’s fault they do not know if Romania ‘is for the Entente or is 
it for the Dual Alliance?’
268
 The idea that Britain was both ignorant about and lacked 
sympathy for Romania had considerable traction in the press.
269
 Even the Westminister 
Gazette, otherwise highly critical of Romania, conceded that the country’s concerns 
over British opposition to their national claims, and the prospect of a Russian 
Constantinople, were fears that ‘Entente diplomacy has to work on’. The Northern Whig 
was more forthright: to win Romania, Britain had to prove it had ‘the knowledge and 
diplomatic skill necessary to turn victory to full advantage’.
270
 
Seton-Waton’s focus on the ‘principle of nationality as one of the chief 
watchwords of the great struggle’ in South East Europe was his overriding concern.
271
 
That he inhabited a relatively unfettered position, engaging with the worlds of politics, 
the press and academia but beholden to no one, left him uniquely free to pursue this 
goal. A 1915 comparison with journalist Dillon is instructive. Seton-Watson’s measured 
criticism of British policy, balanced with an explication of mitigating circumstances in 
Romania, was at odds with Dillon’s uncompromising denunciation of the Romanian 
Prime Minister as a cowardly ‘dictator’ with an ‘average’ brain.
272
 (Seton-Watson and 
other liberals tended to optimistically associate national self-determination with 
democracy.) The polarity between the two men’s opinions, once identified as fellow 
champions of Romania, was stark. Dillon’s primary concern was to entertain and inform 
his readers; a style that involved hectoring nations which did not conform to his 
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understanding of Britain’s war agenda.
273
 Some of Seton-Watson’s work was also in the 
public arena. However, his efforts to cajole the British government to pursue military 
and diplomatic aims that dovetailed with his ambitions in South East Europe involved a 
flexibility of approach that included both bolstering Romania’s credentials and 
considered criticism of British foreign policy.  
Mitrany also alluded to British ‘passivity’ in Romania.
274
 However, a foreign 
national keen to ingratiate himself with his host nation, Mitrany was increasingly drawn 
into facilitating Britain’s relations with Romania. He was approached by Wellington 
House (home to the War Propaganda Bureau) to supply the Admiralty with information 
on Romania, translated selective British White papers into Romanian, wrote articles 
about the British war effort for the Romanian press and was permitted to receive ‘enemy 
publications’.
275
 Invited to write about the ‘men who are the driving force of the country 
today’, Mitrany was more critical about Romania’s leaders than Seton-Watson.
276
 But 
he argued that the ‘obliquity’ of Romanian politics imposed on the Romanian people by 
an ‘oriental’ elite, dependent on ‘German and Austrian capital’, might be overcome if 
the principle of nationality was adhered to and Transylvania was united with 
Romania.
277
 Mitrany’s ‘moral’ case for a Romanian war of national unity was in line 
with Foreign Office thinking, where a belief in the ‘moral effect’ of Romanian action 




Aware of his country’s military’s limitations, and keen to maximise Romania’s 
territorial gains, Brătianu’s negotiations increasingly tried the patience of Entente 
diplomats. In May 1915 Under Secretary Nicolson repeated the French Ambassador’s 
observation that the Romanian Prime Minister was acting like an Oriental at a 
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 By September 1915 the Entente had agreed to all Brătianu’s territorial claims, 
(although Russia only did so in return for a definite military commitment within five 
weeks from Romania).
280
 Britain had granted Romania a £7 million loan on the much 
reduced terms that there was a prohibition on ‘the transit of munitions of war’ and that 
the monies would never be used against the Entente.
281
 But Brătianu still refused to 
commit Romania to war. It was in this context that the Foreign Office gave 
consideration to Seton-Watson’s analysis of Romania’s Premier. As one of the few men 
in Britain who had met him, Seton-Watson advised that Brătianu ‘needs playing up to 
with a blend of finesse, diplomacy and friendly vigour’.
282
  
Couched in his appraisal of Brătianu was another critique of Allied diplomacy. 
Seton-Watson told the Foreign Office that the Romanian Prime Minister ‘suspects the 
Entente of lacking a clear constructive policy and the resolute will to enforce it’.
283
 That 
Seton-Watson also thought this was the case is evidence of the publicist’s ability to use 
his ‘expertise’ to further his own ‘small nations’ agenda at the heart of British 
government. Both Seton-Watson and Mitrany firmly invested in the idea of a Greater 
Latin Romania united through war, but it was Seton-Watson’s ability to criticise British 
relations with Romania while maintaining a position of authority as an expert in South 
East Europe, that set him apart. Although an external voice representing Romania, his 
early affinity with the Transylvanian Romanians’ cause and the nationalities of Austria-
Hungary more generally, helped him develop and prioritise his own ideas about the 
demise of the Dual Monarchy and the creation of a New Europe. After Romania joined 
the Entente in August 1916, confirmation of Mitrany’s more conventional path as an 
expert was his invitation to the write the Peace Handbook for Romania on behalf of the 
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Foreign Office’s Historical Section.
284
 In contrast, and as will be discussed in Chapter 4, 
Seton-Watson’s growing authority saw him straddle several seminal (and sometimes 
controversial) political and publishing roles where he influenced the ‘those who count’ 
with his small nations agenda for New Europe, including a united Greater Romania.  
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Military and Royal Representations of Neutral Romania 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 will argue that during Romania’s two year neutrality, Britain looked to 
traditional military and royal markers in an effort to define Romania as a prospective 
ally.
1
 The ambiguities surrounding German Ferdinand, who became King in October 
1914, encouraged an emphasis on the country’s peasant solider and his Latin descent 
which complimented the nationalities agenda of Seton-Watson. These deliberate efforts 
to demonstrate that Romania fulfilled the requirements of a modern nation-in-arms were 
both supplemented and challenged through autochthonous and feminine constructs 
promoted by the country’s two queens. This chapter will argue that both representations 
of the Romanian soldier and the impact of Elizabeth and Marie in Britain underline the 
importance of Anthony Smith’s approach to nationalism. His stress on ethno-symbolism 
and the need to provide the other ‘half of the story’ resonate in a wartime context that 
reinforced the appeal of traditional national identifiers.
2
 These Romanian 
representations, rooted in an ancient Latin narrative and mobilised through female 
European figureheads, helped dissociate the country from residual ideas associated with 
an unsympathetic, cruel East. However, conflicting gender constructs, exacerbated in 
the context of Romania’s neutrality, will highlight the difficulties of articulating 
nationhood in periods of international dislocation and uncertainty that were only 
resolved in Romania’s case when the country committed to war. 
Section 3.1 will argue that during Romania’s two year neutrality the British 
press focused on the country’s ability to mobilise a large army. The conflation of 
national identity with military capacity helps to explain this emphasis on Romania’s 
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army, with recent research affirming the French Revolutionary wars as the inauguration 
of an era of nationalism which dramatically expanded individual nations’ ability to 
drive collective violence: ‘a shift that can be dated with remarkable precision to the 
years 1770–1810’.
3
 However, by 1914 this military ossification of nationalism was not 
without complications in a war where belligerents were keen to differentiate themselves 
from the enemy.
4
 Section 3.1 will argue that Britain, with a Voluntary Army until 1916, 
was particularly susceptible to associations between military recruitment and political 
legitimacy, and focused on Romania’s numerically superior army to emphasise the 
country’s suitability as a potential ally.
5
  
Section 3.1 will demonstrate that ideas of a militarised Romania had been 
highlighted during the second Balkan war. It will argue that an ongoing tendency to 
frame Romania’s untested army as a prize national asset was facilitated by a failure to 
prioritise empirical military intelligence in the Balkan region generally and in Romania 
specifically. Highlighting the dangers of depending on politically motivated, external 
‘expertise’, Britain saw commentators make exaggerated claims about Romania’s 
military that went unchallenged in a political and public discourse keen for positive 
news. As well as deflecting attention away from issues of support and preparedness, a 
focus on the Romanian peasant-solider appealed to British thinking, where an 
increasing emphasis placed on inherently unstable racial constructions in the late 
nineteenth century had seen growing concerns about an urban working class believed to 
produce soldiers inferior to rural labourers.
6
 In wartime the peasant motif remained a 
powerful one. This section will conclude that while the successful obfuscation of the 
Romanian army’s limitations would exacerbate the disappointment that accompanied 
the country’s rapid defeat in late 1916, the idea of soldiers descended from Romans 
                                                          
3
 Lars-Erik Cederman, T. Camber Warren and Didier Sornette, ‘Testing Clausewitz: 
Nationalism, mass mobilisation and the severity of war’, International Organisation, 
2011, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 605–38. 
4
 J. Horne, ‘Defining the Enemy: War and the Levée en masse from 1870 to 1945’, in 
Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (eds), The People in Arms: Military myth and 
national mobilisation since the French Revolution, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp. 100–23. 
5
 Streets emphasises the promotion of the Voluntary Army in Britain: Heather Streets, 
The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, pp. 102–9. 
6
 Streets argues convincingly that the British army was deeply influenced by Victorian 
racial concepts; ibid., pp. 87–101. 
   
145 
 
provided an enduring European marker essential for the reframing of allied Romania in 
the latter half of the war.  
Section 3.2 will focus on monarchical representations of Romania during its 
two-year neutrality. Chapter 1 has already discussed the devaluation of Romania’s 
German monarchy in Britain as a result of pre-war cooling Anglo–German relations,
7
 
and the death of Carol and accession of a second German-born King, Ferdinand, did 
little to improve the country’s equivocal wartime position. This section will examine the 
increasing importance of monarchs as national symbols and argue that the ambiguities 
surrounding Carol’s Hohenzollern successor exposed Britain’s lack of working 
knowledge regarding Romania’s court.
8
 Newspapers and government officials alike, 
were unable to accurately quantify this weak king whose nationality was perceived as a 
negative. The lack of knowledge also saw Britain simultaneously fail to fully 
understand and articulate the relevance of his impressive British-born wife, Queen 
Marie.
9
 Here it will be suggested that this oversight was indicative of a gendered 
wartime narrative that associated masculinity with national identity and was therefore 




The hazy political picture received in Britain, ensured Romania’s royal imaging 
was susceptible to constructions that were both vague and contradictory. It was outside 
the orbit of realpolitik that Marie, Romania’s new queen, reinforced a precedent 
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established by Elizabeth, Romania’s German Dowager Queen, and saw her serve as an 
additional figurehead for a feminine version of her country’s ancient heritage. This 
section will argue that the queens’ oeuvre stressed a folkloric past imbued with 
innocence and long-standing tradition which necessitates a modest reappraisal of Vesna 
Goldsworthy’s theories regarding the West’s literary colonisation of the East and the 




Although foreign by birth and appealing to a British audience, the 
representations produced by Elizabeth and Marie, as queens of Romania, were less 
susceptible to the vagaries of conventional external representations, while their enduring 
idea of a romantic nation runs counter to more standard Balkan tropes identified by 
Todorova.
12
 Section 3.2 will draw on recent analysis that emphasises the ‘process of 
linguistic, historical and mythical identity formation’ and its practical consequences for 
new nationalism in the nineteenth century to explain the potency of both queens’ work 
beyond Romania’s borders.
13
 Their writing, imaging and gender confounded ideas of 
Romania as a potential belligerent, at the same time as it promoted the country’s ancient 
roots as worth fighting to preserve. This mythical Romania sat comfortably with the 
Latin-peasant motif identified in Romania’s army and ensured that once at war, 
convincing imagery existed in British discourse upon which to build a sympathetic 
European-centric Romanian construct.  
 
3.1 Military Representations of Neutral Romania  
Mid-way through 1915, after heavy losses at the Battle of Ypres and during the first 
naval assaults on the Dardanelles, the British were experiencing ‘war weariness’. The 
Spectator, looking for solutions to the ‘depression’, concluded that ‘one of the reasons 
to feel upbeat is the likely entry into war on the Allied side, of Roumania and Bulgaria’. 
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Six months later, after Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers, the journal observed that 
‘in every rail carriage and in a remarkable number of private houses’ were men who 
‘can tell you what King Ferdinand of Roumania or King Constantine [of Greece] 
intends to do’.
14
 Returning from the Balkans in May 1916, writer W. B. Forster Bovill 
admitted ‘the first question put to me by all and sundry was ‘“what is Rumania going to 
do?”’
15
 In a war defined by deadlock, the significance of once obscure neutral countries 
assumed a striking urgency. This section will demonstrate that two years of neutrality 
saw increasingly wild claims of Romanian military capability disseminated in British 
discourse. The imaging typically resorted to vague representations of Romanian soldiers 
dependent on the commentaries of bias ‘experts’, in a military discourse that would 
leave the country exposed in the wake of its late 1916 defeat. However, the appeal of a 
large peasant army with an ancient heritage provided a founding image upon which a 
later idea of Romania as a sympathetic beleaguered European ally could be built.  
Not directly involved in the Eastern Question from 1870, Romania was not a 
recipient of the unprecedented 14 military officers that Britain, concerned about 
maintaining Ottoman power, sent to the Balkans in the late nineteenth century.
16
 
Nonetheless, throughout the Peninsula empirical analysis was still found wanting, with 
Richard Hall arguing that a failure to appreciate military advances in the Balkan wars 
compounded problems in World War I.
17
 If British intelligence was of poor quality 
elsewhere in the Balkans, it was almost non-existent in Romania. In 1913 Lieutenant-
Colonel F. Lyons, the British military attaché stretched across four Balkan states – 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Romania – provided a typically vague and circumspect 
analysis. Although ‘a great many of the deficiencies have been made good’, the quality 
of Romania’s men and a lack of officers meant efforts to match Bulgaria’s military 
standards would take time to realise.
18
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During the second Balkan war Lyons was replaced by Major E. Plunkett as the 
military attaché to all four Balkan states.
19
 By April 1914 Plunkett had not spent more 
than a few days in Romania and despite repeat requests, only after the outbreak of 
World War I was his jurisdiction reduced and Military Attaché Lieutenant-Colonel H. 
N. Napier appointed to Bulgaria and Romania.
20
 Napier was based in the Bulgarian 
capital, Sofia. He partially relied on the French military attaché for information in 
Romania and when he was there, Napier’s exposure to the army was controlled by the 
Romanian General Staff.
21
 Ambassador Barclay was a ‘very charming chief’ but ‘the 
Roumanian ministers’ were not in the ‘habit of telling him quite enough’ and British 
Under Secretary in Bucharest, Frank Rattigan, provided contradictory military 
information – ‘the Roumanian army is rather an uncertain quantity and they themselves 
do not seem very confident as to its efficiency ... but on the whole it seems to be the 
general opinion that the Roumanians will fight pretty well’.
22
 Barclay begged ‘that a 
Military Attaché may be appointed to act solely at this post. Present Military Attaché is 
obliged to be much at Sofia and I have neither time nor military experience for 
furnishing adequate military experience.’
23
 In March 1915 Colonel Christopher 
Thompson of the Royal Engineers was appointed exclusively to Bucharest.
24
 He 
returned to England that June and was sent back to Romania in July, ordered simply to 
‘bring that country in’.
25
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This lack of credible military knowledge conferred authority onto journalists and 
other military voices in the British press. Given Dr Emile Dillon’s wide-ranging 
influence on constructions of Romania in 1913, it is not surprising that during the 
second Balkan war he also led the championing of the country’s military. Romania’s 
army had not been tested since 1878 during the Battle of Plevna in the Russo–Turkish 
war, (with the exception of its questionable ability to crush the Peasant’s Revolt in 
1907).
26
 But Dillon was undeterred. In January 1913 he wrote that in 1912 Romania had 
the capacity to field 300,000 men and that ‘she disposes of an army of well-nigh half a 
million well-trained well-equipped troops which, without firing a shot, could have 
neutralised the forces of the coalition’.
27
 Six months later ‘over 600 000 reserves and 
new recruits joyfully responded to the summons to the colours but the government, not 
requiring so many, sent back 100 000’.
28
 Fulfilling his January prediction, in July 1913 
Romania did not have to fire a shot. It entered Bulgaria with more than 300,000 troops 
in a move that ended the second Balkan war.  
Dillon’s vindicated depiction of a nation-in-arms was echoed elsewhere in the 
British press that summer. The Times identified ‘a powerful Rumanian army’ at 
Bulgaria’s back and the Pall Mall Gazette commented that ‘the health and spirits of the 
soldiers are excellent’.
29
 Despite reservations, the Manchester Guardian concluded that 
‘the mental level and military education of its officers – both staff and regimental – is 
higher than that of any other state’, believing Romania was ‘in possession of a highly 
organised and untouched army of five army corps and two cavalry divisions’. And the 
Pall Mall Gazette championed Dillon’s argument that Romania was the ‘Deciding 
Factor’ in the war.
30
 This positive military framing provided a crucial differentiation 
between Romania and its Balkan neighbours.  
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The Balkan wars were exceptional for the atrocities they meted out on rival 
civilian populations and their widespread coverage in the British press.
31
 The ‘squalid’ 
behaviour ran counter to thinking around national militarisation at the time, with the 
latter seen as an indicator of political legitimacy and national cohesiveness.
32
 This was 
particularly the case in Britain where late nineteenth century efforts to widen the appeal 
of the army saw the propagation of a military ideal cast in the image of loyalty and 
service to empire.
33
 The 1912–13 atrocities were a key aspect in what Todorova 
identifies as a hardening of the Balkan appellation in this period.
34
 However, Dillon’s 
Romania, with its ordered entry into the war, was framed very differently. The country’s 
‘well trained and well equipped’ recruits were ‘joyfully’ responding to the summons.
35
 
By the end of the 1913 conflict, military legitimacy and the capacity to significantly 
affect the outcome of war were hallmark’s of Romania’s army. 
In an era when military personnel’s engagement in the formation of public 
opinion was commonplace,
36
 the work of journalist Dillon was supplemented by ‘H C 
Woods, formerly of the Grenadier Guards’, who adopted Romania’s cause.
37
 This self-
styled ‘Balkan expert’ provided some of the leading analysis on the Romanian army 
before and during World War I. However, symptomatic of the paucity of voices 
available on Romania, Woods was an unreliable witness. An inefficient officer, he had 
been dismissed from the British Army and failed to win an appeal.
38
 Resigning his 
commission, H. C. Woods turned to journalism in 1907, drawing on his experiences as a 
Lieutenant serving in the British army in South East Europe to write about that part of 
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 There is no evidence that he subsequently returned to the Balkans.
40
 In the 
House of Commons in May 1916, Liberal MP Joseph King raised the matter of putting 
H. C. Woods’s ‘peculiar knowledge’ of the area to better use, but Under Secretary-of-
State-for-War, Harold Tennant, rejected the idea. The government did not consider 
Woods to be of value, but Tennant did concede that this man regularly pronounced in 
the press on military matters in the Balkans, including Romania.
41
 By 1915 Woods 
frequently summarised the strength of the respective Balkan armies; he lectured at the 
Royal Geographical Society and wrote a series of articles in The Field, on which he 
based a second book on the Balkans, War and Diplomacy in the Balkans.
42
 
Nine years earlier in 1906, Woods had watched a choreographed military display 
in Bucharest designed to impress military attachés. Based on this experience, and 
described as ‘formerly of the Grenadier Guards’, he wrote an extensive retrospective 
feature in the Near East in 1908. The article established him as one of the few men who 
had witnessed the Romanian army first hand.
43
 (By 1914 ‘on-the-spot’ experience was 
highly prized. The Manchester Guardian referred to a ‘special correspondent’, probably 
Dillon, who had been ‘at Roumanian Headquarters in the field in 1913.’)
44
 Both Dillon 
and Woods had been guests of the Romanian government and although not convinced 
by the performance he saw, Woods concluded with a focus on Romania’s numerical 
strength that chimed with Dillon’s 1913 analysis. An army of 76,000 could ‘swell to an 
enormous force of half a million officers and men’ with the right equipment. In 1908 
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Woods also wrote Washed by Four Seas focused on his time as an officer in the region, 
in which he claimed that Romania and Bulgaria would have a combined military force 
‘equal to some of the great powers of Europe’.
45
 Streets’s emphasis on Britain’s 
increasingly desperate efforts to recruit sufficient numbers of quality solders into the 
Voluntary Army before 1914 provides context for this pre-war focus on the numerical 
size of the Romanian army.
46
 
Since the French Revolution, a nation’s capacity to mobilise its people – the 
mythified levée en masse – was both an indication of military strength and a totem of 
political maturity.
47
 At the beginning of World War I the rush to arms was symbolic for 
both sides and ideas associated with ‘the spirit of 1914’ endured.
48
 By 1915 Woods was 
out of touch with Romania, conceding in The Field that ‘owing to the reorganisation 
and the introduction of certain changes ... it is difficult to calculate the exact number 
who would be available for war’, before arguing ‘that this number would probably 
amount to between 500 000 and 600 000 of all ranks’. Although ‘Rumania has not been 
compelled to test her strength in arms since the Russo–Turkish War’, Woods decided 
that if their military entered the war it would be ‘a factor of predominating 
importance’.
49
 The Near East conceded statements ‘very far from representing the truth’ 
were written about Romania’s army, but concluded it was the ‘most important army in 
southeastern Europe’.
50
 In his 1915 book Rumania and the Great War Seton-Watson 
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In the wake of the Balkan wars Romania was recognised as a big, populous, 
asset-rich country.
52
 Seton-Watson noted ‘13 of the 20 independent states in Europe 
have a smaller population than Romania, its territory vastly exceeds other Balkan states, 
its trade is almost equal that of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro combined.’
53
 
But during the war, the size of Romania’s army remained the preferred benchmark 
against which both the country and its military were judged in Britain’s mainstream 
press. Table 1 gives an indication of this preoccupation. The Times and the Manchester 
Guardian periodically increased their estimates with no concern for training capabilities 
or equipment.
54
 In October 1914 The Times concluded, ‘it should be fairly easy to raise 
the number in the field to a higher figure than 300 000’. Eighteen months later ‘1 000 
000 newly equipped soldiers’ will be ‘at the disposal of the War Minister in April’.
55
 In 
August 1914 the Manchester Guardian stated Romania could put ‘300 000 well 
provided men into the field’ with ‘a reserve of about the same number’. By February 
1916, it had ‘an army of about a million men’ and the following week Romania’s 
600,000 troops ‘would be decisive for the whole war’. When Romania entered the war, 
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Table 1: Reported Number of Men Available to the Romanian Army  
Year  <400,000 troops <600,000 troops 600,000 troops  > 600,000 
troops 








1914 Near East,  







1915  The Field  
Manchester 
Guardian 





Daily Mail  
Manchester 
Guardian  
1916   Near East  
Manchester 
Guardian  




Near East  
Manchester 
Guardian  
The Times  
Daily Mail 
Illustrated 
London News  
The Nation 
 
The newspapers’ numerical predictions were not wholly inaccurate. Within a 
three-year period, it was estimated that Romania had doubled the number of peasant 
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troops it could draw on, with 800,000 men available by August 1916. But the 
implication that troops numbers equated to military preparedness was misleading. Many 
soldiers were untrained, ill-equipped and old, entering a two-year long war with no 
firsthand military experience.
57
 The Times referred to Romania’s ‘newly equipped’ 
troops in February 1916, but previously dependent on German munitions and with the 
Dardanelles closed, there was no explanation of where the equipment had come from.
58
 
Long wary of feudal Romania, The Nation observed that ‘the peasantry is ignorant, 
poverty stricken, depressed and powerless’ but nonetheless concluded the army was 
‘large and well equipped’ and when Romania entered the war in 1916, these uneducated 
de-motivated men became ‘a perfectly fresh army of well trained men’.
59
 Seton-Watson 
waited until page 65 in Roumania and the Great War before explaining the country ‘is 
not ready for war’, with ‘only enough ammunition for a three month campaign’, and he 
argued Romania should only join the conflict once there is an assurance of ‘adequate 
supplies from a Western source’.
60
 His comments did not gain traction in the press. As 
Hall observes of the Balkan wars, in line with Great Power presumptions of Balkan 
inferiority, they did not use the 1912–13 conflicts to learn about ‘the nature of modern 
warfare’.
61
 So too, in World War I, when a nation’s ability to mechanise killing was 
paramount, Romania’s military significance was not measured in technical terms.  
The quality of the Romanian army was not judged on the basis of numerical 
strength alone. Streets stresses the deliberate construction of martial races within the 
British army in the late nineteenth century. Political expediency demanded that Gurkhas 
and Sikhs were prioritised in the British Indian Army after the 1857 Rebellion, while in 
Britain recruiting difficulties necessitated a focus on the Highlanders as supreme 
fighters.
62
 The construction of these martial races required self-conscious selection and 
propagation which saw the British military simultaneously ‘apply and even believe 
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essentialist rhetoric about race and masculinity ... and at other times openly 
acknowledge the artificial nature of those very martial races and yet use the discourse to 
achieve military and political goals’.
63
 There was a direct equivalence between this 
martial race narrative about the British army and the promotion of a nation descended 




Darwin-inspired arguments from Victorian anthropologist and political theorist, 
Herbert Spencer, regarding ‘a militant type of society’ often took precedence over other 
military benchmarks in British discourse.
65
 Smith’s stress on the importance of ethno-
symbolism, where ‘the myth of being ancestrally related, even if it is purely fictive and 
ideological in character, endows the members of a community with a powerful sense of 
belonging’, is vindicated in the portrayal of Romania’s national story. The emphasis on 
the peasant and his ancient Roman heritage in both the old Kingdom and Transylvania 
fed into ideas of the Romanian army’s suitability as an Entente ally.
66
 The Manchester 
Guardian quickly recast its 1913 scepticism. By 1915 a retrospective analysis of the 
second Balkan war identified Romania’s Officer Corps as ‘highly professional and one 
of best instructed’, in command of an infantry which ‘is recruited from a sturdy, well-
fed peasantry with war-like traditions’. Romania’s peasant warrior improved on the 
Serbian model: these men were ‘originally of Italian origin, fed by military colonists of 
the Roman legions posted to keep back the Slav hordes’.
67
 An inversion of liberalism’s 
long-standing wariness of Slav cruelty saw a willingness to embrace these ‘sturdy tillers 
of the soil ... attacking the passes that lead to the Romanian Irredenta in which their 
brothers in blood and language have long endured the Austrian yoke’.
68
 In World War I 
where increasingly the ‘British saw themselves as the last bulwark of civilisation 
against barbarism’,
69
 Romania’s military credentials were boosted by a Roman ancestry. 
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Unlike his Russian allies, ‘the Rumanian Tommy’, according to the Daily Mail, was 
‘finely chiselled and good looking’. One 
might imagine that something of the prudential opportunism as well as the 
valour of the fighters and rulers who under Trajan are said to have formed the 
Rumanian state survived in her people still. History has tested and purified them 




Propagated with due diligence by Mitrany and Seton-Watson, Romania’s unfulfilled 
small nation’s narrative was complemented with a martial raison d’être which equated 
Romania’s soldiers with ancient European prowess.  
This image of the Romanian army was strengthened through the use of cinema. 
That these Latin-blooded Roman descendants could be seen on film, served to affirm 
dubious racial constructs. The Ministry of Information had identified the value of 
moving images, (estimates put Britain’s wartime cinema audience at about ten 
million),
71
 and complementing official patriotic feature films like The Battle of the 
Somme and King of the Khyber Rifles, were shorter newsreels that included images of 
sympathetic neutrals. By 1915 Topical Budget had released two short films about the 
Romanian army.
72
 The first was aired in March 1915 amidst hopes that Romania and 
Italy would imminently join the war. Entitled ‘Rumania while sitting on the fence keeps 
her army in strenuous training’, it showed footage of cavalry and troop regiments. Three 
months later another film – ‘Rumania’s Fine Army’ – exhibited uniformed soldiers 
performing drill with guns and kit.
73
 The films provided reassuring military imagery of 
Romania in an exciting new medium which had the ability to ‘depict apparently realistic 
images’ through cinema’s ‘almost limitless plasticity and capacity for manipulation’.
74
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Prominent constructions of Romania’s army contrasted sharply with the lack of 
commentary on its German Commander-in-Chief, King Ferdinand.
75
 Britain’s 
denigration of Kaiser Bill in his puffed-up military garb and visual celebrations of brave 
King Peter of Serbia were reminders of the powerful fusion of masculinity and 
monarchy in a war replete with chivalric symbolism.
76
 Ambigiuties surrounding 
Romania’s German monarchy prevented equivalent sign-posting. Woods had 
acknowledged royalty’s theatrical contribution in the military display he watched in 
1906, but by 1913 King Carol’s commitment to Austria-Hungary saw Dillon exclude 
the monarch from descriptions of the second Balkan war.
77
 During neutrality, British 
discourse rarely focused on his German successor Ferdinand as a military figurehead, 
with Carol’s death in October 1914 delivering a brief hiatus from a general absence of 
royal military constructions.  
In October 1914 the British press took the opportunity to reminisce over 
Romania’s first monarch. The Times and the Daily Telegraph returned to 1877 when, 
under Carol, ‘the Roumanians covered themselves with glory’ with a ‘brilliant 
intervention’ that rescued Russia from the Ottomans. The victory was manipulated to 
frame Romania as an astute military operator, which now was a state ‘possessing 
powerful forces’.
78
 According to the Manchester Guardian, one of Carol’s ‘most 
successful administrative efforts was the reorganisation of the Romanian army’.
79
 
Victory at Plevna and an efficient Prussian-styled army were just a couple of the 
achievements credited to the King who had overseen ‘every aspect of national 
development’.
80
 Carol’s death gifted Romania’s army a presumed Prussian level of 
efficiency in British discourse.
81
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Reminiscences about an imagined Prussian army were indicative of a tendency 
to hope and idealise rather than scrutinise. This extended to the British government, 
whose detachment from reality was striking given that the little information they 
received suggested Romania lacked military experience and equipment. After meeting 
Romanian politician George Diamandy, the British Ambassador in Spain warned the 
Foreign Office that Romania ‘has nothing like enough [supplies] for her requirements in 
a campaign against Austria-Hungary’. Romania was trying to acquire munitions from 
neutrals including ‘1 million cartridges and other arms’ from Spain. That request was 
unsuccessful, an ominous sign for a country that had been dependent on German 
munitions.
82
 Once the Straits were closed, supply options were further limited; Barclay 
noted in July 1916, ‘Roumania’s provision of munitions are apparently a dwindling 
quantity’, estimating they only had enough for a six-week campaign.
83
 
Russia expressed misgivings about the quality of Romania’s army, but their 
assessment was dismissed as a by-product of their anxiety about a ‘Greater 
Roumania’.
84
 British Military Attaché Thompson was also doubtful; he ‘knew that the 
Roumanian Army lacked arms and ammunition’.
85
 But after a spat over Romania’s 
considerable resources of oil and grain, which Thompson argued Germany would rather 
grab by force than pay for, the British military concluded that his assessment should be 
taken with a pinch of salt.
86
 Even the head of the British army, General Robert 
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Robertson, doubted the country’s military value: ‘I have always been very sceptical 
about Roumania intervening.’
87
 However, the positive case for Romania’s entry into the 
war was sustained. George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Russia, argued 
Romanian cooperation was valuable if ‘only on account of the moral effect’. Foreign 
Secretary Grey agreed, noting that if Romania entered the war ‘everything that had been 
lost in the East by the failure at the Dardanelles and the collapse of Serbia would be 
redressed’.
88
 Prime Minister Brătianu’s insistence that his offensive into Transylvania 
was backed up by a British-led offensive from Salonika was privately dismissed and 
Grey argued that the Romanians were ‘perfectly secure from any attack on the Austria-
Hungarian side’.
89




When Romania finally entered the war in August 1916 it became the public 
barometer against which the Allies determined the likely end of the conflict, with a 
declaration that will ‘reverberate as a death-knell throughout the Hapsburg 
Monarchy’.
91
 The Nation predicted it might be the ‘beginning of the end’.
92
 The Times 
identified a country which had ‘provided ammunition in abundance, equipped herself 
with every modern weapon and now stands ready’. In the Daily Mail, Romania had 
prepared for ‘war on a modern scale and now knows that she can defy Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. Very rarely in her history has Rumania miscalculated.’
93
 Romania 
was not just a metaphor for the Allies ‘good’ war’, it was also a worthy addition to the 
Entente’s military capacity and one which ‘gives lie to the Germanic theory of 
victory’.
94
 Neutrals Holland, Greece and America were surely taking note.
95
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This optimistic coverage endured for a couple of weeks while Romania’s 
military took unguarded Transylvanian passes. However, within a month successes 
became undignified reverses on two fronts.
96
 The ensuing military collapse, which saw 
the occupation of Romania’s capital, Bucharest, by 5 December 1916, left the British 
government and press with few face-saving options. The public had been served an idea 
of a martial country that did not exist. Romania’s retreat in the winter of 1916 was given 
minimal coverage; there were predictions that soon Britain would be ‘leaving the 
Rumanian news’ and stories of defeat and evacuation were tucked into discreet war 
columns.
97
 Post-August 1916 Romania’s image was pivoted away from military 
representations prevalent in British discourse. Instead the country was framed as a 
sympathetic victim assaulted by German invasion and occupation.
98
 As will be 
discussed in the next section, during the country’s neutrality, counter-imaging and 
gender constructs propagated by Romania’s two female queens ensured there was scope 
for this national recasting in the last two years of war. It was within a reconfigured 
feminine version of Romania that military ideas of peasant-soldiers imbued with an 
ancient Latin heritage endured as unifying European symbols of a future Greater 
Romania.  
 
3.2 A King and Two Queens: Feminine Romania and Neutrality 
When Romania entered World War I, their Hohenzollern King, Ferdinand, was briefly 
catapulted to glory in the British press. What better way to vindicate the Entente’s war 
effort than to flaunt the extraordinary credentials of their newest recruit – a monarch 
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who was leading Romania into war against Germany, the country of his birth? Punch’s 
front page epitomised the hero’s welcome he received. Ferdinand pictured in full 
military uniform stands up to an angry Kaiser:  
Kaiser: ‘SO YOU TOO ARE AGAINST ME! REMEMBER, HINDENBURG 
FIGHTS ON MY SIDE.’  




While Hindenburg personified militaristic Germany, Romania was framed as a country 
so sure of its national raison d’être that its king had abandoned the demands of his 
homeland. In a reminder of the appeal of monarchical symbolism, Romania’s decision 
to enter the war witnessed a sharp focus on a king whose German heritage had 
otherwise compromised his country’s reputation in Britain.  
This section will demonstrate that monarchy mattered in a war where 
increasingly gendered and racial conventions impacted on perceptions of nationhood, 
particularly in relation to the less well-known countries in Eastern Europe. The 
significance of royalty as a symbol of nationhood will help explain why rumours about 
an undecided German king undermined Britain’s ability to clarify an idea of neutral 
Romania and obscured the significance of Ferdinand’s queen, British-born Marie.
100
 
However, it will also argue that the failure to embrace Romania’s royal couple in the 
first two years of the conflict did not prevent Marie from establishing a secondary 
narrative. As with the characterisation of the country’s Latin army, it is an assessment 
of Smith’s ethno-symbolism that will explicate the appeal of this queen’s version of 
Romania. Directly challenging conventional wartime parameters, the feminine and 
sympathetic imaging she helped create would facilitate a later reappraisal of the country 
in the wake of military defeat that contests ideas of Eastern cruelty and partially 
undermines Todorova’s inclusion of Romania in a masculine Balkan rubric.  
                                                          
99
 Punch, 6 Sep 1916. 
100
 David Cannadine, ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British 
monarchy and the “invention of tradition”, c.1820–1977’, in Eric Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1983, pp. 101–64; Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 86–87. 
 
   
163 
 
Under King Carol’s rule, Britain thought it very unlikely that Romania would 
fight against Germany.
101
 But two months after the outbreak of World War I, the old 
king was dead and attention focused on Romania’s new monarch, Carol’s German-born 
nephew, Ferdinand. Very few publications framed this change as unambiguously 
positive.
102
 The Times declared that Carol’s death had created a detente, but suggested it 
was politicians who were pushing to join the Entente, and referred to the new king as 
Germanophile, although he lacked his uncle’s influence. The Manchester Guardian 
believed Ferdinand was less of a Hohenzollern and ‘more of a Roumanian’ than his 
predecessor
103
 but scepticism regarding Romania’s monarchy persisted. ‘Prince 




This inability to convincingly identify Ferdinand as either German or Romanian 
was significant. The gradual redefinition of power, the roots of which lay in the French 
Revolution and the emerging ideologies of nationalism, meant that monarchy was 
expected to take advantage of the political masses and seek popular legitimacy.
105
 The 
year 1848 was the break-point after which continental royalty began to be national 
symbols. Anderson observes that by the mid-nineteenth century ‘there was a discernible 
tendency among the Euro-Mediterranean monarchies to sidle towards a beckoning 
national identification’.
106
 Romania did not acquire its German prince until 1866 and 
Carol proved particularly resistant to adopting a Romanian identity; his loyalties and 
persona remained relentlessly pro-German despite Romania’s increasingly ambiguous 
foreign policy.
107
 This was problematic in a British discourse which had long credited 
the King for all the positive changes in Romania. World War I demanded that Britain 
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discovered Romania as a potentially sympathetic ally in a discourse where Seton-
Watson encouraged the idea of a united Romanian nation, and the press talked up a 
large Latin peasant army. In this context, the accession of a second German monarch 
was decidedly unhelpful. 
The longer Romania remained neutral, the more negative British coverage of 
Ferdinand became. When the country did not enter the war alongside Italy, the 
Manchester Guardian ran the headline ‘Kings Made in Germany’ and cited the German 
Ambassador in Constantinople, Prince Hohenlohe, visiting his brother-in-law, 
Ferdinand of Romania, as an example of German reach. As ‘marriage brokers and king 
purveyors’ the country was ‘obviously unmatched’.
108
 Even the pro-Romanian Near 
East began to doubt the value of installing foreign monarchs on East European thrones. 
‘In Roumania, Bulgaria and Greece ... we find divided counsels and national paralysis 
and we are tempted to ask whether it is only a coincidence that each of these countries 
should have a foreign dynasty.’ They identified a cleavage of opinion between the 
people and the crown in Romania. Ferdinand ‘remains a Hohenzollern and can have 
little desire to lead a war against the head of that House’.
109
  
Bulgaria’s entry into the war alongside the Entente at the instigation of their 
King Ferdinand in November 1915 compounded the royal image problem. Dillon 
lamented that ‘of all the recognised agencies for penetrating international opinion and 
swaying international sentiment one of the most abiding and decisive is that of the royal 
courts’. In the wake of Carol’s death Dillon knew power sat with Brătianu and was a 
vocal critic of the Romanian Prime Minister. He even cited a preference for the late 
German King over Brătianu, as ‘one knew exactly what to expect’.
110
 Nonetheless 
Dillon included Romania in his swipe against German monarchs. ‘Roumania was 
governed by a Hohenzollern, the Queen of Sweden is a daughter of the Grand Duke of 
Baden, the Consort of the Queen of Holland is a Duke of Mecklenburg, the Queen of 
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Examining Europe’s three largest royal houses – British, Russian and German – 
prior to the outbreak of World War I, Roderick Mclean stresses the importance of royal 
diplomacy in an argument which mirrors Dillon’s sentiment that monarchies were an 
important tool for swaying international opinion.
112
 In the smaller countries Dillon 
referred to, where internal power hierarchies were less well known, the attention that 
royalty accrued on the international stage was particularly significant.
113
 Within the 
Foreign Office they recognised that Ferdinand was no match for Brătianu, he was even 
referred to as a ‘non-entity’.
114
 However, Britain was a constitutional monarchy with a 
diplomatic system that partially relied on dynastic relations with other countries. Keen 
to impress the Romanians with a royal envoy who could bolster the perception of the 
British armed forces, the Foreign Office wanted to send Prince Arthur, the Duke of 
Connaught, to visit Ferdinand in November 1915. The approach was turned down. ‘If 
Prince Arthur visited Bucharest it would encourage proposals for visits from German 
Princes’ and put the King in an awkward position with his own (German) brother.
115
 
The impact of the rejection was exacerbated by the knowledge that Ferdinand had 
already hosted Prince Hohenlohe, as well as the Kaiser’s representative, the Grand Duke 
Mecklenburg. News that the King had gone shooting with one of Romania’s staunchly 
pro-German politicians, Petre Carp, drew the conclusion that Ferdinand ‘did not instil 
confidence’.
116
 War increased the demand for conventional, masculine representations 
of power in both a political and a military context. German Ferdinand did not fulfil this 
role in British discourse.  
The impact of this failure was exacerbated by a hardened gender narrative. 
Susan Grayzel recognises that ‘technological advances in weaponary in World War I 
transformed conventional notions of warfare’. The nation morphed into a ‘collective 
body of warriors in combat’ and the resulting ideological blindness was distinctly 
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 This focus contextualises the length of time it took Britain to acknowledge 
the emerging significance of Romania’s British-born Queen Marie. In October 1914 it 
was the New York Times that observed Ferdinand is 
said to be altogether under the influence of his brilliant wife, the English-born 
Crown Princess Marie, daughter of the late Duke of Saxe-Coburg, (the Duke of 
Edinburgh), second son of Queen Victoria. She is an extremely able woman and 




Not only did the popularity of Marie’s predecessor, poet-queen Elizabeth, guarantee her 
a willing audience in America, but the country’s neutrality permitted a detached 
appreciation of the Romanian court. Preoccupied with ideas of nationality bound up in a 
military construct and focused on German proclivities of her husband, British 
commentators were slower to recognise Marie’s changing status.
119
 Reflecting this 
ignorance, the Graphic was one of the very few British publications that acknowledged 
the significance of Marie’s arrival on the Romanian throne in October 1914.
120
 
Britain’s initial failure to recognise Queen Marie’s diplomatic potential was 
further compromised by her earlier reputation. Although Britain had hailed Marie’s 
1893 marriage to Ferdinand as a diplomatic victory,
121
 initially she failed to live up to 
expectations. Pigeonholed by the British press as a flirtatious princess, albeit a relatively 
well-known one,
122
 her image problem was compounded by King Carol, who refused to 
send her on a proposed diplomatic trip to Britain as late as 1907.
123
 Even when the 
astute choice of renowned courtier Barbu Ştirbey (the brother-in-law of Brătianu) as her 
long-term lover improved Marie’s domestic status and influence, British diplomats 
dismissed rumours that she would be ‘the true ruler’ when her husband came to the 
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 Despite Ambassador Barclay’s observation in October 1914 that the new 
queen received a parliamentary ovation in Romania ‘for which her connection with the 
British and Russian royal houses and her known sympathy with the cause of these 
powers, is no doubt largely responsible’,
125
 British officials were slow to take her 
seriously. In October 1914 Military Attaché Napier frivolously recommended the 
Buxton brothers kissed the royal hand and was himself assured of a ‘very jolly’ 
queen.
126
 Only after meeting her did Napier revise his opinion; England was fortunate 




The constraints of neutrality impinged on Marie’s advocacy for the Entente. The 
Queen likened the period to walking on eggshells
128
 and in order to ensure Romania 
could ‘reap equal profits from each’ side, she became a master of tact – ‘dealing out 
smiles to both sides, attending legation parties of both camps’.
129
 Nonetheless, France 
quickly identified Marie’s prowess, dispatching their impressive diplomat Charles de 
Beaupoil, comte de Saint Aulaire, to Romania at the outbreak of war.
130
 He referred to 
Marie as his best ally and France justified a large legation because of the need to 
influence the royal family, ‘especially Queen Marie, considered to be an essential 
political factor’.
131
 Likewise, the Romanian government was quick to utilise the 
Queen’s relationship with her first cousin, British George V. She wrote to the King 
firmly stating her country’s territorial and military demands.
132
 But with a royal family 
of their own and a Queen-Consort, Mary of Teck, who had limited appeal as ‘a one 
woman coordinating body for the administration of wartime charity’, British responses 
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 The gendered and constutional limitations of Britain’s monarchy 
appear to have impinged on their attempts to understand the diplomatic significance of 
the new situation in Romania’s court. 
When Romania entered the war Britain’s press were still identifying Marie in the 
context of her husband. In The Times, she was introduced as Ferdinand’s ‘wife, Queen 
Marie’ before her British heritage was referenced. The Graphic presented the couple as 
‘The King and His Consort ... a cousin of King George’, and in the Daily Mail a tiny 
footnote acknowledged Marie’s ‘British and Russia descent’.
134
 The priority Britain 
accorded representations of Ferdinand adds a wartime imperative to George Mosse’s 
argument that manliness symbolised ‘the nation’s spiritual and material vitality’.
135
 An 
exception was the Illustrated London News, which overlooked Ferdinand in favour of a 
large feature on ‘OUR NEW ALLY – THE QUEEN OF ROUMANIA AND HER 
CHILDREN.’
136
 This was a timely reminder that an alternative royal narrative in the 
context of Romania existed by August 1916.  
Alongside the importance of manliness, Mosse explains that women played a 
symbolic role in a nation’s mystique with symbols like Germania, Britannia and 
Marianne in Germany, Britain and France, respectively, providing alternative gendered 
frameworks. These female symbols were sedate rather than dynamic, standing for 
immutability rather than progress and providing a backdrop against which men 
determined the fate of nations.
137
 Complementing this argument, Catherine Hall 
suggests that theories of nationalism which do not consider gender fail to give an 
adequate account of how nations are constructed or nationalisms rooted in the political 
and emotional lives of men and women. Citing Virginia Woolf, who argued there was 
no way to be outside war as a man or a woman, Hall claims gender issues in relation to 
the nation were most sharply pronounced during periods of military conflict.
138
 It is in 
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this polarised context that Marie’s contribution to representations of neutral Romania in 
British discourse is best understood.  
Compromised politically and limited by the idealisation of masculinity in the 
mainstream press, Romania’s new queen focused her energies on an oeuvre which 
embodied ancient and pacific ideas attributed to a fantastic Eastern realm. Between 
1913 and the first half of 1916 Marie published three books in Britain and in all of them 
she mined a fairytale genre. The year of the second Balkan war, Lily of Life: A fairy tale 
by the Crown Princess of Roumania was published, followed in 1915 by the Dreamer of 
Dreams.
139
 The latter was a spiritual fantasy about the wanderings of Eric Gundain – an 
artist to the court of the great Northern King Wanda – after he had been enchanted by a 
dream.
140
 Her third book, Stealers of Light,
141
 was another legend, this time more adult 
in its dramatic portrayal of love and sacrifice. Marie remained loyal to the fantasy trope, 
blending exotic, Eastern imagery with spiritualism and magic. The protagonist breaks 
free from an ‘old forsaken monastery’ in ‘his clothing of an Eastern cut’ arriving at a 
‘small forsaken Eastern-looking harbour’.
142
 
From the outset, Marie’s books found a ‘high place among the fairy tales of the 
publishing year’
143
 in an England with a popular neo-romantic movement and where the 
war had witnessed a nostalgic return to more traditional literary forms.
144
 The Voice of 
the People has identified recurrent nineteenth-century interest in the fairytale with the 
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old forms married to the ‘new mythology’ which romanticism sought.
145
 During the war 
a surge in spiritualism saw this genre grow.
146
 Marie’s books had contemporary appeal 
and while Romania was not specifically named in the prose, allusions to an Eastern 
outlandish world laid claim to an idea of her realm as a fantasy Ruritania, in books 
embossed with their author’s royal title. The publications’ vogue was affirmed through 
their high-profile artists. The illustrator of the acclaimed art nouveau edition of The 
Fairy Tales of Hans Christian Andersen, Helena Stratton, drew the pictures in Lily of 
Life,
147
 and Marie’s two wartime fictions were illustrated by Edmund Dulac. In 1915 
Dulac had enjoyed an exhibition of his work in London’s Bond Street that included 
illustrations from Dreamer of Dreams and ‘no colour books have been more sought 
after than those containing reproductions of his work’.
148
  
The success of Marie’s books and the appropriation of her own realm and role as 
queen within the literature is an example of what Goldsworthy identifies as literary 
colonisation, through ‘the imaginary or near imaginary landscapes of the British 
concepts of the Balkans’. Just as Marie does not specifically cite Romania, Goldsworthy 
argues that ‘precise details of Balkan history and geography’ are not important in these 
imaginary landscapes.
149
 However, crucially Marie, as the Queen of Romania, was 
reflecting a fictionalised idea of her own – albeit adopted – country (and herself) back to 
Britain. Conforming to Todorova’s recognition that the East essentialised its own 
narrative to appeal to Western expectations and appetites, Marie was capitalising on a 
pre-existing British appetite for folklore and fairytale to further ideas of a Romanian 
fantasia, using an oeuvre which her predecessor Carmen Sylva had already claimed for 
their country. In this context, literary colonisation, as identified by Goldsworthy, was a 
concept that could be exploited by the East in the West. The identification of Romania 
as the place initiating and encouraging ‘imaginary colonisation’, as opposed to a 
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straightforward Western appropriation of the Eastern imagery for the West’s 
gratification, insists that the colonisation process is recognised as a more nuanced 
commercial and nation-building tool than Goldsworthy acknowledges.
150
 Romania was 
Marie’s priority, not Britain. Like Elizabeth before her, this complicates Marie’s place 
in the binary West–East representational paradigm recognised by Said, while ensuring 
the genesis, if not the reception, of her representations was less vulnerable to the 
vagaries of British discourse.
151
  
The Queen’s oeuvre fed into a broader folkloric idea of Romania. The Jewish 
Chronicle celebrated the election of Romanian Jew, Moses Gaster, as President of the 
Folklore Society in 1907. They remarked upon the appointment of a Jewish rabbi of 
foreign birth to ‘a society so essentially English’.
152
 Underlining that significance was 
the English publication of his book Rumanian Bird and Beast Stories in conjunction 
with the Folklore Society.
153
 In it, Gaster explicitly associated Romania with an 
exceptional folkloric heritage, claiming their animal tales, ‘which appear here for the 
first time outside Rumania are so weird, so different from any known to the folklore of 
the West, that they arrest our attention and invite close examination’. Analysing the 
impact of folklore, The Voice of the People argues that ‘after the nineteenth century the 
paths of various national revivals increasingly diverged and that is very much how they 
tend to be seen now, as isolated national phenomena rather than as aspects of a pan-
European process’.
154
 Through Gaster’s book, folkloric Romania defied that isolationist 
trend. Like Marie’s oeuvre, his work affirmed Romania in the British imagination as a 
distant fantasy realm untouched by, and arguably ill-equipped for, war. However, both 
authors also framed Romania as an ancient immutable land, in which ‘the people are 
pure at heart and in the stories their simplicity and purity appear most beautifully’.
155
 
This racial prerogative lent easily to ideas of salvation, unification and Latin-blooded 
soldiering. The transnational appeal of the latter was summed up by The Girls’ Realm, 
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in a 1915 article which credited Romania’s best-known curator, ‘Carman Sylva’, for 
preserving the folklore of a people who now ‘have great aspirations’.
156
 
In Marie’s first fairytale published in 1913, the foreword was written by Queen 
Elizabeth, and Gaster’s Rumanian Bird and Beast Stories was dedicated to ‘Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth of Rumania – Carmen Sylva to whom the soul of the Rumanian people 
is an open book.’
157
 Her headline presence in both affirmed Elizabeth’s place as 
Romania’s chief storyteller. The extent of her appeal in British discourse as Romania’s 
original poet-queen was highlighted when she died in March 1916. ‘Death of Carmen 
Sylva – Queen and Poetess – Her Work Rumania’, read The Times headline. Beyond the 
specifics of her writing, the press hailed the Queen as a monarch famed for artistic 
accomplishments, charitable works and a ‘love of Roumania’.
158
 Dying six months 
before Romania committed to the Entente, Carmen Sylva was remembered as the 
saviour of her ancient nation. The appeal of a primordial country on a journey to 
greatness was prevalent in the coverage, with the poet-queen posited as the agent of 
change who received up to twenty begging letters a day and lived in a high-tech castle.  
The great peculiarity is the contrast between the lavish luxury of Castle Pelesch 
and the wild rugged beauty of the ancient forests and snow-capped mountains 
surrounding it ... only the white robed peasants, sometimes with their ox carts 
are to be met in the surrounding forests.
159
  
Wartime Britain’s appetite for an ancient, mythical land, available in the prose 
of Marie and Gaster and celebrated in the commemoration of Queen Elizabeth’s life, is 
a reminder of the potency of Smith’s other half of the story, when explaining the appeal 
of nationalism.
160
 It challenges Romania’s place in a Balkan rubric Todorova identifies 
as both masculine and prosaic while simultaneously affirming her recognition of the 
‘trap of backwardness’ that saw the East respond to West Europe’s obsession with 
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foundation myths and the ‘historic’ rights of peoples.
161
 The otherworldly narrative had 
a unique appeal in Britain, a country fast submerging in the quagmire of a modern war. 
The inherent instability of racial identifiers in this context is noteworthy. Elizabeth ‘may 
be said to have belonged to all European nations’. It was ‘difficult to think of her as a 
German’. Her nationality eradicated upon her death, Elizabeth’s English credentials 
were embellished: the Queen’s ‘knowledge of English, which she spoke so perfectly, 
and her love for English literature grew’. She wintered in London and Paris.
162
 Upon 
her husband’s death, King Carol’s German identity had been used in British discourse 
to validate his development of the Romanian army. Elizabeth’s death demanded the 
reverse – an eradication of her German identity in order that she could be claimed as a 
universal queen who spread the word of her ancient Romanian lands and people.  
That Queen Marie had already started to replicate and build on Elizabeth’s role 
was acknowledged by several writers during Romania’s neutrality. In Dorothea Kirke’s 
Domestic Life in Rumania, only one Romanian figurehead stood out – Princess 
Marie.
163
 Kirke’s account was a curious retrospective of ‘familiar chatty letters’ sent to 
a cousin in Devonshire from a British nanny, Millie Ormonde, around the turn of the 
century.
164
 A young, fresh version of Marie was introduced to a British audience just 
months before Romania committed to war in August 1916; the timing of the book’s 
publication ensured it received a critical reception.
165
 The ‘lovely Crown Princess’ 




has a summer-house made for herself in a tree, and often sits up in it with a lady-
in-waiting ... she calls it ‘The Nest.’ Many Rumanians complain that she is too 
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free in her ways; it is most inconsistent of them with all their talk about 
democracy. She has a most gracious bow.
167
 
Mrs Will Gordon, a well-connected British socialite, published her favourably 
reviewed Women in the Balkans a couple of months after Kirke’s book in June 1916.
168
 
Gordon had enjoyed audiences with both Queen Marie and the Dowager Queen and in 
the chapter ‘Two Queens’, Romania was celebrated through its female monarchs. 
Elizabeth was photographed in her hallmark white gowns and the prose describes her 
hosting a musical programme in a ‘Salon de Musique’, reading her own poetry in a 
lilting voice and working up a ‘beautiful altar curtain’. But it was Marie who led the 
narrative; appearing first and photographed alone in a tiara, together with her husband 
Ferdinand and as a young beauty in Romanian peasant dress. She was ‘regal yet full of 
grace’, with an exquisite complexion thanks to her ‘English inheritance’ and as a 
woman who ‘like her environment, is picturesque in the extreme’.
169
  
Smith argues that his ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism goes beyond the 
‘top-down’ approaches of modernisation to bring ‘popular, emotional and moral 
dimensions of national identity back into focus’. Crucially, although the monarchy was 
a recent imported ‘invention’ in Romania, Marie as a queen of British descent gifted her 
adopted nation a figurehead who enjoyed the mystique and credibility associated with 
Britain’s most revered dynasty. Echoing Smith’s analysis, the persona of Marie enabled 
Britain ‘to recognise the great variety of historical and symbolic components’ of 
Romanian nationalism during the ‘specific historical juncture’ of war.
170
 This began in 
neutrality, when Marie was consolidating her reign as a new monarch in Romania. The 
emerging romantic identity she promoted in British discourse was one she would 
capitalise on once Romania was at war. 
While neutrality demanded of Romania political ambiguity, Britain, framing the 
country as a prospective ally, looked for national markers that conformed to those of a 
sympathetic European co-belligerent. As discussed, emphasis was placed on the 
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nation’s military progress and the identification of a large Romanian peasant army. 
Against this masculine construct, it is significant that a counter Romanian narrative 
emerged. With an emphasis on Romania’s ancient purity, the country’s folkloric 
identity under the umbrella of two queens both conflicted with, and conformed to, ideas 
of Romania as a suitable military ally. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the 
instability of national constructs during war and Romania’s multi-faced identity in 
neutrality ensured that there were options to draw on when Bucharest fell to the 
Germans in December 1916. The ancient Latin soldier would be repositioned and 
Romania’s military capacity reframed in order that Romania could be ‘saved’ by a 
British-born queen. This was possible courtesy of a sympathetic secondary feminine 
narrative that appeared in British discourse and had its genesis in neutral Romania. It is 
the existence and later development of this imagery that both complicates a Saidian 
emphasis on the premise of exteriority in Western representations of the East in the case 
of Romania and confuses the country’s imagined place in a masculine, prosaic Balkan 
rubric.171 
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Romania at War, August 1916–December 1918  
Introduction 
 
This chapter will focus on representations of Romania in British discourse after the 
country’s entry into war, many of which sought to mitigate public fall out in the wake of 
Romania’s partial defeat and the occupation of Bucharest in December 1916. It will 
emphasise Queen Marie’s deliberate efforts to frame herself as the iconic figurehead of 
her country and argue that her work and royal image helped mobilise a popular idea of 
Romania that did not threaten accepted gender norms.
1
 In an effort to explain the 
significance of this imagery in British discourse, it will argue that the appeal of 
Hobsbawm’s ‘invented traditions’ and Smith’s emphasis on ethno-cultural indicators 
need to be understood in a broad context which requires a reassessment of Hroch’s 
three-stage model of nationalism in relation to wartime Romania. It will suggest that 
heroic constructions of the beleaguered country were conflated with ambitions for a 
post-war Greater Romania in political discourse. In a further identification of 
Brubaker’s evolving nationalisms, this chapter will argue that Britain’s political 
representations of wartime Romania continued to prioritise the Romanians in 
Transylvania in a narrative which conveniently dovetailed with Marie’s identity as 
‘Empress of All Romanians’. It will conclude that this emphasis on a feminine 
figurehead and an optimistic external homeland nationalism temporarily undermined 
Romania’s location in traditional Balkan and Eastern rubrics, in anticipation of the 
country’s relocation in a post-war New Europe.
2
  
Section 4.1 will examine the impact that Marie had on interpretations of her 
adopted country in Britain between August 1916 and November 1918 and argue that 
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through its queen, Romania played a significant role in the essentialising of its own 
identity in British discourse. Cannadine argues that a rediscovery of the ‘meaning’ of 
royal ritual at the beginning of the twentieth century saw the British monarchy become 
a ‘unique expression of continuity in a period of unprecedented change’.
3
 Romania’s 
total war, which saw the richest two-thirds of the country occupied and its population 
ravaged by typhus, gifted Queen Marie an opportunity to harness that ‘continuity’ 
narrative for the benefit of her desperate country, in a series of heroic and feminine 
representations that were frequently profiled in Britain’s national press. Framed as the 
mother of her people, British-born Marie slotted Romania into a familiar imperial 
construct. However, this section will argue that the Queen’s success in British discourse 
suggests a deeper resonance with her audience than that afforded by royal cachet and 
imperialism alone. It will propose that Marie was increasingly depicted as the Romanian 
figurehead around which the peasant-solider mobilised in a British version of Romania 
that appears to fulfil the final mass mobilisation stage in Hroch’s three-stage model of 
nationalism.
4
 Wrapped in a conventional national package that pre-war Romania had 
resisted, this sympathetic wartime construct could be more easily manipulated for 
political purposes.  
Section 4.2 will focus on an oeuvre published in Britain about wartime Romania 
that was partially inspired by the writings of Queen Marie and which distracted from the 
fictions of a bullish Romania so recently peddled in the British press. It will identify a 
tone and type of national construct predominantly penned by British women that drew 
heavily on ideas of Romania as a feminine ancient land and in doing so distanced the 
country from untrustworthy masculine identifiers commonly associated with the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe. It will argue that the depiction of women in conventional 
roles contrasted sharply with the British women writing in Serbia who challenged 
gender norms and reinforced Serbia’s military heroism. If Marie was a catalyst for the 
Romanian oeuvre, the resulting national themes leant heavily on the racial constraints of 
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war which simplified the country’s image and pushed an exclusive national agenda 
harder than the Queen’s more judicious imaging. Michael Jeismann’s recognition that 
there was an intensity in national demarcations during war which encouraged a focus on 
the idea of a nation’s ‘humanity’ will explicate the appeal of the emerging Romanian 
construct to a British readership,
5
 while an analysis of this literature will suggest 
engagement with the idea of a Romania that was poised for greatness at the same time 
as it was threatened both internally and externally.  
It is an assessment of Bakić-Hayden’s ‘Nesting Orientalisms’ which examines 
race in post-World War I Yugoslavia and the assertion of their respective European 
qualities, that will serve as a guide to definitions of Romania against encroaching 
‘others’, in this case identified by British writers.
6
 Specifically in the context of 
Romania’s Jews, applying the nationalisms identified in Brubaker’s Reframing 
Nationalism to the case of wartime Romania will help explicate the impact of this 
minority’s denigration. Pitted against the Jewish ‘other’, ideas of Romania that 
celebrated the peasant, in particular the Transylvanian peasant, were prioritised in a 
narrative that highlighted the racial qualities of the Romanian kingdom (and therefore 
served to burnish Romania’s nationalising nationalism) and the dream of Greater 




Section 4.3 will discuss how this sympathetic re-versioning of Romania found 
its political expression among Britain’s leaders and experts who needed their Eastern 
ally to conform to an emerging idea of a war fought on behalf of small nations that 
would be vindicated through the creation of a New Europe.
8
 It will examine the 
increased influence of R. W. Seton-Watson and a coterie of like-minded thinkers whose 
reconceptualisation of Central Europe impacted on government peace-planning, with 
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Romania’s primary British champion, Allen Leeper, becoming a member of the 
influential wartime Political Intelligence Department. Again, an assessment of 
Brubaker’s distinct, evolving nationalisms will serve to highlight the PID’s simplified 
agenda for a projected Greater Romania.
9
 The binary politics of war which reinforced 
convenient racial profiling of enemy nations and aliens ensured that within the context 
of a post-war New Europe Romania’s homeland nationalism, embedded in the West-
facing lands of the Habsburg Empire, was prioritised. This narrative was assertively 
pushed by the Romanian legation in London, with contact between British government 
official, Leeper, and Romanian émigrés highlighting the role of the Eastern ‘other’ in its 
own external representations. A common need for a credible post-war Romania saw 
Britain adopt a single-minded approach that framed the historic nationalism of the core 
‘Romanian’ nation optimistically, while deliberately sidestepping Brubaker’s third 
minorities nationalism in a political mirroring of the oeuvre identified in §4.2.
10
 In 1917 
Britain’s recognition of a Jewish nationality with its own state, as constructed by 
wartime Zionists, coupled with an eagerness to dissociate Romania from its 
revolutionary neighbour Russia, will help explain why the country’s long-term Achilles 
heel – ‘the Jewish Question’ – was relegated to a side issue.  
By the end of 1918, a political equivalent of Marie’s sympathetic version of 
wartime Romania had found its voice among London’s ruling classes. Bakić-Hayden 
reminds us that in Said’s Orientalism discourse ‘East’ like ‘West’ was much more a 
‘project than place’.
11
 But this chapter will conclude that war insisted it was in the 
interests of Romania and Britain to identify the country as both in British discourse. A 
projected Greater Romania was identified as an important ‘place’ between Russia and 
Germany, the implications of which demanded additional expectations of, and 
investment in, the country as a ‘project’. Romania was complicit in its positioning as 
both biddable and sympathetic in British discourse. This was an ancient nation with a 
European queen and an unredeemed Latin population that war had fortuitously thrown 
into the arms of the civilising West.  
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4.1 Iconic Marie and Romania’s War 
Doina Pasca Harsanyi suggests that Queen Marie, through her wartime networking, 
cultural activities and journalism, left a ‘mark on important events’.
12
 This section will 
examine Marie’s ability to both inhabit a version of Romanian identity and transport it 
to a British audience and suggest that in the context of Romanian imagining in Britain, 
she did more than that. Cannadine argues that in twentieth-century Britain as 
monarchy’s real power waned, ‘the way was open for it to become the centre of grand 
ceremonial once more’. Edward VII’s carriage on his coronation day in 1910 is 
‘emphatic proof of the monarchy’s new and unique capacity to call in the old world to 
redress the balance of the new’.
13
 But by 1916 the tableau of international war not only 
demanded a contrast between the old world and the new but also juxtaposition between 
darkness and light, evil and innocence, masculinity and femininity.
14
 Romania’s Marie, 
as a queen, a mother and a nurse proved adept at fulfilling that role in British popular 
discourse in a manner that would also facilitate the rehabilitation of her German 
husband, King Ferdinand.  
Marie’s harnessing of the multi-form British media to promote her use of 
costume, imagery and prose saw the Queen establish her own rules for monarchy that 
moved beyond standard imperial norms, in a war which has generally been recognised 
as a disaster for Europe’s crowned heads. In an effort to understand Marie’s value in the 
context of her country’s imaging, this section will assess both Hobsbawm’s analysis of 
invented tradition and Smith’s identification of ethno-symbolism in the articulation of 
nationalism. However, it is Hroch’s three-stage nationalism model that most fully 
encapsulates the potency of Marie’s appeal in British discourse, with the Queen 
establishing herself as the active agent around which the feted Romanian peasantry 
mobilised.
15
 It will be argued that English-born Marie not only represented a personal 
wartime success story in which the British could share, but that the imaging of a 
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mobilised peasantry fighting for and saved by their queen also gave Romania’s national 
narrative a legitimacy it had previously lacked. 
Romania’s humiliating and rapid defeat in the last three months of 1916 
impacted badly on the Entente Powers. Already overstretched and undermined by 
discontent, Russia was worst affected but there were tensions and recriminations in 
London and Paris, with the defeat influencing the demise of both the Briand and 
Asquith Cabinets.
16
 In the British Parliament the resounding silence that met the rapid 
defeat was challenged and the new Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, referred to the 
Romanian conduct of war as ‘incompetent to the verge of a crime’.
17
 A new space had 
to be found to reframe a disappointing ally that had failed to live up to military 
projections. This section will demonstrate that a subsequent national ‘project’ did 
emerge under the stewardship of Queen Marie.
18
 Romania’s total war, defined by 
retreat, occupation, starvation and typhus,
19
 provided Marie with extensive 
opportunities to capitalise on pre-established imperial norms. It was her regal English 
heritage and feminine philanthropic disposition that facilitated the reframing of 
Romania as a sympathetic repository for British aid and attention. Most visibly in this 
context was the almost immediate transformation of the Queen’s own identity into the 
saviour and nurse of her nation.  
Marie’s self-confessed concern about losing her looks (she was 40 when 
Romania entered the war) was indicative of a keen awareness that her image mattered.
20
 
Saddled with stodgy Queen Mary, during the war the British press was appreciative of 
the Romanian Queen’s aesthetics. Everywoman’s, a popular penny weekly, conceded 
that ‘Romania’s royal family is undoubtedly the most beautiful in Europe. Queen Marie, 
the daughter of the late Duke of Edinburgh, was always renowned for her good looks.’ 
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The Observer premised an article about the ‘War Work of the Royal Family’ with the 
observation ‘The Queen has woman’s greatest asset in life: beauty.’
21
 When American 
journalist for The Times, Stanley Washburn, first met Marie in the autumn of 1916 he 
recalled, ‘I found her to be a wonderfully beautiful woman with the most gorgeous hair 
and very blue eyes with constantly changing expression.’
22
 It was the very public 
subordination of this renowned beauty to the service of her nation, more specifically the 
vocation of nursing that provided the perfect juxtaposition between royal glamour and 
national sacrifice, with Marie fastidious in the application of that image.  
Historians Alexander Michael and Stefan Goebel have written about the appeal 
of medievalism during the war and Allen Frantzen in Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice 
and the Great War, notes that so often ‘chivalry looks best on the offensive’. Wartime 
postcards showed cavalry charges and mounted warriors fighting with a crusade-like 
zeal.
23
 Serbia’s elderly King Peter, frequently pictured resplendent and brave on the 
front line in his military uniform, was a good example of this.
24
 Marie provided a 
feminine juxtaposition to his warrior through her conversion into a Madonna-style icon 
for the wounded.
25
 From the outset of war she was obsessed with the need for head-to-
toe luminous nurse’s whites. In her diaries she referred to her ‘white nun-like head-
dress’ keeping her tidy, was aware of her popular appeal in the ‘white nurse’s costume’, 
liked to be seen in it, and insisted that her daughters and female entourage followed suit. 
The day war was declared, Marie arranged the conversion of palace rooms into a 
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hospital and promised to ‘show myself as much as I can so that the people should well 
see that I have remained amongst them’.
26
 Her domestic success in asserting this image 
is in no doubt, with Maria Bucur criticising the exclusive focus Marie the nurse 
received, arguing that it perpetuated normative gender roles and detracted from 
Romania’s ill-equipped nursing profession.
27
 
However, what Bucur does not acknowledge is that the exclusive focus on Marie 
as Romania’s nurse facilitated the successful assertion of that image abroad. 
Challenging Wingfield’s and Bucur’s claim that Eastern European propaganda efforts 
were ‘limited and generally unsuccessful’, especially ‘with regard to gender’, the Queen 
demonstrated a remarkable awareness of the importance of international approval.
28
 
Constantly making herself available to foreign dignitaries, medics and soldiers, within a 
month of war she had also received ‘an English correspondent, who wants to make an 
appeal on our behalf to the English and American public’, and had been ‘photographed 
with the hospital by an Englishman for English newspapers’. Marie made sure the light 
was good for pictures.
29
 In order to evaluate the meaning of royal ‘ritual’, Cannadine 
outlines a series of criteria against which to measure the monarchy’s role and he 
includes royal dress and its ability to enhance ‘mystery and magic’.
30
 Marie was a case 
in point. The Romanian Queen’s orthodox-style floor-length whites and nun-like head 
dresses – a far cry from the modest cap and apron worn by British nurses – were 
reminiscent of a symbolic Britannia-style figure.
31
  
Formalised with the advent of photo-journalism and Florence Nightingale’s 
endeavours during the Crimean War, by World War I nursing, unlike most other war 
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work for women, met with universal approval. Everywoman’s noted ‘nursing is so pre-
eminently the profession of devotion for women, and the one in which they appear at 
their very best’.
32
 By 1915 Edith Cavell’s shocking murder reinforced the idea of 
nursing as a sacred profession for women. The British press used Cavell’s death to 
castigate the Germans for their barbarity and simultaneously boost the appeal of 
nursing.
33
 By inhabiting this mythologised role in 1916,
34
 when Germany was on the 
cusp of occupying her country, Marie established herself as an international icon who a 
British audience could relate to on numerous levels. Another of Cannadine’s criteria for 
successful royalty is a conservative national press that is sympathetic to monarchy. He 
identifies this as the key to the British royal family’s rejuvenation in the early twentieth 
century.
35
 Leading that newspaper pack during the war with a circulation of over one 
million was Lord Northcliffe’s Daily Mail. The self-styled ‘Soldier’s Paper’ 
predominantly focused on the home front and the welfare of British troops, but it also 
featured Marie – a foreign monarch – in her whites twice in January 1918, the month 




Cannadine restricts his view of the media to a print press. However, Marie, and 
her predecessor Queen Elizabeth, also understood the potential power of cinema. In 
1913 ‘Queen “Carmen Sylva”’ had ‘written a drama for the cinematograph dealing with 
Romanian scenery and customs’ and by January 1916 the Near East observed that 
Queen Marie ‘has joined the ranks of that very modern class of Litterateurs who supply 
texts for cinematograph film’ which represented ‘the daily life of the Roumanian 
peasantry’.
37
 Once at war Marie was well placed to prioritise film and her role in it. 
Several times in 1917 the Queen met foreign ‘cinematographers’. She talked to them, 
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ate with them, entertained them and was filmed by them ‘among the wounded’ and in 
hospitals.
38
 Chapter 3 has already discussed the impressive reach British cinema 
achieved during the war. It was Pathé News, with French origins and artistic flare that 
embraced more visual and outlandish events (they covered Edith Cavell’s state funeral 
at Westminster Abby in 1915).
39
 By 1917 Pathé News ran a one minute film focused on 
Queen Marie dressed in blazing whites. The carefully choreographed footage framed the 
Queen as the physical saviour of her country and conforms to the sanitised version of 
war that Rebecca Harrison identifies in her article about World War I’s British 
Ambulance Train films.
40
 Invested with ‘qualities superior to regular journalists’, 
moving images were identified as purveyors of truth and the official status of newsreel 
was carefully fostered by film production units, distributors, exhibitors, the daily press, 
and in Marie’s case even queens.
41
  
Sharon Ouditt has compellingly argued that in Britain ‘the loudest and most 
persuasive call to women was to come from the Red Cross and Order of St John via the 
VAD organisation’.
42
 A ‘beautiful Red Cross nurse looking heavenward’ was pictured 
on Britain’s sheet music for ‘The Rose of No Man’s Land.’
43
 The Red Cross was the 
darling of the conservative press throughout the war, with the Daily Mail regularly 
running campaigns and features.
44
 By the end of 1918 over 70,000 predominantly 
middle-class women had volunteered as Voluntary Aid Detachments organised under 
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the auspices of the British Red Cross Society.
45
 When Romania entered the conflict 
Queen Marie claimed that universal badge for herself and for the promotion of Romania 
in Britain. In her heavily publicised wartime book, My Country, there was a full-page 
photograph of Marie dressed as a Sister of Mercy with a Red Cross on her sleeve. Both 
the postscript and appendix declared all proceeds would go to ‘the British Red Cross 
Society for work in Roumania’.
46
 In November 1916 British miners delivered a hospital 
unit and ambulance to Queen Marie’s Red Cross and within a year her English cousin 
George V sent her ‘the Red Cross Order’ as a ‘precious token of his sympathy for her 
work’.
47
 Harrison notes that throughout the war, cinema-going intersected not only with 
‘notions of public duty but also charity’. Captioned ‘Help Roumania’, Pathé released a 
film in 1916 featuring a woman in traditional costume collecting proceeds for the 
‘Roumanian Red Cross’.
48
 The Foreign Office went out of their way to track a Red 
Cross delivery on Marie’s request, with the British-born royal providing a reassuring 
counter to Ambassador Barclay’s assessment that the Romanian government lends 
‘itself in a peculiar degree to corruption and favouritism of all kinds’.
49
 Thanks to 




If for Larry Wolff, Eastern Europe was a barometer against which the West 
could gauge its own civility, the Queen of Romania was the figurehead who neatly 
straddled both worlds. In doing so Marie provided a positive reinforcement of 
Todorova’s argument that the Balkans serviced the West of Europe with a point of 
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difference within one type.
51
 In line with Hammond’s application of Mary 
McClintock’s emphasis on non-settlement imperialism, from her presumed position of 
superiority, Marie as Queen of Romania was the ideal repository through which to 
reinforce ideas of Romanian inferiority and dependency.
52
 The Near East noted 
‘Princess Marie of Edinburgh won Romanian hearts by the freshness of her essentially 
English character. She has proved herself no less English in playing her part as 
Roumania’s Queen in the war.’
53
 That she was entirely complicit in this construct 
requires a slight adjustment of emphasis in the Saidian argument that Western 
depictions of the East are ‘premised on exteriority’ in the case of wartime Romania.
54
  
Marie, encouraged by prominent Romanians and Britons alike, deliberately 
flaunted ideas of a desperate Romania in need of charity and dependent on an English 
queen.
55
 This international versioning in her own image underscores Todorova’s point 
that more attention should be given to the East’s essentialisation of an idea of the West 
‘as the hegemonic pair in the dichotomy’.
56
 In the case of wartime Romania, the country 
needed help and recognition from its more powerful ally Great Britain and it was 
through Queen Marie that Romania most effectively distributed this message. However, 
Marie’s prominence should not be confused with modified power dynamics. It was 
precisely because the imagery Marie promoted conformed to ideas of a worthy, weaker 
ally, that it found a receptive British public. Said argues that the Orient was orientalised 
‘also because it could be’. In World War I Marie pushed the idea of a dependent country 
in her image because Romania was desperate (after December 1916, the country fought 
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Marie’s application of her royal status was not unprecedented. The Serbian royal 
family also used their position to manipulate ideas regarding Serbia and its position in a 
broader Balkan paradigm, with war providing the guise under which to formally impute 
the responsibility for improvement of the more ‘backward’ East onto stronger Western 
belligerents.
58
 King Peter’s son, Crown Prince Alexander, took a Serbian delegation 
from Corfu to London in February 1916 ‘to apprise the British of how they had 
abandoned Serbia’. Alexander’s adept use of the British media to portray Serbia’s war 
as a continuation of its centuries’ long national fight against the barbaric ‘other’ laid the 
groundwork for a successful London Exhibition in June 1916.
59
 But while Serbia’s 
military record outshone Romania’s chequered efforts, the Serbian dynasty lacked 
familial connections with London, and crucially, they lacked women. Mrs Will 
Gordon’s 1916 book on the Balkans noted there was ‘neither a queen nor a crown 
princess at the Serbian court’.
60
 Marie was uniquely well placed to develop and promote 
a feminine narrative rarely associated with Balkan nation-building. 
The prominence of Marie’s role among the soldiers near the frontline, contrasted 
with the understated female efforts in the British royal family. The Windsors included 
women with considerable nursing and charitable track records. Associated with several 
nursing charities, the Dowager Queen Alexandra was the British royal who lent her 
name alongside Marie’s to the Romanian Relief Fund established in 1916, but in her 
seventies, age and energy inhibited her wartime effectiveness. Although an impressive 
charity worker, there was no frontline for Queen Mary to visit in Britain and she was 
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slow to visit French trenches.
61
 Despite the best efforts of the media, her only daughter 
Princess Mary was too young (17 at the outbreak of war) and gauche to stand out.
62
 This 
left both space and appetite to celebrate the unapologetic ostentation with which Marie 
tackled her role as nurse and queen of a suffering country.  
Hobsbawm argues that invented traditions were the ideal vehicles around which 
to rally national sentiment, and Marie, as part of a royal family imposed on a relatively 
new country, was a good example of this ‘invention’. However, Hobsbawm also 
acknowledges that conscious invention succeeded mainly in proportion to its ability to 
broadcast on a wavelength that the public was ready to tune in to. He cites the 
combination of king and church and their ability to mobilise the peasantry in the south 
of Italy beyond their localities,
63
 but could as easily have pointed to the success of 
Queen Marie at galvanising national sentiment in wartime Romania. Bucur concedes 
that Marie’s availability as a nurse in Romania was ‘unparalleled by any other female 
royalty during the war in either Western or Eastern Europe’ and acknowledges that her 
representation was ‘unique in Europe’ because female heads of state were normally with 
their husbands or nursing, not ‘presented as a symbol of the state among the troops’.
64
 
However, Bucur does not visit the impact of Marie’s occupation of this ‘unique’ space 
outside Romania.  
Captured on British newsreel, in head-to-toe whites Marie entered a hospital, 
gifted wounded soldiers flowers and sugar and allowed them to kiss her royal hand.
65
 In 
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another film nurse Marie read to injured troops.
66
 Romania’s queen, whose wartime 
resemblance with Marian imagery was striking, commandeered a carefully 
choreographed version of her vulnerable country, where the peasant-soldiers were clean, 
grateful and recovering. Returning to ideas of statehood associated with militarisation 
discussed in the last chapter, British representations of Romania’s military efforts were 
revised and humanised through the role of Queen Marie in series of moving images, the 
ideas behind which were reinforced in her published wartime prose. 
Discussed in §4.2, Marie’s best-selling book My Country, serialised in The 
Times, established a bucolic Romania, which adeptly mobilised the image of man in his 
purest form – the peasant – for the construction of an ancient people over whom she 
reigned. The celebration of that connection between male Romanian subject and female 
sovereign was at the crux of much of Romania’s own wartime imagining. Marie 
regularly wrote in the popular frontline newspaper Romȃnia, and four of her articles 
were also selected for a female, middle-class, English readership and duly published in 
wartime Britain (and America).
67
 Key themes in the Queen’s prose were the 
infantilisation of Romania’s soldiers, their divine dependency on their feminine 
‘empress’ and their dream of a Greater Romania. In ‘From My Soul to Theirs’ 
Romanian troops are childlike in their adoration of Marie; their success promising to 
convert her into ‘Empress of all the Roumanians.’
68
 The soldiers ‘grope’ for her, dying 
in ‘crimson-stained rags’, still clinging to a national dream, hoping to share the ‘glory 
beyond the grave’ that she represented.
69
 ‘The Coming of Spring’ identifies a rich fertile 
motherland, waiting for the return of its children and flowers. Against this tableau Marie 
introduces her own pain. In ‘My Child’ her son Mircea’s death (discussed below) 
becomes the symbol of Romania’s tragedy, with this personal ‘sorrow’ ‘an added link 
between me and my people’.
70
 ‘Bucharest’ closes with an optimistic rallying cry – the 
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belief that Mircea was a sacrifice and that Romanians will return to their capital. ‘One 
day their arms will be opened wide to receive us, O-Mother-town!’
71
 
The Queen who never imagined she would write articles ‘that the world at large 
would sanction’,
72
 portrayed Romania endorsing the idea of Marie as their Saviour in 
front of a British audience.
73
 When considered in relation to the explicit messaging in 
newsreels featuring Marie, this imaging has significant implications for some of the 
leading assessments deployed by historians and analysts of nationalisms. In terms of 
Romania’s agency in perceptions of its own identity, the articles and newsreels are a 
prime example of what Todorova’s describes as the self-essentialisation of the East 
which appeared in the West. Romania is helpless and hopeful in an expression of 
national sentiment rendered more powerful courtesy of its authorship by an English-
born queen.
74
 Within that imperial construct, Marie’s emphasis on a symbolic, innate 
bond between herself and her soldiers resonates sharply with Smith’s ethno-symbolic 
approach to understanding nationalism. His focus on the ‘sentiments and bonds’ of 
national identity, which are nowhere ‘more palpably expressed than in the common 
grief and collective piety for the sacrifice of war heroes’ helps explain the appeal of 
Marie’s words and iconography, not just in Romania, but also in wartime Britain.
75
 In 
Marie, Greater Romania had its own version of Britannia, where the Queen was a 
national symbol who transcended borders and personified a popular feminine 
expression of her country’s suffering and ambition. Todorova’s and Hammond’s 




The broader significance of Marie as a figurehead for Romania in Britain is best 
explicated through a reassessment of Hroch’s three-stage model for the development of 
nationalism. As discussed in Chapter 1, in pre-war constructs of Romania the nation’s 
image was undermined by a lack of popular support (particularly apparent during the 
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Peasants’ Revolt). It appeared that Romanian nation-building had failed to move 
beyond the second phase which Hroch associates with a new range of activists who 
sought to win over as many of their ethnic group as possible.
77
 Only when Romania 
entered the war in August 1916 was the country’s ‘national consciousness’ portrayed as 
fully awakened through the figure of Marie, a royal ‘activist’ with international appeal. 
The Queen was acutely aware of her role in this process. When the Tsar and Tsarina 
abdicated, she observed that in contrast to the Empress who ‘never showed herself’, 
Romanian soldiers were fabricating M and F on the front of their caps and M on buttons 
– a sign her ‘word has touched their hearts’.
78
 While her indisputable domestic 
popularity delivered the manifestation of ‘mass mobilisation’ that Hroch demands for 
the development of a modern nation,
79
 it was Marie’s capacity to articulate her mass 
appeal in film and prose that legitimatised both her and her country in a second, British 
hinterland. That Romania and Britain were experiencing ‘absolutist oppression’ from 
the same ‘foreign other’ (with foreign oppression a key component in Hroch’s 
nationalism model)
80
 provided further ground for understanding between the two allies.  
Framed in the context of a ubiquitous German enemy, war simplified national 
debate in both countries and saw them share celebrated national identifiers. Marie as the 
maternal repository for the Romanian peasant’s metamorphosis into a passionate 
nationalist soldier resonated with ideas of the British Tommy and his duty for king and 
country.
81
 It was her feminine iconography in the context of the peasant soldier that 
helped to articulate the country’s national ‘dream’ with its imagined ancient heritage. 
Bulgarian sympathiser, James Bourchier, reviewed Will Gordon’s book, in which 
Marie’s articles appeared. Published in the Times Literary Review and aptly named ‘A 
Paradise Lost’, Bourchier focused on the Queen’s contribution. Her ‘simple touching 
style’, and her bravery in the face of ‘double tragedy’ impressed him, but it was the idea 
of Romania’s troops willing her to ‘become Empress – Empress of all the Rumanians!’ 
that convinced Bourchier that ‘the deeply implanted desire for national unity’ among the 
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Balkan peoples must not be left unsatisfied.
82
 This pan-Romanian vision was 
particularly important in political articulations of a future New Europe, as will be 
discussed in §4.3.  
Marie’s ability to express the sentiments of her nation – on both sides of the 
Carpathians – was enhanced by events. Both Hroch’s acknowledgement of the need for 
a foreign oppressor and Jensien’s exposition on the role of the enemy in war against 
which nations could define themselves, serve as reminders of the external aspects of 
nation-building which lie outside a country’s control.
83
 In Marie’s case her rising 
popularity in both Romania and Britain was facilitated by the Germans’ advance. In The 
Times, where Marie was heavily featured as the author of several pen portraits on 
Romania,
84
 she was also the victim of German ‘Frightfulness’ when a bomb landed in 
the royal residence on the outskirts of Bucharest. ‘Peaceable inhabitants especially 
women and children’ were targeted including the Queen and Princesses. As well as 
aiming at the ‘peasants working in field’ the Germans were framed as having attempted 
to kill the royal family. This tragic tableau was exacerbated by the death of Marie’s 
youngest son, Mircea, in the same month.
85
  
Claire Tylee articulates the contradiction at the heart of motherhood during war. 
Conflict turned a mother’s primary life-giving role on its head by demanding the 
sacrifice of sons and husbands. To overcome this contradiction, a son’s death was 
portrayed as the greatest sacrifice a mother could make.
86
 Marie’s conversion from 
frivolous princess to nurse and mother of the nation was completed with the loss of her 
youngest son to typhoid fever in November 1916. The Observer concluded the Queen 
‘has grasped her nettles of public and private grief in a firm hand’.
87
 The significance of 
Mircea’s death was heralded by two British female writers, whose books on Romania 
were published in 1917–18. For Lady Kennard the loss ‘seems more than a woman 
should be asked to bear. Nevertheless his mother still works at the hospital and her 
soldiers love to see her.’ The rest of the Queen’s children were evacuated from 
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Bucharest but ‘she herself intends to remain here until the last minute and is 
wonderfully plucky and calm’. The needs of Romania’s soldiers replaced the needs of 
her son, Mircea. Reinforcing ideas of Romania as the sympathetic ‘project’, in Mrs Will 
Gordon’s book Mircea’s nursery becomes a metaphor for the infantilisation of his 
country. ‘The bright toys, the rocking horse, the gay cheerfulness of the nursery – and 
close and ever closer the muffled footsteps of approaching death.’
88
 In a vindication of 
the Queen’s symbolic importance, her vulnerability had become Romania’s and 
Romania’s hers.  
Bucur observes that Marie was the only titular female head of state presented as 
a symbol of her country independently of her husband.
89
 However, the gender 
constraints of war demanded that Romania also had a credible king and Commander-
and-Chief of its army. When Romania entered the war, Ferdinand was briefly hailed in 
the press as a heroic leader.
90
 But in the wake of Romania’s military collapse, the 
German King quickly disappeared from view. Arriving in Bucharest in October 1916, 
The Times journalist Stanley Washburn recognised Romania had an image problem as a 
nation associated with an ‘expedient ignoble war’ and he understood the importance of 
the King in reclaiming a positive narrative.
91
 It was Queen Marie who helped Washburn 
re-establish Ferdinand’s credibility. Together they convinced the King to publicly set 
out Romania’s case for war.
92
 Ferdinand’s words, written by Washburn and meditated 
through the Queen were wired to Britain; they were published in The Times and Prime 
Minister Asquith refered to Romanian people and their King ‘spilling their best blood 
on behalf of the threatened independence of small nationalities.’
93
 Washburn believed 
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this statement played an ‘important role’ for Romania’s cause.
94
 Although he was 
deeply impressed by the Queen, in a subsequent article Ferdinand was again the focus. 




When Washburn first arrived in Romania he was told by British military attaché, 
Colonel Thompson, that Queen Marie was ‘the most important man in Roumania’, a 
comment he heard ‘everyday thereafter’. It was a statement echoed by Lady Astor’s 
proclamation ‘Queen Marie is the strongest woman in Europe since Catherine the 
Great’.
96
 Ironically, that these comments could be made and in flattering terms serves to 
underline the limits of Marie’s power as a queen. She knew she must not be seen to 
overplay her hand. Although Marie lamented, ‘if only I was a man with a man’s rights’, 
equally significant was her criticism of the dethroned Russian Tsarina for her ‘complete 
influence’ over Nicky.
97
 Washburn’s description of Marie as ‘universally beloved for 
her democratic ways and her charities’, feared not for her power but her ‘dynamic 
energy’, helps to explain Marie’s unthreatening appeal both in Romania and Britain. It 
was within this carefully cultivated and crucially, popular brand of monarchy, that 
Ferdinand’s image was rehabilitated.  
In June 1917 Marie and Ferdinand were one of the few royal couples that 
London cigarette manufacturers Messrs H. L. Savory and Co., had retained on their 
boxes.
98
 If in America the more unconventional image of Marie ‘Rumania’s Soldier 
Queen’ was given occasional preference,
99
 Britain relied on traditional gender norms to 
enhance the roles of Marie the nurse and Ferdinand the soldier.
100
 Representations of 
their appeal and popularity were particularly important after Bolshevik Russia pulled 
out of the war in the winter of 1917–18, when The Sphere identified Romania’s 
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monarchy as symbols of hope and stability. ‘The Brave Effort of the Roumanian Royal 
Family under the Welter of Eastern Europe’ pictured Marie in nurses’ whites decorating 
Romanian troops alongside Ferdinand in military uniform.’
101
 Eastern chaos and 
untrustworthiness were pitted against the pluck of Romania’s royal couple. Marie 
understood that the Russian Revolution provided Romania with an ideal opportunity to 
address its long standing, undemocratic, repressive reputation. She encouraged 
Ferdinand to promise the peasants land and electoral reform after the war
102
 and noted 
‘England and America are very attentive re the Jews.’
103
 This awareness would inform 
her conduct and messaging at the Paris Peace Conference after the war.
104
  
Historians have focused on King George’s unwillingness to offer the Tsar and 
Tsarina sanctuary in Britain in the wake of their abdication.
105
 Much less attention has 
been given to the reassurance the British King offered the Romanian monarchy. He told 
Marie ‘Whenever you consider the necessity has arisen, you and your children will be 
given a warm welcome in this country.’
106
 Marie reassured George that with Ferdinand, 
she kept ‘our people steady amidst the state of anarchy’ while Romania’s political men 
‘are a bit excitable and rowdy’.
107
 The Russian Revolution and its fall out served to 
underscore the value and reliability of Romania’s monarchy.  
Romania’s capitulation in March 1918 (which the Allies strongly advised 
against despite the country’s isolation) gave Marie further opportunities to elevate the 
monarchy above the political fray.
108
 She insisted that neither she nor the King would 
sign the Treaty of Bucharest forced upon Romania (‘Nando cannot sign that peace, he 
cannot’).
109
 In The Times German reports that Ferdinand refused to sign the peace and 
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references to his unsuitability as king added to an air of royal defiance.
110
 But if the 
‘King has undoubtedly proved himself a great man in this war ... it is also remembered 
that he has had to help him a woman who is beautiful and brilliant and who is besides 
his Queen.’
111
 The Foreign Office was likewise informed that ‘the spirit of resistance is 
personified in the Queen ... Mackensen exclaimed recently ‘she has been and still is our 




In November 1916 there was a pro-Romania rally in London’s Trafalgar Square 
attended by a large crowd and led by two nationalistic figures from the Women’s Social 
and Political Movement. A newsreel proclaimed, ‘Mrs Pankhurst and Mrs Dacre Fox 
address a meeting on the Government’s policy in Rumania and Greece.’
113
 Early on 
Romania’s national plight struck a chord with women and this section has argued that it 
was the familiar, uncontroversial figure of Queen Marie who ensured that her country 
maintained a prominent position in wartime Britain. The dramatic nature of Romania’s 
defeat in late 1916, neighbouring Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution and Romania’s 
capitulation in March 1918 underlined the country’s need for Marie as an exceptional 
figurehead, and simultaneously served to enhance her appeal both domestically and 
internationally. It is unsurprising that Cannadine’s thesis on ritualised British monarchy 
as a powerful vehicle for national identity is also applicable to the Queen of Romania’s 
efforts in Britain. In a vindication of Hroch’s three-stage model of nationalism, through 
Marie an idea of the Romanian ‘Tommy’ and his loyalty was successfully articulated. 
Posing a direct challenge to standard Balkan motifs of savagery and barbarity but still 
working within presumed West–East paradigms of superiority and dependency, Marie’s 
Romanian soldiers appeared in British discourse as men ready to die for their own 
English-born queen and her dream of a Greater Romania. Packaged in iconic feminine 
form, this national messaging would gift the political elite, both Romanian and British, 
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a sympathetic canvass onto which an idea of a post-war Greater Romania in a New 




4.2 My Country, Female Literature and Wartime Romania 
Marie’s wartime book, My Country, published by Hodder and Stoughton and serialised 
in The Times at the end of 1916, was erroneously dismissed by her biographer Hannah 
Pakula as ‘sentimental in the extreme’.
115
 In fact the book represented a significant 
departure in terms of the distinct Romanian imaging it generated in British discourse, 
directing Romania’s royal oeuvre away from fiction and folklore with a factual account 
that described the country through permanent and ancient identifiers.
116
 Both distinct 
and feminine, this identity was also championed by other British, predominantly female, 
writers. However, the Romania they described was increasingly defined as a country in 
relation to the ‘idea of the enemy’ in texts that focused on the German external threat or 
the perceived threats that came from bordering and internal minorities. In this section, 
the impact of those tensions on the development of Romania’s national identity will be 
discussed in relation to Jeismann’s identification of enmity in the role of national 
development, while Bakić-Hayden’s ‘Nesting Orientalisms’ will serve as a guide to 
external definitions of Romania against the encroaching ‘other’ in a series of 
comparisons which underlined Romania’s European qualities.
117
 The specific 
denigration of Romania’s Jewish national minority, evidenced in this oeuvre, will 
require an assessment of Brubaker’s nexus of competing nationalisms to explicate the 
dominant Romanian constructs in this British discourse.  
This section will argue that more Britons were encouraged to engage with ideas 
about Romania than ever before, in a series of depictions which stressed the country’s 
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femininity, spirituality and vulnerability in a tone and form which differed significantly 
from the Serbian-generated equivalents also discussed here.These constructions 
challenge Romania’s place in generalisations pertaining to Balkanism and Eastern 
Europe, rubrics that were temporarily played down by the divisions of war. The 
literature fostered quasi-imperial ideas of Britain as Romania’s mentor and potential 
saviour, which complemented the iconography surrounding Queen Marie and suited the 
emerging political consensus about Greater Romania’s place in New Europe discussed 
in §4.3. No longer was Britain simply a yardstick against which to measure Romania’s 
failings and charms. It will be suggested that the alliance of war demanded a 




Ion Duca, a member of Romania’s wartime government, lamented in the winter 
of 1916 that Romania was ‘without a press organisation in Paris, London, St Petersburg 
or Rome’.
119
 This absence of an official Romanian presence serves to emphasise the 
singular and exceptional success of Marie’s book in December 1916. Written prior to 
Romania’s entry into war, her forward planning proved astute and her judgement – ‘we 
found it good, attractive descriptions of attractive things’ – correct.
120
 As Romania’s 
attack collapsed, and over-optimistic headlines claiming the ‘beginning of the end’ 
morphed into talk of ‘a time of crisis’,
121
 My Country appeared in Britain to rave 
reviews. The Daily Mail enthused,  
One of the most beautiful of the war books. Queen Marie writes simply yet 
entrancingly of the widely diversified life in Rumania and her descriptions of 
pastoral and historic scenes form wonderful pen pictures, enhanced in their 
vividness by extremely good photographs taken by the royal hand.
122
  
Impressive wartime photo-journalism was highly prized, with travel and history 
books quick to flaunt their photographs. My Country, advertised with 60 pictures, 
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 The Times felt ‘one has seen Rumania with one’s own eyes’. The 
Daily Mail exclaimed that the stories were ‘enhanced in their vividness by extremely 
good photographs’.
124
 Months earlier, the Serbian photographic exhibition in London 
underlined the power of photography, displaying 260 photographs which ‘illustrated the 
terrible suffering of Serbia during the last three years’.
125
 Melissa Bokovoy 
convincingly argues that the exhibition, ‘Official Serbia’, ‘consciously and with great 
care presented the violence of war and the shame of defeat and retreat as tragedy, 
martyrdom, resurrection and redemption’.
126
 In contrast, My Country made no reference 
to the war. Instead the British reader was presented with the story of a ‘wholly 
unknown’ land,
127
 signposted through rural vistas – nuns, peasants, gypsy children, 
monasteries and wooden icons.
128
 It deflected attention away from Romania’s military 
defeat and struck a chord in war-weary Britain – ‘a book very full of charm which will 
make an instant and pathetic appeal to the whole British race’.
129
 
My Country presented Romania in its pre-existing form; the country’s original 
‘draft’ that Jeismann identifies, before the conflict between national identity and enmity 
takes place, with the subsequent development of nationality focused through an 
oscillation between these two poles.
130
 The primary relationship was between the Queen 
and Romania, encapsulated in the book’s opening line: ‘The Queen of a small country! 
                                                          
123
 The full title of Dorothea Kirke’s book was Domestic Life in Rumania with eight 
illustrations, London; New York, John Lane, 1916; Mrs Will Gordon’s A Woman in the 
Balkans was advertised with ‘50 illustrations on Art Paper’; Times Literary Supplement, 
29 June 1916; My Country was advertised with ‘60 photographs’; Times Literary 
Supplement, 21, 28 Dec 1916, 4, 11, 25 Jan, 1, 8, 29 Mar, 5 Apr 1917. 
124
 The Times, cited in Dunlop, ‘Queen Marie and the Conduct of Romanian Foreign 
Policy’, p. 28; Daily Mail, cited in Times Literary Supplement, 11 Jan 1917. 
125





 The TLS description for the Balkans in a review of Mrs Will Gordon’s book, A 
Woman in the Balkans, Times Literary Supplement, 29 June 1916. 
128
 Queen of Roumania, My Country. 
129
 Daily News review, cited in TLS advertisement, Times Literary Supplement, 11 Jan 
1917; My Country was translated into Romanian and French, Marie Diaries, 25 Mar 
1917, p. 14, 108/III, 9 Dec 1917, p. 113, 111/III; two editions were published in 
America, with Marie reminding Americans they had joined the war ‘for the rights and 
principles of smaller nations’ such as her own ‘small suffering country’. ‘Chapter 1 
written for the Americans’, p. 1, III/5, CRRM, RNA. 
130
 Jeismann, ‘Nation, Identity and Enmity’, pp. 17–19. 
   
201 
 
... It means work and anxiety and hope and great toiling for small results.’
131
 The line 
was quoted in the Sunday Times’ ‘Some Words of the Moment’ feature.
132
 Marie had 
neatly tied herself to an uncompromising vision of a ‘small’ country. (Romania was in 
fact the biggest Balkan country in terms of size, revenue, trade and population.
133
) The 
Queen toils and her ‘peasants toil beneath scorching suns, a country untouched by the 
squalor of manufactories, a country of extremes where winters are icy and the summers 
burning hot’.
134
 Her tableau deliberately excluded politics in order to focus on the 
nation’s ‘soul’.
135
 It was an elemental portrayal that again underlines the importance of 
Smith ethno-cultural focus, binding a simple version of a working queen to a nativist 




My Country, with dazzling descriptions of cornfields and full of bucolic 
sentiment, promoted a timeless Romania. It was upon this foundation that British 
writers built with their later contributions (including the Queen in her extracts for Mrs 
Gordon’s Roumania Yesterday and Today published in 1918).
137
 Their work added what 
Jeismann identifies as the angles or ‘oscillations’ that emerged in the process of war, 
onto the original Romanian ‘draft’. Several books about Romania were published after 
My Country in 1917 and 1918, and the texts often included their authors’ experiences 
before the country entered the war. Discussed in Chapter 1, Bucharest’s spendthrift 
Parisian reputation had been reported as early as 1906, with Harry de Windt’s 
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descriptions of ‘a miniature Paris’ and a veritable ‘city of pleasure’.
138
 If Marie’s ‘draft’ 
Romania tactfully ignored the profligacy of peacetime, British women were quick to 
remember the bright side of the country’s very recent past.  
The effect was to reframe Romania as a nation on a journey towards maturity, 
with the excesses of neutrality couched in nostalgic, forgiving terms. English woman, 
Dorothy, Lady Kennard, was the daughter of the elderly British Ambassador in 
Bucharest, Sir George Barclay. She visited neutral Romania ‘to experience life in this 
far off country’ where hats still arrived from Paris and ‘the clothes are wonderful and 
even more wonderfully expensive ... the country must be made of money’.
139
 In A 
Roumanian Diary 1915, 1916, 1917 ‘we ourselves had almost forgotten the war’, with 
Kennard recalling that ‘The Roumanians are all rather rich (I am speaking of the ones 
who live in cities) and love to dawdle here at noon.’ Mrs Will Gordon, who had married 
into a family of British financiers, was another adventuresome socialite; testament to 
her British significance as a ‘traveller and a writer’, Everywoman’s dedicated a full-
page feature to this ‘Gifted War Worker’, including a headshot, in May 1917.
140
 In her 
1916 book, A Woman in the Balkans, Mrs Gordon concluded that Belgrade did not 
compare to Bucharest, ‘one of the gayest and brightest capitals to be found 
anywhere’.
141
 Two years later in Roumania Yesterday and To-day, Gordon remembered 
Bucharest as the ‘gayest, brightest, light-hearted little sister to the elder Paris’.
142
 A duo 
serialised in the Fortnightly Review – Mr W. F. Bailey, an established travel writer
143
 
with female collaborator Jean V. Bates – recalled ‘fashionable beauties of the City of 
Joy lie amongst their pillows – unthinking, careless, unknowing. Such was Bucharest 
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when the war came.’
144
 Memories of old decadent Romania served to remind British 
readers of the sacrificial path the country had chosen. 
Marie’s own development was a marker on that journey. Kennard witnessed the 
National Troop Review in May 1916, three months before Romania entered the war. 
The King, Queen and Crown Prince were at the head of this ‘splendid parade’, which 
‘did not stand for warfare as it has developed during the last two years’.
145
 The royals 
were the figureheads in the nation’s colourful narrative, where the army was only just 
‘waking from a sleep of infancy to watch interestedly the games of older children’.
146
 
During neutrality, Romania was remembered as under-developed; excessive and 
childlike, or, contradictorily, occasionally chastised for being part of the disappointing 
Balkans. ‘When one has known and loved the Furthest East, one meets with daily 
disappointment in these Balkan states.’ At their worst the peasants were dirty children 
who scarcely knew the world was at war.
147
 Those same peasants had been feted in the 
British press during Romania’s neutrality as a benchmark for the country’s military 
preparedness. In a reminder of the malleability of the ubiquitous peasant in imagery of 
Romania, once at war they would re-emerge in British literature as the primary indicator 




Marie’s self-conscious image as the Mother and Nurse of her peasant nation was 
facilitated through the early publication and success of My Country.
149
 The Times 
serialised the book and led with an article about ‘The Peasantry of a little known land, 
by the Queen of Rumania.’
150
 ‘They are poor, they are ignorant these peasants, 
neglected and superstitious but there is a grand nobility in their race.’ Romania’s 
previously problematic serf population was imbued with an innocent vulnerability. ‘The 
Rumanian peasant is never in a hurry ... He is as picturesque in his rough sheep-skin 
coat as he is in summer in his white shirt and broad felt hat.’
151
 Her prose celebrated an 
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idea of peasant-man in his original form, unsullied by conflict, leaving space for the 
metamorphosis of these ‘noblemen’ into chivalrous soldiers. The Manchester Guardian 
noted ‘a high tribute is paid to the Roumanian peasantry’.
152
  
During neutrality Kennard promised to do an ‘investigation’ of the Romanian 
peasants, who were ‘children: happy, well clothed and well fed’ but, stuck in what Mary 
Louise Pratt identifies as a ‘contact zone’ where ‘imperial encounters’ between subject 
and traveller invariably take place, she did not carry it out. Instead Kennard assumed the 
peasant lived beyond the ‘standards of labourers of the West’, but despite his wealth 
was unable to shake off his primitive ways.
153
 Bailey and Bates cultivated the idea of 
these peasants on a journey: ‘Roumanians, sons of a race whose glory has been long in 
dawning but whose noon day will probably be all the more splendid because of its tardy 
coming.’
154
 By 1917 historian and Romanian politician Nicolae Iorga, demanded that 
the West proclaimed ‘the superb sacrifice’ the Romanian peasant ‘has made for his 
country which he only knows instinctively without its ever being made clear to him by 
word or writing’. Published in Seton-Watson’s political journal, The New Europe, Iorga 
eschewed what modernist theories of nationalism would later declare as necessary for 
successful nation-building – literacy. Instead he focused on an innate sense of belonging 
where ‘only the means failed them’.
155
 This articulation of a profound, deeply 
embedded Romanian nationality vindicates Smith’s reiteration of the ‘popular, 
emotional and moral dimensions of national identity’ and chimes with Marie’s 
descriptions of Romania’s peasants in My Country.
156
  
In The Times, ‘Lonely Shrines and Holy Places’ saw Marie’s Romania swarm 
with ‘nuns making humble gestures’, ‘hoary old monks’, ancient monasteries and 
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‘village churches in faraway corners’.
157
 My Country’s numerous pictures evidenced a 
biblical spiritualism: ‘a lonely little cemetery filled with crosses of wood’; monks and 
nuns of whom ‘some were so bent, that they could no more raise their heads to look up 
at the sky above’.
158
 Orthodox Romania’s unreformed practices and architecture lent 
easily to an Eastern mysticism. If nineteenth-century efforts at reunification had 
foundered, Anglicans who claimed Orthodoxy was stagnant were simultaneously 
confronted with the successful preservation of virtually unchanged ancient orthodox 
traditions.
159
 Scrutiny of the Eastern Church was partially inspired by falling church 
attendance in Britain. However, Adrian Gregory has observed that during the war that 
decline was briefly reversed. Although conventional religion was criticised for not 
having sufficient answers, more women went to church and sought solace through a 
broad sweep of spiritual practices.
160
 By avoiding official religion and emphasising 
ancient forms of worship and ‘rustic testimonies of faith’, Marie’s descriptions 
resonated with that spiritual quest.
161
 It was onto this unimpeachable canvass that the 
enemy would brutally encroach. 
Jeismann highlights the relationship between national self-definition on one 
hand and the idea and impact of the enemy on the other. He argues that ‘every nation 
believed that it embodied the greatest attributes of “humanity”’ and that when the 
interests of that ‘humanity’ came under threat, then a common ‘national interest’ 
emerged and competition was activated ‘by a spiral of emotionally charged claims’. 
Germany’s crushing military success over Romania in their first three months of war 
provided the enmity against which Romania was able to both define its own ‘humanity’ 
and also, through the voices of onlookers, find a common ‘humanity’ with allied 
Britain.
162
 That the unfolding scene was described by British women who were exposed 
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Kennard, a society lady, became a wartime nurse in Romania. Borrowing 
heavily from the familiar trope of German frightfulness, she wrote a graphic letter 
published in The Times, which described Romania’s unexpected Armageddon. German 
taubes – ‘devils’ or ‘beasts’ – daily ‘flew around and around’ picking off innocent life 
under a pretty blue sky adorned with ‘puffs of white smoke like cigarette rings’.
164
 
(Mirroring this juxtaposition, Mrs Gordon described Romania the hour war broke out: 
‘the twilight of a wonderful summer day, falling softly over the woods and 
mountains’.
165
) Kennard’s days became nightmares or dreams, the mania in the hospital 
felt like ‘a pistol to your head’ and death was all around. ‘A woman was killed at the 
gate of the hospital, another man on the doorstep.’ ‘In the market, people’s arms were 
blown off and one man’s head.’ Patients arrived limbless (‘three of the poor legless 
fellows died’) and a child was killed in Kennard’s street.
166
 By the time these 
descriptions were published in Britain, the notion of war as a valorous Christian 
adventure was wearing thin. Many writers stayed loyal to the chivalric trope but first-
hand experience demanded a fresh narrative that was provided in these accounts about 
Romania.
167
 The spiritual idea of unblemished Romania so effectively articulated by 
Queen Marie had been blown up, providing a grim answer to Jeissman’s question 
‘where does the intensity of such national demarcation come from?’
168
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Total war in Romania depicted as impacting women, children and queens, 
served to underline the feminine constant in much of the writing examined here.
169
 
British nurse Yvonne Fitzroy, who was working in Romania, observed ‘not an army but 
a whole country, women and children and beasts’ were in retreat.
170
 In Serbia British 
women also wrote about their experiences, but with very different effect. Historian 
Angela Smith argues that these ‘women illustrate the importance of Serbia as a 
battleground for sexual politics during the First World War.’
171
 Mabel St Clair Stobart’s 
book, The Flaming Sword in Serbia and Elsewhere, underlined woman’s military value 
and professionalism in a coded statement about female enfranchisement. In charge of a 
Serbian Field Hospital Column, Stobart tied her valour to the bravery of the army she 
travelled with and duly became the first woman to ever be given the rank of major.
172
 
By 1917 her exceptional performance had been publicly commended by former Prime 
Minister Asquith.
173
 Likewise, vicar’s daughter Flora Sandes used her book to highlight 
her status as a military hero. Serbia’s desperate retreat through the mountains was 
depicted as one of rearguard defence; Sandes smoked, talked war and shot the enemy 
with her Serbian comrades.
174
 In both cases, the women inhabited a man’s world. The 
Serbian Army escaped to the coast with Stobart claiming ‘Serbia is ahead of other 
nations in her power of sacrificing herself for ideals.’ Sands, the only British women to 
see active service as a soldier in World War I, became a corporal and anticipated 
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In comparison, Romania was a country still in military infancy – the wounded 
peasant soldiers ‘are all children’ tended by British women who occupied conventional 
feminine nursing roles.
176
 Unlike the Serbia’s more radical depictions which affirmed 
the country’s place in a masculine Balkans, albeit a heroic one, constructions of 
Romania, although shocking, were located within accepted gender norms. Kennard’s 
article in The Times struck a chord. The Times History of the War album noted ‘a vivid 
picture of those days was given in letters written by an English lady who worked in a 
Bucharest hospital’ and quoted several graphic scenes.
177
 Kennard reproduced much of 
the original article in her published diary and in 1918 Mrs Will Gordon used Kennard’s 
descriptions of men with bleeding stumps to embellish her chapter on Romania’s war.
178
  
Evaluating the impact of these representations in British wartime discourse is 
challenging. Kennard was distraught by the lack of attention Romania received, noting 
that in the British press only ‘one amongst fifteen papers mentioned Roumania – just 
that and no more. It made us all rather angry at first to realise that we must appear so 
utterly unimportant.’ Two months later the situation had not changed.
179
 Arguably this 
paucity of news strengthened the impact of those who did publish on Britain’s newest 
ally. A Times Literary Supplement comment on Bailey’s descriptive writing as ‘perhaps 
more likely to correct preconceptions than works written with a political purpose’ 
suggests the wartime oeuvre on Romania was well pitched.
180
 The Sunday Times argued 
Mrs Gordon’s 1918 book added to an already extant knowledge of the country.
181
 In 
terms of political influence, as will be discussed in §4.3, The New Europe was read in 
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the Foreign Office, with Iorga’s article about Romania’s appearing when British 




In the wake of Romania’s 1916 defeat, the Foreign Office fell back on standard 
Balkan tropes to denigrate the Romanian soldier.
183
 But as an ally, and one projected to 
make significant territorial gains in the wake of an Entente victory, Romania needed to 
inspire hope. In ‘Nesting Orientalisms’ Bakić-Hayden identifies implicit assumptions 
about the ‘primordial qualities’ of different peoples, which are used to explicate the 
‘fate of nations’.
184
 In Romania the peasant was the main repository for those primordial 
qualities in a country where other nationalities ‘jostle’. Astutely political, Marie was 
aware of the need to merge the ethnic validation of her country’s nationhood with a 
civic, multinational gloss. ‘It is especially in the Dobrudja that these different 
nationalities jostle together: beside Rumanians, Bulgarians, Turks, Tartars, Russians, in 
places even Germans live peacefully side by side.’
185
 The only minority race whose 
primordial qualities Marie explicitly tied to Romania was the romantic gypsy. Imps, 
beauties and hags, they were less ‘thieving criminals’ and more ‘an unending source of 
interest’.
186
 If, in Britain ‘a nostalgia for the past’ demanded a place for the ‘exotic, 
strange and mysterious gypsy’,
187
 Marie’s Romania with its claim on folkloric otherness 
was the country to find them.
188
 
However, while the Queen avoided further explication of Romania’s other races, 
visiting writers felt no such compunction. Bakić-Hayden refers to the appropriation and 
manipulation of the designation of the ‘other’ by those who had already been labelled as 
such in Orientalist discourse, with different races seeking to demonstrate their superior 
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European qualities in post-war Yugoslavia.
189
 In the middle of World War I this 
tendency to define rival groups against each other was pronounced, with the German 
enemy ensuring the European hierarchy could be temporarily eschewed in favour of a 
model that flattered allied countries, Balkan or otherwise. It is significant that while 
Bakić-Hayden focuses on the ‘nesting’ or divisions created by those within the 
‘Orientalist discourse’, in the cases studied here, it was British writers who defined 
Romanians against dubious ‘others’. Bailey and Bates negotiated the contours of 
Romania and its bordering countries and peoples. Romanian peasants in a Hungarian 
inn – men in linen shirts, garments that are ‘worn with indescribable dignity’ – were the 
beleaguered minority in a contested land, surrounded by condescending Saxons 
gobbling sauerkraut and the Magyar making violent love to his sweetheart. These were 
coarse tropes in a country ‘where war has increased tension’ and against which the 
purity of the Romanian was posited. ‘1800 years have not robbed the Roumanians of 
their Latin physiognomy and language.’
190
 
As Jeismann’s arguments predict, Romania’s innocence and femininity were 
exacerbated through contact with the ‘other’. Borrowing Marie’s idea of a jostling, yet 
peaceable, Dobrodgea (despite reports on Bulgarians and Jews that suggested the 
reverse),
191
 Bailey and Bates identify a Romanian wedding party as the ‘most brilliant’ 
of all the groups in that region. In comparison ‘the Bulgars are the most disagreeable 
people ... ugly of disposition, they are also distressingly unprepossessing of 
countenance’.
192
 Mrs Gordon also differentiated between the Romanian and his 
neighbours.  
The crafty impetuous Hungarian, the imperturbable slow moving Serb, the stolid 
Bulgar might be perhaps mistaken for brothers if dressed alike ... but never 
could one mistake the Latin origin of the Roumanian ... Slender with dark eyes 
in which a sombre fire mingles with much latent fun and good humour, graceful 
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figures and courteous ways, they are Latin through and through – a Western 
power in an Eastern setting.
193
  
Ideas of Romanian racial superiority fed off Romania’s classical associations 
with the Dacians and Trajan’s Roman conquerors. Bailey and Bates went to the Danube 
where ‘the legions of Caesar’ and the ‘legions of Emperor Trajan passed by!’ and 
Gordon carried the analogy further. The shepherds are the ‘steadfast preservers of the 
ancient Daco-Roman traditions and blood of the original pastoral ancestors of 
Roumania’ in prose certified through references to Pliny and Herodotus, Ovid and 
Trajan’s column in Rome.
194
 While Bourchier criticised Gordon’s tendency to see 
Roman ancestry ‘in everything’,
195
 these very deliberate efforts to pitch a European 
Romania out of a Balkan/Eastern setting were assisted by events on the ground. 
The Entente’s Russian allies were in revolt by 1917 and out of the war by early 
1918. This military disappointment impacted most acutely on Romanians, whose entry 
into the war had been premised on the help of allied Russia and whose remaining ear of 
land in Moldova was full of Russian soldiers. British writers were quick to depict these 
Russian turn-coats as giant parasites that caused friction, cluttered streets and ate all the 
food. The Daily Mail’s correspondent, Hamilton Fyfe, was struck by the difference 
between the Russians and the Romanians who ‘have steadily refused, in any respect, to 
be Easternised’. Kennard concurred. The Romanians unlike the disloyal Russians, had 
identified the ideal of a fight for peace and  
one had only to watch them march by nowadays to mark the difference in their 
carriage and the concerted drumming of their hobnailed boots. And they have 




She observed that ‘it is curious to contrast the present attitude of mind in Russia with 
the one that has gradually crept over the Roumanian population’.
197
 The differences 
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between the two served to exacerbate Romania’s specialness to a British audience long 
wary of Tsarist Russia and underlined another stage in Romania’s journey westwards 
towards military maturation and civility.
198
  
A second, and more insidious enemy identified as threatening Romania from 
within, was the Jew. In My Country Marie deliberately omits any reference to her 
country’s largest minority. Significantly the Jewish narrative is also left out of David 
Mitrany’s and Herşcovici Hurst’s political accounts published during Romania’s war.
199
 
Political men and Romanian Jews by birth they, like the Queen, were aware of 
heightened international sensitivities around the Jewish Question, and avoided the 
subject. Literary constraint among British writers was rarer. Pendlebury has identified a 
‘revival of religious notions of national identity’ which saw the emergence of a 
sharpened anti-Semitic discourse in Britain.
200
 Mrs Gordon was careful to dissociate the 
‘Jews of London, Paris, Berlin or Vienna to whom one could assuredly never refuse any 
civil or political rights, with the Jews of Serbia, Roumania ... who are a veritable 
scourge for the indigenous population’, but admitted that it was ‘very strange’ Western 
Jews showed such a ‘curious interest’ in their ‘flotsam and jetsam’ coreligionists in the 
East. These ‘unscrupulous’ Jews, who cared only about their ‘own material gain’ and 
arrived in Romania to ‘evade military service’ in Russia, were blamed for both the 
peasants’ economic instability and Romania’s economic woes.
201
 This economic attack 
was echoed by Bailey and Bates. ‘Jews carry things off with a high and irritating hand 
... jingling their pockets.’ The only ‘unclean place’ in Bucharest was the Jewish quarter, 
full of ‘bulbous nosed ... Jews Pendi (pigs)’.
202
  
In his book Constructions of the Jew, Bryan Cheynette is ‘at pains to show the 
way in which racialised constructions of Jews were at the heart of [British] domestic 
liberalism’. Using the model Edward Said first articulated, he identifies British writers 
inside an imperial culture who were able to define ‘the self’ in relation to the Semite 
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 By relocating the literary subject to illiberal Romania, the broader imperial 
construction remains British, but the ‘others’ have multiplied, and their antagonisms 
have intensified, conforming to Bakić-Hayden’s model of Nesting Orientalisms, with 
hatred for the Jew the most consistent and prevalent expression of ‘Other’ in wartime 
Romania. Unlike Gordon and Kennard, British nurse Yvonne Fitzroy had little 
sympathy for the Romanian soldiers. ‘They are unattractive, complaining creatures with 
very little self control.’ But she was more appalled by the Jews, identifying them as 
German and working for the Germans. In the nesting order, the Romanian is ‘ground 
down by the Jew’. A fight in a hospital ward saw a Jew nearly get ‘torn to pieces’ and 
Fitzroy ‘found my sympathies at the time were distinctly Christian’.
204
  
As will be discussed in §4.3, the position of the Jew in Allied countries (more 
specifically Russia and Romania) was contested throughout the war, with an eventual 
identification of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a compromise which highlighted their 
complex status. However, while the Foreign Office had to tread carefully, there was a 
kinship between British writers and Romanians over the Jews, with the former 
articulating anti-Semitic sentiments that mapped out the Romanian against his most 
unsympathetic other.
205
 Trevelyan had concluded in 1915 that Romania was only 
known for its treatment of the Jews. However, the tone of British writers publishing 
during 1917 and 1918 suggests that if he was right about the conflation of Romanian 
identity with the Jewish Question (which seems unlikely in the public domain),
206
 the 
thickening racial discourse exonerated, rather than condemned, Romania. Heightened 
attitudes towards the Semitic other in wartime Britain facilitated understanding with its 
East European ally. This diminishment of the Romanian Jew as a credible national 
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minority has implications for the positioning of Romanian identity within British 
discourse. Returning to Brubaker’s nexus of competing nationalisms, which asserts that 
the national minority nationalism depends on an ability to portray the host nation as an 
oppressor, in the context of Romania’s war this ability was undermined.
207
 The 
Romanian Jew was framed as the oppressor and the Romanian Kingdom, represented by 
its ‘core nation’ through the peasant, the oppressed. This distinction reversed previous 
framing of Romania as a cruel Eastern ‘other’, and instead positioned the country as a 
sympathetic vulnerable ally.  
Bakić-Hayden reminds us of the ‘project’ aspect that defined West/East relations 
and Todorova is adamant that ultimately for all ‘others’, whether Balkan or otherwise, 
the West was the yardstick against which they judged themselves.
208
 However, the 
imperial constructs that underpinned these presumptions acquires additional nuance in 
British literature inspired by Romania during the war. If Britain was the higher ‘culture’ 
in the name of which these writers defined and excluded, it was also a culture rebuked 
for its relative complacency. Queen Marie started Romania’s war wanting outsiders to 
learn to love the country that she had once found ‘alien’. Within two years that 
sentiment hardened. Fitzroy wrote in 1918 ‘I wish that certain people living securely in 
a certain island could see a country in retreat ... [I]t is not a pretty sight but it’s a very 
fine lesson.’
209
 Having used childlike referencing throughout her book, in the postscript 
Kennard decided Romania ‘no longer required’ leadership and help from foreigners. 
She committed fully to the idea of Romania’s maturation through war, declaring ‘we 
outsiders feel that we want to go home and tell the family of Allies that our little brother 
Roumania has grown into a man of whom we have reason to be very proud’.
210
 This 
idea of national fruition was reinforced by Marie who, writing in Gordon’s 1918 book, 
shifted her attention from the rustic peasant to the soldier peasant prepared to die for his 
queen. He had no face, no eyes, and wore blood-stained clothes but reiterated ‘the same 
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This construct sees Romania’s identity conform to Jeismann’s conclusion that 
civil and ethnic definitions of nation-building alone prove insufficient when explaining 
national development during war.
212
 It was in the face of the enemy, surrounded by 
hostile others that Romanians learnt to sacrifice for queen and country. This flattering 
exposition of Romania’s ‘mass mobilisation’ was the crux of the message relayed in 
British discourse. Romania had transitioned from vulnerable and backward, to fulfil its 
‘noble’ potential. That this change was imagined through predominantly female writing 
and experiences distanced Romania from prosaic masculine ideas that historiography 
has associated with the Balkans.
213
 Ancient, sympathetic imagining worked to exempt 
Romania from military failure and unflattering comparisons with heroic Serbia, while 
demanding action and re-evaluation from Britain, the home of these projections. This 
new version of Romania, firmly rooted in a European heritage and guided by an 
English-born queen, complemented the bold political direction envisaged for a New 
Europe by those in Britain negotiating the last years of war, an idea that will be pursued 
in the next section.  
 
4.3 Peace-planning, Greater Romania and a New Europe 
In January 1917 influential wartime academics Arnold Toynbee and Alfred Zimmern 
recognised that ‘organised information will also be of the highest importance in the 
actual making of peace’.
214
 This section will look at Britain’s emerging peace strategy 
with particular reference to Romania, an allied belligerent due to make considerable 
post-war territorial gains. It will identify a Romanian construct in British political 
discourse influenced by the thinking of Seton-Watson and his journal, The New Europe, 
which argued for a total war that would dismantle Austria-Hungary, replacing the threat 
of Pangermanism with a political framework of small nations in Central and Eastern 
Europe based on the principles of self-determination. Although this ambitious 
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nationalities project suited a coarsening British discourse focused on ethnicity as a 




This section will argue that in Romania’s case, as a country with a conflicted 
wartime record and a compromised political reputation, image overhaul was a complex 
process. It will identify Allen Leeper, one of a new breed of British academic-cum-
government experts, as the man who assumed that task on Romania’s behalf. An 
examination of his war work will highlight the influence of New Europe-style 
‘expertise’ in political representations of Romania, including his impact on public 
discourse, an area which recent analysis of wartime experts has tended to overlook.
216
 
That his knowledge of Romania partially depended on information sourced from 
Romanian politicians operating in London between 1916 and 1918 will highlight the 
complexities in national image-making, ill-served by presumed Western hegemony.
217
 
In the context of Brubaker’s competing nationalisms, these British and Romanian men 
added legitimacy to Romania’s national homeland narrative, framed against oppressive 
Magyar nationalism. They focused on Transylvania within a reformed Romanian 
kingdom, while the country’s Jewish minority agenda was compromised by the 
exigencies of war and increased intolerance in British thinking.
218
 This section will 
demonstrate that the emerging political construct relied on ideas of Romania as a 
European nation with sufficiently vaunted racial heritage and political potential to shift 
its axis from an untrustworthy Eastern rubric into an imagined New Europe. 
 
Prott identifies the role of ‘academic experts’ in the creation and application of 
‘a publicly announced programme of national self-determination’ that was articulated 
by both Prime Minister Lloyd George and President Wilson in January 1918. However, 
he is heavily influenced by the American Inquiry team whose genesis was primarily 
academic, when he describes expertise as ‘a hybrid form of applied knowledge that is 
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located in the space that resides between science and politics’.
219
 In wartime Britain, the 
role of campaigning journalism and propaganda continued to occupy a seminal place 
among a Pantheon of ‘experts’ led by Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed. Long before 
the establishment of the Intelligence Bureau in 1917, and its successor the Political 
Intelligence Department as a corollary to the Foreign Office in 1918, Seton-Watson 
continued his public championing of the minority nationalities within the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire.
220
 In his reconception of post-war Europe he identified the 
nationalities within the Habsburg Empire providing a bulwark against what New Europe 
thinking identified as ‘Pangermanism’- the close unification of Germany and Austria-
Hungary and the eventual ‘union of Central Europe and the Near East.’
221
 Holding fast 
to his conviction that Britain had forgotten ‘that the programme of nationality and the 
rights of small nations to control their destiny... if it means anything at all, involves the 
emancipation of the Slav nations of Austria-Hungary and their detachment from 
German control’,
222
 Seton-Watson maintained a prolific press campaign consisting of 
lectures, articles and books. He was the Honorary Secretary of the Serbian Relief Fund 
from 1914 and key to the establishment of what became London School of Slavonic and 
East European Studies in 1915. However, although Romania, with its sizeable minority 
in Hungary’s Transylvania, fitted into his campaigning agenda, Seton-Watson 
prioritised the Czecho-Slovak and Southern Slav causes. 
Bakić-Hayden has convincingly argued that the construction of ‘essences’ is 
ultimately motivated by political (or other) power, thus demonstrating the ‘force that 
cultural constructions have in directing human action’.
223
 The idea of the historic 
Czecho-Slovak nation suffocated by German designs, or the valorised Serbian nation’s 
sacrifice for its peoples within the stranglehold of Austria-Hungary, were two constructs 
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Seton-Watson was well known for promoting. While Bakić-Hayden identifies ‘nesting 
variants’ within Yugoslavia (Europe, Asia, Balkans, Christian, Muslim), in Seton-
Watson’s book, German, Slav and Magyar, he employed cultural differentiation to 
highlight both the fledgling nature of nationhood in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
discrepancies within it, citing the superior qualities of the Slavs in comparison with 
their Magyar overlords.
224
 Romania, which in early 1916 was still prevaricating about 
whether to join the war, was more or less excluded from this narrative. The country was 
a ‘Balkan’ other whose minority in Austria-Hungary could not claim a historic national 
precedent, as in the case of the Czechs, Croats and Poles. Instead, the Romanian 
Transylvanians relied on the idea of unification with the Kingdom of Romania, a county 
that unlike Serbia was yet to spill sacrificial blood for the Entente cause.
225
  
After Romania committed to war, it remained complicated among the ‘nesting 
variants’ within the East and military failure compounded the problem. In late 1916 
Seton-Watson was one of the few publicists prepared to speak out against the Allied 
failure to support their newest recruit’,
226
 but he did not have a role in the Romanian 
Relief Fund. His paucity of contacts within the Kingdom of Romania and Premier 
Brătianu’s ‘sphinx-like’ oriental reputation
227
 meant he had no obvious Romanian 
equivalent of Tomáš Masaryk, the Czech exile in London (and later the country’s first 
president) to work with. Masaryk gave the inaugural speech in 1915 at Seton-Watson’s 
newly opened School of Slavonic Studies in Kings College at the University of London 
                                                          
224
 Ibid., p. 931; Seton-Watson, German, Slav and Magyar, p. 17. 
225
 When Transylvanian-born Romanian Moroianu arrived in 1918 London he was 
struck by Serbia’s efforts to popularise their territorial claims in British public opinion, 
occupying every diplomatic salon and taking tea with the editor of The Times. He also 
noted they had been in London since the beginning of the war.George Moroianu, 
Legăturile noastre cu Anglia, Cluj, 1923, p. 62. 
226
 Seton-Watson wrote in an unidentified broadsheet, ‘the whole question of 
Roumania’s entrance was bungled unspeakably ... It was nothing less than madness to 
allow the Roumanians to abandon neutrality and no criticism can be too severe for those 
responsible for prompting them’; newspaper clipping, 10 Dec 1916, SEW 3/7, 
UCL/SSEES; ‘The Conquest of Wallachia’, The New Europe, 30 Nov 1916, vol. 1, p. 
222. 
227
 By the end of neutrality the term Sphinx was not only used to refer to the Romanian 
Premier Bratiănu, but also the country, §2.2, p. 123. 
   
219 
 
and wrote the first article in Seton-Watson’s journal, The New Europe, entitled 
‘Pangermanism and the Eastern Question.’
228
 
However, it was Seton-Watson’s publication of that weekly journal, The New 
Europe, from October 1916, with the declared aim of standing up for ‘the rights of 
small nations’,
229
 that offered a new space in British discourse for a positive 
interpretation of Romania’s claims. Privately funded, the journal provided a platform 
for Seton-Watson’s conviction that the liberation of ‘Slavs, Roumanians and Czecho-
Slovaks from foreign domination’ would only be possible as ‘the result of the 
dismemberment of Austria-Hungary’.
230
 The New Europe ‘was “Wilsonian” long before 
Wilson himself’.
231
 Although it had an initial circulation of just over 4000, with an 
impressive range of contributors and boasting The Times’s Foreign Editor, Henry 
Wickham Steed, on its board, the publication was highly influential. A number of The 
New Europe’s British writers were recruited into political roles.
232
 It received flattering 
reviews in the press and was commended for its use of foreign contributors, with three 
Romanians on the journal’s initial list: ‘Octavian Goga of the Roumanian Academy, 
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In The New Europe Seton-Watson sought to shape foreign policy at the highest 
level with his call for a ‘new era in Central Europe’ that demanded the dismantling of 
Austria-Hungary and the creation of a series of small nations.
234
 The job of identifying 
Romanian specifics within this projected New Europe was left to one of Seton-
Watson’s disciples, Allen Leeper. The son of an Australian-based Victorian imperialist, 
with a brother, Rex Leeper, who was also part of the New Europe coterie, by 1916 Allen 
Leeper had left an academic post at the British Museum to work for the Propaganda 
Department in Wellington House. There he used his prolific knowledge of foreign 
languages to survey international newspapers, in particular the Balkan press.
235
 That 
same year Leeper met Seton-Watson: 
our greatest authority on Hungarian and Jugo-Slav questions ... I had been dying 
to meet him for some time ... Seton-Watson knows everyone worth knowing in 
Hungarian, Serbo-Croatian, Rumanian and Czech political circles ... I was of 
course just like a child with him. And most of the little knowledge I have is 




Under the tutelage of Seton-Watson, Leeper adopted Romania as his specific cause. Of 
Romania’s entry into the war he wrote to his mentor: ‘I do not think that I ever saw a 
poster which gave me more pleasure than “Rumania declares war” on Monday last ... I 
sent you my article in the New Statesman ... It is of course simple propaganda as it 
seemed hardly the moment to be critical of our new ally.’
237
 
Leeper’s Romanian role was formalised through his engagement with the British 
government’s wartime propaganda and peace planning, prioritised under Lloyd George. 
By 1917 both Seton-Watson and Leeper were part of an impressive team that worked 
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for the Department of Information’s Intelligence Bureau.
238
 In March 1918 the majority 
of them moved to ‘a new Political Intelligence Department’ absorbed ‘into the central 
machinery of the Foreign Office’. ‘This ‘Ministry of all Talents’ under the direction of 
Sir William Tyrell was ‘frequently shown papers and invited to comment before action 
was taken’.
239
 Seton-Watson, wary of Foreign Office control, refused to join the PID, 
opting instead for Lord Northcliffe’s Propaganda Department in Crewe House, but 
Leeper, by now Britain’s leading Romania ‘expert’, was an integral member of the 
department and ideally placed to influence government thinking and public discourse.
240
 
Goldstein identifies the PID’s most important activity as the ‘preparation of 
special reports on the political situation in a wide variety of states’.
241
 Three were 
written about Romania: ‘Memorandum on the Bessarabian Question and the Act of 
Union with Rumania’ which addressed Romania’s unanticipated expansion eastwards in 
the wake of Russia’s withdrawal from the war. The ‘Memorandum on Conversations 
with Two Transilivanian Leaders’ focused on the heralded Transylvanian Irredenta and 
‘Memorandum on the Meaning and Effect of the Bucharest “Peace Treaty”’ defined 
Romania in the face of Germany’s rapacious ‘peace’.
242
 However, the PID enjoyed a 
reach beyond the confines of reports, influencing both political decision-making and 
public debate. Leeper’s was often the final word on Foreign Office dispatches 
concerning Romania
243
 and when accused of publicly divulging details of the Secret 
Treaty that brought Romania into the war, the Foreign Secretary defended him.
244
 In a 
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Commons exchange Balfour described Leeper’s role as ‘a member of one of the special 
organisations ... created during the war with a view to meeting special needs’. Leeper 
was permitted to write a follow-up article reiterating his defence of Romania’s 1916 
territorial claims.
245
 Two month later in July 1918, Tyrrell produced a document 
outlining the exceptional permission granted to members of the PID to write for the 
press, based on the need to ‘build up sound public opinion, and this can only be done by 
providing to the educated and interested members of public full information’.
246
  
One of Leeper’s earlier articles in the New Statesman ‘made a good impression’ 
on the Romanian delegation in London and led to closer collaboration between the two 
groups.
247
 By March 1917 Leeper was writing a short promotional book – The Justice of 
Rumania’s Cause – for which he received help from ‘Prince Antonie [sic] Bibescu’, the 
First Secretary of the Romanian Legation.
248
 The importance of academic networks, 
including the transnational exchange of information, in particular between the British 
and the Americans, has been recognised, but experts’ relations with foreign nationals 
from smaller allied countries is less well-served.
249
 This oversight is indicative of a 
broader Western bias in the interpretation of national constructs. The idea of Eastern 
‘submission’ to Western ideas is inadequate in the context of wartime exchange.
250
 
Leeper did not visit Romania during the war, despite his keenness to go there.
251
 He was 
dependent on Romania’s London-based elite for much of his information about the 
country. Sherman Spector noted Premier Brătianu’s awareness of the need for good 
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 and with a ruling class educated in the capitals of Western Europe, 
Romania had scope to choose well. Leeper was impressed by ‘wonderful’ multilingual 
Romanian Ambassador Nicolae Mişu,
253
 and developed a firm friendship with Bibescu. 
By 1918 the two men had met at least 26 times.
254
 Leeper enjoyed Bibescu’s impressive 
social circle and his house in Windsor.
255
  
By August 1918 Leeper was anticipating the arrival of Anglophile Irredentist 
Take Ionescu; hailed as the former ‘vice president’ of Romania, Ionescu’s virtues were 
extolled in The Times.
256
 (Although Brătianu did not share Ionescu’s staunchly pro-
Entente views, aware of his popularity in the West, he did endorse the latter’s trip there 
in 1918.
257
) By September 1918 two leading Romanian Transylvanians, Octavian Goga 
and Sever Bocu, had also arrived in London and wrote a memorandum on Romania 
with Leeper.
258
 In Northcliffe’s Propaganda Department Seton-Watson was joined by 
his Romanian friend George Moroianu, who had been tasked by the Romanian 
Government to oversee issues concerning the Romanians in Austria-Hungary.
259
 Hroch 
argues that all national movements depend on the ‘external factor’, primarily in the 
support they receive from neighbours and Great Powers.
260
 United for the first time 
through a common allied cause, Romania was quick to capitalise on that ‘external 
factor’ in Britain.  
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Pratt is concerned with the possibilities and perils of travel writing in what she 
calls ‘contact zones’ – ‘that is social spaces where disparate cultures meet’. She argues 
that while the ‘imperial metropole tends to imagine itself as determining the periphery 
... it habitually blinds itself to the reverse dynamic’.
261
 During the war that ‘contact 
zone’ was London and at a time when information about and access to Romania were 
restricted, Romanians had considerable influence over the creation of their country’s 
image. Their elite entertained a young man employed by the British government to 
represent Romania and its Irredentist ambitions. Leeper’s treatment of enemy Bulgaria 
provides a useful counterpoint. Minus a Bulgarian colony in London to convince him 
otherwise, and disparaging of the country’s former British champions, Leeper 
frequently wrote critical articles about Bulgaria and was in charge of compiling regular 
dossiers against the country.
262
 
Evidenced in his memorandums, correspondence and articles, Leeper’s thinking 
regarding Romania mirrored Seton-Watson’s preoccupation with the liberation of the 
Habsburg nationalities. In October 1916 Seton-Watson wrote about ‘The Rumanians of 
Hungary’ in The New Europe and their subjected status at the hands of the ‘vampire’ 
Magyars.
263
 In the New Statesman and the Westminster Gazette Leeper also focused on 
this minority, with Romania identified through a prospective racial union with their 
Transylvanian kinsmen. ‘Every Rumanian soldier as he crosses the Carpathians knows 
he crosses them on a crusade of liberation.’
264
 Leeper argued that Romania’s westerly 
minority were ‘some of the most vigorous and progressive portions of a race’ who had 
benefited from competition with ‘energetic neighbours’. These men would ‘bring to 
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Rumania the vitalising force that only democratic feeling and education can give’.
265
 
This idea of an oppressed educated Transylvanian minority was reiterated in a 1918 PID 
memorandum, when Goga spoke of Hungary’s suppression of Transylvanian Romania’s 
educational and Christian organisations.
266
 The 1918 unification of the Russian province 
Bessarabia with Romania was also the subject of a PID memorandum, in which 
reservations about Romania’s conduct in the region and concerns regarding the union 
among the ‘non-Romanian population, in particular the Jews’, were expressed.
267
 
However, although the annexation of Bessarabia involved over 1.6 million inhabitants 
including 1 million Romanians, Leeper rarely mentioned Romania’s eastern acquisition 
from a discredited Russia.
268
 This omission reinforced the idea of a Western-facing 
Greater Romania. 
The moderate tone of the PID’s memorandums was very different from the few 
reports the Foreign Office received about Romania. In those, the country’s capacity was 
doubted, both militarily where ‘methods more closely resembled AD 1800’, and more 
generally: ‘it is impossible that any nation can be so utterly incapable as the 
Roumanians appear to be’.
269
 But these reservations were secondary to Britain’s 
political agenda for a new post-war Europe. In January 1918 Lloyd George had 
recognised that ‘national self-determination’ was to be a general principle in the Allied 
peace terms; five days later in Wilson’s 14 points, the American President 
acknowledged the need for ‘genuine self-government on true democratic principles’ for 
the nationalities of Austria-Hungary.
270
 That the Entente’s war aims increasingly 
dovetailed with Seton-Watson’s thesis for a New Europe and the Irredentist ambitions 
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of the Romanians in London, served to validate the selective parameters of Leeper’s 
Romanian construction in British discourse. 
Five Romanians, including two Transylvanians, attended the ‘almost semi-
official’ Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in May 1918 (an Entente gathering 
that Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed were ‘instrumental in organising’)
271
 and in 
April 1918 Leeper travelled to Paris to meet France’s Romanian contingent. In his diary 
he noted that heated arguments with significant players including Pavel Brătasănu, 
former president of France’s prestigious Romanian Academy and proprietor of La 
Roumanie, yielded results. ‘We finally got our idea of a new non-party democratic 
Rumania into their heads.’
272
 Although Leeper was dependent on Romanians for his 
information about the country, the smaller Eastern ally had to pay lip service to 
Leeper’s prioritising of a Western nationality model for their imagined Romania. This 
construction conformed to Leeper’s ‘determination to secure for all nations the free 
choice to secure their own destiny’. His modus operandi credited Britain with a 
supervisory role over a new Romania in a confirmation of Said’s recognition of the 
West ‘dominating and restructuring’ through representations of the East.
273
  
To develop Anglo–Romanian relations Leeper helped established an Anglo-
Romanian Society in August 1917.
274
 Its membership included Liberal MP A H Whyte 
(who temporarily replaced Seton-Watson as the editor of The New Europe in May 1917) 
and Lord Bryce, well-known historian, radical, and the first President of the Balkan 
Committee, as well as several Romanians including Ambassador Mişu and the 
academic Mitrany.
275
 By July 1918 the Anglo-Romanian Society shared a stage with 
Serbian, Italian and Hellenic equivalents in the House of Commons.
276
 In August 1917, 
just after Romania’s unexpected military come-back at Mărăşeşti, Leeper outlined the 
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 He insisted Britain must come out of its ‘splendid 
isolation’ and help this nation which was committed to agrarian, electoral and Jewish 
reform. He anticipated a ‘future of intellectual, social, economic and political 
cooperation’.
278
 In 1916 when the Czech exile, Professor Masaryk, delivered his lecture 
at Kings College’s new School of Slavonic Studies he observed ‘there is a striking 
difference’ between nationhood in the East and West of Europe, with the former 
consisting of many racial fragments and lacking the latter’s nation-state coherence.
279
 In 
Leeper’s imagined Romania, the racial ‘fragment’ in Transylvania provided the 
oppressed ethnic narrative that legitimised Romania’s nation-building project, with 
Britain’s guidance needed for the purpose of improved civic development. 
Brubaker’s model for reframing nationalism is instructive in terms of explicating 
Leeper’s nation-building efforts. Romania’s Transylvanian minority gifted Romania a 
homeland nationalism that was elevated above Romania’s other national identities and 
served to further denigrate enemy Hungary.
280
 In Britain, a wartime focus on national 
legitimacy and race supported this agenda, with Leeper insisting that ‘the sole criterion 
of nationality worth respecting is that of the consciousness of a certain origin or 
tradition. This the Rumans of Hungary possess very strongly.’
281
 Again the ubiquitous 
appeal of Smith’s ethno-symbolism is apparent, with Romania’s blend of two 
exemplary races – the Dacians and the Romans – considered sufficient to justify union 
with their kinsmen in Hungary. Juxtaposed against this notion of racial purity and 
ancient heritage was the Magyar’s history as interlopers and oppressors. ‘We have seen 
that there are few better instances of a clear cut issue between right and wrong, justice 
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and injustice, oligarchic tyranny and democratic aspirations than between the Magyar 
rulers and the Ruman oppressed subjects of Eastern Hungary.’
282
 
However, despite the overwhelming focus on Romania’s Transylvanians, 
concerns persisted over the reputation of the Entente’s newest ally, particularly in 
relation to Romania’s Jewish Question and the views of neutral America.
283
 In January 
1917 the New York World raged that the Entente ‘contemplate the seizure of territory 
that never belonged to Italy or Roumania in order to pay bribes that these two eminently 
sordid governments exacted as their price for entering the war’.
284
 Writing to Seton-
Watson the next day, Leeper argued it was vital to ‘get this Rumania question straight 
for the American public’. Avoiding any reference to Romania’s long-standing Jewish 
issue, Leeper outlined the need to emphasise ‘the gross inequalities and injustice the 
Transylvanian Rumans suffer and the impossibility of any proper settlement of these 
except by union with the Kingdom’. In a validation of Hroch’s and Jessiman’s assertion 
of the role of the oppressor or enemy in national identity, he again took the idea of the 
Transylvanian Romanians as both oppressed and democratically advanced to encourage 
Seton-Watson to invert the idea of ‘sordid government’ away from the Romanians and 
onto the Hungarians through a press campaign in America.
285
  
In Britain, the Conjoint Jewish Committee’s efforts to keep Romania’s Jewish 
Question alive in the Foreign Office had been complicated by war and a rival Zionist 
cause. A belief that Jews were behind the Bolshevik Revolution, combined with fears 
that Russia would pull out of the conflict led to the Balfour Declaration in November 
1917 which recognised the idea of a Jewish state in Jerusalem. Russian-born Jew Chaim 
Weizmann’s successful presentation of the Jewish Question as an issue of national self-
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determination with a territorial solution,
286
 publicly endorsed by Zionists and anti-
Semite commentators alike,
287
 was a blow to Lucien Wolf’s assimilation ambitions for 
Romania’s large Jewish minority. That Moses Gaster, President of the Roumanian 
Jewish Association, focused his efforts on Weizmann’s Zionist cause was a loss for 
those championing improved rights for Jews in Romania.
288
  
The Zionist issue compounded the ambiguous attitude of the British government 
towards Romania’s Jewish Question. Leeper acknowledged that ‘in spite of the 
stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, the Rumanian government refused to facilitate for 
Jews the acquisition of citizenship’, but was quick to conflate King Ferdinand’s 
December 1916 promise of agrarian and electoral reform with anticipated emancipation 
of the Jews. ‘There is not the faintest doubt that agrarian and franchise reform will be 
followed by relief for the Jews.’
289
 Here, it is again instructive to refer to Brubaker’s 
identification of the national minority nationalism needing to both assert itself in the 
face of the host state as well as construct the idea of the latter as oppressive.
290
 Neither 
was permissible in a war that required Britain to burnish its Romanian ally. This was 
particularly the case after the Russian Revolution when Leeper publicly identified 
Romania as ‘a smaller, less developed state, monarchical’ and ‘non-socialist’.
291
 Keen 
to play down the impact of losing Russia and possibilities of contagion, Romania was 
defined as a reliable counter to its giant neighbour’s otherness, in an Eastern region 
where the two countries’ identities had previously been conflated.  
Leading British Jew, Lucien Wolf, believed he enjoyed the support of the 
Foreign Office, describing Leeper as ‘a personal friend of mine’. This optimism was 
                                                          
286
 For an effective analysis of Jewish Irredentist claims on the grounds of historical and 
religious significance see Hedva Ben-Israel Kidron, ‘Irredentism: Nationalism re-
examined’, in N. Chazan (ed.), Irredentism and International Politics, Twickenham, 
Adamantine, 1991. 
287
 Particularly instructive is Liebich’s analysis of Wickham Steed’s Zionism. As 
Foreign Editor of The Times he ensured the paper was fully supportive of the Zionist 
position. Andre Liebich, ‘The Anti-Semitism of Henry Wickham Steed’, Patterns of 
Prejudice, 2012, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 187–93. 
288
 Gaster to Weizmann, 7 May 1917, Box 49, 3/C/3 (4). As President of the Roumanian 
Jewish Association Gaster wrote to Romanian Jews in Britain drawing their attention to 
the plight of their co-religionists; Memorandum, 6 July 1917, Box 51, 3/E, MGP, 
UCL/SC. 
289
 Leeper, The Justice of Rumania’s Cause, pp. 19–21. 
290
 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 64. 
291
 Leeper, ‘Roumania in Extremis’, The New Europe, 14 Feb 1918, vol. 6, pp. 131–37. 





 Although Leeper was not hostile towards the Jews, he was the devoted 
disciple of Seton-Watson, a pronounced anti-Semite.
293
 (Seton-Watson’s blind-spot 
regarding Romania’s Jewish Question mirrored an increasingly truculent anti-Semitism 
in official British thinking.
294
) Leeper and Wolf met in London, but Wolf was not 
described in the warm terms reserved for Romania’s delegates.
295
 The assimilationist 
version of civic nationalism championed by Wolf made little headway in the face of 
ethnic Romania’s charm offensive. Leeper took Ionescu’s blithe public assurance that 
‘the Jewish question will be settled in Rumania in the broadest possible way’ at face 
value. When repeatedly confronted with Wolf’s fears regarding pogroms, Leeper 
observed ‘Mr Take Ionescu’s plan appears eminently reasonable and the best way out of 
the difficulty.’
296
 In contrast, Wolf identified the problematic aspects in Ionescu’s 
commitment to the principle of Romanian nationality for Romania’s Jews, an issue that 
was usurped when chauvinistic Liberal Party leader, Brătianu, returned to power in 
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 Leeper remained optimistic: ‘it may be conjecture that it will be 
found absolutely impossible to arrive at any agreement with Mr Brătianu over the 
question of the Jews who entirely distrust him’ and he continued to believe the matter 
would be solved by a ‘spontaneous’ settlement, urging Wolf to be satisfied with the 
Romanian decree-law as late as February 1919.
298
  
The pressure to downplay the Jewish Question in Britain’s official 
representations of Romania is evident in the work of Romanian-born Jew Mitrany. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Mitrany minimised the Jewish Question during Romania’s 
neutrality. Likewise, in 1918 with a job in the British government’s Historical Section 
writing the official history of Romania for the Peace Conference, he apportioned some 
of the country’s long-term inflexibility over the enfranchisement of their Jews to 
German Chancellor Bismarck’s commercial back-channelling.
299
 By defining Romania 
as the paradigmatic other to encroaching, sinister German power, Mitrany evaded a 
compromising analysis of Romanian politics. That he was simultaneously maintaining a 
private correspondence with Wolf regarding improved Jewish rights makes this 
dissembling tactic particularly noteworthy.
300
  
Leeper’s convenient disregard of the Jewish Question was paralleled by the faith 
he persuaded the Foreign Secretary to place in Ionescu’s ‘National Council of 
Roumanian Unity’ which boasted two vice-presidents from Transylvania. Leeper argued 
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it ‘was the first body ever successfully formed to represent the aspirations of the 
Roumanian race as a whole’, Balfour told Ionescu how pleased he was to enter relations 
with both the man and his organisation
301
 and Moroianu observed that the Council was 
the main body with whom the Allies dicussed Romanian claims until the opening of the 
Peace Conference.
302
 This willingness to believe in a Greater Romanian narrative which 
disregarded the existence of separate competing nationalisms would undermine 
Britain’s ability to understand the motivations of an assertive Romanian Kingdom under 
Brătianu’s leadership at the Peace Conference. Brubaker’s nexus of nationalisms 
identifies homeland nationalism in ‘mutually antagonistic’ competition with a rival 
country’s nationalising nationalism.
303
 However, in Romania dominant wartime 
representations of an external homeland narrative focused on a feted minority in 
Hungary had served to diminish ideas of Romnania as an oppressive nationalising 
nation in British discourse. Hobbled by its dependency on a handful of Romanian 
émigrés in London and the need to believe in expedient political solutions, Britain was 
tuned in to just one version of Romanian identity. 
Scant information was forthcoming from wartime Romania,
304
 and that which 
did arrive from the British Ambassador was disregarded. Barclay warned that Premier 
Brătianu was disparaging about Ionescu and thought his National Council would soon 
become a ‘superfluous body’. He insisted that Brătianu, who was ‘far superior to him 
[Ionescu] as a statesman, is as I have often said the only man who could have brought 
the King to take our side in war and it would be unfair to deny him his place at 
Congress’.
305
 The Foreign Office dismissed these comments, assumed Barclay was in 
Brătianu’s ‘pocket’ and believed the latter’s Liberal government was only transitional, 
and that possibly ‘Take Ionescu will succeed it. He has more support in the country than 
Brătianu.’ Leeper added that Barclay’s telegram regarding the National Council was 
‘extraordinary’ and perhaps ‘not serious’, pointing out the close contact they had with 
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Ionescu and his standing among his countrymen, Transylvanians and neighbouring 
countries.
306
 A ‘statesman of special mark’,
307
 regularly held up as ‘that old friend of 
England’ and the unequivocal ‘European’ face of his country,
308
 Ionescu’s perceived 
legitimacy in the West explains British acceptance that a Greater Romania based on 
ethnic criteria would be capable of civic government.
309
 This imagined reality or 
‘project’ conceived in Britain, acquired additional legitimacy because of the leading role 
played by Romanians. In an extension of Todorova’s claim that the East essentialised 
ideas of the West as a barometer against which to judge themselves, the Romanians in 
London modelled the civic potential of their own country on the expectations of their 
British allies in order to push their ethnic agenda.
310
 
Leeper was the recognised authority behind this construct. Initially under the 
tutelage of Seton-Watson, he became a devoted champion of the idea of a Greater 
Romania within New Europe. Consistently articulating his vision for Romania in the 
public domain, by 1918 Leeper was also the leading Balkan expert in the PID, writing 
the comprehensive report for that region with Under Secretary Nicolson ahead of the 
Peace Conference.
311
 The assertion of what was often little more than propaganda under 
the guise of expertise has been routinely overlooked in recent analysis of wartime 
experts that stress historical, political and scientific knowledge.
312
 Complicating ideas 
of Western domination in Eastern representations, wartime London was a contact zone 
where Romanians played a significant role in the crafting of Romania’s identity.
313
 
However, their influence was dependent on a willingness to promote an idea of 
Romania that conformed to British peace plans.  
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That the British Government presumed the Romanian nationals they were 
working with had leverage in post-war Romania is evidenced in the Foreign Office’s 
efforts, (with only partial success), to name their preferred men – Romania’s 
Ambassador in London, Nicolae Mişu, and former member of Romania’s wartime 
government, Take Ionescu – as the country’s delegates in Paris.
314
 From the comfort of 
their wartime ‘contact zone’, Britain willingly embraced the idea of the Romanian 
nation’s maturation through war and unification, attributing disproportionate power to 
Romania’s unredeemed West-facing Transylvanian population in a construct which 
chimed with the sympathetic projections of Romania’s suitably English queen as 
‘Empress of all Roumanians’. But as Wolf was aware, just one version of the country 
had been propagated. Romania the European ‘project’, conceived and legitimised in the 
West would have to fit into a new framework dictated by the Great Powers at the Peace 
Conference, and compete with both its own Eastern alter ego and the nationalities which 
inhabited and surrounded it.   
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Romania and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 
Introduction 
Re-entering the war in November 1918 with the ‘express purpose of benefiting from the 
Allies victory’, Romania’s use of force and undemocratic assemblies to lay claim to 
Bucovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia in the immediate aftermath of World War I, left 
the delegations convening in Paris at the beginning of 1919 in no doubt over the 
country’s territorial ambitions.
1
 Here it will be argued that the presentation of Greater 
Romania as a fait accompli provided the Great Powers with a tempting solution for their 
goals of peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the realities of 
Romanian chauvinism and unaccountable government demanded that the Conference 
tempered the latter’s overbearing approach, sometimes with dramatic results. This 
chapter will look at British interpretations of Romania in that first seminal year of the 
Conference and assess the fall out when Prime Minister Brătianu led his country’s 
demands for expansion both East and the West.  
Brubaker wrote Nationalism Reframed with particular reference to the redrawing 
of political boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe after the war, but he does not 
focus on Romania.
2
 This chapter will partially address that omission and use his 
nationalisms model to understand how Britain misread Romanian ambitions in 1919. It 
will employ Hroch’s three-stage model for the rise of nationalism to explain the impact 
of Queen Marie on Romanian imaging at the Peace Conference and suggest that the 
inclusive idea of Romania she projected, helped Britain ignore the political realities 
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which a consideration of Brubaker’s analysis exposes.
3
 Through an assessment of these 
models, this chapter will demonstrate that Britain found itself wrong-footed when the 
civic pressures couched within Wilson’s 14 points were juxtaposed against the stark 
reality of Romanian self-determination on the ground. To surmount this political 
problem and present an idea of Romania that chimed with the public appetite for 
geopolitical security and peace in Europe, it will argue that the British delegates 
continued to prioritise representations of Romania that identified the country through its 
newly acquired Transylvanian population. 
Section 5.1 will identify the changing status of Romania’s three nationalisms -
‘nationalising nationalism’, ‘national minorities’ nationalism’ and an external 
‘homeland nationalism’- using Brubaker’s model.
4
 It will argue that in the process of 
acquiring extensive new territories, Romania conformed to the chauvinistic, insecure 
qualities of Brubaker’s nationalising nation distinction, where the state makes claims in 
the name of a core nation that is sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole.
5
 
However, the propaganda pressures of war ensured that the British Foreign Office failed 
to anticipate the depth of Romania’s preoccupation with border security and expansion. 
Instead they continued to identify the country through its pre-existing West-facing 
external homeland narrative that was focused on the Romanian nationality in Hungary 
and upon which Romania’s war had been premised. This perspective allowed Britain to 
overestimate the country’s capacity for future change.  
To understand Britain’s framing of Romania in 1919, §5.1 will look specifically 
at the characterisation of Ion I. C. Brătianu. Returning to power unelected in November 
1918, the Liberal prime minister was renowned for his ‘politics of national ego’ and had 
staked his reputation on the territorial aggrandisement of Romania.
6
 Key Conference 
negotiators denigrated, even mocked, the Romanian leader, often refusing to accept that 
Brătianu represented the status quo in a country that had long proved resistant to 
democratic change. This section will draw on the arguments in Naomi Chazan’s 
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Irredentism and International Politics which acknowledge the possible fluidity of 
Irredentism in specific contexts.
7
 It will suggest that the British delegation in Paris, 
aware that the nation-building process in Romania was in transition, naively attributed 
too much power to the Romanian population in Transylvania, whilst failing to 
comprehend Brătianu’s significance and his motivations. In contrast, the majority of the 
British press – derided as jingoistic by at least one member of the Peace delegation
8
 – 
sympathised with the pressures that saw Romania forcefully play its hand in Paris. This 
section will argue that the media’s concerns about Bolshevism and the possibility of a 
revanchist Germany dovetailed with the chauvinism of Brătianu at the Conference and 
on the ground in Hungary, and helped facilitate a political climate that allowed Britain’s 
representatives in Paris to dissemble or ignore the less palatable aspects of Romanian 
identity.  
Section 5.2 will argue that despite the Peace Conference’s overriding emphasis 
on the nation state, its work created a Romania where 29% of the population were 
minorities, a reality that the country was ill-equipped to manage.
9
 It will frame 
Romania’s minorities debate through the ‘national minority nationalism’ of the 
country’s Jews.
10
 Issues centred on their persecuted status and treatment had long 
impacted the country’s identity in British discourse and American pressure helped 
ensure the Jewish Question led the minorities’ agenda in Paris. Mark Levene contends 
that Lucien Wolf’s achievements at the Conference, as an advocate for national 
minorities’ rights, in particular those of East European Jews, have not been sufficiently 
acknowledged by history, but this section will suggest that in the context of Romania, 
Wolf’s was a pyrrhic victory.
11
  
The stand-off with Brătianu over the Minorities Treaty saw the Peace 
Conference initially refuse to compromise in the face of Romanian intransigence. 
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However, it was highly unlikely that a prime minister of a nationalising nation, who was 
known for his contempt of the Jews, in a country that had long been defined by its 
Jewish Question, would find easy accommodation with its minorities. Brătianu was 
temporarily sacrificed in order that the Conference and Romania could reach an 
agreement and save face. It will be argued that the post-war emphasis on self-
determination and a resistant anti-Semitic strain among most British officials, allowed 
Romania to emerge from its tarnished history without any evidence of real change. 
Britain’s compliance in this pretence was indicative of their keenness to dissociate the 
new Greater Romania from ideas of Eastern cruelty.  
Section 5.3 will analyse the impact of Queen Marie at the Conference and argue 
that Rodney Barker’s contention that nationalism seeks exceptional representatives is 
corroborated through Romania’s deliberate use of their queen on the international 
stage.
12
 However, his premise that the principal audience for a leader’s legitimation is 
the ruler and her surrounding elite is challenged in the case of Marie.
13
 While Brătianu 
sought and failed to convince the international elite in Paris of his legitimacy, §5.3 will 
demonstrate that the Queen’s authority in the West was rooted in her perceived 
popularity in Romania. Chapter 4 recognised that it was Marie’s association with 
Romania’s peasant-soldier in British discourse that helped legitimise ideas of the 
country as a modern nation state. But if the final stage of Hroch’s three-stage model 
appeared to have been realised through Marie’s connection with the peasant in war, it 
was her arrival in Paris and London in March and April 1919 that allowed her to 
capitalise on that success story. In a period widely recognised as disastrous for 
monarchy, at the Peace Conference Marie won approval from the largest possible 
audience, and in doing so this section will conclude that she softened the image of a 
nation that had politically re-entered the Balkan ‘gang’ in Paris.
14
  
In 1919 Marie provided a cultural bridge between a wary British elite and the 
Romanian government. Section 5.3 will discuss how Britain understood the language of 
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monarchy and that Marie’s gender, personal quirks and wartime success enhanced her 
appeal as a queen from one of the ‘lesser’ East European states. This inferior 
positioning, matched by Marie’s descriptions of Romania as ‘small’ and vulnerable’, 
provided an effective counterpoint to the country’s recalcitrant behaviour over Hungary 
and the Minorities Treaty, and served to affirm the comforting idea of British hegemony 
within a standard West–East paradigm.
15
 More broadly, Marie’s significant presence on 
the international stage in 1919 is a further indication that the public contributions of 
Romania’s early twentieth-century queens contradict Todorova’s dismissive tone 
regarding Balkan monarchs, as well as her claim that Balkan imagery was 
predominantly male and frequently violent.
16
  
This chapter will conclude that the dramatic appearance of Marie at the 
Conference softened the country’s compromised image. Neither a conventional 
‘external representative’ as identified in Saidian thinking, nor a Romanian, this English-
born queen bridged Romania’s and Britain’s political and cultural spheres and 
manipulated constructions of her adopted realm for maximum impact in British 
discourse. Marie reinforced an idea of a legitimate Romanian nation based on broad 
support, a construct that complemented the idealised version of post-war Romania 
which British officials prioritised over a more nuanced reality. Contrary to Todorova’s 
argument that the Balkans’ ‘imputed ambiguity’ rendered them more susceptible to 
classifications which ‘condemns them’,
17
 by framing Brătianu as the Balkan scapegoat 
for his nation’s refusal to conform to Conference demands, Romania in 1919 was 
granted a reprieve. As demanded by realpolitik, an imagined Romania emerged as a 
suitably pliant learner-nation in a New Europe, its ‘Eastern’ flaws repackaged as a 
temporary state of backwardness and conveniently sugar-coated in a peculiar optimism 
courtesy of its British queen.  
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5.1 Brătianu, Transylvanian Romania and a New Europe 
This section will argue that the political idealism cultivated during the war coupled with 
the strategic realities on the ground in 1919, ensured that Romanian chauvinism 
exhibited in Paris, and the Romanian Prime Minister’s conduct in particular, were a 
challenge that required a political solution. Peace Conference histories including 
Sherman Spector’s Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference, Erik Goldstein’s Winning 
the Peace and Margaret Macmillan’s Peacemakers have mainly analysed Romania’s 
performance in Paris through the personality and diplomacy of Ion Brătianu.
18
 His 
recalcitrance certainly drew the wrath of the Supreme Council, but this section will 
demonstrate how it also provided scope for dissembling Romania’s political reality. For 
British delegates, especially Allen Leeper who oversaw much of the technical side of 
Romania’s case, the focus was not on Brătianu but rather an idealised version of the 
country identified by Romanian émigrés in London during the war.
 
It will argue that the 
demonisation and eventual disappearance of Brătianu helped Britain simplify and 
legitimise the idea of a European Romania embedded in historic and democratic 
narratives associated with its Transylvanian minority. While this model served to 
vindicate Greater Romania’s place in a New European confection, engagement with the 
assessments of Donal Horowitz will suggest that the possibility of Transylvania 
dominating Romanian politics in the long term was unlikely.
19
  
In early 1919 the British Empire Delegation convened in Paris where all matters 
were ultimately decided by the Council of Four.
20
 In the wake of Austria-Hungary’s 
collapse, the need for an East European Settlement was a priority. Britain, which did not 
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share the strategic concerns of France, or territorial interests of Italy, and had more in 
common with America’s ideological stance, was keen to secure a durable peace without 
excesses in the distribution of spoils.
21
 Heavily staffed with former members of the PID, 
the delegation’s Political Section was dominated by New Europe ideals, the thought of 
which ‘made our hearts sing at heaven’s gate’.
22
 Delegate Harold Nicolson explained 
that this refrain referred to the ‘new Serbia, the new Greece, the new Bohemia, and the 
new Poland’.
23
 He made no mention of a new Greater Romania. If Greece could rely on 
philhellenism within the delegation, the other ‘new’ countries, predominantly carved 
from the former lands of the Habsburg Empire, gifted the rubric a central European bias 
that tilted it away from Balkan and Eastern associations. This bias helps to explain 
Nicolson’s omission of Romania. The country’s acquisition of Transylvania did not 
negate the legacy or geography of the Old Kingdom.  
Unlike Romania, the other New European countries had historic roots but were 
new creations. Even Serbia’s strident nationalism was partially disguised amidst hopes 
for a Yugoslavian state. It is historian Ben-Israel Hedva’s observations on the appeal of 
young nationalism that help to further differentiate between the newly created countries 
and Romania. Hedva argues that nascent nationalism is initially perceived as a 
liberating, generous force and only later morphs into a xenophobic, aggressive 
construct. What is identified as an admirable quality gives way in the face of mature 
nation-building processes because ‘the area has to be cleared for political, social and 
military activities and above all the pursuit of a foreign policy’.
24
 Unlike most other 
nations in New Europe which were arguably still in the earlier, more sympathetic stages 
of nationalism,
25
 by 1919 Romania incorporated both ends of this nationalising 
paradigm and would demonstrate its national ‘maturity’ at the Conference in a display 
of force and political inflexibility that was impossible to ignore. 
                                                          
21
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The prospect of disproportionate Romanian gains worried British diplomats, 
especially when the extent of Romania’s chauvinism was revealed in early 1919.
26
 
However, Macmillan’s conclusion that Romanians had ‘a high opinion of their own 
importance’ in Paris misreads the situation.
27
 In this instance Brubaker’s analysis of a 
‘nationalising nation’ is particularly instructive. The nationalising nation ‘despite 
having its own state’ is conceived as being in a ‘weak position’ which is ‘held to justify 
the ‘remedial’ or ‘compensatory’ project of using state power’ to promote specific 
interests of the core nation.
28
 Prime Minister Brătianu arrived in France bruised by what 
he regarded as a negation of the Allies’ commitment to Romania during the war and the 
suggestion that Romania would only have associate status at the Conference.
29
 The 
Prime Minister was determined to control his country’s agenda and this involved 
blatantly bending idealism to secure the existence of Greater Romania. Dependent on 
information from partial Romanians and blinkered by an idea of a New European order, 
Britain failed to anticipate Romania’s diplomatic gear-change. Allen Leeper exhibited 
political naivety when he observed that Brătianu was using the 1916 Treaty ‘which he 
knows perfectly well no longer holds good’ as his primary negotiating card, rather than 
‘a principle’.
30
 Brătianu was trying to claim as much Romanian territory by whatever 
means possible and reference to the over-generous terms of the 1916 treaty upon which 
he had staked his reputation was one obvious, legalistic way of doing this.
31
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It is striking how much Western officials disliked Brătianu.
32
 Before he arrived 
in Paris, the Prime Minister had already incensed British Vice-Admiral Ernest 
Troubridge, head of Allied forces in South East Europe, who met him in Serbia where 
discussions centred on the Banat region, formerly in the Habsburg Empire and contested 
by Serbia and Romania. Troubridge complained that the Premier’s claims were not 
based on ethnic grounds but on the necessity ‘that the Roumanian people should have 
room for development in a westerly direction to fulfil their natural life and destiny’. The 
Admiral sided with Serbian Prince Peter (‘he stated his views in opposition to M. 
Bratiano’s very neatly’) and concluded that the Romanian Prime Minister ‘is apparently 
several rungs lower on the ladder of statesmanship than I had imagined’. He repeated 
Peter’s observation that Brătianu was a ‘haggler’, concluding this was ‘a man cunning 
rather than clever, conscious of the weakness of this case and become an extremist with 
intention not conviction’.
33
 This reaction to Brătianu was a precursor to Paris, where his 
chauvinism and efforts to play the part of a sophisticated leader stood out.  
What Macmillan identified as self-importance cloaked Brătianu’s insecurity as a 
Balkan statesman of a minor nation in a Western city full of international leaders. In 
Harold Temperley’s account of the Conference, historian Robert Laffan noted 
Brătianu’s isolation both during the war and in Paris.
34
 Virtually the only Western 
official who appreciated the Romanian Prime Minister was diplomat Charles Seymour 
(although others grudgingly admired his tactics). A historian from Yale University and 
new to politics, Seymour was struck by Brătianu’s efforts to impress his own 
entourage.
35
 The British delegation, familiar with Brătianu’s political bargaining over 
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the 1916 Treaty, and well versed in standard tropes about Balkan politicians, were quick 
to criticise the Romanian Prime Minister and Brătianu’s attempt to ingratiate himself in 
Paris society made matters worse.  
‘Handsome and exuberant he flings his fine head sideways catching his own 
profile in the glass. He makes elaborate verbal jokes imagining them to be Parisian.’ 
According to Nicolson Brătianu was a ‘bearded woman, a humbug, a Bucharest 
intellectual, a most unpleasing man’, even a ‘silly ass’, ‘very verbose and unconvincing 
and Balkan’.
36
 Sir Eyre Crowe, the British delegate appointed alongside Leeper to the 
Romanian Territorial Commission, decided ‘Mr Bratiano ... plays his game very 
unskilfully here.’
37
 Nor did the Big Three bother to hide their contempt. Brătianu noted 
his meeting with Lloyd George went badly and complained statesmen did not like him, 
especially ‘Lloyd George, Mr Balfour and Mr Clemenceau’.
38
 Likewise, ‘one of 
President Wilson’s marked dislikes is his aversion to Brătianu, the beetle-browed Prime 
Minister of Rumania with the notorious Byzantine background’.
39
 It was after listening 
to Brătianu’s verbose claims that Lloyd George proposed preliminary investigations 
should be ‘carried out by experts’.
40
 The Territorial Committees were duly set up. 
Barker in Legitimating Identities argues that ‘the principal way in which people 
issuing commands are legitimated is through their identification as special, marked by 
particular qualities, set apart from other people’.
41
 Brătianu was certainly ‘set apart’ in 
Paris. Seton-Watson avoided him entirely and Leeper met him for the first time in 
February 1919. ‘I was not very favourably impressed. He’s quite a fish out of water 
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 Brătianu’s efforts to essentialise the West and appear Parisian failed, and 
comparisons with the Entente’s favourite ‘eloquent’ Romanian, Take Ionescu, who was 
excluded from his country’s delegation but remained a prominent player in Parisian 
society, exacerbated the problem.
43
 Beside his Balkan colleagues Brătianu was 
perceived as the worst kind of Eastern stereotype; untrustworthy, second-rate, even 
repulsive. Lloyd George concluded that the white-bearded Serbian nationalist Pašić was 
‘one of the craftiest and most tenacious statesmen in southeastern Europe’, but Brătianu 
was ‘a damned fool!’
44
 He compared particularly badly with the ‘charm and genius’ of 
Greek Prime Minister Venizelos.
45
 Barker’s theory finds its inverse in Brătianu. 
Romania’s national leader had particular qualities, but cast through the prism of the 
West–East paradigm identified by Wolff, whereby the East of Europe is a useful stick 




The discrediting of Brătianu posed a problem for the British.
47
 After all, Greater 
Romania was an unavoidable and integral part of the New Europe upon which the 
British delegates premised their hopes for future peace. Initially, on the advice of 
outgoing ambassador Barclay, they tried to work with him, acknowledging that Brătianu 
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 Even men-on-the-spot (generally inimical to the new order 
intended for Europe),
49
 led by General Greenly, the military attaché in Bucharest, 
agreed that Romania required support.
50
 What Macmillan dismisses as ‘the diffuse 
threat of Revolution’ in 1919, appeared very real on Romania’s borders.
51
 According to 
Glenn Torrey, the preservation of the Romanian army as a fighting force in the wake of 
the country’s March 1918 capitulation was a vital factor ‘which forced the Entente to 
accept the creation of Greater Romania’.
52
 Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary in 
London, noted that Romania was ‘peculiarly exposed to Bolshevik danger and she 
constitutes one of the few remaining barriers against Bolshevism’. Both Leeper and 
Crowe agreed with him.
53
 This was especially the case in April 1919, when Bela Kun’s 
communist takeover in neighbouring Hungary exposed Romania to Bolshevism on two 
fronts. By legitimately presenting itself as the solitary bulwark against communism in 
the East, Romania served the Conference with a military fait accompli. Some felt Bela 
Kun’s coup was partially the result of Romania’s territorial encroachment of Hungary 
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beyond the agreed demarcation line, but this suggestion merely served to underline 




The Daily Telegraph blamed the Entente for the Communist coup in Hungary, 
and their special correspondent Dr Emile Dillon returned to pre-World War I form with 
his support of Romania. He balanced a realistic appraisal of the competing demands that 
faced the Conference with an articulation of the pressure on Romania’s Brătianu, 
‘whose name is indissolubly associated with the large increase of his country’s 
territorial desires’.
55
 Dillon acknowledged the pitfalls that faced ‘generous idealists’ and 
in January 1919 was already writing of ‘the gravity of the Bolshevik danger’.
56
 
Although most publications lacked Dillon’s more detailed knowledge and were kept at 
arm’s length by the Conference – ‘the newspapers are entirely ignorant of 99% of the 
subject’
57
 – the majority were consistent in their portrayal of Romania as part of a 
solution to what they considered the new balance of power on the Continent. The 
Spectator packaged Romania as one of the ‘brave little nations’ whose claims were 
‘infinitely superior to that of the enemy peoples’. The Allies were ‘extremely remiss’ 
for failing to help countries which were the essential replacement to Mittel-Europa and 
had to be protected from the Germans and the Magyars. The Daily Mail used the 
Bolshevik threat over Romania to highlight Allied prevarication and poor decision-
making. Brătianu was scarcely mentioned and the Spectator brushed over any ‘little’ 
local quarrels that got in the way of an Entente versus enemy (German or Bolshevik) 
vision. Romania’s unauthorised occupation of Budapest in August was hailed as a 
‘prompt and vigorous’ solution for which the Magyars and Allies ‘should be grateful’.
58
 
The idea of a united, friendly nation, deftly pushed during the war, was hard to shift and 
the need for a bulwark against Teutonism and Bolshevism keenly emphasised. That 
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This support for Romania (much taken from French publications Le Matin and 
Le Temps)
60
 posed an additional problem for the delegates in Paris. By August the 
occupation of Budapest (and accompanying requisitioning) was just one issue that 
clouded relations between Romania and the Conference.
61
 The Minorities Treaty was 
another major sticking point, with Romania arguing that to sign the clause in the 
Austrian Treaty would infringe their sovereignty.
62
 In July Brătianu returned to 
Bucharest, and relations with the Conference further deteriorated. Hitchins writes the 
Supreme Council ‘responded menacingly’ to Romanian intransigence that summer and 
Torrey concludes the Conference ‘tended to treat the Romanians as erring children’.
63
 
Relations were acrimonious, with historians subsequently arguing that Romania only 
emerged as a victor from the Conference because, on the one hand the idea of an 
enlarged friendly Romania suited Britain’s New Europe experts, and on the other 
Romania represented a security fait accompli.
64
 Both arguments carry some weight, and 
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therein lay the difficultly for the British delegation. They wanted and needed to believe 
in Greater Romania and yet found Brătianu impossible to deal with.  
 However, although Brătianu was keenly associated with his country’s identity 
in Paris, for the British delegates he only represented one version of Romania. In this 
context it is important to recall the pronounced nature of the ‘mutually antagonistic 
nationalisms’ Brubaker identifies in the post-war sphere of nation-making. According to 
Brubaker’s definition Romania was a nationalising nation, but crucially the British 
delegation continued to identify the country through its wartime homeland nationalism 
and the potential of the Romanian minority in Transylvania.
65
 Chazan underlines 
Irredentism as ‘a by-product of transition and uncertainty in the international order’. She 
argues that in pursuit of Irredentism there is a point of transition ‘from nation to 
communal state construct’. This uncertainty insists that the nation’s elite are under ‘real 
or perceived pressure ... with threats from opposing domestic forces and opportunities 
offered by regional circumstances’.
66
 Brătianu felt under pressure hence his heightened 
intransigence in Paris. It was this rigidity in the face of a fluid regional scene of 
competing nationalisms that enabled Britain’s diplomatic team to cast the Romanian 
prime minister as the temporary (unelected) face of Greater Romania.
67
  
Goldstein rightly argued that Romanians ‘could hardly have hoped for a better 
choice’ than Leeper as their main British representative at the Conference. He had been 
‘primarily responsible for Romania during the preparatory phase’ and once in Paris, as a 
leading member on Romania’s Territorial Commission, Leeper was a negotiator in his 
own right.
68
 Having spent the latter half of the war promoting an European idea of 
Romania focused on Transylvania with its high value, reforming Irredenta, Leeper 
considered Brătianu ‘absolutely suranné’ and representative of an old, Eastern version 
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 The Foreign Office’s Romanian Peace Handbook written by Mitrany, 
also identified the Romanian Transylvanians as a group where ‘the common language 
has been the cultural language’, which allowed the peasant to ‘rise much above the level 
of his brethren’ in a region where the ruling class had not been under the ‘evil 
influences’ of ‘foreign and especially Greek elements’.
70
 This thinking found its British 
genesis in the arguments long espoused by Seton-Watson,
71
 and in December 1918 
when the Romanian Transylvanians established a National Government and issued a 
declaration of independence, The New Europe hailed them as ‘extremely well 
organised’ leaders who have ‘always presented an united front to their oppressors’. 
Their Declaration was identified as tolerant and democratic and a good example of 
‘political maturity’. Seton-Watson looked forward to seeing ‘my friends MM. Vaida 
and Maniu and others in Paris during the Peace Conference as representatives of free 
Transylvania’ and by May 1919 he predicted that the ‘rotten structure’ which Brătianu 
and Mişu supported would imminently collapse.
72
  
Seton-Watson remained highly influential behind the scenes at the Conference 
and Leeper was an integral part of his social circle.
73
 The latter observed ‘Paris is full of 
Roumanians at present which give us the advantage of many conversations with 
representatives of various views on more than one subject’ and he hoped this would be a 
‘symbol of real practical cooperation in the future’.
74
 Leeper concluded that Bratainu’s 
regime was ‘inviting a catastrophe’ and continued to dismiss the opinions of the out-
going, long-serving diplomat Barclay.
75
 Sir George Clerk, the senior Foreign Office 
official who was sent to Romania to deliver an ultimatum from the Conference in 
September 1919 referred to Leeper’s ‘great knowledge of Roumanian men and parties 
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and his objective and impartial insight into their real aims and intentions’ which were 
‘of the highest value’.
76
 But Leeper’s first visit to Romania was when he accompanied 
Clerk that September and his views were heavily influenced by the narrow coterie of 
Romanian émigrés and New Europe thinkers he met in wartime London. A more 
accurate way of framing Leeper’s contribution would be American journalist Walter 
Lippman’s observation of the British delegation: ‘each expert seems to have some pet 
nationality of his own’.
77
  
Leeper needed to find an alternative to Brătianu for his ‘pet’ nation; someone 
who could tackle ‘the Roumanian question from a moderate Roumanian standpoint’.
78
 
American suspicion of Romania, exacerbated by the Jewish Question, heightened this 
need.
79
 By May 1919 Sir Frank Rattigan, the new British chargé d’affaires in Bucharest, 
was ‘certain that the centre of political power must move to Transylvania’. He argued 
they were ‘more advanced politically than the Old Roumanians’, and that Transylvanian 
men such as I. Maniu and M Popp had ‘a more Western training than is found in 
Roumania proper’.
80
 Leeper was encouraged, referring to Rattigan’s analysis as ‘an 
exceedingly interesting and valuable report’, arguing that ‘there seems no doubt that a 
Maniu–Take Ionescu–Averescu Government would be ideal for the British and 
desirable from the Roumanian point of view’.
81
 Although the form of union between 
Transylvania and the Old Kingdom had not been agreed, the desirability of this political 
combination was frequently cited during the summer of 1919.
82
 In comparison, Rattigan 
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acknowledged that Romania’s administration of Bessarabia ‘had not been a great 
success’ and conceded that in this former Russian province a ‘Bolshevik advance may 
be welcome’.
83
 Although there was a Bessarabian representative on Brătianu’s 
negotiating team in Paris, the British delegation’s references to Romania’s acquisition 
of Bessarabia were noticeable by their absence.
84
 Unlike East-facing Bessarabia, 
westerly Transylvanian offered the British an alternative to Balkan Romania and its 
political leaders with their ‘methods of the bazaar’.
85
 
Beyond the short term, a belief in this Transylvanian-led construction of 
Romania, heavily promoted by ‘Romanians abroad’, and to an extent encouraged by 
Brătianu, who chose Transylvanian Dr Vaida-Voevod as a delegate in Paris, was naive. 
Horowitz in Chazan’s Irredentism and International Politics, argues that it is difficult 
for leaders from a newly annexed region without the necessary knowledge and 
experience, to break into ‘a crystallised political situation’. He claims Irredentism is less 
common than secession because it is hard for peripheral leaders to enter an already 
established political structure, and yet the British delegation not only expected the 
Transylvanians to enter Romania’s political structure but to fundamentally reform it. 
While the exceptionalism of Transylvania ‘as the cradle of Romanian civilisation’ in the 
historic narrative of the Romanian nation counters Horowitz’s argument that the new 
ethnic area is likely to be ‘regarded as at least sub-ethnically different in its 
composition’ (a status that was saved for Bessarabia),
86
 the control that the Old 
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Kingdom’s oligarch exercised over Romania, in particular Brătianu and his Liberals, 
was a long-term issue.
87
 
During the game of brinkmanship between the Conference and Romania in the 
autumn of 1919, the extent to which the delegates regarded Brătianu as the repository 
for all his country’s ills became clear. After his trip to Bucharest, Leeper recommended 
that the Conference exercised ‘unequivocal action’ over Romania, arguing that if 
Brătianu refused to comply, the accession of Ionescu and Maniu would be secure.
88
 He 
claimed Romania would then have better relations with their neighbours, good 
collaboration with the Conference and the prospect of ‘some measure of independence 
and progressive government in the country’.
89
 The Daily Telegraph sounded a ‘grave’ 
warning note at Romanian insouciance in September, while the Manchester Guardian, 
like the British delegation, pinned the blame for poor Romanian relations on Brătianu. 
‘The Council finds all its difficulties in the Government of M Bratiano.’ They advised 
Romania that ‘to replace this turbulent statesman and his ministry by another, with a 
real existence of its own, the whole of the difficulties between Roumania and the world 
would soon be resolved’.
90
 
The latter was a moot point which delegates skirted over. The British delegation 
knew that beyond Brătianu, the idea of a democratic tolerant Romania required 
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considerable window dressing. As early as January 1919, Nicolson observed that only 
Ionescu would ‘suggest a reasonable solution’ to Romania’s outstanding issues, 
concluding ‘we shall have to impose one’.
91
 The Foreign Office were aware that 
Romanian corruption and chauvinism were endemic
92
 and Rattigan warned them that 
any suspension of Liberal power was unlikely to last long and held out little hope for 
the ‘purification of public life’.
93
 However, Leeper disregarded reports of Romanian 
atrocities in Bessarabia as ‘extremely disputable’ and suggested that if Brătianu was 
replaced with a coalition government, then the Conference would be prepared to water 
down their demands, especially with regards to the Minorities Treaty.
94
 As will be 
argued in §5.2, considerable bargaining eventually bore fruit when Brătianu lost his grip 
on power after the November elections, and a Bloc Government led by Transylvanian 
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, dealt with the remainder of the Treaty negotiations.
95
  
Spector argues that ‘any study of Rumania’s policy during and after the World 
War hinges upon the personality and character of her Premier Brătianu’.
96
 Certainly 
Brătianu’s political chauvinism laid down ambitious parameters for Greater Romania 
that the Conference could not ignore. But his obstructions and inflexibility had an 
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additional impact. Brătianu’s behaviour cast Romania’s political alternatives in a 
sympathetic light, and facilitated the pretence that these men offered Greater Romania a 
different democratic future. British delegates conferred considerable political credibility 
on an untried Transylvanian minority alongside their favourite, Take Ionescu. Political 
potential was held up as a reality, ideals were watered down, and ‘Britain was willing to 
acquiesce in most Romanian demands’ including the acquisition of much coveted 
Transylvania agreed in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon.
97
 By the time the work of the 
Conference was concluded Romania had more than doubled in size.  
Todorova, when describing Balkan imaging from a Western perspective, imbues 
it with a ‘transitory status’. She argues the region was not only identified as a 
geographical crossroads between Europe and Asia but also as a bridge ‘between stages 
of growth’.
98
 In 1919 the idea that Romania was still on a journey towards civilisation 
served in the country’s interests. Immediate expectations were lowered; British 
politicians argued that Romania would become an ‘outpost of Western civilisation’ 
against Bolshevism and Conference historians wrote of the country’s ‘redemption’.
99
 
Concerns that progress was unlikely to be sustainable proved less important than the 
ability to imagine a future European Romania. In a reminder of the expediency of 
external representatives and ‘expertise’, at the end of 1919 even Leeper was looking to 
shed his role as secretary of the Anglo-Romanian society, instead eyeing a permanent 
job in the Foreign Office, with a CBE pending.
100
 Britain’s long-term sphere of interest 
had never been South East Europe and once the political issues in Paris were settled, 
attention was turned elsewhere, Romania’s behaviour in 1919 having done little to 
convince them to change course.  
 
                                                          
97
 The exception was the former Habsburg lands in the Banat which was partitioned 
between Yugoslavia and Romania; Goldstein, Winning the Peace, pp. 252–57. 
98
 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p. 15. 
99
 Romania ‘will inevitably develop into the outpost of Western civilisation against the 
disruptive tendencies of Bolshevism’; Rattigan to Curzon, 8 Oct 1919, 123, FO608/51, 
TNA. 
100
 Leeper hoped Transylvanian Vaida-Voevod would replace him as the secretary and 
by November he had resigned his post; Leeper Diary, 14 May, 2 Nov 1919, 1/2; Leeper 
‘passed for Second Secretary in the Diplomatic Service and was awarded a CBE the 
same month. Leeper Diary, 19, 31 Mar 1920, 1/3, AWAL, CA. 
   
256 
 
5.2 Britain, the Peace Conference and Romania’s Jewish Question 
Romania finally signed the Minorities Treaty on 9 December 1919, joining Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in agreeing to terms drawn up by the Peace Conference 
which were to be overseen by the League of Nations. Levene has argued that Anglo-
Jewish Conjoint leader, Lucien Wolf, working in conjunction with the British head of 
the Small States Committee, James Headlam-Morley, to shape the 1919 Minorities 
Treaties, was more successful than history has previously acknowledged
.101
 However, 
this section will argue that the political atmosphere immediately after World War I 
solicited a British response to Romania’s Jewish Question that was more complex than 
the country’s December 1919 acquiescence suggests. Prime Minister Bratiănu’s 
aggressive national agenda in Paris focused on two issues; the aggrandisement of 
Romania’s borders and a refusal to submit to the Minorities Treaty. His obdurate 
behaviour regarding the latter strained relations in Paris and the Conference had no 
intention of being outplayed by the Romanian Prime Minister. In that context the Jewish 
Question mattered. However, an assessment of Brubaker’s competing nationalisms will 
demonstrate that while the Supreme Council refused to pander to Brătianu, framing 




It was the Americans in Paris, committed to a Wilsonian peace, who were 
adamant that the application of self-determination must be modified in accordance with 
a recognition of minority rights. However, they met with early disappointment when 
Wilson failed to insert a global solution to the minorities question in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. In February 1919 the establishment of ‘expert committees’ to decide 
most technical and political questions – ‘an ominous development for dealing with the 




Determined to counter apathy on the question of the Jews, Wolf was in Paris 
from the beginning of 1919, where Russia’s absence focused attention on the anti-
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Semitism in a new Poland and and the inadequacy of Romania’s promised safeguards 
for its Jews. Wolf made regular appeals to Allen Leeper and Sir Eyre Crowe, the two 
British men on the Romanian Territorial Commission. His efforts met with resistance. 
Crowe noted ‘it will be well to continue to maintain the position that the Committee on 
Roumanian frontiers has nothing to do with the Jewish Question’.
104
 Likewise Leeper, 
who pressed for a ‘solution to be found with Rumania’s own consent’,
105
 did not 
consider minority rights a matter for the Committee and argued that it should be 
referred to the Supreme Council.
106
 Crowe was more cynical than Leeper about the 
prospects of a workable Minorities Treaty in Romania’s case, with Under Secretary 
Charles Hardinge agreeing ‘that in practise the guarantees are useless’.
107
 Compounding 
the problem, dispatches arriving from Romania were unsympathetic towards the Jews.  
The Jew of Roumania, unlike the Jew of England or France does not ... identify 
himself to the country of his adoption but remains above all a Jew, a person of 
foreign and apathetic nationality accentuated by the inveterate exclusiveness of 
the Hebrew. In Roumania the bourgeoisie commercial class does not exist, this 
gap has been filled up by the Jews who have endeavoured to exploit their 
advantage to the detriment of Roumanian nationalism.
108
  
Britain’s official Peace Handbook on Romania noted that 7% of the Old 
Kingdom’s population (mainly Jews) were still denied political rights.
109
 While the 
Jewish Question continued to define Romania’s minority issue, by 1919 Hungarians, 
German Saxons, Serbians and Russians in the new territories saw Romania’s minority 
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population rise to 29%.
110
 Britain’s resistance to Wolf’s appeals, who worked on behalf 
of all minorities, can be explained through an interpretation of Brubaker’s nationalism 
of ‘national minorities’, representations of which were overridden by a desire to fulfil 
the ambitions of Romania’s homeland nationalism. Imbued with New Europe’s self-
determination principles and ‘trying to get together the peoples of South-Eastern Europe 
to form a bloc’ against future German and Russian threats, Leeper’s priority was 
Romania’s new frontiers, not its minorities.
111
 By April 1919 British delegate, E. H. 
Carr, who had submitted a report on ‘Minority Rights’ in November 1918, wisely 
suggested Romania’s Jewish Question ‘needs its own special committee’.
112
 A few 
weeks later the matter was taken out of their hands when the Supreme Council 
committed to a Small States Committee to deal with a Minorities Treaty. 
Wolf was mistaken when he claimed the inception of this committee was his 
victory.
113
 The driving force came from the Americans. Louis Marshall, leader of the 
American Jewish Comité, arrived at the Conference two months after Wolf, but he 
enjoyed direct access to five of the top American delegates, leaving him well placed to 
push the minorities issue onto the presidential agenda.
114
 Levene acknowledges that 
unlike well-connected Marshall, Wolf lacked direct contact with the leading British 
politicians and was many steps removed from Lloyd George, instead relying on slower, 
official channels.
115
 Although Carole Fink argues that Wolf was ‘considered by his 
critics as a “wise” and “prudent” diplomat’, there is plenty to suggest that the close ties 
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she identifies between him and the British delegation were not affectionate.
116
 By April 
Crowe lamented ‘it is a pity that Mr Lucien Wolf cannot be deported to Roumania’.
117
  
Coming from a country where Democratic politics was dependent on Jewish 
votes in key states, Marshall enjoyed considerable influence as leader of the American-
Jewish contingent working to a Democratic president. Jewish minority rights were a 
pressing issue in a way that they were not in Britain. Carr noted ‘no one knows how far 
the Americans, who are having strong Jewish influence brought to bear on them, may 
press the question of Jews’ rights’.
118
 President Wilson, aware of America’s 3,300,000 
Jews, most of whom were recent arrivals from Eastern Europe, was receptive to 
Marshall’s pressure.
119
 At a Paris dinner with Romania’s Queen Marie, Lloyd George 
and Balfour did not mention the Jews,
120
 but when she met President Wilson on 11 
April 1919, the two clashed over Romania’s Jewish Question.  
He very sanctimoniously preached to me about how we should treat our 
minorities, demonstrating how very important this was, and expanded at great 
length upon this topic, becoming exceedingly unctuous and moral as he warmed 
to his subject, treating me all the while as a rather ignorant beginner who could 
profit from his advice ... I mildly suggested that he was evidently well 
acquainted with these difficulties because of the Japanese question in the United 
States. Upon this he bared his rather long teeth in a polite smile, drew up his eye 




This exchange highlights the importance Wilson attached to Romania’s minorities issue, 
and a reciprocal concern on the part of the Romanian delegation, who had briefed their 
queen regarding Japanese concerns about workers’ rights in America, an issue which 
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had helped scupper Wilson’s desire for a global solution to the Minorities Question.
122
 
Within three weeks, the Small States Committee was established. Fink cites the 
convergence of press and political attention in Paris over the Pinsk pogroms in Poland 
and the impact of pressure from both East European and Western Jewish organisations, 
to help explain the establishment of this Committee. However, her analysis serves to 
over-inflate the significance of minorities beyond the confines of the American 
delegation.
123
 Although the British recognised that a resolution was needed, a 
Manchester Guardian article, an anti-pogrom demonstration in London and an 
acknowledgement from Lloyd George that the Peace needed to be durable did not 
amount to a vociferous demand for minority rights.
124
  
It was Marshall’s prompt return to America that saw Anglo-Jewish Wolf 
undertake much of the subsequent work done by the Small States Committee. His 
effectiveness was facilitated by the appointment of British liberal, James Headlam-
Morley, as the ‘dominant element’ on the Small States Committee and ‘the Jews most 
reliable friend’. A classicist and former member of the PID, Headlam-Morley, who 
operated within the orbit of the British Prime Minister and his Private Secretary Philip 
Kerr, had a constructive working relationship with Wolf and together they drove British 
thinking behind the Minority Treaties.
125
 Both men recognised the limitations of a 
Jewish national agenda and shared assimilation ambitions for East European Jews.
126
 
Their united front was important in the face of proposals that exclusively targeted new 
states and those with dramatically extended borders (Romanian and Serbia). It was 
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correctly predicted that Romania’s Brătianu would ‘deliver a vigorous protest’ with 
other states supporting him, leading to ‘a very serious situation’.
127
  
Aware his country had made its own peace after the Balkan wars, and 
emboldened by continued conflict in the East throughout 1919, Brătianu focused his 
argument on the infringement of sovereignty in East European countries.
128
 Even 
Temperley, in his cool-headed history of the Conference, conceded ‘the reasons for the 
wrath shown by the small powers on 31
st
 May are not difficult to fathom’.
129
 Romania 
emerged as the cause célèbre for pugnacious ethnic nationalism and state sovereignty, 
pushing back against the presumption of Great Power superiority, exemplified in 
Wilson’s retort that while there was ‘no intention of humiliating anyone’, it was 
necessary to remember ‘that in the matter of minorities, everyone’s history has not been 
quite the same’.
130
 Lloyd George’s loud aside delivered while Brătianu spoke – ‘this 
damned fellow; he cannot even get coats for his soldiers without us!’ – serves as a 
reminder of the unchanged presumptions at the heart of power-brokering in 1919.
131
 
Temperley perhaps best articulated the main contention between Romania and 
the Conference regarding the Minorities Treaty when he conceded that in the wake of 
the showdown, ‘the Supreme Council were now formally committed; they could not 
recede from the position they had taken up; the principle of the treaties was to be 
applied not only to the new states – Poland and Czech-slovaka but to the older Balkan 
states’.
132
 The authority of the Conference was at stake in a West versus East 
showdown. Brătianu, as the Treaty’s loudest opponent and leader of the country 
notorious for its persistent negation of the Treaty of Berlin, returned to Romania and cut 
off communication. The subsequent brinkmanship was more a commentary on the 
Conference’s ability to control events, further complicated by Romania’s occupation of 
Hungary, than it was an exposition of their concern for minorities. From the Supreme 
Council’s point of view, a line had been crossed and Romania needed to be punished. 
                                                          
127
 Dispatch on Brătianu’s conditional response to Headlam-Morley’s proposed 
Minorities Treaty, 30 May 1919, FO608/51, TNA. 
128
 Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. III, pp. 394–409. 
129
 Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. IV, p. 138. 
130
 FRUS, vol. III, p. 339. 
131
 Sir James Headlam-Morley, A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919, ed. 
Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna Cienciala, London, Methuen, 1972, 
p. 136. 
132
 Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference, vol. V, p. 132. 
   
262 
 
However, before his departure Brătianu had reminded the Conference of the reality on 
the ground, pointing out that Romania’s ‘own troops’ provided ‘the defence for the 
whole of central Europe’.
133
 Beyond the specifics of the Council’s negotiations there 
was a broader recognition that militarily it was not possible to fully control Romania, 
and nor was a weak Romania desirable.
134
  
Further criticism came from the Daily Telegraph’s Dillon. He condemned what 
he saw as the ‘moral guidance of the world by Anglo-Saxondom’ which stood ‘above 
the new law’ while ‘maxims proclaimed to be of universal application were restricted to 
the second class nations’. Romania was the David who slayed the arrogance of an 
ineffective Wilsonian Goliath by quitting the Conference ‘in disgust’ and striking out 
‘their own policy’ and ‘courteously’ ignoring the Great Powers.
135
 In doing so Dillon 
believed they won the ‘substantial sympathy of the largest and most influential section 
of the world’s press’.
136
 While Brătianu worked hard to impress his case on a domestic 
audience in Romania, claiming that his political rivals would ‘humiliate the country’ by 
permitting foreigner interference,
137
 the Foreign Office encouraged Wolf to take up 
journalistic cudgels in favour of minority protection (Leeper pressed this point).
138
 The 
request was indicative of the delegation’s anxiety over the Conference’s media image in 
Britain, where coverage was sympathetic towards Britain’s smaller allies and 
increasingly paranoid about the role of the Jews.
139
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Wolf had already written to Lord James Bryce who was wary of The New 
Europe nation-builders, and asked him for supportive coverage. Bryce was not 
unsympathetic, arguing no one ‘could ever count on such a country’ as Romania. 
However, he was more concerned about the Hungarians and Szeklers in Transylvania 
than the Jews, and was too busy to write to The Times. He only managed to remark that 
‘fair and equal treatment is being cynically denied to the minorities that have fallen into’ 
Romania’s ‘custody’ in ‘a little speech’ at the National Liberal Club. Leaving Wolf 
without much to go on, Bryce’s response was indicative of a wider lack of concern 
regarding Jewish rights.
140
 If Romania’s anti-Semitism had once provoked indignation, 
by 1919 apathy was often the best that could be hoped for. A Jewish correspondent 
wrote in the New Statesman, ‘if ever there were a just cause which the Paris Conference 
should uphold and fight for to the end it is the cause of the 300 000 Jews in the enlarged 
Romania’, and Wolf’s Westminster Gazette article outlined the need to counter 
Romanian chauvinism.
141
 But beyond specific interest groups, attitudes hardened, with 
British delegate Nicolson declaring in September 1919 ‘we have heard more than 
enough about the Jews in Roumania’.
142
 Dillon’s analysis that the Conference was in 
hock to Jewish influence served to underline broader concerns about Jewish power in 




Observing relations between the Conference and Romania, Dillon identified the 
Council’s ‘repugnance to her whole system of government, with its survivals of 
feudalism, anti Semitism and conservatism’. He believed this attitude motivated the 
Conference to seek  
radical and as they thought beneficent change in the entire regime by getting rid 
of its chiefs. This plan had been successfully tried against MM Orlando and 
Sonnino in Italy. Their solicitude for this latter aim may have been whetted by a 
personal lack of sympathy for the Rumanian delegates with whom the Anglo-
Saxon chiefs hardly ever conversed.
144
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As discussed in §5.1, the British delegates made no secret of wanting ‘the defeat of the 
Liberal Party and his [Brătianu’s] disappearance’.
145
 Returning from his September trip 
to Bucharest, Leeper argued that Brătianu had ensured the Minorities Treaty had 
become ‘the burning issue’ in Romania by ‘inflaming public opinion’ and giving the 
impression that the requirements ‘the treaties proposed are quite different from what 
they really are’. After Brătianu’s resignation, Leeper claimed, ‘Roumanians who have 
discussed the matter with an open mind are quite willing now to admit the Treaty itself 
involves no infringement of Roumanian sovereignty or violation of Roumanian 
interest.’
146
 However, during the same trip Clerk told Queen Marie that ‘the actual 
form’ of the Minority Question ‘could be modified’ and Iuliu Maniu followed Ionescu 
in admitting he was concerned about public opinion regarding the Treaty. The more 
tolerant image of a future Romania which Leeper projected fell short in reality.
147
  
The British delegation knew most Romanians regarded the treaty as toxic from 
both a sovereign and a racial perspective and that they would have to moderate their 
terms accordingly.
148
 After successive delays Romania, now under the new premiership 
of Transylvanian Vaida-Voevod, was granted an additional five-day extension and 
requested modifications to the Minorities Treaty.
149
 As with the Serbian case four days 
earlier, the modifications were granted, including the removal of two specific Jewish 
Clauses and a reference to the Treaty of Berlin (although Wolf was pleased these 
concessions were exchanged for Romanian recognition of ‘all Jews resident in the 
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country and not subject of foreign states as ipso facto Rumanian nationals’).
150
 
Communications between Headlam-Morley and Wolf shortly after 9 December 1919 
were indicative of how important the public presentation of the case was to both sides. 
Headlam-Morley telephoned Wolf: ‘very pleased with The Times report this 
morning’.
151
 Wolf explained the modifications were necessary in order that the 
Romanians could claim the signing was a victory.
152
 The Jewish Chronicle took him at 
his word: ‘so far as it could be solved on paper, the Treaty provided a complete solution 
of the Jewish Question in Roumania’.
153
 
Although Wolf convinced himself that the Treaty delivered everything that his 
February memorial had demanded, it was a hollow victory. Romania had stalled for 
months, employed all available tactics including the diplomacy of their queen and only 
signed under extreme duress.
154
 This was an agreement in which the Romanians would 
acknowledge the letter but not the spirit of the law. Irina Livezeanu observes that in 
Romania ‘the imposition of Western democratic processes such as the equal rights of 
minorities ... were widely perceived as illegitimate alien grafts and clear demonstrations 
of disunity within the ethnic Romanian community’ during the interwar period when the 
country was defined by the emergence of an extreme nationalism that was backed by 
mainstream politicians.
155
 Brubaker observes that if there was recognition of national 




The Conference, and more specifically the British contingent, allowed 
themselves to be ‘played’ for appearances’ sake. As Headlam-Morley explained to 
Seton-Watson, the tussle with Romania and other East European countries over 
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minority rights was a historic one about ‘maintaining continuity of policy in the Foreign 
Office’.
157
 The Minorities Treaty, by concluding an issue which had defined Romania in 
British discourse during the Arnoldian, high Victorian period, was paying lip service to 
the past. But amidst the political realities of 1919, the real significance of the Jewish 
Question was scuttled by broader nationalist agendas. Again Brubaker’s analysis is 
pertinent. In Romania, the nationalising nation sought to quash the national minority 
issue which looked to portray it as the oppressor state, and Britain’s less tolerant post-
war climate worked in favour of the Romanian Kingdom.
158
 With the Zionists 
controversially claiming the national Jewish narrative for Palestine, and Romania seen 
as ‘an essential bulwark for the preservation of European peace’,
159
 British politicians 
could pretend that the Jewish Question had been resolved, and that an ‘inferior’ Eastern 




5.3 Queen Marie in Paris, London and Greater Romania, 1919 
Marie’s high-profile arrival in Paris and London in spring 1919 has attracted 
considerable historical debate. She has either been portrayed as a vital element in 
Greater Romania’s success story or a temporary boon with little lasting influence.
161
 
This section will build on previous arguments that the Queen was an important 
propagandist and seek to ascertain the extent to which Romania was essentialised 
through her wartime reputation and image on the world stage in Paris, and in the more 
intimate setting of London’s Buckingham Palace.
162
 Cannadine underlines the 
importance of regal ceremony and ritual in the political arena but wonders ‘what form 
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of power it is?’
163
 Marie questioned how much the promises and attention lavished upon 
her would translate into hard political and economic currency for Romania, but was in 
no doubt Paris ‘received me and honoured my country through me’.
164
 Regarded as the 
focal point for the ‘pro-English idea’ in Romania, it will be suggested that Marie’s brief 
sojourn in Paris and London in March and April 1919 was critical for the image of her 
country in British discourse. On the Queen’s return to Greater Romania, the success of 




Romania’s flamboyant queen would have always played well amidst the 
personality politics and mass media scrutiny that haunted the Conference. However, this 
section will demonstrate that her significance for Romanian imagining went beyond the 
impact of her personality and it will stress the importance of Smith’s ethno-symbolic 
arguments in an assessment of her effectiveness.
166
 Having mobilised an idea of the 
Romanian peasant fighting for his queen during the war, Marie’s arrival in Paris saw her 
deliberately reinforce this national construct in an international context. Hroch 
recognises the importance of activists in the instigation of mass participation behind a 
national idea; this section will look at the impact of that nationalising process when 
articulated by a queen who talked directly to the British press, and it will discover a 
sympathetic feminine version of Romania. It will argue that Marie’s effectiveness was 
enhanced through her ability to capitalise on her British heritage and her framing of 
Romania as a dependent country. The reinforcement of this imperial-style construct 
acted as a counterbalance to ideas of Romanian belligerence fostered by Brătianu, 
leaving the Queen well placed to define and simplify Romania’s imperatives of national 
consolidation and unification.  
                                                          
163
 David Cannadine, ‘The Divine Right of Kings’, in David Cannadine and Simon 
Price (eds), The Rituals of Royalty: Power and ceremonial in traditional societies, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 17. 
164
 Queen Marie in Mandache (ed.), Later Chapters of My Life, p. 66. She hoped ‘that 
the whole thing should be crowned with real and lasting results’. Marie Diaries, 26 Apr, 
pp. 114–15, 28 Mar 1919, p. 18, III/116, CRRM, RNA. 
165
 General Greenly, ‘Report on Roumanian Mission’ 10 Jan 1919, dispatched 25 Mar 
1919, 5156, FO608/51, TNA. 
166
 Anthony Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical debates about ethnicity 
and nationalism, Hanover, NH, University Press of New England, 2000, pp. 63–78. 
   
268 
 
Marie’s arrival at the Peace Conference in March 1919 was a clever piece of 
political strategising by her unpopular Premier. Diana Mandache argues that her visit to 
the French capital was part of a ‘new’ diplomatic game by Brătianu, but Spector notes 
that the Prime Minister showed an appreciation of effective propaganda during the war 
when he sent missions peopled by sympathetic Transylvanians to both Washington and 
Paris in 1917.
167
 Brătianu had also understood and capitalised on Marie’s value 
throughout the war. He used the Queen’s dynastic channels to broker diplomatic 
negotiations during neutrality, and after Romania joined the conflict the Queen was 
promoted as a symbol of the state among the troops and encouraged to flaunt that image 
abroad.
168
 The invitation to Paris was the culmination of Marie’s exceptional war, 
perhaps best summed up by the New York Times which described her as one of the 
‘vivid and unforgettable figures’ to emerge from the conflict.
169
 Marie considered it 
fitting that she had been invited to the Conference, noting in her diary: ‘I? Yes of 
course; I was the one designated – yes I think I felt capable of holding my own, even 
with the “Great Three”!’
170
  
World War I had been disastrous for monarchy. Four of Europe’s five leading 
royal houses were destroyed (the Russian Tsar did not have to lose the war to forgo his 
throne and then his life) and even the British royal family thought it prudent to change 
their German name, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, to Windsor.
171
 Against this querulous 
background Marie’s success story was outstanding and her triumphant appearance in 
Paris served to underline her exceptional status. Combining democratic levels of 
popularity with the privileges and recognition accorded to monarchy, Marie arrived in a 
city where the British ambassador, Lord Derby, had been lamenting France’s lack of 
royalty: ‘Here the crowds have wandered aimlessly about the streets with no particular 
objective.’ He compared the French capital to London where ‘the whole lot seem to 
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have concentrated on the one place, Buckingham Palace, with a view of cheering the 
King as the representative of the nation’.
172
  
Britain was a constitutional monarchy accustomed to the ‘functional relationship 
between power and ceremonial’.
173
 What the British missed in France, Marie more than 
delivered for Romania. The Daily Mail’s picture page went into overdrive; the 
Romanian Queen was even photographed inside her royal train arriving in Paris.
174
 She 
was immediately struck by the press pack. ‘All the journalists of the “universe” try to 
get hold of me, like a swarm of bees they buzz around me.’
175
 Brătianu had been 
‘envious of the lavish receptions accorded in Paris to such heroes of resistance as King 
Albert of Belgium’ and ‘Prince-Regent Alexander of Serbia’.
176
 Marie was his solution; 
she arrived in Paris at the beginning of March when the Big Four were due to reconvene 
and just before the territorial commissions were scheduled to deliver their findings and 
she clinched audiences with the French and the British prime ministers and the 
American president.
177
 Romania, Marie’s ‘small country’ needed to be seen courting the 
Great Powers, and the British were keen to be associated with a popular English-born 
queen who was immediately shown off by the French prime minister and with whom 
even a reluctant American president met twice.
178
  
Marie’s reception in Paris validates Barker’s observation that leaders seek to 
‘engage in mutual legitimation’.
179
 However, while Barker focuses on private 
legitimation between rulers, Marie’s gift was to use her ‘magic symbols of nationalism’ 
to appeal to the elite minority, while simultaneously parading the legitimacy accrued 
through those meetings, in front of a wider audience.
180
 Her first meeting with one of 
the ‘Great Three’ – France’s Prime Minister Clemenceau – was lauded in the French 
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media and featured in several British papers. There was a picture of the meeting in the 
Daily Mail, and The Times referred to the unprecedented full military honours she 
received.
181
 In London her dinner with the acting Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, 
attended by numerous ambassadors and the Churchills, was also considered 
newsworthy.
182
 Given the attention these events attracted, it would be inaccurate to 
evaluate them primarily as private events. A useful comparison is the much less public 
reception which Alexander of Serbia was accorded when he arrived in Paris.
183
 
Although privately admired by the British Foreign Office, the Prince lacked the 
celebrity attention Marie commanded.
184
  
Macmillan concedes Marie made an impression at the Conference but suggests 
that as decision-making took place within the territorial commissions, the Queen’s 
energies were misplaced.
185
 This conclusion underestimates the value of informal 
diplomacy and access in a city where over twenty countries were vying for attention. 
Britain, while contemptuous of Brătianu, was mindful of its poor standing in Romania 
and albeit temporarily, was keen to cement a working relationship with this tricky 
Eastern ally.
186
 Marie, who both felt comfortable among the British establishment and 
had daily meetings with the Romanian delegation in Paris, was a well-placed figurehead 
through which to mediate good intentions.
187
 Aware of her Prime Minister’s 
                                                          
181
 Marie’s French press clippings for 10 Mar 1919 in VI/4/1919, CRRM, RNA (Le 
Journal, Le Matin, L’Homme Libre, Le Petit Journal, L’ Oeuvre, L’Echo de Paris, 
L’Avenir, Excelsior, Les Gaulois, Le Figaro, Le Temps, L’Intransigeant); Daily Mail, 
10 Mar 1919, The Times, 8 Mar 1919. 
182
 The Times, 29 Mar 1919; Daily Telegraph, 29 Mar 1919. 
183
 The Times dedicated three perfunctory lines to Prince Alexander’s arrival in Paris; 
The Times, 3 Feb 1919. 
184
 On her return to Bucharest Marie met with Alexander in Serbia and reassured him 
that ‘she felt no bitterness’ regarding the contested area in the Banat. Rattigan cautioned 
that ‘her opinions have very little weight in political circles’. Rattigan dispatch, 8 May 
1919, FO608/51, TNA. 
185
 MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 143. 
186
 The Bolshevist threat made this need acute, but a recommendation that Balfour 
should flatter Romania recognised Brătianu did not make the prospect easy; Crowe 
observation on FO Notes on Greenly Military Report, 26 Feb 1919, FO608/48, TNA. 
187
 Of the British delegation she wrote, ‘Having myself been born in a “Great Country” 
I could only too well comprehend their mentality.’ Brătianu visited the Queen daily and 
‘went over all our national questions’; Queen Marie in Mandache, Later Chapters of My 
Life, p. 32, 38–9; Marie Diaries, 7 Mar 1919, pp. 109–10, III/116, CRRM, RNA. 
   
271 
 
shortcomings, noting prior to her meeting with Clemenceau that Brătianu was ‘hard’ to 
listen to, she did things ‘in my own way’.
188
  
Marie enjoyed her lunch with the British leaders. Although Lloyd George 
professed to dislike the Queen, he was struck by her intelligence and naughtiness, and a 
more receptive hearing for Brătianu was forthcoming.
189
 Lord Derby was impressed by 
Marie’s political style, referring to her as ‘amusing’ and detailing her supreme 
confidence: 
She never talks of the King at all and always talks of ‘my’ ministers, ‘my’ army 
and ‘my’ country. She now says that they want her to become the Queen of 
Poland. I suggested she might undertake also Czecho-Slovakia and try and get 
Poland, Roumania and CZ as a federated state under her. She took it quite 
seriously and seemed to think it was an excellent idea and was quite confident 
she would make it work.
190
 
That she was in Paris without her King, served to underline Marie’s exceptional 
status,
191
 while her gender safeguarded against her overstatements or ‘conceit’ being 
interpreted as unconstitutional assertions of power. From Britain’s perspective, with a 




At the lunch Marie also talked to Arthur Balfour. Jokes about her prospective 
conversation with President Wilson and whether she should begin it by discussing her 
pink chemise or the League of Nations indicated a familiarity between the Queen and 
the British Foreign Secretary.
193
 Their exchanges suggest a coded acknowledgement 
that they belonged to the old European world of politics and Wilson to a stark new 
democratic era. Underlining that sentiment was the presence of Herbert Hoover, Head 
of the American Food Administration, at the same event who struck Lord Derby ‘as a 
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 Over dinner in London with Lord Curzon and his wife, 
Marie acknowledged that when discussing Romania she made them laugh and cry, 
‘telling little anecdotes in a funny way, I managed to lead the conversation to what I 
wanted to talk about’.
195
  
Challenging Macmillan’s dismissal of the Queen’s political relevance, when 
Marie crossed the Channel to visit George V on 12 March 1919, Leeper was keen to 
discover why she had summoned Brătianu to join her and wanted to know ‘what he is 
up to’.
196
 Marie had managed to clinch a meeting with George V for her unpopular 
Prime Minister which she also mediated.
197
 Her trip to Paris and London affirmed her 
role as a political conduit with the capacity to shape and soften Romania’s image. When 
Brătianu abandoned the Conference three months later and a game of brinkmanship 
ensued, that role took on new significance. Delivering an ultimatum from the Supreme 
Council to Romania in September 1919, Sir George Clerk visited the Queen.
198
 
Although Marie remained unrepentant regarding Romania’s occupation of Hungary, 
Clerk conceded that the Minorities Treaty could feasibly be watered down, and 
concluded that Romania was hospitable, finding ‘real feeling for more intimate relations 
with England’. His responses suggest that she helped mitigate the unease caused by 
Brătianu.
199
 In December 1919 it was the Queen who beseeched the British Ambassador 
for additional time prior to the signing of the Minorities Treaty. She appealed to 
Rattigan ‘as a former compatriot’, playing on her shared British heritage to prevent ‘the 
fatal consequences to Roumania of a refusal to sign’.
200
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Marie was both British (declaring herself ‘proud I am English’ in the press)
201
 
and the first cousin of George V. Those two assets were underlined in the extensive 
coverage of the cousins’ London reunion. The Daily Mail observed that ‘the Belgian 
suite of apartments at Buckingham palace – the rooms used by President and Mrs 
Wilson – will be placed at the disposal of the Queen of Rumania and her daughters’. 
The Daily Telegraph recalled her girlhood in Kent’s Eastwell Park and the English-
made trousseau for her marriage. Both The Times and Daily Telegraph noted the 
presence of George V and his wife, as well as the ‘crimson carpet’, and ‘considerable’ 
crowds at Victoria station, which awaited this popular monarch.
202
 That Romania 
considered the London leg of Marie’s spring 1919 tour as important as the Parisian 
sojourn was evidenced in the delay prior to the confirmation of her appearance at the 
Conference. Romania was waiting to hear from Britain regarding the Queen’s stay at 
Buckingham Palace.
203
 Brătianu believed that Marie’s best work in London ‘was to be 
on excellent terms with the royal family’.
204
  
During her visit, the Queen was clear about where her interests lay – in a closer 
union between Romania and Britain. Written about and photographed on an almost 
daily basis,
205
 Marie elevated Romania’s exposure on the British stage and fulfilled her 
desire to ‘arouse the interest of your people in my people’. The Daily Telegraph decided 
Romania’s new populations in Bessarabia and Transylvania and other ‘even less known 
folks’ could be reassured that ‘the advocacy of their wants and rights could not be better 
represented than by our royal guest’.
206
 Pictured on the front of the Graphic, the journal 
emphasised that she was the eldest child of the ‘late Duke of Edinburgh’. Beneath a 
photograph of Marie nursing the wounded, it read ‘The Queen of Roumania is 
interesting not only for herself but as representing a country which has played a 
conspicuous part in the War ... [S]he is a woman of great ability, a fitting co-ruler of a 
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Her identity as Romania’s British queen, which Marie deliberately promoted and 
the British press focused on, encouraged the idea that Britain would enjoy an influential 
role in post-war Romania. Marie provided what Drummond identifies more generally in 
Balkan discourse, as the ‘linkage between old world capacity and new world 
inadequacy’.
208
 The Queen recognised Britain’s ‘indifference’ towards ‘those Balkan 
countries’, which is certainly the ‘name they gave us when we were not in the room’, 
and used her position to hold to account what Wolff and Todorova identify as self-
serving Balkan or Eastern stereotyping.
209
 ‘You English – I can say so though I too am 
English in a sense – have a way of regarding distant Continental peoples with a sort of 
superior aloofness.’
210
 Marie beseeched readers to ‘see how much your own interests 
are bound up with intelligent appreciation of the position of other peoples whom you 
can help to develop and who are eager for your assistance’.
211
  
The challenge of quantifying the value of royal ceremony, acknowledged by 
Cannadine, was obvious to Marie in spring 1919. ‘The difficulty was to ascertain if any 
of my pleading and interventions had brought about results? Was I making headway? 
What had I obtained?’
212
 In a quest to overcome the latter conundrum, she resorted to 
what Drummond argues was the buttressing of colonial and postcolonial power, that 
demands the construction of geographical zones which invite economic, political and 
territorial domination.
213
 Marie occupied that ‘colonial’ space so familiar in Britain, in 
order to attract aid and attention for her beleaguered nation. Punch ran a front cover 
with Romania personified as a peasant girl begging the Allies not to forget their 
‘starving friends’. On the one hand the image is proof that, counter to standard Balkan 
tropes, Romania could be constructed as a feminine, sympathetic nation, presenting an 
                                                          
207
 Graphic, 15 Mar 1919. 
208
 Andrew Hammond, The Debated Lands: British and American representations of 
the Balkans, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, pp. 12–13. 
209
 Queen Marie, in Mandache (ed.), Later Chapters of My Life, p. 39; Todorova 
describes the Balkans as the ‘culturally despised alter ego’, Todorova, Imagining the 
Balkans, p. 18; Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, pp. 35.  
210




 Cannadine, ‘Divine Right of Kings’, p. 17; Queen Marie in Mandache (ed.), Later 
Chapters of My Life, p. 66. 
213
 Drummond, The Debated Lands, pp. 12–13. 





 On the other, it served to compound Romania’s image as a 
country dependent on Western help, underscoring a frozen idea of a region suffering 
from both ‘economic and cultural backwardness’.
215
 (Arguably the image was a 
caricature of the Queen. Although Marie did not recognise herself in the picture, she 




In a ‘special interview’ with British war correspondent Mary Macleod Moore, 
Marie positioned herself as the ‘tender, unselfish mother’ of a vulnerable country, 
‘whose biggest problem was education’. She extended the metaphor by demanding of 
Britain both ‘English Governesses’ who can do ‘good national work’, and money to 
establish ‘district nurses with motor cars’. The former idea was already being 
considered by the Foreign Office.
217
 Marie’s vision was of a country full of ‘happy, 
healthy people’, in a Romania that was both ‘small’ and appealing.
218
 In line with 
Chazan’s identification of Irredentism being a by-product of international transition,
219
 
Marie’s national construct was also a work in progress, a growing country that was still 
learning and which required external assistance. This depiction found its opposite in 
Brătianu’s aggressive nationalising Romania, against which it acted as a convincing and 
sympathetic counterpoint, with Marie’s Romania proving a far bigger news story in 
spring 1919 than any Conference niggles over Romania’s post-war conduct.  
However, it is inaccurate to identify Marie’s efforts to shape the image of 
Romania solely in terms of backward representations within a traditional binary 
construct that prioritised Western advancement and Eastern dependency. The breadth of 
her appeal lay in what Smith articulates as the importance of ethno-symbolism in the 
‘emotional power and hold of nationalism’.
220
 Queen Marie, as a close relative of the 
British royal family, was a shared national symbol, at once British and Romanian. So 
too, her publicly acknowledged, sacrificial role in the war provided a conduit for both 
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national pride and shared experience.
221
 ‘The average man’ should no longer think of 
‘Roumania as simply one of the troublesome Balkan states’.
222
 With Bolshevism 
recognised as the enemy of monarchy (and Romania’s monarchy specifically)
223
 she 
was well placed to talk up Romania’s vital strategic role in the face of Bela Kun’s 
coup.
224
 ‘We are keeping a fortress for you down there; but we are very far away. Do 
not forget us.’
225
 As ‘Queen of a gallant and unfortunate Allied country’, she had broad 
appeal. ‘It may be that the war stirred all the old soldier’s blood in me and made me feel 
now is the time to play the woman.’
226
 The Queen managed a nod to the contemporary 




As the repository for British royal standards as well as Romanian potential and 
vulnerability, Marie deflected attention away from Brătianu’s aggressive assertion of 
power in Hungary.
228
 In July 1919 with King Ferdinand, she accompanied the army into 
Romania’s contested territory of Transylvania. The London Illustrated News dedicated a 
full-page spread to the Queen’s trip: ‘Royal devoir and Queenly Charities. Roumania’s 
Queen.’ Marie was photographed in a peasant dress; there were welcoming village 
deputations and girls in local costumes playing giant mountain horns.
229
 With ‘her 
Grandmother’s gracious charity’ and the ‘modern manners of British Royals’ Marie was 
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at once British and Romanian, contemporary and old-fashioned, conforming to 
Drummond’s analysis that ‘the intricate flexible discourse of imperial texts spins webs 
of colonising power’.
230
 In this case a British female figurehead served to legitimise 
Romania’s muscular response to Bolshevist Hungary. The publication approved of the 
royal tour, informing readers that the King and Queen ‘visited the principal towns of 
Transylvania where they were welcomed with great enthusiasm’.
231
 This image did not 
match the reality on the ground. Bucur observes that in the newly incorporated 
territories there was a ‘great ambivalence’ towards the royal couple, with Hungarians 
regarding Marie as the ‘partner of the King who took away their status and made them 
second-class citizens’.
232
 The Queen privately acknowledged that the situation in 
Transylvania was complicated and carefully stage-managed the foreign press who 
accompanied the tour,
233
 noting they were ‘delightfully conscious of the honour of 
having travelled ten days in a royal train and eating at a king’s table’.
234
 
Marie’s ability to embody and publicise an idea of Greater Romania was 
important. Lloyd George was remembered for his faux pas regarding Teschen, but 
ignorance about New Europe ran far deeper than the Prime Minister in the spring of 
1919.
235
 For Lord Derby ‘Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-slavs’ were ‘weird people’, the 
renowned Czechoslovakian leader Edvard Beneš had a ‘weird crowd’ and the 
Yugoslavian government were ‘fellows with unpronounceable names’. An ignorance 
surpassed by Sir William Tyrrell’s observation that a British official, Mr Sharp, had 
‘startled’ Romanian politician Take Ionescu by asking him whether ‘Transylvania was a 
man or a woman’.
236
 As the celebrity ‘face’ of Romania, Marie provided an antidote to 
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these hazy interpretations, and her wartime legacy created an emotional link between 
the British and ideas about Romanians.  
In Barker’s analysis of national leaders he suggests the role of the masses in the 
twentieth century has inadvertently belittled the significance of private ceremony 
between individuals. To justify this argument he cites Hroch’s three stages of 
nationalism where it is only during the third stage that the national elite turn to enlist the 
masses. Barker misleadingly holds this up as an illustration of the masses’ ‘relative 
unimportance’.
237
 In Marie’s case, she was the iconic symbol of Greater Romania which 
reached its apogee in Alba Iulia with the carefully stage-managed coronation of 1922, 
but her power as a figurehead was dependent on the perceived approval and adoration of 
her subjects.
238
 That relationship between Marie’s celebrated popularity and elevated 
position was symbiotic, thus negating Barker’s efforts to minimise the focus on mass 
appeal in legitimate leadership while serving to emphasise the importance of the third 
stage in Hroch’s nationalism model. In Paris 1919 the Daily Telegraph wrote of how 
Marie’s ‘reward has come. The soldiers call her “mother” and she had the confidence of 
all the classes.’
239
 This ‘reward’ directly tied her own unimpeachable reputation back to 
that of her people. She mused publicly ‘I do not know why but I have always felt at one 




Barker highlights the importance of the elite fully representing the nation, while 
being distinct from them.
241
 The Queen’s English heritage and her gender gave Marie’s 
commitment to her adopted country (and theirs to her ‘of this I can never be deprived’) 
a newsworthy significance. Having cultivated an international image for being 
exceptional, by association the Romanian people whose ‘love and trust’ Queen Marie 
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claimed to value more highly than all else, became exceptional too.
242
 This idea of a 
sympathetic Romania personified by the simple peasant or soldier also featured in the 
ethno-focused assessments of official Foreign Office correspondence. The Romanian 
peasants were ‘a loyal, honest, industrious and patient race’ and ‘eminently capable of 
evolving a democratic civilisation’.
243
 The implication was that without their pilfering 
politicians, Romania had the racial capacity to be an upstanding country. Beyond 
military reports and Foreign Office files, Marie was the figurehead who articulated that 
hope.  
While long-term wariness of Romania’s capacity for political shenanigans had 
been exacerbated by Brătianu’s wrangling in 1919, the Queen, as a high-profile broker 
between the supercilious West and her ‘people’, offered a valuable counterpoint. The 
popularity and respect accorded to Alexander of Serbia is evidence that a royal head of 
state as a national diplomat was not unusual,
244
 but Queen Marie’s wartime legacy, 
charisma and gender guaranteed her a special place in Paris. Admiral Sir Walter Long 
assured her ‘that propaganda was the most difficult thing to make, that they had all 
spent thousands of pounds upon it, and that I had been the most astonishing 
propagandist he had ever seen’. The British legation in Bucharest concurred; aware of 
the challenges of the Romanian brand, Rattigan conceded that ‘the Queen is an excellent 
ambassador and is much loved’.
245
 Marie’s ability to harness her new found status in 
1919 ensured that the country's unpopular politicking was countered through her 
celebrated royal stature. Justifying her trip to Paris and London, Marie claimed that she 
came ‘to give Romania a face – she needs a face so I have come to give her mine. And 
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this I succeeded in doing.’
246
 This ‘face’ softened and legitimised a Greater Romanian 
identity that included Transylvania and Bessarabia. Marie, fully invested in her adopted 
country and prepared to capitalise on her British heritage accordingly, provided a 
credible bridge across a considerable cultural and political divide. It is the exceptional 
and enduring impact of this queen and her work on Romanian identity in British 
discourse that has yet to be taken seriously by those same historians who claim the 
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Focused on a period of unprecedented engagement between Britain and Romania, this 
thesis has sought to highlight the importance of common national interests for the 
assertion of positive Romanian imagery in British political and public discourse. During 
and immediately after World War I, geopolitical demands briefly prioritised a flattering 
version of the country over the ambiguous, pejorative representations that had 
previously dominated. In order to illuminate Romania’s evolving identity in British 
thinking, this study has brought into productive exchange explorations from a wide 
range of fields. These include Romania’s perceived place within several spatial 
groupings, particularly Balkanism, an examination of ‘experts’ and their agency in 
political and public constructions of Romania, the roles of monarchy and gender in 
diplomacy and national imaging, and the polarised responses to national identification 
in relation to Romania’s Jewish question and the peasant motif. Several prominent 
theories of nationalism have been assessed in relation to this multi-dimensional 
material; these theoretical frameworks have helped explain the contradictions and 
compromises that impacted on competing ideas about Romania, a country which saw its 
identity shift from savage Eastern unknown to membership of a New European category 
within a decade.   
This thesis concludes in 1919, a year that witnessed a clash between British 
expectations and the political realities behind three prominent Romanian nationalisms, 
all of which are informed by the above fields of research and are best articulated 
through an assessment of Rogers Brubaker’s triadic nexus of nationalisms. At the Paris 
Peace Conference the ambitions of Prime Minister Brătianu’s nationalising nation, the 
claims of Romania’s Jewish national minority, and the fulfillment of Romania’s 
homeland nationalism, focused predominantly on the Transylvanian Romanians, were 
competing realities on the international stage. Brubaker identifies three equivalent 
nationalisms in a post-war context, by which time the homeland nationalism belongs to 
defeated Hungary and Bulgaria and is pitted against Greater Romania’s nationalising 
nation in possession of an expanded minority population.
1
 However it is through an 
earlier pre-war identification of all three distinct and evolving nationalisms that this 
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study elucidates Romania’s complex emerging national identity in British discourse and 
helps make sense of the political decision-making in 1919.  
Liberal politician and historian George Trevelyan identified a Romania predominantly 
defined through its Jewish Question, which had become an international issue as early 
as the 1860s.
2
 Rising tensions in Europe and Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe 
intensified nationalistic tendencies in Britain by the turn of the twentieth century and 
saw the prominence of and sympathy for Romania’s Jewish minority give way in favour 
of a focus on the Romanian population in Transylvania and the Old Kingdom’s 
developing external homeland nationalism framed against a chauvinistic Hungary. The 
subsequent wartime identification of an ethnic Romania mobilised in the name of 
‘freedom and justice’ that would fight for its oppressed ethnic brothers in adjacent 
Transylvania, conveniently disguised the nationalising tendencies of the Romanian 
state.
3
 The prominence this narrative was accorded suited Britain’s strategic war needs 
and suppressed the uncomfortable realities behind Romania’s conflicting identities.  
Chapter 1 analysed a Romania which, on the peripheries of British interest and 
without a distinct Balkan identity, confounded regional generalisations and lacked a 
British champion. Chapter 2 acknowledged that changed in 1913, when two influential 
commentators, Dr. Emile Dillon and R. W. Seton-Watson, focused on Romania as an 
emerging power in South East Europe. With Seton-Watson’s version of the country 
predominantly identified through the oppressed Romanian population in Hungary, it 
established Dillon as the Romanian Kingdom’s leading champion in 1913. Previously 
excluded from Britain’s recognised pool of Balkan ‘experts’, the identification of 
Dillon’s influence is a significant addition to a historiography which has consistently 
overlooked the impact of journalism and conservative commentary on Balkan and 
wartime expertise.
4
 The role both Dillon and Seton-Watson played in highlighting 
Romania’s exceptional status, singling it out as a peace broker in the region, does not 
negate Maria Todorova’s general assertion of Balkanism as a pejorative trope that 
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hardened between 1912 and 1918. However, this thesis acknowledges Romania’s 
conflicted place within that rubric.
5
  
The early efforts to shift Romania’s status from an obscure Eastern nation to an 
emerging power in South East Europe were facilitated during World War I. Chapters 3 
and 4 discovered that Romania’s Balkan and Eastern identities, fixated on by Dillon in 
neutrality, and highlighted in a Jewish context by the Conjoint Committee, were 
diminished and overlaid with representations of a Latin Romania fighting for its Roman 
heartland in Transylvania. Romania’s European identity was well served in a conflict 
that saw the term Balkan become less applicable as a political shorthand, when 
countries in the Peninsula fought on opposing sides. Associations with a larger Eastern 
rubric were also lessened by the muted commentary on the Jewish Question during the 
war, while the Russian Revolution strengthened ideas about Romania as an exceptional 
European monarchy.  
Extreme wartime dislocation that saw the country cut off by December 1916, 
exacerbated the influence of a few British ‘experts’ in a conflict which required a 
sympathetic European ally. Although ultimately Britain retained a Saidian ‘upper hand’ 
in political representations, Chapters 2 and 4 highlighted the influence Romanian 
diplomats and politicians had over constructions of their own country. Their role was 
facilitated by common British and Romanian interests in an information-sharing process 
that began with Seton-Watson’s pre-war contact with Transylvanian Romanians and 
was reinforced through the work of Romanian émigrés in wartime London. A lack of 
knowledge about Romania and a British willingness to accept a narrative that suited 
their geopolitical ambitions served to over-emphasise Transylvania’s potential influence 
and exaggerate the prospects for change in post-war Greater Romania.  
Romania’s nationalising tendencies were exonerated through a wartime focus on 
an external homeland narrative directed towards a vaunted Romanian minority in 
British discourse. This ability to dissemble Romanian chauvinism was particularly 
important in 1919 when Britain played a leading role in the reconstruction of Central 
and South East Europe at the Peace Conference. Romania, winning territory from both 
Austria-Hungary (Transylvania, the Banat, Bucovina) and Russia (Bessarabia) and 
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retaining Dobrogea in Bulgaria, was set to gain disproportionately. Chapter 5 outlined 
how Greater Romania became part of a Central European constellation posited as a 
solution to concerns over Russian Bolshevism and a potentially revanchist Germany. 
However, despite deliberate wartime efforts to reframe Romania, Chapter 5 also 
acknowledged a persistent uneasiness among British politicians; significantly the ‘heart’ 
of delegate Harold Nicolson did not ‘sing’ for Greater Romania as it did for the other 
countries in the region. Decades later, historian Kenneth Calder also avoided Romania 
in his seminal analysis of post-1918 New Europe.
6
 Ultimately the strategically 
motivated efforts to identify a European Romania in the 1910s through a sympathetic 
homeland narrative, could not eradicate a stubborn wariness of the country and what it 
stood for. It was in this context that the controversy over the Minorities Treaty and 
Romania’s Jewish Question acquired a fresh relevance.  
Romania’s more pronounced Eastern geography and identity put it at a relative 
disadvantage among the countries in a feted post-war New Europe. During the latter 
half of the war, expert thinking regarding the creation of new states from lands which 
lay predominantly within the Habsburg Empire had gradually been adopted as policy by 
the British government. Boasting ancient ethnic and historic nations, Czechoslovakia 
and much of Poland were carved from the west-facing territory of the former Dual 
Monarchy, with Prague enjoying the distinction of having served as the capital of the 
Holy Roman Empire twice since the fourteenth century. Significantly, New Europe’s 
primary champion, Seton-Watson, left the Conference in May for a month-long visit to 
Czechoslovakia, where he provided British delegates with first-hand information.
7
 
Meanwhile Serbia’s future was promoted as part of Yugoslavia, a new country, half of 
which was made up of former Habsburg territories, including Bosnia, Croatia and 
Slovenia, while Serbia’s valour on the battlefield conveniently disguised the distinct 
Balkan footprint of Yugoslavia’s largest component nation. It is in the context of this 
Central European rubric that Allen Leeper’s efforts to package the reality of a Greater 
Romania around a possible Transylvanian future, need to be understood.  
                                                          
6
 Kenneth, J. Calder, Britain and the Origins of New Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1976. 
7
 Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-
Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary, London, Methuen, 1981, pp. 365–72. 
   
285 
 
In this New Europe, self-determination and democracy were posited as 
fundamental principles to be guaranteed by a League of Nations. However, Romania’s 
reluctance to sign the Minorities Treaty in 1919, the country’s unauthorised military 
incursions into Hungary, and disagreements with Serbia over the Banat were indicative 
of what came next. Irina Livezeanu summed up interwar Greater Romania as ‘the idea 
of unifying all ethnic Romanians and all the contiguous territories where they lived, into 
one state’.
8
 This mission was chiefly propagated and sustained in the 1920s by 
Brătianu’s National Liberal Party. The resultant post-war nationalising Romanian 
nation, home to sizeable national minorities and driven by fear and desire, that fought to 
establish ethnic Romanians in public office and for which anti-Semitism became a 
national rallying cry,
9
 provides the denouement for Brubaker’s post-1918 model of 
reframed nationalisms. Exclusive Greater Romania was a nation that British war aims 
helped create, but the reality of which British delegates in Paris never fully 
acknowledged. 
Britain’s apparent complicity in constructions of this nationalising nation in 
1919 was facilitated by the pre-war problems associated with Romania’s identity in 
British thinking. Chapters 1 and 2 addressed historiography’s inconsistent treatment of 
Romania within a Balkan rubric. Through an extensive interrogation of a wide 
evidential base, it has been demonstrated that before the second Balkan war Romania’s 
perceived inclusion in this spatial grouping invariably did not stand up to scrutiny. Even 
the violent 1907 Peasants’ Revolt, which ostensibly conformed to negative ideas of 
Balkanism, served to pin Romania to a broader East European identity with its anti-
Semitic overtones and compromising depictions of the peasantry. That within five years 
Romania could be hailed as the first among Balkan equals in the wake of the second 
Balkan war is indicative of the superficial basis upon which judgements about this 
region were made. 
While ill-formed paradoxical ideas about Romania compromised its early 
imaging in British discourse, this thesis has suggested that the fluid inchoate nature of 
these constructs served both Romanian and British political ambitions well in World 
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War I. In line with ‘expert’ opinion, British diplomatic representations sought to 
highlight Romania’s redeeming European and peasant qualities in an atmosphere that 
increasingly demanded a moral case for war. To better explain this image-overhaul 
which saw British ideas of Romania shift from uncivilised East European player to feted 
member of a New European rubric, it is instructive to return to Miroslav Hroch’s three-
stage model.  
Chapter 2 argued that Hroch’s efforts to develop methods for the ‘assessment of 
experiences of nation-building’ in the East, which involved the identification of an 
‘exogenous’ ruling class that dominated ethnic groups, helps to explain the appeal in 
British discourse of the well organised Transylvanian Romanians living under the yoke 
of the Magyars.
10
 However, this thesis observed that, although appropriate for other 
Balkan states, Hroch’s model was not applicable to British interpretations of the pre-war 
Romanian Kingdom. The widely reported violent 1907 Peasants’ Revolt delegitimised 
ideas about Romania and highlighted the absence of a ‘mass movement’ stage in the 
country’s formation. The peasants were framed as disenfranchised and predominantly 
illiterate and their oppressors were identified not as ‘exogenous’ rulers but rather 
Romanian landowners or Jews. This perceived Romanian exceptionalism explicates the 
early difficulties inherent in efforts to articulate Romanian identity in British discourse, 
and British experts’ preponderant emphasis on sympathetic Transylvania as the 
country’s potential saviour.  
Chapter 4 argued that it was the iconic appeal of Queen Marie, who established 
herself as an outstanding national champion during Romania’s war, that served as a 
bridge between the final two stages in Hroch’s model which involve a ‘new range of 
activist’ and mass mobilisation. The popularity of Romania’s royal nurse and mother, 
framed as the saviour of her peasant soldiers, was enabled through Germany’s 
occupation of two thirds of Romania in December 1916. Her opposition and strength in 
the face of German ‘frightfulness’ saw Marie celebrated as an effective and sympathetic 
champion of a country that by 1919 was exhibiting rampant chauvinism. Fulfilling 
Hroch’s three-stage criteria, at the end of the war Romania both presented as a more 
easily recognisable national construct in British discourse and was simultaneously better 
placed to push forward its nationalising nationalism agenda. 
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This version of Romania was embraced in the British press in large part due to 
Marie’s outstanding wartime efforts at promoting herself, her adopted country and her 
peasant soldiers. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide a significant contribution to recent ideas 
concerning the gendered nature of nationalism in the context of war. Maria Bucur 
acknowledges Marie’s dominant domestic image but fails to interrogate her 
international impact post-August 1916.
11
 Building on the oeuvre and imagery 
established by her predecessor Queen Elizabeth, Marie was able to refocus wartime 
representations of Romania away from standard masculine tropes through the 
transposition of the soldier-peasant narrative onto a fresh, affectionate, and crucially, 
feminine canvass. 
This thesis has returned to Anthony Smith’s identification of the ethno-symbolic 
aspects of nationalism in order to explain the appeal of Romania’s Latin heritage and 
national idea, essentialised through Marie.
12
 Chapter 3 discussed how the national 
insecurities of wartime Britain played to sympathetic representations of the devout 
sacrificial peasant. Military constructions of Romania were grafted onto that affection 
for the peasant-solider motif and in the wake of military collapse the same imagery was 
reframed under the sympathetic figure of Romania’s leading nurse and queen. In this 
context, Marie’s wartime popularity in Britain, which capitalised on pre-existing 
ruritanian messaging, supports Todorova’s contention that the characterisation of West 
Europe as the area that produced modern principles, and East Europe as the region 




However, the combined impact of both Queens, Marie and Elizabeth, challenges 
Romania’s place in Todorova’s characterisation of Balkan imaging as male and prosaic 
and her dismissive tone regarding Romania’s Hohenzollern dynasty.
14
 Their ephemeral 
writings and feminine personas, which endured across decades, were more 
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representative of qualities that Todorova attributes to the Orient ‘as an exotic and 
imaginary realm’.
15
 In a process started by Queen Elizabeth, who helped establish the 
idea of Romania as an otherworldly ancient realm in British discourse, it was during the 
war under Marie that the country was convincingly included in a European narrative 
through representations of the Latin peasant and his English-born saviour. 
 Marie’s gendered appeal, which played to conventional conceptions of 
femininity, went beyond a reiteration of Romania’s immutable peasant stock and served 
to inspire a literary genre of its own. Chapter 4 analysed the published wartime 
endeavours of several British female writers whose tone avoided the suffrage-style 
militancy of their British Serbian equivalents and affirmed Romania’s identity as a 
sympathetic, albeit vulnerable nation, on a journey to greatness. Perfidious male 
connotations were airbrushed out of this re-versioning of Romania, in a country that had 
always been far harder to positively identify on the basis of its ‘political aspects’.
16
  
In the political sphere, Marie’s presence helped compensate for Romania’s 
untrustworthy reputation. An analysis of British correspondence with and coverage of 
Romania’s Queen during the war and at the Paris Peace Conference leave no doubt as to 
her impact; she was a significant diplomatic force whose ability to garner headlines 
heightened her relevance. With her influence over weak King Ferdinand well known 
and as a sympathetic focal point for diplomats and politicans, Marie’s impact on the 
international stage culminated in 1919. Her prominence in both British public and 
political discourse insists that Roderick Mclean’s assertion of monarchial influence in 
the diplomatic field should be extended beyond 1914 in the case of Romania, a country 




With Romania’s image cast through the prism of their English-born queen, the 
imperative to challenge the country’s belligerent nationalism in 1919 was reduced in 
British representations. This ability to reframe her own country demands a slight 
reappraisal of the presumptions behind the binary power dynamic in Western 
representations of the East. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, it was Marie’s German 
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predecessor, Queen Elizabeth, who initiated the keen international association between 
Romania and sympathetic female royal figureheads. Both women were European 
imports but their capacity to facilitate an essentialised version of their adopted country 
helped legitimise their own identity as Romanian Queens beyond that superficial 
‘invented’ facade recognised by Hobsbawm. Chapters 4 and 5 discovered a Marie who 
belonged to Romania, yet for the benefit of her British audience capitalised on her 
reputation as an outsider, encouraging the reader to see Romania as she saw it, 
coquettishly playing to the familiar expectations and presumptions of British diplomats 
and royalty, and exercising an imperial concern for her ‘small country’. In Britain she 
was familiar yet foreign, belonged to Eastern Europe but appeared exotic, and perhaps 
most importantly, she was an exceptional royal success story in which Britain could 
share. 
The hybrid role Marie occupied challenges the Saidian premise of exteriority as 
a presumed aspect of Western representations, which most British ‘experts’ in this study 
otherwise conform to.
18
 Chapters 2, 4 and 5 have demonstrated that in the early 
twentieth century Romanian identity was predominantly shaped by politically 
influential men whose own appraisals of Romanian nationhood were both partial and 
conditional. Seton-Watson’s overriding concern was the establishment of a viable post-
war Europe based on the principles of self-determination in the wake of the demise of 
the Habsburg Empire. Early contact with influential Romanian Transylvanians impacted 
on his perceptions of a possible future Greater Romania within this larger New 
European construct, a vision facilitated by his embedded anti-Semitism which served to 
negate concerns over Romania’s long standing Jewish Question. It was the growing 
influence of Seton-Waton and a coterie of like-minded thinkers in wartime Britain, and 
the promotion of their ‘small nations’ agenda through public and political channels, that 
saw Romania’s image distorted to fit a political vision in Britain which prioritised the 
creation of a New Europe as a means of achieving lasting peace on the continent.  
If Seton-Watson was retrospectively feted as a great friend of Romania (and 
honoured accordingly), and had, by 1934, written the definitive history of Romania for 
an English-speaking audience,
19
 other ‘experts’ engaged with the country on a more 
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transitory basis. New Europe acolyte and Romanian ‘expert’, Leeper, did not visit the 
country until 1919, and with the majority of the legwork completed at the Conference 
he was looking to shed his commitment to the Anglo-Romanian Society the following 
year. However, it was journalist Dillon’s indignant outbursts during Romania’s 
neutrality that best exemplify the potential for inconsistency in external opinion-
making. Dillon quickly adapted and contradicted his previous arguments in support of 
Romania, in an effort to align the country with his British-centric conservative world 
view which was subject to the demands of international alliances, and ultimately, war.  
In contrast Marie, a leading champion of Romania in Britain from 1916, always 
put the interests of her adopted nation first. That she formulated representations of her 
country which would appeal to British ideas of Eastern backwardness, and was most 
effective when British and Romanian strategic needs coincided, affirms that she was 
operating within a conceptual structure ultimately dictated by a Western power. 
However, as both an external representative for her country and an internal one, Marie 
was a figurehead whose representations of Romania complicate interpretations of a 
paradigm where exteriority and power are presumed to travel from West to East. 
Marie’s prominence in British discourse between 1916 and 1919 had 
ramifications for Romania’s interwar image. Her literary appeal endured, further 
complicating Vesna Goldsworthy’s thesis that the West appropriated and ‘exploited the 
resources of the Balkans to supply its literary and entertainment industries’ in what she 
terms as ‘imaginative colonisation’.
20
 Marie controlled the images of herself and her 
country that she sold to the West, albeit within established Ruritanian and royal tropes. 
In 1925 she published a second book about Romania and by the early 1930s there were 
three volumes of the Queen’s memoirs.
21
 In 2018 104-year-old retired art publisher Ann 
Baer, the daughter of the publisher Frank Sidgwick of Sidgwick & Jackson, 
remembered a Christmas present she received in 1920 aged 6. ‘I was given a copy of 
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Queen Marie’s Peeping Pansy. The book fascinated me. The illustrations were magical. 
There was a roof planted with irises and little door in a tree.’ Ann knew the Queen was 
‘related to the English royal family and also that she was Romanian’, and that Peeping 
Pansy had been reviewed in her father’s trade magazine The Bookman.
22
 This vivid 
recall is evidence not only of Marie’s literary reputation, but also the enduring 
association between the Queen, her fantasy oeuvre and Romania.  
In the early 1920s a lavish coronation and the conversion of 10 May into a 
Heroes Day and national holiday emphasised the monarchy’s central role in Greater 
Romania.
23
 Internationally Marie’s work and profile also dominated Romanian identity, 
offsetting less flattering ideas of a country that The Times like to remind readers 
included Bessarabia, a region both ‘remote’ and ‘untutored’.
24
 Confronted with an ill 
King Ferdinand, in late 1926 the Sunday Times wrote ‘the throne means almost as much 
to Rumania as it does to the British Commonwealth’.
25
 A royal visit to Britain by 
Romania’s King and Queen in 1924 and Marie’s well publicised tour of America in 
1926 reaffirmed the international appeal of Romania’s royalty after World War I. The 
belief that in Greater Romania the ‘throne is the axis around which the unity of the 
country revolves’, belied a British perception of Romania established by Marie in the 
war, where the monarchy had become shorthand for the country itself. Like much of 
Europe, interwar British politics were introspective; disengagement was the hallmark of 
relations in the Balkans. However a British survey of newspaper reading habits 
confirmed that the popularity of royal stories endured.
26
 This contextualises the Sunday 
Times’s earlier commentary. Marie, and by association Ferdinand, identified as familiar 
constitutional monarchs, guaranteed Romania a sympathetic place in British discourse 
until the King’s death in 1927.  
Marie’s success as her country’s leading national indicator in Britain would 
exacerbate her ‘wayward’ son’s failure. Although by 1938 constitutional monarchy had 
                                                          
22
 Ann Baer, i/v recorded 25 July 2018 in Richmond, London; Marie, Queen of 
Romania, Peeping Pansy, Illustrated by Mabel Lucie Attwell, London, Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1919. 
23
 Maria Bucur, Heroes and Victims: Remembering war in twentieth century Romania, 
Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2009, pp. 102, 103, 110–12. 
24
 Cited in Henry Baerlein, Bessarabia and Beyond, S.I., Methuen, 1935, p. 117. 
25
 Sunday Times, 12 Dec 1926. 
26
 Survey cited in Eugene Michail, The British and the Balkans: Forming images of 
foreign lands, 1900–1950, London; New York, Continuum, 2011, p. 19. 
   
292 
 
survived in Romania for nearly 60 years – a unique achievement in the Balkans – during 
the 1930s Carol II gained notoriety as ‘Europe’s most corrupt crowned head’
27
 and 
exposed the flaws in a monarchical system which depended on a responsible custodian. 
Tom Gallagher cites ‘an inglorious tradition of the leaders of the Western powers 
deciding the fate of small Balkan states on the basis of stereotypical views about a 
country and its leaders’. He suggests Carol’s widely reported lifestyle may have 
encouraged British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to abandon Romania ‘to the 
tender mercies of the Soviet Union during the Second World War’.
28
 With Carol’s 
efforts at totalitarian rule challenged by an internal fascist movement, it is unlikely 
Churchill would have found much to redeem Romania had he looked beyond the King 
but nonetheless the monarch’s prominence underlines a binary association between 
Romania and its royal image that was firmly established during World War I.  
Twenty years earlier when affectionate ideas of Romania were centred around a 
‘European Royal’ like Queen Marie, generalising about a nation on the ‘basis of 
stereotypical views’ did not appear as quite such an ‘inglorious tradition’. The 
subsequent diminution of Marie’s royal role and Carol’s assumption of the throne in the 
1930s exposed the flimsiness of Romanian constructs in British discourse, dependent on 
both a political imperative and a sympathetic figurehead. Carol II, as the first monarch 
born in Romania and with an undisguised contempt for parliamentary rule, was easier to 
identify as an ‘oriental despot’ and Romania, increasingly drawn into Nazi Germany’s 
economic orbit, was denigrated accordingly.  
This thesis has been written one hundred years after the events described here. 
Much has changed. It is thirty years since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the country’s re-engagement with the West. Romania no longer has a ruling royal 
family to act as a bridge between the two countries sitting on opposite sides of Europe 
but former ties were commemorated when the Romanian government decided to fund 
and erect a statue of Queen Marie in Kent, the English county of her birth, to celebrate 
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the centenary of Greater Romania in December 2018.
29
 Her inanimate appearance in 
Britain a hundred years after World War I is an apt reminder of a representational 
relationship that was ultimately facilitated and controlled by Britain, but in which the 
central player was a woman who belonged to Romania.  
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